{ "id": 1597036, "name": "Billie J. RODMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT and Presbyterian Hospital, Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Rodman v. New Mexico Employment Security Department", "decision_date": "1988-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 17721", "first_page": "758", "last_page": "764", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "107 N.M. 758" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "764 P.2d 1316" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 N.M. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568770 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557168 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.M. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21" }, { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/50/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 927", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Mass. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 330473 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/375/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 A.2d 1123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1126" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Pa.Commw. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1907673 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/50/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 So.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9583102 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/373/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 A.2d 1256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Pa.Commw. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1920716 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/59/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 So.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9606925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/364/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555186 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 S.W.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9974444 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/626/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2863146 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 A.L.R.3d 1333", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5349489 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 3", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2803921 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "862-63" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555112 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598990 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 So.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9583102 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/373/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555186 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294-95" }, { "page": "581-82" }, { "page": "295" }, { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2863146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" }, { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0575-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 950, "char_count": 20763, "ocr_confidence": 0.796, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.384816308172585e-07, "percentile": 0.6412590077645454 }, "sha256": "619eaf50b156e85c7cb8be45e49b6bb5ab08e724536aa9c1e85d32bc0b3592a4", "simhash": "1:bd77e622c8b387a0", "word_count": 3234 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:54.316311+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stowers, J., specially concurred and filed opinion.", "WALTERS, J., concurs.", "STOWERS, J., specially concurs." ], "parties": [ "Billie J. RODMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT and Presbyterian Hospital, Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nRANSOM, Justice.\nAn administrative decision of the New Mexico Employment Security Department denying unemployment compensation to Billie J. Rodman was reviewed on certiorari by the district court. Rodman now appeals to this Court from the order of the district court affirming the administrative decision.\nRodman had been employed by Presbyterian Hospital as a unit secretary for nearly eight years when, on February 17, 1987, she was terminated under hospital personnel policies following a \u201cthird corrective action\u201d notice. Prior restrictions had been placed on Rodman\u2019s conduct due to personal problems adversely impacting upon her place of work. At issue is whether the misconduct which warranted termination from employment rose to the level of misconduct which would warrant denial of unemployment compensation under NMSA 1978, Section 51-1-7 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, NMSA 1978, Sections 51-1-1 to 51-1-54 (Repl.Pamp.1987).\nRodman challenges the administrative decision and the district court\u2019s review as being unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to the law. The standard of review is whether the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence in the whole record. No part of the evidence may be exclusively relied upon if it would be unreasonable to do so. National Council on Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm\u2019n, 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, 562 (1988); Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Dep\u2019t, 105 N.M. 467, 734 P.2d 245 (Ct.App.1987). Additionally, as appellant points out in her brief-in-chief, a reviewing court may correct a misapplication of the law. Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 136, 138, 637 P.2d 567, 569 (1981).\nThe Department reasonably summarizes the substantial evidence as follows: Rod-man was reprimanded in June of 1986 for receiving an inordinate number of personal telephone calls and visitors at her work station, which was disruptive to her own work and to her co-workers. The formal reprimand set forth conditions to prevent further corrective action. Rodman was to have no personal telephone calls during work hours outside of a designated break or dinner time, in which event they were to occur in an area not visible to patients, physicians, or other department staff. When leaving the department for dinner, Rodman was to report to her immediate supervisor and was not to leave the hospital. Rodman was to make every effort to resolve the matters in her personal life that were causing problems at work.\nNevertheless, according to the testimony of her supervisor, extremely disruptive telephone calls continued. The doctors were beginning to comment on it. The staff was getting more distressed. According to her supervisor, \u201c[A]gain we talked about the visits, the behavior at the desk. When it got pretty bad with the phone calls, Billie would slam charts, push chairs and be a little abrupt with the people she worked with.\u201d Another written reprimand in November of 1986 warned Rodman that her job was in jeopardy if the disruptive behavior continued. The supervisor established restrictions prohibiting the claimant from having visitors at the department and instructed her to notify security if there was a potential problem.\nOn February 15, 1987, Rodman began work at 1:00 o\u2019clock in the afternoon. She had spoken to her boyfriend\u2019s mother earlier in the day to tell her that she did not want him to use her car as she had broken off their relationship. The boyfriend\u2019s mother called her at work and told her the boyfriend had her car keys. Rodman told the mother to have the boyfriend call her at work. When he did, she informed him that she could not talk to him at her duty station, and he hung up on her. He called her back and left a number where he could be reached. She left the work area and went to the break room to call him.\nAfter returning to her duty station, Rod-man got another telephone call from her boyfriend who told her to go downstairs to the lobby to meet him and pick up the keys. When she refused, he told her that if she did not come down he would come up to her department.\nClaimant left the department to confront her boyfriend, and, because her supervisor was at lunch in the hospital cafeteria, Rod-man notified a co-worker, a registered nurse, that she was leaving. Rodman testified, \u201cI didn\u2019t want any kind of confrontation at the desk, so I went downstairs.\u201d Before she left her desk, Rodman called the employer\u2019s security guard and asked him to meet her in the lobby because she anticipated that a problem could develop.\nWhen Rodman got to the lobby, her boyfriend started yelling and forced her outside. In doing so, he tore her shirt. At this point the security guard arrived and observed them arguing. Rodman was in the passenger seat of her car. The security guard instructed the boyfriend to return the keys, but the boyfriend jumped into the driver\u2019s seat, locked the doors and drove off.\nAbout thirty-five minutes later, Rodman returned to her work station, after having changed her torn shirt. She resumed working, but, as the shift progressed, more telephone calls were received for her in the department. The supervisor became frustrated with the volume of calls and the behavior of Rodman. It was determined that Rodman should be sent home. Thereafter she was terminated.\nThe Appeals Tribunal of the Department of Employment Security found on the basis of the evidence that the appellant had proven unwilling to restrict her personal contacts while at work, as requested by her employer. The hearing officer dismissed as without merit Rodman\u2019s contention that she could not stop her acquaintances from calling or visiting her at work. The hearing officer concluded that Ms. Rodman\u2019s behavior was unreasonable, had caused many problems for her work section, and constituted misconduct connected with work under Section 51-1-7(B).\nThe Meaning of \u201cMisconduct\u201d in New Mexico\u2019s Unemployment Compensation Law. Given the remedial purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law, New Mexico courts, like most jurisdictions, interpret the provisions of the law liberally, to provide sustenance to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own, and who are willing to work if given the opportunity. Wilson v. Employment Sec. Comm\u2019n, 74 N.M. 3, 14, 389 P.2d 855, 862-63 (1963); Parsons v. Employment Security Comm\u2019n, 71 N.M. 405, 409, 379 P.2d 57, 60 (1963). Like most states, New Mexico also provides that an employee who is determined to have been discharged for \u201cmisconduct\u201d is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. \u00a7 51-1-7(B); see generally Annotation, Employee\u2019s Insubordination as Barring Employment Compensation, 26 A.L.R.3d 1333 (1969). Two purposes are served by this statutory bar: first, it prevents the dissipation of funds for other workers; second, it denies benefits to those who bring about their own unemployment by conducting themselves with such callousness, and deliberate or wanton misbehavior that they have given up any reasonable expectation of receiving unemployment benefits.\nGiven the remedial purpose of the statute, and the rule of statutory construction that its provisions are to be interpreted liberally, the statutory term \u201cmisconduct\u201d should not be given too broad a definition. Accordingly, in adopting the majority definition of the term, this Court wrote in Mitchell v. Lovington Good Samaritan Center, Inc., 89 N.M. 575, 577, 555 P.2d 696, 698 (1976):\n\u201c[Mjisconduct\u201d * * * is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer\u2019s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability * * *. [M]ere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed \u201cmisconduct\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nWhere an employee has not acted with the requisite degree of \u201cfault\u201d under Mitchell, he or she has not sacrificed a reasonable expectation in continued financial security such as may be afforded by accrued unemployment compensation benefits. It is therefore possible for an employee to have been properly discharged without having acted with such willful or wanton disregard for an employer\u2019s interests as would justify denial of benefits. See e.g., City of Dallas v. Texas Employment Comm\u2019n, 626 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.Ct.App. 1981). This Court recognized in Alonzo v. New Mexico Employment Security Department, 101 N.M. 770, 689 P.2d 286 (1984), that even an act of willful disobedience which leads to termination will not always rise to the level of \u201cmisconduct\u201d when the act is an isolated incident in an otherwise favorable employment history and the incident does not cause a significant disruption of the employer\u2019s legitimate interests. Cf., Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Dep\u2019t, 105 N.M. 467, 472, 734 P.2d 245, 250 (Ct.App.1987) (where employment contract gave employer the right to draft employees to work overtime in emergency situations significantly affecting the employer\u2019s interests, it was \u201cmisconduct\u201d for appellees to have refused to report for overtime work).\nAlonzo and Trujillo demonstrate that there are two components to the concept of misconduct sufficient to justify denial of benefits. One is the notion that the employee has acted with willful or wanton disregard for the employer\u2019s interests; the other is that this act significantly infringed on legitimate employer expectations.\nTotality of circumstances and the \u201clast straw\u201d doctrine. Often, the courts have been confronted with a series of minor infractions by the employee, where each incident showed a willful disregard of the employer\u2019s interests, but no single incident was serious enough to justify denial of benefits. In such cases, courts have applied a \u201ctotality of circumstances\u201d or \u201clast straw\u201d test to determine whether, taken together, this series of incidents constitutes misconduct sufficient to disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits. Mitchell v. Lovington Good Samaritan Center, Inc., 89 N.M. 575, 555 P.2d 696 (1976). See also Donovan v. New Mexico Employment Sec. Dep\u2019t, 97 N.M. 293, 639 P.2d 580 (1982); C.F. Industries v. Long, 364 So.2d 864 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978); Rolon v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 59 Pa.Commw. 378, 429 A.2d 1256 (1981).\nRodman recognizes the \u201clast straw\u201d doctrine, but contends that the district court erred in applying the rule in this case because her infractions of February 15 were the result of acts of third parties over whom she had no physical or legal control. Appellant contends that she may not be denied unemployment benefits where the \u201clast straw\u201d which led to her termination was not willful or intentional, especially where, under the employer\u2019s personnel policy, she could not have been discharged at all before this final incident.\nThe Department contends that it is immaterial whether the precipitating act was a willful or intentional violation of the employer\u2019s rules, where the record indicates that the claimant had a history of previous acts which demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for the employer\u2019s interests, and the employer discharged the employee for the accumulation of events, including the precipitating event. Fort Myers Pump & Supply v. Florida Dep\u2019t of Labor, 373 So.2d 429 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979). Although Fort Myers does offer support for the appellee\u2019s position, we believe termination for a series of incidents which, taken together, may constitute \u201cmisconduct\u201d is distinguishable from termination for a single incident following one or more corrective action notices. In the latter event, as here, we hold that the \u201clast straw\u201d must demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for the employer's interests for unemployment benefits to be denied.\nIt should be noted, however, that the \u201ctotality of circumstances\u201d is relevant in contexts other than discharge after the accumulation of a series of minor incidents. The \u201ctotality of circumstances,\u201d such as provided by the employee\u2019s past conduct and previous reprimands, may also be used to evaluate whether the employee acted with willful or wanton disregard of the employer\u2019s interests on the occasion that precipitated his or her termination. In American Process Lettering, Inc. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 50 Pa.Commw. 272, 275, 412 A.2d 1123, 1126 (1980), the court stated, \u201cThough not a necessary element [to show misconduct], a [previous] warning is relevant in that it reflects the employee\u2019s attitude toward his employment * * * and thus adds to the willfulness of the misconduct.\u201d (citations omitted). Other relevant circumstances include the worker\u2019s knowledge of the employer\u2019s expectations, the reasonableness of those expectations, and the presence of any mitigating factors Goodridge v. Director of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978). Mitigating factors in this case include the acts of Rodman\u2019s boyfriend, a third party, and Rodman\u2019s attempts to conform to her employer\u2019s expectations following previous reprimands.\nIf substantial evidence existed that Rod-man\u2019s conduct on February 15, considered in light of the totality of circumstances including her previous history of personal phone calls and unauthorized visitors, showed a willful or wanton disregard for her employer\u2019s interests, then Rodman\u2019s benefits were properly denied.\nThe district court\u2019s adoption of independent findings and conclusions. Before deciding whether there was substantial evidence to support denial of Rodman\u2019s benefits for misconduct connected with her employment, it is necessary to discuss whether the district court erred in adopting its own findings and conclusions rather than accepting those of the Department in their entirety.\nSCRA 1986, 1-081(C)(4) provides:\nThe district court shall try and determine such cause upon the evidence legally introduced at the hearing before said board of review of the employment security department presented by the parties to said court. After hearing said cause the court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment therein upon the merits.\nThis Court has had occasion in the past to interpret this provision. In an early case, M.R. Prestridge Lumber Co. v. Employment Security Commission, 50 N.M. 309, 320-21, 176 P.2d 190, 198 (1946), this Court held that while the district court may properly give some weight to agency findings, \u201c[i]n the last analysis * * * the responsibility of making correct findings rests with the district court and it is not to be hampered or embarrassed in the performance of this duty by the findings of the Commission.\u201d Wilson v. Employment Security Commission, 74 N.M. 3, 8, 389 P.2d 855, 858 (1963), however, modified the rule from Prestridge, and held, \u201cThe trial court shall adopt as its own such of the Commission\u2019s findings of facts as it determines to be supported by substantial evidence and shall make such conclusions of law and decision as lawfully follow therefrom.\u201d (emphasis added). See also Ribera v. Employment Sec. Comm\u2019n, 92 N.M. 694, 594 P.2d 742 (1979); Abernathy v. Employment Sec. Comm\u2019n, 93 N.M. 71, 596 P.2d 514 (1979).\nAlthough under the Wilson case and its progeny, the court\u2019s affirmation of the Appeals Tribunal decision may appear inconsistent with the court\u2019s adoption of independent findings, we hold that the trial court\u2019s actions in this case were proper. Under Wilson, the trial court cannot both decide that the findings of the Department are supported by substantial evidence and adopt independent findings. Where, however, the court decides that the result reached by the Department was correct, but that the Department\u2019s specific findings are inadequate or ambiguous due to a misapprehension of the law, the court consistently with SCRA 1986, 1-081(C)(4), may adopt independent findings and conclusions.\nIn this case, the hearing officer misapprehended the standard of \u201cmisconduct\u201d as set forth in Mitchell and in this opinion. Specifically, the hearing officer defined \u201cmisconduct\u201d as denoting \u201ca material breach of the contract of employment or conduct reflecting a willful disregard of the employer\u2019s best interests.\u201d (Emphasis added). The use of the disjunctive \u201cor\u201d was error, as it implies that a breach of the employee\u2019s duties sufficient to warrant termination is automatically grounds for denial of benefits. Moreover, the Appeals Tribunal appears to have based its finding of \u201cmisconduct\u201d on Rodman\u2019s behavior following her first reprimand and leading up to her termination, without specifically addressing whether her conduct of February 15 constituted willful or wanton disregard of her employer\u2019s interests. Under these circumstances, it was proper -for the district court to make independent findings and conclusions. Accordingly, we examine the record to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the district court\u2019s findings and denial of benefits.\nThe district court ruled that Rod-man\u2019s behavior prior to February 15 constituted misconduct; that her acts of February 15, considered in light of her previous history, constituted misconduct; and that she was terminated for misconduct. Based on these considerations the court reasoned that the Appeals Tribunal\u2019s denial of Rod-man\u2019s benefits should be affirmed.\nUnder the analysis of the previous section, the first of these findings cannot alone stand as a sound basis for the court\u2019s decision, because it implies that absent consideration of the events of February 15 a basis existed to deny Rodman\u2019s claim. However, the finding that Rodman\u2019s conduct of February 15, when considered in light of her previous behavior, constituted misconduct sufficient to deny her benefits stands on a different footing. If supported by substantial evidence, this finding would justify denial of her benefits. Although the evidence in this case is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the district court to decide that Rodman\u2019s actions on February 15, when considered in light of the restrictions which had been placed upon her and her previous failure to comply with those restrictions, demonstrated a willful disregard for her employer\u2019s interests.\nTherefore, the decision of the district court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nWALTERS, J., concurs.\nSTOWERS, J., specially concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "RANSOM, Justice." }, { "text": "STOWERS, Justice\n(specially concurring).\nI do not agree with the majority opinion\u2019s statement that \u201ctermination for a series of incidents which, taken together, may constitute \u2018misconduct\u2019 is distinguishable from termination, for a single incident following one or more corrective action notices.\u201d Nor do I agree with the opinion\u2019s conclusion that the \u201c \u2018last straw\u2019 must demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for the employer\u2019s interests for unemployment benefits to be denied\u201d. In my opinion, that conclusion is incorrect and does not comport with the \u201ctotality of circumstances\u201d test we adopted in Mitchell v. Lovington Good Samaritan Center, Inc., 89 N.M. 575, 578, 555 P.2d 696, 699 (1976), and followed in Donovan v. New Mexico Employment Sec. Dep\u2019t, 97 N.M. 293, 294-95, 639 P.2d 580, 581-82 (1982). Although each separate incident within a series of incidents may not be sufficient in itself to constitute misconduct, taken in totality the conduct may deviate sufficiently to classify it as misconduct. See Donovan, 97 N.M. at 295, 639 P.2d at 582. Thus, the \u201clast straw\u201d need not necessarily demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for the employer\u2019s interests if, when taken in combination with the prior incidents, the conduct as a whole demonstrates misconduct as used in NMSA 1978, Section 51-1-7(B) (Repl.Pamp. 1987) and defined in Mitchell. Cf. Fort Myers Pump & Supply, Inc. v. Florida Dep\u2019t of Labor, 373 So.2d 429 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1979) (since the employee\u2019s work record consisted of willful conduct which occurred repeatedly, the precipitating event resulting in the discharge of that employee need not be a willful violation of the employer\u2019s rules).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "STOWERS, Justice" } ], "attorneys": [ "Juan A. Gonzalez, Legal Aid Society of Albuquerque, Inc., Albuquerque, for petitioner-appellant.", "Connie Reischman, New Mexico Employment Sec. Dept., Albuquerque, for respondents-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "764 P.2d 1316\nBillie J. RODMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT and Presbyterian Hospital, Respondents-Appellees.\nNo. 17721.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nNov. 30, 1988.\nStowers, J., specially concurred and filed opinion.\nJuan A. Gonzalez, Legal Aid Society of Albuquerque, Inc., Albuquerque, for petitioner-appellant.\nConnie Reischman, New Mexico Employment Sec. Dept., Albuquerque, for respondents-appellees." }, "file_name": "0758-01", "first_page_order": 800, "last_page_order": 806 }