{ "id": 1597113, "name": "Harry MENDOZA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The GALLUP INDEPENDENT CO., John K. Zollinger, Robert C. Zollinger, Donald W. Green a/k/a \"Veritas\", and Reed Eckhardt, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Mendoza v. Gallup Independent Co.", "decision_date": "1988-08-16", "docket_number": "No. 10501", "first_page": "721", "last_page": "727", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "107 N.M. 721" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "764 P.2d 492" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "398 U.S. 6", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169038 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in context of dispute over zoning variances, use of term \"blackmail\" to describe plaintiffs negotiation position was \"rhetorical hyperbole\" and could not reasonably be understood to impute crime of blackmail" }, { "parenthetical": "in context of dispute over zoning variances, use of term \"blackmail\" to describe plaintiffs negotiation position was \"rhetorical hyperbole\" and could not reasonably be understood to impute crime of blackmail" }, { "parenthetical": "in context of dispute over zoning variances, use of term \"blackmail\" to describe plaintiffs negotiation position was \"rhetorical hyperbole\" and could not reasonably be understood to impute crime of blackmail" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172714 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in context of labor dispute, use of term \"scab,\" accompanied by highly derogatory definition, held to be \"rhetorical hyperbole,\" protected by First Amendment" }, { "parenthetical": "in context of labor dispute, use of term \"scab,\" accompanied by highly derogatory definition, held to be \"rhetorical hyperbole,\" protected by First Amendment" }, { "parenthetical": "in context of labor dispute, use of term \"scab,\" accompanied by highly derogatory definition, held to be \"rhetorical hyperbole,\" protected by First Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13322 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 F.2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1361752 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/639/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555170 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 F.Supp. 463", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5720490 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/657/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 L.Ed.2d 1367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 S.Ct. 3112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 1132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6270145, 6270786, 6271075, 6270467, 6271972, 6269832, 6271374, 6269584, 6271700, 6269271, 6272287 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/1132-04", "/us/462/1132-06", "/us/462/1132-07", "/us/462/1132-05", "/us/462/1132-10", "/us/462/1132-03", "/us/462/1132-08", "/us/462/1132-02", "/us/462/1132-09", "/us/462/1132-01", "/us/462/1132-11" ] }, { "cite": "695 F.2d 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1492059 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/695/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 F.Supp. 1299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3529460 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/555/1299-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 F.Supp. 481", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4146360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/489/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 L.Ed.2d 278", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 S.Ct. 2662", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 1127", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6396578, 6396796, 6396108, 6395933, 6396915, 6396342, 6397079, 6396246, 6396666, 6396028, 6396445, 6397271 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/1127-07", "/us/471/1127-09", "/us/471/1127-03", "/us/471/1127-01", "/us/471/1127-10", "/us/471/1127-05", "/us/471/1127-11", "/us/471/1127-04", "/us/471/1127-08", "/us/471/1127-02", "/us/471/1127-06", "/us/471/1127-12" ] }, { "cite": "750 F.2d 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 628946, 3805683 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/750/0970-01", "/us-app-dc/242/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "En banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "898 Mass. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "En banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 P.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Cal.Rptr. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582487 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582545 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "3006-07", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708097 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" }, { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 975, "char_count": 17345, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.7792437434860365e-08, "percentile": 0.360812155457712 }, "sha256": "c20201892bd39c7c343e0ed9bd628cacad9c84cf224b3004be8e63d022239663", "simhash": "1:bd6397a44796aa3e", "word_count": 2754 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:54.316311+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BIVINS and APODACA, JJ\u201e concur." ], "parties": [ "Harry MENDOZA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The GALLUP INDEPENDENT CO., John K. Zollinger, Robert C. Zollinger, Donald W. Green a/k/a \u201cVeritas\u201d, and Reed Eckhardt, Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\nDefendants appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of their motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. We granted defendants\u2019 application for interlocutory appeal, which raised the following two issues: (1) whether the statement at issue constitutes opinion, as a matter of law and, accordingly, whether the trial court erred in denying defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion; and (2) whether defendants made a prima facie showing that the statement, regardless of its nature, was made absent actual malice. We deem issue one to be dispositive and, accordingly, will not address the remaining issue. We reverse.\nThis action arose out of the publication of a column entitled \u201cThe Week\u2019s Wash\u201d appearing in the opinion-editorial section of \u201cThe Gallup Independent\u201d on April 18, 1987. See attached Appendix A. Plaintiff, Harry Mendoza (Mendoza), a Gallup city councilman, sued defendants for libel. The column describes a Gallup \u201ctourism promotion\u201d office outside of City Hall. Several tourists approach the \u201ctourism counsel- or\u201d for information. The counselor\u2019s office is made of packing crates, much like the famed character Lucy\u2019s psychiatrist office in Charles Shultz\u2019 \u201cPeanuts\u201d cartoon. The defamatory statements arise from the following exchange between the \u201ctourism counselor\u201d and \u201ctwo tall, swarthy suit-and-tie types\u201d:\n\u201cI'm agent Frammis and this is agent Stanfran,\u201d one said, flashing open a dark wallet with gold leaf and fine black printing inside. \u201cWe\u2019re here to investigate your City Council.\u201d\n\u201cR-r-right in there,\u201d WW [Week\u2019s Wash] stammered. \u201cBut it\u2019s not in session just now. C-can I direct you to any particular member?\u201d\n\u201cWe have received a report,\u201d said the other one, \u201cthat the council has been taken over by the Mexican Mafia. What can you tell us about that?\u201d\nThis was scarey. Word sure travels fast.\n\u201cWell, um, er, the new council hasn\u2019t met yet. But the new mayor is known for shooting first and asking questions later.\u201d\nThey patted the bulges under their coats.\n\u201cB-but he doesn\u2019t take office until May 5,\u201d WW hurried on. \u201cHe\u2019s already taken one straw vote on replacing the city manager, however.\u201d\n\u201cThat may be it,\u201d said agent Stanfran. \u201cDid anything happen that might support our tip?\u201d\n\u201cWell, it\u2019s only one instance, and it\u2019s pretty controversial,\u201d WW equivocated, \u201cand I can\u2019t say if it\u2019s the start of a trend. But you can decide for yourself.[\u201d]\n\u201cThe vote was Munoz, Mendoza, and Gutierrez on one side and Richards and Hight on the other.\u201d\nMendoza alleges that the above statements imputed his involvement in corruption, dishonesty and criminal activity. The thrust of Mendoza\u2019s complaint is that the writing falsely links him to the Mexican Mafia. He does not contend, however, that the writing accuses him of any specific criminal act or wrongdoing. Defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the column was opinion and absolutely privileged as a matter of constitutional law; and (2) that defendants did not knowingly or recklessly publish a false statement of fact and, thus, did not act with actual malice as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Mendoza responded with affidavits of various persons who interpreted the column as conveying factual allegations concerning him, together with his own affidavit on the issue of actual malice. The trial court, carefully and correctly noting factual disputes in the affidavits, denied defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.\nWhether the published statement constitutes opinion or fact.\nWe initially note that if the statements are purportedly \u201cfacts\u201d as opposed to \u201copinions\u201d, then the trial court properly denied summary judgment because there are factual disputes on material issues which are properly resolved by a fact finder. The same is not true, however, if the statements constitute opinion. An action for defamation lies only for false statements of fact and not for statements of opinion. Saenz v. Morris, 106 N.M. 530, 746 P.2d 159 (Ct.App.1987). We recognize that:\nUnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.\nGertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3006-07, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (footnote omitted).\nWhen the alleged defamatory statements could be fact or opinion, it is proper to deny summary judgment, as the trial court did here, and allow the fact finder to resolve the dispute. See Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321 (Ct.App.1981). However, if the statements are unambiguously opinion, the trial court may properly rule as a matter of law. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982). Thus, we must initially determine whether the alleged defamatory material contains a protected statement of opinion.\nIn commenting on the differences between statements of fact and opinion, the California supreme court noted:\nThe distinction frequently is a difficult one, and what constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature and content of the communication taken as a whole. Thus, where potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.\nGregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 644, 552 P.2d 425, 428 (1976).\nIn resolving the distinction between fact and opinion, the trial court should consider: (1) the entirety of the publication; (2) the extent that the truth or falsity of the statement may be determined without resort to speculation; and (3) whether reasonably prudent persons reading the publication would consider the statement to be an expression of opinion or a statement of fact. Marchiondo v. Brown; see SCRA 1986, 13-1004. In applying the above test to the statements, we believe the column expresses statements of opinion rather than fact.\nIn considering the \u201centirety\u201d requirement, the published statement must be read in context. First, the column here was situated on the \u201cOpinion\u201d page of the newspaper along with four other articles and an editorial cartoon. Readers of the opinion-editorial page generally expect to read the columnist\u2019s views and opinions as opposed to factual news stories. Aldoupo lis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 898 Mass. 731, 500 N.E.2d 794 (1986) (En banc); see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F.Supp. 481 (D.Mass.1980); National Rifle Ass\u2019n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 1299 (S.D.Ohio 1983).\nSecond, the column indicates, by the tag line \u201cDAYS OF OUR LIVES\u201d, that it is fictitious in nature and not intended to represent factual statements. In addition, the column is entitled \u201cThe Week\u2019s Wash\u201d and depicts a drawing of a clothes line laden with clothing. The column's setting is unreal. The tourism office is set up \u201con the front walk of City Hall in a booth made out of a couple of apple crates, Lucy-style.\u201d The homemade sign reads: \u201c \u2018Free Tourism Information\u2014The tourism counselor is IN.\u2019 \u201d Equally fictitious are the visitors to the booth: one visitor has heard that \u201c \u2018Red Rock Park has cracks in it the size of the Grand Canyon * * * * \u2019\u201d; another has heard that Gallup has the \u201c \u2018world\u2019s biggest zero.\u2019 \u201d The tongue-in-cheek style used by the author alerts all but the most careless readers that the descriptions were no more than rhetorical hyperbole. See Pring v. Penthouse Int\u2019l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 3112, 77 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1983); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F.Supp. 463 (D.N.H.1987); Ollman v. Evans.\nMoreover, under the second-prong of the Marchiondo test, the column constitutes \u201cpure opinion\u201d. See 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 566 (1977); Saenz v. Morris. Under the Restatement, \u201c[a] defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.\u201d Restatement, supra, \u00a7 566 at 170. However, if the material, as a whole, fully discloses the facts upon which the opinion is based and permits the reader to reach his own opinion, the statement is generally an opinion rather than an assertion of fact, and is absolutely protected. Saenz v. Morris; Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co., 97 N.M. 243, 638 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App.1981).\nIn the case at bar, \u201cWW\u201d is asked whether the Mexican Mafia has taken over the council. \u201cWW\u201d reaches no conclusion, but reports the vote results on the straw poll, together with the surnames of the councillors who cast the votes. The writer invites readers to reach their own conclusions by stating to \u201cagents\u201d Stanfran and Frammis, \u2018\u201c[I]t\u2019s only one instance * * * and I can\u2019t say if it\u2019s the start of a trend. But you can decide for yourself.\u2019 \u201d\nPlaintiff argues that the writer\u2019s observation that: \u201cThis was scarey. Word sure travels fast.\u201d implies that the author had private knowledge that the council had been taken over by the \u201cMexican Mafia.\u201d We disagree. When placed in context and read as a whole, we believe the column discloses the factual basis for the writer\u2019s opinion, namely, the straw vote to replace the city manager, and the ethnicity of the councillors who cast the votes. The opinion leaves no room for speculation or implication that the writer has private knowledge of defamatory facts. See Marchiondo v. Brown.\nFor the third-prong of the Marchiondo test, plaintiff submitted affidavits of various members of the Gallup and Ra-ton community to show that six reasonably prudent persons interpreted the column\u2019s statements as a representation of fact. Each affiant expressed their belief that the term \u201cMexican Mafia\u201d referred to a vast criminal organization whose leaders are of Mexican descent. Each also interpreted the column as a statement that Mendoza was either a member of, or under the control of, the \u201cMexican Mafia.\u201d These affidavits, though well-intended, are irrelevant. Whether the statements are capable of a defamatory meaning is initially a question of law for the trial court, not a question of fact. See Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co.\nIn addition to failing the Marehiondo three-prong test, plaintiffs reliance on Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2nd Cir.1980), is misplaced. In Cianci, plaintiff was accused, in a published magazine article, of specific criminal acts, including rape, and of paying off the victim to avoid prosecution. The Cianci court held that the charges were not employed in a \u201c \u2018loose, figurative sense\u2019 \u201d or as \u201c \u2018rhetorical hyperbole,\u2019 \u201d as here, rather, the court determined that the statement imputed specific criminal activity. Id. 639 F.2d at 64. Such is not the situation here. No specific accusation was made against Mendoza; no specific criminal act was charged. Further, the underlying facts giving rise to the publisher\u2019s opinion are apparently undisputed: a straw vote was taken; the vote was three-to-two; three councillors with Hispanic surnames voted one way, while the two remaining councillors voted another. This was not the case in Cianci, where the underlying facts were vigorously challenged.\nNor is plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) well founded. In Hustler Magazine, plaintiff Falwell sued defendant Hustler Magazine for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. The suit arose out of Hustler\u2019s publication of an advertisement parody concerning Falwell. Id. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant on the privacy claim and the jury found for defendant on the libel claim. Id. The jury, however, awarded damages to plaintiff on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Falwell\u2019s money judgment, holding that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication absent a showing that the publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with actual malice. Id.\nPlaintiff notes that \u201cas outrageous as the statements were in the offending article,\u201d the trial court in Hustler Magazine, nonetheless, allowed the libel claim to go to the jury. Nevertheless, we note that the jury found that the ad parody could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about plaintiff. Id. The question of whether plaintiff\u2019s libel claim in Hustler Magazine should have been allowed to go to the jury was not before the Supreme Court. The true import of Hustler Magazine is not the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion, but its extension of the First Amendment protections, previously announced in Sullivan, to cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nWe conclude that the alleged defamatory statement is an editorial opinion on a matter of local political interest. One of the most fundamental privileges protected under the First Amendment is the right to free, uninhibited, political debate. The Week\u2019s Wash column is a criticism of city officials and the incoming administration. Public officials, such as plaintiff, are often the target of \u201cvehement, caustic and unpleasantly sharp attacks.\u201d New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 720; see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. While we empathize with those stung with the barbs of racial slurs or ephitets, we must also recognize the vital role played by free, open and public discourse. First Amendment protections encourage and foster the dissemination of ideas and opinions. A publication is not deemed libelous simply because the opinion is expressed in terms of strong invectives, profanity or sarcastic language. Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co. Further, fiery political dialogue, rhetoric, and public debate, including the use of epithets and hyperbole, are protected under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Id.\nIn Communications Workers of Am., Local 8611 v. Archibeque, 105 N.M. 635, 735 P.2d 1141 (1987) the supreme court held that use of characterizations such as \u201camoral,\u201d \u201ctotally void of character,\u201d and \u201can embarrassment,\u201d in the context of a labor dispute, were rhetorical hyperbole and not misstatements of fact. See also Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (in context of labor dispute, use of term \u201cscab,\u201d accompanied by highly derogatory definition, held to be \u201crhetorical hyperbole,\u201d protected by First Amendment); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass\u2019n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970) (in context of dispute over zoning variances, use of term \u201cblackmail\u201d to describe plaintiffs negotiation position was \u201crhetorical hyperbole\u201d and could not reasonably be understood to impute crime of blackmail); Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co. (average reader would have no difficulty in reading \u201crabid environmentalist\u201d to be expression of writer\u2019s opinion).\nLikewise, we are not convinced that the statements here could reasonably be interpreted as imputing criminal conduct to plaintiff. We believe that the column\u2019s use of the term \u201cMexican Mafia\u201d in the context of the debate over issues of public interest is rhetorical hyperbole. See Communications Workers of Am., Local 8611 v. Archibeque. Accordingly, we deem, as a matter of law, the statements to have been \u201copinion\u201d and not \u201cfact.\u201d Hence, we reverse the trial court and remand with instructions that defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion be granted and Mendoza\u2019s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. By virtue of our determination that the statements are protected as a matter of law, we need not discuss defendants\u2019 second issue.\nWe remand with instructions to dismiss Mendoza\u2019s complaint with prejudice.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBIVINS and APODACA, JJ\u201e concur.\nAPPENDIX A\n. During the municipal elections in Gallup, New Mexico, which preceded publication of the article, Munoz, candidate for office, referred to councilman George Hight as a \u201cBig Zero.\" The candidate\u2019s remark, together with his subsequent apology, were previously published in The Gallup Independent.", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lowell E. McKim, McKim, Head & Ionta, P.C., Gallup, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Joseph L. Rich, Schuelke & Rich, Gallup, George R. McFall, Joseph E. Roehl, R.E. Thompson, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "764 P.2d 492\nHarry MENDOZA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The GALLUP INDEPENDENT CO., John K. Zollinger, Robert C. Zollinger, Donald W. Green a/k/a \u201cVeritas\u201d, and Reed Eckhardt, Defendants-Appellants.\nNo. 10501.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nAug. 16, 1988.\nLowell E. McKim, McKim, Head & Ionta, P.C., Gallup, for plaintiff-appellee.\nJoseph L. Rich, Schuelke & Rich, Gallup, George R. McFall, Joseph E. Roehl, R.E. Thompson, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0721-01", "first_page_order": 763, "last_page_order": 769 }