{ "id": 1592820, "name": "MORTGAGE INVESTMENT COMPANY OF EL PASO and the Home Insurance Companies, Petitioners, v. Pilar GRIEGO, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Mortgage Investment Co. v. Griego", "decision_date": "1989-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 17692", "first_page": "240", "last_page": "246", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "108 N.M. 240" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "771 P.2d 173" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 N.M. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568677 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" }, { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 P.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586345 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638-39" }, { "page": "980-81" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "981" }, { "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841815 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568796 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" }, { "page": "739" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582908 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584587 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55-56" }, { "page": "886-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557049 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555138 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504503 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" }, { "page": "887" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599048 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711307 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580019 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045986 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557049 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504503 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0691-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 838, "char_count": 20448, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.05967838279374589 }, "sha256": "502147988979f51db75b5775380f7f14170205dec6dfae63eb8e8dbedfc6dfbe", "simhash": "1:53632d27b0670379", "word_count": 3303 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:06:26.206257+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RANSOM and BACA, JJ., concur.", "SCARBOROUGH, J., concurring in result only.", "SOSA, C.J., dissenting.", "ALARID and MINZNER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "MORTGAGE INVESTMENT COMPANY OF EL PASO and the Home Insurance Companies, Petitioners, v. Pilar GRIEGO, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSTOWERS, Justice.\nWe granted certiorari in this workers\u2019 compensation action to consider whether under the facts of this case the death of a worker at his place of employment satisfies the \u201carising out of\u201d employment requirement of the New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-28 (Repl.Pamp.1987).\nPlaintiff-respondent, Pilar Griego, is the surviving spouse of Robert Griego, decedent. On August 16, 1984, Robert Griego was employed as a loan officer by defendant-petitioner, Mortgage Investment Company of El Paso (MICO). Between 9:00 and 10:00 that morning, Robert Griego was shot to death while at work in his office. There were no witnesses to the shooting. For a period of approximately one year following Robert Griego\u2019s death, respondent collected death benefits as provided by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. After Angel R. Martinez pled guilty to the charge of voluntary manslaughter in the death of Robert Griego, respondent\u2019s death benefits were terminated.\nRespondent filed a complaint for restoration of these death benefits, claiming that Robert Griego\u2019s death \u201carose out of\u201d his employment with MICO and, therefore, his death was compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Petitioners, MICO and The Home Insurance Companies, counterclaimed, requesting reimbursement of amounts received by respondent as a result of Robert Griego\u2019s death.\nAfter a trial on the merits, the district court entered judgment dismissing respondent\u2019s claim and petitioners\u2019 counterclaim. The trial court made the following findings: The decedent\u2019s office was located in a public area, which was well trafficked and easily visible to the general public; the decedent did not work in a high crime area; Angel R. Martinez is the perpetrator in the death of Robert Griego; the reason or motivating cause of decedent\u2019s death is unknown or unexplained, but may have been explained by Angel or Dorothy Martinez, husband and wife, had they been asked or subpoened to testify; respondent failed to produce sufficient credible evidence to establish that the decedent\u2019s death was caused by a risk incident to his employment with MICO or that it was a natural consequence of that employment; respondent failed to produce sufficient credible evidence to establish that the decedent\u2019s death arose out of his employment with MICO; and, petitioners failed to produce sufficient credible evidence that decedent\u2019s death was motivated by jealous revenge on the part of Angel R. Martinez. As a result of these findings, the trial court concluded that respondent failed to meet the necessary burden of proof that decedent\u2019s death \u201carose out of\u201d his employment with MICO. And further, petitioners were not entitled to an offset or reimbursement for benefits paid. Respondent appealed and petitioners cross-appealed.\nThe court of appeals concluded that this case is controlled by Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966), because the trial court had determined that the cause of Griego\u2019s death is unknown and unexplained. Under Ensley, the court reasoned, respondent was entitled to the presumption that Griego\u2019s death arose out of his employment with MICO, and petitioners failed to rebut this presumption with credible evidence. The court of appeals reversed the district court\u2019s decision denying respondent\u2019s claim for death benefits and affirmed the denial of petitioners\u2019 counterclaim for reimbursement. We granted certiorari, and now reverse the court of appeals\u2019 decision on respondent\u2019s claim for death benefits.\nIn order to establish liability under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, a claim must be supported by substantial evidence indicating the existence of \u201can accidental injury arising out of, and in the course of [the worker\u2019s] employment,\u201d and that the injury must be \u201creasonably incident to [the worker\u2019s] employment.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-28. See also \u00a7 52-1-19. Whether an injury occurs in the course of employment relates to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. Sena v. Continental Casualty Co., 97 N.M. 753, 755, 643 P.2d 622, 624 (Ct.App.1982). If the worker was not reason ably involved in fulfilling the duties of his employment at the time of his injury, he was not acting within the course of his employment. Gutierrez v. Artesia Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 112, 583 P.2d 476 (Ct.App.1978). The necessity that an injury \u201carise out of\u201d and be incident to a worker\u2019s employment requires a showing that the injury was caused by a risk to which the worker was reasonably subjected by reason of his employment. Velkovitz v. Penasco Indep. School Dist., 96 N.M. 577, 633 P.2d 685 (1981).\nThe \u201carising out of\u201d requirement excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause; the causative danger must be peculiar to the work, it must not be independent of the relation of master and servant. After the event it must appear that the accidental injury had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and have flowed from the risk as a rational consequence. [Emphasis in original]\nMcDaniel v. City of Albuquerque, 99 N.M. 54, 55-56, 653 P.2d 885, 886-87 (Ct.App.1982). The burden of proof, however, is always on the claimant to show that the employee sustained an accidental injury in the course of and arising out of his employment. Clower v. Grossman, 55 N.M. 546, 549, 237 P.2d 353, 354 (1951); Sena, 97 N.M. at 756, 643 P.2d at 625.\nBefore trial in the present case, respondent and petitioners stipulated that Robert Griego\u2019s death occurred during the course of his employment. Hence, the only issue which remained to be tried was whether his death \u201carose out of\u2019 his employment within the meaning of Section 52-1-28.\n\u201cWhen an employee is found dead under circumstances indicating that death took place within the time and space limits of the employment, in the absence of any evidence of what caused the death, most courts will indulge a presumption or inference that the death arose out of the employment.\u201d 1 A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Laws \u00a7 10.32 (1985) (emphasis added); accord Ensley, 76 N.M. at 695, 417 P.2d at 887. In Ensley we held that, because the facts were uncontradicted, evidence of an unexplained assault on the employee by her co-employee while she was at work at her usual place of employment did not rebut the presumption that her death arose out of the employment. Ensley, 76 N.M. at 696, 417 P.2d at 888. Thus, we based the permissive presumption of compensability applicable in that case on \u201clogical\u201d as well as \u201cpolicy\u201d grounds.\n\u201cUntil the adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 1973, the law in New Mexico was that a presumption ceases to exist upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of its nonexistence.\u201d Trujillo v. Chavez, 93 N.M. 626, 629, 603 P.2d 736, 739 (Ct.App.1979); see also Morris v. Cartwright, 57 N.M. 328, 258 P.2d 719 (1953). This theory of presumptions known as the \u201cThayer-Wigmore\u201d or \u201cbursting bubble\u201d theory was eliminated when the 1973 Rules of Evidence were adopted by this court. Trujillo, 93 N.M. at 629, 603 P.2d at 739; accord Benham v. All Seasons Child Care, Inc., 101 N.M. 636, 638-39, 686 P.2d 978, 980-81 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 686, 687 P.2d 743 (1984). As stated by the court of appeals in State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duran, 93 N.M. 489, 492, 601 P.2d 722, 725 (Ct.App.1979):\nRule 301 ... provides that, * * * \u201ca presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.\u201d Thus the inference may continue to operate in an evidentiary sense even after introduction of evidence tending to establish the contrary, and may sufficiently influence the trier of facts to conclude that the presumed fact does exist.\nSee also Benham, 101 N.M. at 639, 686 P.2d at 981. In 1980 Rule 301 was amended to eliminate the shift in the burden of persuasion. Rule 301, now codified in SCRA 1986, 11-301 (formerly NMSA 1978, Evid. Rule 301 (Repl.Pamp.1983)), reads:\nIn all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.\nOur Rule 301 is patterned after the comparable federal rule, Fed.R.Evid. 301. According to the judiciary committee notes, a presumption does not vanish upon the introduction of contradictory evidence. Instead, it shifts to the party against whom the presumption is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption, but it does not shift to that party the burden of persuasion on the existence of the presumed fact. If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the trial court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the presumed fact. If the adverse party does offer evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court cannot instruct the jury that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic fact. The court may, however, instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. Fed.R.Evid. 301 advisory committee\u2019s note.\nThe effect of the federal rule was to make clear that, while evidence of facts giving rise to a presumption shifts the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, it does not shift the burden of persuasion or the existence of the presumed fact. The burden of persuasion remains on the party to whom it is allocated under the rules governing the allocation in the first instance. See Fed.R. Evid. 301 and SCRA 1986, 11-301.\nPresumptions governed by the federal rule operate to avoid a directed verdict and to justify an instruction to the jury. 21 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 5123 (1977). Nevertheless, the rule applies to civil nonjury as well as jury proceedings.\nThere are, of course, no instructions and no motions for a directed verdict in cases tried to the court. The motion for an involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff\u2019s case is not the same as a directed verdict since the judge actually weighs the evidence rather than judging its sufficiency to support a verdict. Therefore, as a practical matter, presumptions in a civil nonjury trial under Rule 301 are little more than rhetorical devices; one can argue them to a judge but they have no mandatory effect upon his decision. [Emphasis aded.]\nId. (footnotes omitted)\nOur rule of evidence imposes only a burden of production on the party against whom the presumption is directed. See Benham, 101 N.M. at 639, 686 P.2d at 981. In the instant case the presumption that Griego\u2019s death arose out of his employment was directed against MICO. To overcome this presumed fact, MICO had the burden of coming forward with evidence to prove its nonexistence, namely, Griego\u2019s death did not arise out of his employment. Whether or not MICO met its burden of production, the presumption did not disappear. And the burden of persuasion on the existence of the presumed fact remained throughout the trial on the party invoking the presumption. See SCRA 1986, 11-301.\nThe district court found that the production of evidence did not suffice to meet MICO\u2019s burden of production in this case.\nThe burden that Rule 301 places upon the adverse party \u201cof going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption\u201d is a burden that is similar to the burden of proof, in that whether it has been satisfied is left to the [fact finder]; it is the risk that if the opponent of the presumption does not come up with any evidence to contradict the presumed fact, the [fact finder] may choose to find in accordance with the presumption. * * * [If] the opponent introduces evidence to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact * * * [and] that evidence would not be sufficient to support a jury finding that the presumed fact did not exist, it would have the same effect on the presumption as no evidence at all * * * [T]he [fact finder] * * * may find the presumed fact, but is not compelled to do so. If, however, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the presumed fact did not exist, this evidence does not eliminate the presumption from the case * * *. [In that case] the [fact finder] may infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts.\nC. Wright and K. Graham \u00a7 5126 (footnotes omitted).\nThe trial judge found that MICO failed to rebut the presumption. As the fact finder, he was entitled to presume that Griego\u2019s death arose out of Griego\u2019s employment. He was not, however, required to make this presumption, and upon weighing the evidence, he correctly resolved the issue against Greigo. The claimant did not meet her burden of persuasion that the death of Griego was work related.\nWe need not address the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to reimbursement of the death benefits paid to respondent, since this issue was not included in the petition for writ of certiorari. See SCRA 1986, 12-502(C)(2). For these reasons, the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRANSOM and BACA, JJ., concur.\nSCARBOROUGH, J., concurring in result only.\nSOSA, C.J., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "STOWERS, Justice." }, { "text": "SOSA, Chief Justice\n(dissenting).\nI hereby adopt as my dissent the majority opinion of the court of appeals as appended herein in full.\nAPPENDIX\nMEMORANDUM OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals and defendants cross-appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint for worker\u2019s compensation death benefits and defendants\u2019 counterclaim for reimbursement, and denying plaintiff attorney fees for successfully defending against defendants\u2019 counterclaim. We reverse the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint and the denial of attorney fees and affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 counterclaim.\nPlaintiffs decedent, Robert Griego (Griego), was employed as a loan officer by defendant Mortgage Investment Company of El Paso. While at work during regular business hours, he was beaten, shot and killed. Angel R. Martinez (Martinez) later pled to the charge of voluntary manslaughter in the death of Griego, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Based on this plea, the trial court found that Martinez was the perpetrator of Griego\u2019s death. Defendants, in an effort to demonstrate that Griego\u2019s death did not arise out of his employment, attempted to show that Martinez\u2019s motivation for killing Griego was an extramarital affair he had had ten years previously with Martinez\u2019s wife. There was also evidence that Griego had foreclosed on the Martinezes home in 1974.\nThe trial court found that the statements of Griego\u2019s family regarding the alleged affair were not credible and that defendants had failed to produce sufficient credible evidence that Griego\u2019s death was motivated by jealous revenge. The trial court also determined that: \u201c[t]he reason or motivating cause of Robert Griego\u2019s death is unknown and unexplained, but may have been explained by Angel R. Martinez and/or Dorothy Martinez had they been asked or subpoenaed to testify.\u201d The trial court also found, however, that plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient credible evidence to establish that Griego\u2019s death was caused by a risk incident to, was a natural consequence of, or arose out of his employment.\nPlaintiff has briefed the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the identity of the murderer; (2) whether the trial court erred in holding the summary judgment in abeyance during trial and in admitting evidence relevant to this issue; (3) whether plaintiff had met her burden in establishing that Griego\u2019s death arose out of his employment; and (4) whether plaintiff is entitled to recover her costs and attorney fees. In their cross-appeal, defendants claim the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proving the motivation for the killing from plaintiff to defendants and erred in denying their claim for reimbursement.\nBecause the trial court determined that the reason or motivating cause of Griego\u2019s death is unknown and unexplained, this case is controlled by Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966). The fact that Griego was murdered while at work during regular business hours is undisputed. In Ensley, the supreme court determined that when a worker dies at work and the cause of death is unexplained, it is presumed that the death arose out of the employment. Id.\nAlthough defendants presented evidence which might have explained Griego\u2019s cause of death, the trial court explicitly determined that this evidence was not sufficiently credible to prove jealous revenge as the motive. Cf. Gutierrez v. Artesia Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 112, 583 P.2d 476 (Ct.App.1978) (worker\u2019s compensation not available for widow of decedent who, while at work, was killed by another for personal reasons bearing no relation to decedent\u2019s employment). The fact that there exists evidence consistent with defendant\u2019s view of the case is of no consequence. On appeal, we must determine if there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. This court does not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses. Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct.App.1985). Rather, we defer to the fact finder who heard the testimony, saw the witnesses and ultimately determined that the evidence proving jealous revenge was not credible. In upholding this determination, however, we must further determine that the Ensley presumption is applicable.\nSince plaintiff was entitled by law to a rebuttable presumption that Griego\u2019s death arose out of the employment and defendants failed to rebut this presumption with credible evidence, the trial court erred both in finding that plaintiff failed to establish Griego\u2019s death arose out of the employment and in denying plaintiff death benefits. See Ensley v. Grace. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for a determination of the appropriate amount of death benefits.\nBased on the above disposition, we need not reach plaintiff\u2019s first two issues regarding summary judgment or the admission of evidence as to the identity of the murderer.\nPlaintiff also asserts that she was entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending against defendants\u2019 counterclaim. We agree. By analogy, NMSA 1978, Section 52-l-54(E) (Repl.Pamp.1987) provides for the payment of a worker\u2019s attorney fees where an employer failed to establish that the worker\u2019s disability diminished under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-56 (Repl. Pamp.1987). Because defendants failed to establish their right to reimbursement, plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees related to the efforts of plaintiff's attorney in preserving plaintiff\u2019s right to those death benefits previously paid and are, thus, recoverable. See Jaramillo v. Kaufman Plumbing & Heating Co., 103 N.M. 400, 708 P.2d 312 (1985). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees. On remand the trial court should award fees for plaintiff\u2019s success in defending against defendants\u2019 counterclaim and shall consider plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s efforts on appeal. See Nelson v. Nelson Chem. Corp., 105 N.M. 493, 734 P.2d 273 (Ct.App.1987).\nIn light of the above discussion, it is clear that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to defendants. Since plaintiff is entitled to receive death benefits, defendants have no claim for reimbursement of monies paid as death benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 claim for reimbursement of the death benefits paid. Ensley v. Grace.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID and MINZNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "dissent", "author": "SOSA, Chief Justice" } ], "attorneys": [ "Butt, Thornton & Baehr, David M. Houliston, Albuquerque, for petitioners.", "E. Justin Pennington, Albuquerque, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "771 P.2d 173\nMORTGAGE INVESTMENT COMPANY OF EL PASO and the Home Insurance Companies, Petitioners, v. Pilar GRIEGO, Respondent.\nNo. 17692.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 24, 1989.\nRehearing Denied April 18, 1989.\nButt, Thornton & Baehr, David M. Houliston, Albuquerque, for petitioners.\nE. Justin Pennington, Albuquerque, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0240-02", "first_page_order": 278, "last_page_order": 284 }