{ "id": 1597034, "name": "Olga JAYNES, Claimant-Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORE NO. 824 and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824", "decision_date": "1988-08-30", "docket_number": "No. 10761", "first_page": "648", "last_page": "650", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "107 N.M. 648" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "763 P.2d 82" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 N.M. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594980 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586349 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580019 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573116 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568769 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2869856 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0282-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 408, "char_count": 6615, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.28805424563362575 }, "sha256": "b452f6da1328627879ccb8bd5b55cea7d55b9899297d8721e73fdda3e97d9d7a", "simhash": "1:152549a76d9037e4", "word_count": 1037 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:54.316311+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BIVINS and APODACA, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Olga JAYNES, Claimant-Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORE NO. 824 and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nALARID, Judge.\nClaimant appeals the denial of her claim for benefits by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Division. Our calendar notice proposed summary affirmance of the hearing officer\u2019s decision. Claimant has filed a memorandum in opposition. The memorandum was filed one day late. We caution claimant\u2019s counsel that a party has a maximum of thirteen days within which to file a memorandum responding to a calendar notice. See SCRA 1986, 12-210(E)(3); SCRA 1986, 12-308(B). Being unpersuaded by claimant\u2019s memorandum, we affirm the hearing officer.\nFACTS\nClaimant was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with respondent Wal-Mart Store No. 824 (Wal-Mart) on May 23, 1986. In her employment application to Wal-Mart, claimant denied any history of back injury. In fact, she had suffered a back injury in a previous job resulting in a three percent physical impairment rating. Respondents\u2019 expert medical witness testified in his trial deposition that claimant was at an increased risk of injury becaus\u00e9 of her prior undisclosed injury. Based upon claimant\u2019s misrepresentation in her employment application, the hearing officer denied her claim for compensation benefits.\nDISCUSSION\nTo bar recovery of workers\u2019 compensation benefits on the ground of a falsified employment application, three essential factors must be present: (1) the employee must have knowingly and wilfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; (2) the employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and (3) there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Martinez v. Driver Mechenbier, Inc., 90 N.M. 282, 562 P.2d 843 (Ct.App.1977); see also 1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 47.53 (1986).\nClaimant does not challenge the hearing officer\u2019s findings that the first two factors were present in this case. Rather, she argues that there was not substantial evidence to support the hearing officer\u2019s determination of a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Our calendar notice proposed to find substantial evidence in support of the hearing officer\u2019s finding in the form of claimant\u2019s physical impairment rating and respondent\u2019s expert testimony that claimant was at an increased risk due to the prior injury.\nClaimant relies on Chavez v. Lectrosonics, Inc., 93 N.M. 495, 601 P.2d 728 (Ct. App.1979) (per Sutin, J.). In Chavez, Judge Sutin wrote that the employer establishes a causal connection between the false representation and the injury:\n(1) where an employer proves a previous permanent disability, and (2) that by medical testimony the risk of injury in his employment has increased * * *. On the other hand, if a workman has proven that (1) his physical condition and disability is such that he was able to perform the same duties in prior employment without any physical difficulty, (2) before he made application for employment, and (3)he was able to perform the duties of his employment, no causal connection exists between the false representation and the injury.\nId., 93 N.M. at 498, 601 P.2d at 731.\nOur calendar notice pointed out that Judge Sutin\u2019s opinion was not an opinion of this court. See Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (Ct.App.1980); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 34-5-11 (Repl.Pamp.1981). Nevertheless, claimant urges the court to adopt Judge Sutin\u2019s reasoning. We are not inclined to do so.\nThe dilemma posed by Judge Sutin\u2019s opinion is illustrated by the present case. Clearly, under Judge Sutin\u2019s test, respondents produced substantial evidence establishing a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. See Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct.App.1985). On the other hand, claimant vigorously argues that she established that her present injury was not a result of the false representation. Claimant contends that she was able to perform similar duties in prior employment without physical difficulty as well as perform the duties of her employment with Wal-Mart. Rather, claimant asserts that her injury was causally related to a previous auto accident and not to any prior work-related injury. Thus, we have a standoff if we apply Judge Sutin\u2019s reasoning.\nClaimant states that our rejection of the Chavez rationale denies her the opportunity to prove that the previous work injury was not causally related to the subsequent work injury. This, claimant argues, goes against the well-established rule that we will liberally construe the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in favor of the worker. See Brooks v. Hobbs Mun. Schools, 101 N.M. 707, 688 P.2d 25 (Ct.App.1984). We disagree. Claimants are free to present evidence, as claimant did in the instant case, refuting the employer\u2019s evidence of causal connection. It is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, reconcile inconsistent statements of the witnesses, and determine where the truth lies. Sanchez v. Home-stake Mining Co. Here, the hearing officer determined, on the basis of substantial evidence, that there was a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. The question on appeal is not whether there is evidence to support an alternative result but, rather, whether the fact finder\u2019s result is supported by substantial evidence. See Bagwell v. Shady Grove Truck Stop, 104 N.M. 14, 715 P.2d 462 (Ct.App.1986). Our holding is also consistent with the spirit of the Act because the burden of proving a causal connection remains with the employer.\nFinally, claimant maintains that respondents did not present substantial evidence of a causal connection because their physician did not examine claimant until one year after the injury. We point out that the physician\u2019s credibility and the weight of his testimony were matters for the hearing officer. See Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co. We also note that our result would be the same under a \u201cwhole record\u201d standard of review.\nThe order of the hearing officer denying claimant compensation benefits is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBIVINS and APODACA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ALARID, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Narciso Garcia, Jr., Toulouse, Toulouse & Garcia, Albuquerque, for claimant-appellant.", "Robert A. Martin, Bradley & McCulloch, P.A., Albuquerque, for respondents-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "763 P.2d 82\nOlga JAYNES, Claimant-Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORE NO. 824 and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Respondents-Appellees.\nNo. 10761.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nAug. 30, 1988.\nNarciso Garcia, Jr., Toulouse, Toulouse & Garcia, Albuquerque, for claimant-appellant.\nRobert A. Martin, Bradley & McCulloch, P.A., Albuquerque, for respondents-appellees." }, "file_name": "0648-01", "first_page_order": 690, "last_page_order": 692 }