{ "id": 1597094, "name": "Gloria GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMITY LEATHER PRODUCTS COMPANY, Self-Insured, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Products Co.", "decision_date": "1988-01-26", "docket_number": "No. 9869", "first_page": "26", "last_page": "31", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "107 N.M. 26" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "751 P.2d 710" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 N.M. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2873551 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580200 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711274 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584592 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588600 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2735597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the \"arising out of\" requirement was met, where fire fighter's preexisting condition of arterioscierosis was aggravated by on-the-job stress causing a heart attack" }, { "parenthetical": "the \"arising out of\" requirement was met, where fire fighter's preexisting condition of arterioscierosis was aggravated by on-the-job stress causing a heart attack" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599044 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584587 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577266 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804399 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582444 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588577 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5372986 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the required proof is not present if the medical testimony only establishes that one of several factors could have caused the disability" }, { "parenthetical": "the required proof is not present if the medical testimony only establishes that one of several factors could have caused the disability" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 706998 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711384 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577371 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594980 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580019 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580056 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571184 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Sutin, J., specially concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "Sutin, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2741406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2806030 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 S.W.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9969886 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/735/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599029 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2850555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8502088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0321-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 783, "char_count": 14353, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.151646980271638e-08, "percentile": 0.4286054901270306 }, "sha256": "c6a768822a90840cc687b8c5f4e827395bfc38505c02e8d7f950f3fcb0cbf95f", "simhash": "1:1c772d2fd04737fb", "word_count": 2255 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:54.316311+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MINZNER and FRUMAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Gloria GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMITY LEATHER PRODUCTS COMPANY, Self-Insured, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, Chief Judge.\nEmployer, Amity Leather Products Co. (Amity), appeals from a judgment awarding worker\u2019s compensation benefits to the claimant, Gutierrez. The award included total temporary disability benefits, future medical benefits, vocational rehabilitation benefits, travel expenses, and attorney fees and costs. The dispositive issues on appeal are: (1) whether psychogenic pain disorder is a compensable injury under the New Mexico Worker\u2019s Compensation Act (Act), see NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-1 (as it read prior to amendment by 1987 N.M.Laws ch. 235, \u00a7 1, effective June 19, 1987); (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Gutierrez\u2019 psychogenic pain disorder was a direct and natural result of the accident occurring at Amity on July 26, 1984; (3) whether the trial court erred in not granting Amity\u2019s motion for a continuance; and (4) whether Gutierrez presented sufficient evidence on which to base an award of vocational rehabilitation benefits. We discuss the first two issues together. We affirm the trial court.\nGutierrez was employed by Amity on July 26, 1984 when she suffered an on-the-job injury to her right shoulder. Thereafter, Gutierrez saw several physicians and underwent surgery. When Gutierrez continued to experience a chronic pain in her shoulder, she was referred to Dr. Dempsey, a psychiatrist. Dempsey diagnosed Gutierrez as suffering from psychogenic pain disorder and stated that \u201c[t]he essential features of this group of disorders are physical symptoms suggesting physical disorder for which there are no demonstrable organic findings or known physiological mechanisms and for which there is positive evidence, or a strong presumption, that the symptoms are linked to psychological factors or conflicts.\u201d\nThe trial court found that Gutierrez was disabled due to her physical injuries, as well as psychogenic pain disorder. Amity has not challenged the trial court\u2019s findings concerning the physical injury to her shoulder and it is undisputed that the shoulder injury was causally connected to the accident.\nI. COMPENSABILITY OF PSYCHOGENIC PAIN DISORDER.\nA. Recognition of the Cause of Action.\nAmity asserts that psychogenic pain disorder is not a compensable injury under the Act because the medical cause for the condition is not known and because it did not arise out of Gutierrez\u2019 employment at Amity. We discuss each of these arguments separately.\nNew Mexico courts have recognized that in cases involving physical injuries sustained during the course and scope of a worker\u2019s employment, resulting psychological disabilities are also compensable. Ross v. Sayers Well Serv. Co., 76 N.M. 321, 414 P.2d 679 (1966); Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 131, 371 P.2d 605 (1962); Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct.App.1986). Thus, psychogenic pain disorder, insofar as it is a psychological disability, is compensable so long as it was proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Amity. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-9 (Repl.Pamp.1987); Wade v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 735 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn.1987) (psychogenic pain disorder qualifies as a compensable mental illness when causally connected to a work-related accident).\nB. Causal Connection.\nAmity claims that Gutierrez failed to meet her burden of establishing the medical and scientific cause of psychogenic pain disorder. Amity relies on the testimony of Dr. Dempsey, a board-certified psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine in this state. No challenge has been made to the competency of Dr. Dempsey to render an expert medical opinion. Dr. Dempsey testified to the effect that he could not \u201cscientifically\u201d explain the cause of psychogenic pain disorder. Amity confuses scientifically proven knowledge with the required proof. By statute, Gutierrez was required to establish the causal connection between the disability and the accident as a reasonable medical probability by expert testimony; she was not required to present proof of the scientific basis for psychogenic pain disorder. See Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 77 N.M. 408, 423 P.2d 603 (1967); Gallegos v. Kennedy, 79 N.M. 590, 446 P.2d 642 (1968); Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431 (Ct.App. 1978) (Sutin, J., specially concurring).\nOn appeal, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court\u2019s decision, and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See Clovis Nat\u2019l Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984); Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct.App.1985). The issue is not whether there is evidence to support an alternative result, but, rather, whether the trial court\u2019s result is supported by substantial evidence. Bagwell v. Shady Grove Truck Stop, 104 N.M. 14, 715 P.2d 462 (Ct.App.1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231 (Ct.App.1980). Although contrary evidence is presented which may support a different verdict, this court does not reweigh the evidence. See State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 712 P.2d 13 (Ct.App.1985).\nUpon review of the evidence, we find support for the trial court\u2019s finding that the condition diagnosed by Dr. Dempsey was within a reasonable medical probability a natural and direct result of the accident at Amity. Dr. Dempsey testified that based on medical probability, the psychogenic pain disorder is secondary to, and was caused by Gutierrez\u2019 shoulder injury of July, 1984. Moreover, from a clinical perspective, he found a temporal relationship between the accident and the injury, and that the accident played a role in Gutierrez\u2019 psychogenic pain disorder. While there are conflicts in Dr. Dempsey\u2019s testimony, it is for the trier of fact, not a reviewing court, to reconcile the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the witnesses. Lopez v. Smith\u2019s Mgmt. Corp., 106 N.M. 416, 744 P.2d 544 (Ct.App.1986). This rule is equally applicable to conflicts within the testimony of a single witness. Id. Dr. Dempsey\u2019s testimony is sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. Compare Renfro v. San Juan Hosp. Inc., 75 N.M. 235, 403 P.2d 681 (1965) (the required proof is not present if the medical testimony only establishes that one of several factors could have caused the disability) with Crane v. San Juan County, 100 N.M. 600, 673 P.2d 1333 (Ct.App.1983) (clear import of medical testimony negated two equally probable causes and was buttressed by an incident at work immediately prior to the accident). Thus, Amity\u2019s argument that psychogenic pain disorder is not a compensable injury under the Act must fail.\nC. Arising out of.\nIn addition to showing that the psychological injury is proximately caused by the accident, a disability is compensable only if it results from an accidental injury \u201carising out of\u201d and occurring \u201cin the course of\u201d the worker\u2019s employment. \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-9 and -28(A). These are two distinct requirements: the \u201carising out of\u201d relates to cause, whereas \u201cin the course of\u201d refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381 (Ct.App.1982). For an injury to \u201carise out of\u201d the employment, there must be a showing that the injury was caused by a risk to which the plaintiff is subjected by reason of his employment. Velkovitz v. Penasco Indep. School Dist., 96 N.M. 577, 633 P.2d 685 (1981). The employment must contribute something to the hazard of the injury. Williams v. City of Gallup, 77 N.M. 286, 421 P.2d 804 (1966).\nThe \u201carising out of\u201d requirement, however, excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause; the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and must not be independent of the relation of master and servant. After the event it must appear that the accidental injury had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and flowed from that risk as a rational consequence. Adamchek v. Gemm Enter., Inc., 96 N.M. 24, 627 P.2d 866 (1981); McDaniel v. City of Albuquerque, 99 N.M. 54, 653 P.2d 885 (Ct.App.1982).\nAmity argues that Gutierrez\u2019 psychogenic pain disorder does not \u201carise out of\u201d her employment because it is related to the receipt of compensation benefits and is not a risk of employment, and because Gutierrez was equally exposed to the risk of\ndeveloping psychogenic pain disorder apart from her employment. We disagree. In Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., this court concluded that a \u201cpsychological injury resulting from a sudden or gradual emotional stimulus \u2018arises out of employment when it is causally related to the performance of job duties.\u201d 105 N.M. at 174, 730 P.2d at 477. In this case, there was evidence that the pain disorder was caused by the shoulder injury, which occurred at work. Under these circumstances, the \u201carising out of\u201d issue depends on an application of substantial evidence rules. See Beyale v. Arizona Public Serv. Co., 105 N.M. 112, 729 P.2d 1366 (Ct.App.1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court\u2019s judgment, we conclude that the pain disorder arose out of claimant\u2019s employment within the meaning of the Act. See Oliver v. City of Albuquerque, 106 N.M. 350, 742 P.2d 1055 (1987) (the \u201carising out of\u201d requirement was met, where fire fighter\u2019s preexisting condition of arterioscierosis was aggravated by on-the-job stress causing a heart attack); see generally IB Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a7 42.24(b) (1987) (concerning compensation neurosis, where the line of causation from the original injury to the anxiety over the compensation and the accompanying neurosis is unbroken).\nMoreover, Gutierrez\u2019 alleged predisposition to psychogenic pain disorder does not preclude recovery. See Shannon v. Sandia Corp., 79 N.M. 634, 447 P.2d 514 (1968); Pena v. New Mexico Highway Dep\u2019t, 100 N.M. 408, 671 P.2d 656 (Ct.App. 1983). Finally, it is not necessary that the accident be the sole cause of the psychological disability, so long as the disability is shown to have naturally and directly resulted from the accident. See Lopez v. Smith\u2019s Mgmt. Corp.; cf. Renfro v. San Juan Hosp., Inc.\nBased on the above, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Gutierrez\u2019 psychogenic pain disorder was the natural and direct result of the work-related accident and subsequent injury to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Thus, the award of worker\u2019s compensation benefits was proper.\nII. DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE.\nAmity also asserts that because the deposition testimony of Dr. Dempsey differed significantly from his trial testimony, the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance to allow Amity to find expert testimony to rebut the trial testimony. Denial of a motion for a continuance is discretionary, and absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court will not be reversed. See Albuquerque Nat\u2019s Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982). We do not agree that there was a significant difference between the deposition and the doctor\u2019s trial testimony. Much of Dr. Dempsey\u2019s testimony appears to clarify and expand upon his deposition testimony at trial. Moreover, Amity was aware of the inconsistencies contained in the deposition of Dr. Dempsey. We find no abuse of discretion.\nIII. AWARD OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION BENEFITS.\nFinally, Amity argues that Gutierrez failed to present evidence that she required vocational rehabilitation benefits consisting of a general business curriculum. Amity does not dispute that Gutierrez is unable to return to her former employment; indeed, Amity argues that Gutierrez failed to establish a need for an office occupation education.\nUnder the Act, Gutierrez was entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services as were necessary to return her to suitable employment. While this section is mandatory in nature, Gutierrez had the burden of presenting sufficient evidence so as to establish a need for rehabilitation benefits. See Lopez v. Smith\u2019s Mgmt. Corp.; Nichols v. Teledyne Economic Dev. Co., 103 N.M. 393, 707 P.2d 1203 (Ct.App.1985).\nThe trial court found:\n8. Gutierrez is unable to return to her former employment as an assembly line worker due to her physical injuries and psychogenic pain disorder.\n10. Each of Gutierrez\u2019 prior jobs involved frequent bending, lifting and carrying of items in excess of twenty pounds on a regular basis.\n12. Gutierrez, as a result of this accident, is wholly unable to perform any work for which she is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience.\n15. Gutierrez is presently undergoing a course of vocational rehabilitation under the supervision and direction of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation for the State of New Mexico which requires her attending general business occupation courses at the Technical Vocation Institute in Albuquerque____\n16. Gutierrez is entitled to vocational rehabilitation services within the meaning of the New Mexico Worker\u2019s Compensation Act.\n17. It is anticipated that Gutierrez\u2019 disability should not last more than one year from the date of trial.\nThese findings have not been challenged on appeal and are therefore binding on this court. See Blumenthal v. Concrete Constructors Co. of Albuquerque, Inc., 102 N.M. 125, 692 P.2d 50 (Ct.App.1984). These findings are supported by substantial evidence and support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Gutierrez is entitled to receive vocational rehabilitation benefits in accordance with the Act.\nIV. CONCLUSION.\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Gutierrez is awarded attorneys fees on appeal in the amount of $2,500. We deem oral argument unnecessary. Garcia v. Genuine Parts Co., 90 N.M. 124, 560 P.2d 545 (Ct.App.1977).\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nMINZNER and FRUMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "DONNELLY, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David Archuleta, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Earl R. Norris, Oldaker, Oldaker & Norris, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "751 P.2d 710\nGloria GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMITY LEATHER PRODUCTS COMPANY, Self-Insured, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. 9869.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 26, 1988.\nDavid Archuleta, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee.\nEarl R. Norris, Oldaker, Oldaker & Norris, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0026-01", "first_page_order": 68, "last_page_order": 73 }