{ "id": 715061, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER P., Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Christopher P.", "decision_date": "1990-07-03", "docket_number": "No. 11178", "first_page": "80", "last_page": "85", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 N.M. 80" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "801 P.2d 662" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "92 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5336547 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571185 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "941" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2825152 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575535 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Wis.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8675612 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/126/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.W.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9942531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/650/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Pa.Super. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 162197 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/286/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.W.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10681568 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/293/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 So.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9588220 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/388/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ariz. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 719991 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/139/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 So.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9625622 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/365/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555178 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838747 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "1194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "1455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711352 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "1115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187407 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "fifth amendment privilege applies in penalty phase of criminal proceedings" }, { "parenthetical": "fifth amendment privilege applies in penalty phase of criminal proceedings" }, { "parenthetical": "fifth amendment privilege applies in penalty phase of criminal proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568753 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 L.Ed.2d 1354", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "97 Doe I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 S.Ct. 2965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "97 Doe I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 1136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6292065, 6292326, 6290984, 6292941, 6291535, 6293648, 6293424, 6293173, 6291327, 6291767, 6292639 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "97 Doe I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/1136-05", "/us/457/1136-06", "/us/457/1136-01", "/us/457/1136-08", "/us/457/1136-03", "/us/457/1136-11", "/us/457/1136-10", "/us/457/1136-09", "/us/457/1136-02", "/us/457/1136-04", "/us/457/1136-07" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555190 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868394 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0150-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 703, "char_count": 14070, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3264960621256297 }, "sha256": "98d36a9742c372aa21526b140d4c2798052f2d90d5c6b704a14539fe899132b3", "simhash": "1:e5403f12decc00c3", "word_count": 2187 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:01.816679+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BIVINS, C.J., and DONNELLY, J\u201e concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER P., Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nAPODACA, Judge.\nThe child appeals the children\u2019s court\u2019s orders transferring the proceedings filed against him to district court and denying his motion to suppress certain statements made to police after his arrest. The children\u2019s court ordered the transfer after concluding that the child was not \u201camenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities\u201d as required by NMSA 1978, Section 32-l-30(A)(4) (Repl. Pamp.1986).\nThe two issues raised on appeal involve implications of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination: (1) whether the child\u2019s statements concerning the subject incident, made during a court-ordered psychological examination, can be used as a basis for the psychologist\u2019s opinion testimony on the amenability issue; and (2) whether the children\u2019s court\u2019s holding that the child voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights before making the statements was supported by substantial evidence. Being unpersuaded by the child\u2019s arguments, we affirm on both issues. A third issue raised in the docketing statement but not briefed is deemed abandoned. State v. Vogenthaler, 89 N.M. 150, 548 P.2d 112 (Ct.App.1976).\nOn February 23, 1988, a petition was filed in the children\u2019s court charging the child and a co-respondent, another child, with the delinquent acts of two counts of first degree murder (willful and deliberate with firearm enhancement), and conspiracy to commit murder, of the co-respondent\u2019s parents. The assistant children\u2019s court attorney petitioned to have the matter transferred to district court and that the child be directed to undergo a psychological examination on the question of whether he was amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through available facilities under Section 32-l-30(A)(4).\nThe transfer hearing was bifurcated. The children\u2019s court first heard evidence on the question of whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the child committed the alleged delinquent acts as required under Section 32-l-30(A)(5), before ruling on the state\u2019s motion for the psychological evaluation. After hearing the psychologist\u2019s testimony on amenability at a separate hearing, the children's court entered an order transferring the proceedings to district court.\nISSUE I: PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION\nThe child does not contest the children\u2019s court\u2019s authority to require the psychological evaluation. See State v. Doe, 97 N.M. 263, 639 P.2d 72 (Ct.App.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982) (97 Doe I). Instead, he contends compelled self-incriminating answers given by him to the psychologist\u2019s questions were improperly used against him. In so arguing, he points to two separate alleged violations of his fifth amendment privilege: (1) he was compelled to answer the psychologist\u2019s questions concerning the incident giving rise to the petition; and (2) because the psychologist\u2019s testimony was the only evidence presented on the amenability issue, his compelled self-incriminating answers were used improperly against him in a criminal proceeding. U.S. Const, amend. Y.\nIn making its determination concerning the psychological evaluation, the children\u2019s court concluded that the evaluation would be of significantly less assistance in determining amenability if the evaluator was not able to communicate with the child concerning the incident. The child maintains this conclusion by the children\u2019s court impermissibly compelled him to make self-incriminating statements to the psychologist. However, we believe the children\u2019s court was legitimately concerned with the level of expert assistance regarding amenability. See State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 481, 601 P.2d 451 (Ct.App.1979) (amenability is an evidentiary question requiring careful and cautious consideration) (93 Doe).\nThe child argues that, because the contemplated transfer would expose him to more severe punishment and because his amenability to treatment and rehabilitation was the only remaining issue, the hearing at which such amenability was considered should be deemed a \u201cpenalty phase\u201d of the criminal proceedings. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (fifth amendment privilege applies in penalty phase of criminal proceedings). The child does not claim that transfer to district court was based on a determination of guilt or directly resulted in punishment. In State v. Doe, 103 N.M. 233, 704 P.2d 1109 (Ct.App.1985) {103Doe), this court observed that, although the consequences of a transfer are important to the child, the transfer process determines only where he will be tried.\nAlternatively, the child contends it does not matter if we do not agree with his characterization of the transfer process as a \u201cpenalty phase.\u201d In support of this contention, he relies on In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), which stated that \u201cthe availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.\u201d However, in this case, the children\u2019s court, in its order permitting the evaluation, expressly protected the child against potential exposure by reason of his statements to the psychologist. Specifically, the order allowing the psychologist\u2019s evaluation clearly stated that any information gleaned by the evaluator about the incident could be used only at the amenability portion of the transfer hearings. Thus, the order protected the child from his statements being used in any future criminal proceeding.\nThe fifth amendment\nprivileges a defendant not to answer questions put to him in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Defendant [has] the right to refuse to answer until he [is] protected against the use of his compelled answers, and evidence derived [from those answers], in any subsequent criminal case in which he might be a defendant.\nRainbo Baking Co. of Albuquerque, Inc. v. Apodaca, 88 N.M. 501, 504, 542 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ct.App.1975) (emphasis added). In 97 Doe I, we declined to hold \u201cthat expert testimony resulting from an involuntary examination ordered by the court which is acceptable on a transfer motion would necessarily withstand a Fifth Amendment attack if offered at trial.\u201d Id., 97 N.M. at 266, 639 P.2d at 75. Thus, because of the express language contained in the children\u2019s court order protecting the child from the use of the statements in any future criminal proceedings, the potential for exposure prohibited by Gault is nonexistent in this appeal.\nWe also need not determine whether a child\u2019s self-incriminating statements may be used to support a finding of reasonable grounds to believe that he committed the alleged delinquent act, as required under Section 32-1-30(A)(5). See State v. Doe, 97 N.M. 598, 642 P.2d 201 (Ct.App.1982) (97 Doe II). The children\u2019s court found reasonable grounds existed based on evidence presented at a separate hearing held before the psychological evaluation took place. The child\u2019s statements made to the psychologist, on the other hand, bore only on the amenability issue.\nAdditionally, in 103 Doe, we essentially held that the amenability question is not determinative of whether the child should be tried as an adult. \u201cAmenability enters the analysis only to let the children\u2019s court know that it is not required to transfer all children believed to have committed serious felonies.\u201d Id., 103 N.M. at 239, 704 P.2d at 1115. Section 32-1-30(A)(4) requires only that the children\u2019s court consider the amenability question, nothing more.\nOther jurisdictions have similarly found that court-ordered psychiatric examinations used to aid amenability determinations do not violate the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Lippold v. State, 365 So.2d 1015 (Ala.Crim. App.1978); In re Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. J-77027-1, 139 Ariz. 446, 679 P.2d 92 (Ct.App.1984); State in Interest of Bruno, 388 So.2d 784 (La.1980); S.R.J. v. State, 293 N.W.2d 32 (Minn.1980); Commonwealth v. Dotson, 286 Pa.Super. 595, 429 A.2d 682 (1981); C.J.P. v. State, 650 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); In re G.B.K., 126 Wis.2d 253, 376 N.W.2d 385 (Ct.App.1985).\nWe also decline to adopt the child\u2019s characterization of the transfer process as a \u201cpenalty phase\u201d of the criminal proceedings. We find even less reason to so characterize the amenability consideration of the transfer process. We thus hold that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to the evidence admitted to assist the children\u2019s court in considering the amenability question.\nIn summary, we determine that the amenability phase of the transfer process was not a \u201cpenalty phase.\u201d We also conclude that the children\u2019s court expressly protected the child against the use of his self-incriminating statements in any future criminal proceedings. Consequently, we hold there was no error committed in the limited use of the child\u2019s responses during the psychological evaluation. See State v. Urioste, 95 N.M. 712, 625 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App.1980).\nISSUE II: THE CHILD\u2019S STATEMENTS TO POLICE\nOn February 22, 1988, the child was arrested and taken to the Bernalillo County Detention Center. En route, he was interrogated by Detective Olivares. However, following the arrest and before transporting him to the center, the police read to the child his Miranda rights, and the child acknowledged that he understood them. The child moved to suppress the statement that he gave to the police.\nThe children\u2019s court denial of the motion to suppress was based on a finding that the statements were elicited after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his fifth amendment rights was obtained. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-l-27(D) (Repl.Pamp. 1986).' The child does not contend he was not properly advised of his constitutional rights under Section 32-l-27(C). Thus, the only question before us is whether the police secured a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights before obtaining his statements as required by Section 32-l-27(D).\nThe child argues that the weight of the evidence at the suppression hearing made it \u201cclearly improbable\u201d that the waiver of his constitutional rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. However, we do not consider the weight of the evidence when determining whether substantial evidence exists. State v. Santillanes, 86 N.M. 627, 526 P.2d 424 (Ct.App.1974). Additionally, our standard of review when evaluating a claim that a person did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive constitutional rights is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court\u2019s ruling. State v. Greene, 91 N.M. 207, 213, 572 P.2d 935, 941 (1977); State v. Courtright, 83 N.M. 474, 493 P.2d 959 (Ct.App. 1972).\nSection 32-l-27(E) lists specific circumstantial factors that the children\u2019s court must consider in determining whether the proper waiver was secured. The child urges us to consider independently the evidence relating to each factor listed in the statute. See \u00a7 32-l-27(E). However, those factors are for the children\u2019s court to consider, not this court. Id.; see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-l-3(C) (Repl.Pamp. 1986). That the children\u2019s court ultimately made a finding against the child on this issue does not mean that the children\u2019s court did not consider the factors. See 103 Doe.\nWe have reviewed the evidence presented to the children\u2019s court. This evidence indicated that (1) the child was \u201cpretty smart\u201d; (2) he was given his Miranda rights and understood them; (3) he signed a waiver of rights form; (4) he indicated he wanted to talk to the officer alone without any attorneys or parent present; (5) he declined the opportunity for more time or for food and drink; (6) he denied he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol; and (7) he appeared to his questioners to be coherent and rational. We hold that this evidence substantially supports the trial court\u2019s determination. The fact that there was evidence upon which conflicting inferences could be drawn does not alter the fact that substantial evidence supported the trial court. We so hold because, under a substantial evidence standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the result below, resolving all conflicts and indulging in all inferences in favor of the decision. State v. Lankford, 92 N.M. 1, 582 P.2d 378 (1978). Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the children\u2019s court order denying the motion to suppress.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that the amenability phase of the transfer proceedings was not a \u201cpenalty phase\u201d and that the children\u2019s court protected the child against use of any self-incriminating statements in any- future criminal proceedings. For these reasons, we hold there was no error in the limited use of the child\u2019s responses during the psychological evaluation. We also conclude the children\u2019s court did not err in determining the child properly waived his constitutional rights. We therefore affirm the order transferring the proceedings to district court and the order denying the child\u2019s motion to suppress.\nFinally, we note that the child\u2019s surname has not been deleted from the record, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 32-l-39(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989). The clerk of this court is directed to delete the child\u2019s surname from all documents filed in this court that are not part of the children\u2019s court record. The children\u2019s court judge shall likewise order deletion of the child\u2019s surname from the children\u2019s court record.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBIVINS, C.J., and DONNELLY, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "APODACA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Katherine Zinn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Billy R. Blackburn, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "801 P.2d 662\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER P., Respondent-Appellant.\nNo. 11178.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJuly 3, 1990.\nCertiorari Granted Sept. 17, 1990.\nHal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Katherine Zinn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.\nBilly R. Blackburn, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0080-01", "first_page_order": 114, "last_page_order": 119 }