{ "id": 715044, "name": "Robert EVANS, Petitioner, v. VALLEY DIESEL and Mountain States Casualty Company, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. Diesel", "decision_date": "1991-03-13", "docket_number": "No. 19645", "first_page": "556", "last_page": "560", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 N.M. 556" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "807 P.2d 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 N.M. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708550 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" }, { "page": "1128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599004 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "worker tripping over sprinkler head in parking lot on her way home for the day" }, { "parenthetical": "worker tripping over sprinkler head in parking lot on her way home for the day" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586346 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598973 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592870 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 P.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592854 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0124-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 565, "char_count": 11031, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.567267418804054e-08, "percentile": 0.4884033779575566 }, "sha256": "682247e14a554df1dcc11c6fc2f96134d1770dbce20ce11c924eb66da3af9a1a", "simhash": "1:9d85e179380102db", "word_count": 1840 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:01.816679+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Robert EVANS, Petitioner, v. VALLEY DIESEL and Mountain States Casualty Company, Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSOSA, Chief Justice.\nPetitioner, Robert Evans, pursuant to our grant of his petition for writ of certiorari, seeks reversal of the court of appeals\u2019 decision reversing the workers\u2019 compensation judge\u2019s (WCJ\u2019s) disposition awarding benefits to Evans. We agree with Evans and thus reverse the court of appeals. See Valley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans, No. 11,558 (Ct.App., Dec. 18, 1990) (Chavez, J., dissenting).\nWe cite pertinent portions of the court of appeals\u2019 majority opinion, followed by pertinent portions of Judge Chavez\u2019 dissenting opinion.\nWorker, an automotive mechanic, owned a vehicle, known as a \u201cmudbogger,\u201d which he used for personal, recreational activities. Employer had been permitting worker to store the vehicle inside employer\u2019s garage during non-work hours and to work on the mudbogger during slack time and after work. Worker was paid on an hourly basis and was not paid for the work he did on the mudbogger. On September 18, 1987, after the work day was over, worker attempted to start the mudbogger and the battery blew up, injuring his eyes. While worker was not the only person on the premises at the time of the accident, there was evidence presented to the effect that, as he chose to remain after the work day had ended, he was responsible for closing and locking the doors through which he planned to drive the mudbogger.\nThe WCJ found that worker was injured as he was moving his vehicle so that employer\u2019s premises could be secured for the evening, that the risk of the accident was incident to worker\u2019s employment, and that the accident was in the course of his employment. Employer has challenged not only the correctness of the decision but also the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we are called upon to review the evidence under the whole record standard of review. Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 [(Ct.App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).] We then determine the correct application of the law to the facts in this case.\nThe WCJ found that worker was moving his vehicle so that employer\u2019s premises could be secured. After viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the evidence does not support this finding. There was no evidence that employer required the mudbogger to be inside when the doors were locked or that having it inside served his interests. His premises would have been secure if the mudbogger had been left outside or put on a trailer and taken back to worker\u2019s residence. Worker wanted to move the mudbogger for his own purposes \u2014 to protect it from the elements, vandalism, and theft.\nThe WCJ also determined that workers\u2019 accident occurred in the \u201ccourse of\u201d employment. We disagree.\n[Then follows Judge Chavez\u2019 dissenting opinion]\nThe WCJ found that when employee was injured, he was moving his vehicle so that employer\u2019s premises could be secured, and that the injury was incident to and in the course of his employment. Utilizing the whole record standard of review, Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 [ (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988)], there was sufficient evidence to support the WCJ. The test applied on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the judgment of the fact finder, not whether there is evidence to support an alternative result. Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Co., 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984 (Ct.App. 1989).\nThe majority states that the record does not support this finding, because there was no evidence that employer required the mudbogger to be inside when the doors were locked or that having it inside served his interests. The record discloses it was the established practice that employee would move the mudbogger into the building before securing the premises. Employer told employee to lock the doors when employee left the premises. Employee testified that the last order he received was to lock the shop. Employer testified that he \u201ccould have asked Robert to lock up.\u201d There is no question that employer was well aware that employee would move the mudbogger into the shop before he secured the building. This action was consistent with what employee had to do in fulfilling his duties, and is supportive of the WCJ\u2019s finding that employee was moving his vehicle so that employer\u2019s premises could be secured for the evening. Employee\u2019s accident was incident to and in the course of his employment.\nThere was sufficient evidence to find that employer benefitted from employee being able to work on the mudbogger while on the premises and while using company tools. Employee testified that he used many of the same tools on his mudbogger as he did when he performed service on customer vehicles and that he sharpened his skills in doing so. Allowing employee to work on the mudbogger benefitted employer by providing him with a more skillful mechanic. In addition, employer benefitted by being able to retain employee under the circumstances. Previously, employee had been guaranteed a forty-hour wage per week. Later, that was changed so that he was paid only when there was work. The WCJ could have found it to employer\u2019s benefit to allow employee to work on his personal vehicle while waiting for jobs in order to retain him in employer\u2019s business. Employer admitted that employee liked working at Valley Diesel, because he was able to work on his own vehicle. Also, employee testified that it was \u201cpart of the benefits of the job\u201d to be able to work on the mudbogger. In accordance with Smith v. City of Albuquerque, 105 N.M. 125, 729 P.2d 1379 (Ct.App.1986) (dual purposes), the trial court could have found that it was in employer\u2019s interest to have employee work on his own vehicle, because that would keep him working on an as-billed basis.\nValley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans, No. 11,558 (Ct. App., December 18, 1990) at 1-2, (Chavez, J., dissenting) at 1-2.\nOur disagreement with the court of appeals\u2019 majority opinion lies in how it applies the whole record review standard set out in Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988). In applying that standard of review, the court of appeals\u2019 opinion conflicts with our holding on whole record review as set forth in National Council on Compensation Insurance v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm\u2019n., 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, 562 (1988). As stated in Tallman, \u201cNational Council ... makes clear the supreme court did intend a favorable light view of the agency\u2019s decision.\u201d 108 N.M. at 129, 767 P.2d at 368. The court of appeals in Tallman continued:\nThe reviewing court starts out with the perception that all evidence, favorable and unfavorable, will be viewed in the light most favorable to the agency\u2019s decision. This would, however, not preclude the court from setting aside the agency decision when it cannot conscientiously say that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the whole record furnishes.\n... Based on our discussion and our understanding of the whole record review standard as adopted in [Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984) ], the reviewing court ordinarily should not make independent findings except in the limited circumstances noted [such as when the trial court\u2019s findings are contrary to undisputed evidence in the record or when the evidence is documentary or by way of deposition].\nId., 108 N.M. at 129-30, 767 P.2d at 368-69.\nHere, we can conscientiously say that the evidence supporting the WCJ\u2019s disposition is substantial, when viewed in the light that the whole record furnishes. Further, there are no \u201climited circumstances\u201d here that called for the court of appeals, in effect, to make findings independent from those entered by the WCJ. For example, as noted above at page one of the majority opinion, the WCJ found that \u201c \u2018worker was injured as he was moving his vehicle so that employer\u2019s premises could be secured for the evening____\u201d The majority of the court of appeals disagreed, but in doing so, we hold, the majority erroneously applied the applicable standard of review. The majority, in our judgment, went beyond the admittedly sometimes fine line between reviewing the WCJ\u2019s disposition and rewriting that disposition. While it is a close call, we conclude that the majority went too far, by making its whole record review a refinding of the facts; it reconsidered the evidence without giving the particular deference to the WCJ\u2019s findings that is called for by our opinion in National Council.\nWe further disagree with the court of appeals\u2019 construction of the whole record to mean that Evans was not injured during the course of his employment. The court of appeals construed the record to mean that Evans was on his employer\u2019s premises \u201cfor the sole purpose of working on his personal vehicle.\u201d Valley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans at 2. That is one construction to be given to the evidence, but the WCJ gave the evidence another construction \u2014 namely \u2014 that Evans was supposed to lock up for the night. While Evans could have attended to this chore without having pushed or driven his mudbogger into the shop, nonetheless he didn\u2019t leave it outside, but, as usual, tried to move it inside the shop. The employer was sufficiently apprised of Evan\u2019s custom of pushing or driving the vehicle inside before locking up to understand that the two actions went together, and thus there was substantial evidence to sustain the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that the two actions ordinarily took place together, that is, \u201cin the course of employment.\u201d\nThe facts in Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987) (worker tripping over sprinkler head in parking lot on her way home for the day) are parallel to the facts before us. Thus we conclude, as we did in that case, that Evans was \u201cin a place where the employee [was] reasonably expected to be, and that he [was] engaged in a necessary incident of employment.\u201d Id. at 506, 734 P.2d at 746. Further, applying the holding of Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 106 N.M. 594, 596, 746 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct.App.1987), the employer here, as the WCJ found and as Judge Chavez noted, derived sufficient \u201cintangible value[s]\u201d from having Evans work on his mudbogger at the locale of his employment to justify the WCJ\u2019s finding that the injury \u201carose out of\u201d Evan\u2019s employment. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-28 (Repl. Pamp.1987).\nAccordingly, the court of appeals is reversed and the WCJ\u2019s disposition is reinstated in its entirety.\nRANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SOSA, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hanratty Law Firm, Kevin J. Hanratty, Fisk & Vandiver, John Fisk, Artesia, for petitioner.", "Atwood, Malone, Mann & Turner, Freddie J. Romero, Roswell, for respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "807 P.2d 740\nRobert EVANS, Petitioner, v. VALLEY DIESEL and Mountain States Casualty Company, Respondents.\nNo. 19645.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 13, 1991.\nHanratty Law Firm, Kevin J. Hanratty, Fisk & Vandiver, John Fisk, Artesia, for petitioner.\nAtwood, Malone, Mann & Turner, Freddie J. Romero, Roswell, for respondents." }, "file_name": "0556-01", "first_page_order": 588, "last_page_order": 592 }