{ "id": 715057, "name": "Ravindra GORADIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAHN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Goradia v. Hahn Co.", "decision_date": "1991-04-30", "docket_number": "No. 19496", "first_page": "779", "last_page": "782", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 N.M. 779" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "810 P.2d 798" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "907 F.2d 566", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10538807 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/907/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S.Ct. 3177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6220451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 U.S. 317", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6207800 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 U.S. 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6206897 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5334147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" }, { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10002 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0792-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 673, "char_count": 12843, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3141549885682605e-07, "percentile": 0.6250866363251294 }, "sha256": "5eb540eca6e212d1bd3b258fd9382fd9c6ebee0521acc008f8a9db743ff97808", "simhash": "1:a78204446fca1591", "word_count": 2117 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:01.816679+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BACA and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Ravindra GORADIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAHN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSOSA, Chief Justice.\nPlaintiff-appellant, Ravindra Goradia (Goradia), appeals grant of summary judgment to defendant-appellee, Hahn Company (Hahn). The essence of Goradia\u2019s complaint was that Hahn discriminated against Goradia on the basis of his national origin (East Indian) when Hahn refused to renew a lease Goradia had on a space in a shopping center which Hahn managed and in which Goradia had been a tenant for some eight years.\nThe record discloses the following pertinent facts. Goradia, a dominant shareholder in La Fama, Inc. (La Fama), sold Indian clothing in La Fama\u2019s store. It was La Fama and not Goradia who was the tenant of record. Nonetheless, even though La Fama was not a corporation sole, La Fama and Goradia were for all practical purposes equivalent. Hahn argues that because it was La Fama whose lease was not renewed, rather than Goradia\u2019s, Hahn could not have committed racial discrimination against the corporation. For purposes of the present discussion, we will consider Goradia the tenant.\nExcept for the last two years, when his sales volume dropped slightly, Goradia\u2019s sales went up consistently from year to year and, based on substantial credible evidence introduced in support of his motion, he was one of the most successful proprietors in the shopping center. Yet, when he pursued the question of renewing the corporation\u2019s lease, he met with resistance, and, as he interprets it, rebuffs and stalling tactics.\nShortly before the term of the lease expired, he was informed that his lease would not be renewed but that he would be offered the chance to lease another space in the shopping center \u2014 this one on the periphery of the shopping center without access to the interior \u2014 after paying Hahn a \u201cfinder\u2019s fee\u201d of $80,000 to induce the present tenant of the new premises to relocate. Goradia rejected the new space, refused to sign anything other than a renewed lease on his accustomed space, and refused to move out. Eventually, after he filed a suit to restrain Hahn from taking any steps to remove him from the premises, he entered into a settlement with Hahn\nwhereby he agreed to remove himself from the premises \u2014 roughly a month after the lease expired.\nIn the present suit, akin to a civil rights action, Goradia alleges that Hahn refused to renew the lease on the grounds that he sold Indian clothing. He cites evidence in the record establishing that Hahn had decided to oust him from the premises as early as mid-1987, even though he was not told his lease would not be renewed until shortly before the end of March, 1988.\nHahn contends that its decision not to renew the lease was purely a business judgment based on its efforts to improve its \u201ctenant mix.\u201d Hahn also argues that Goradia\u2019s way of merchandising set up a \u201cgarage sale\u201d atmosphere not conducive to its philosophy of renting. There is credible and substantial evidence in the record to the effect that Goradia\u2019s store was more of a \u201cneighborhood store\u201d than a store suited to a modern shopping center mall.\nHahn first attempted unsuccessfully to lease the premises to a sandwich company, but would not allow the company to sell pizza and yogurt because this would cause competition with other established tenants in the shopping center. Eventually, after the space stood vacant until well after the lease expired, Hahn rented the premises to a flower shop.\nEven though the flower shop\u2019s sales are of a lower volume than were Goradia\u2019s, Hahn argues that more customers are attracted to the flower shop and enter the shopping center than would do so if Goradia\u2019s shop still remained on the premises. This is so because flowers cost less than Indian clothing, and thus more people buying flowers will spend less in total volume than fewer customers purchasing Indian clothing.\nTo Hahn, this state of affairs is favorable. Hahn thus argues that even though Goradia\u2019s sales volume was higher than the flower shop\u2019s, the volume of potential customers in the shopping center is higher with the flower shop. Hahn also points out that the square footage in Goradia\u2019s shop was relatively small, accounting for his high sales-to-square-foot volume.\nGoradia points to testimony of his leasing consultant, Mr. Laubert, who had previous considerable experience with Hahn and the shopping center, to the effect that the only explanation for Hahn\u2019s refusal to rent to Goradia was his ethnic background. There is nothing in the record to explain why Hahn, in renting to Goradia in the first place and allowing him to stay for eight years without any evidence of harassment, is now alleged to have discriminated against him.\nTwo witnesses of Arabic descent testified by affidavit to the effect that they knew of no prior discrimination against tenants by Hahn and did not feel that they themselves had ever been discriminated against because of their national origin. Although Goradia testified in deposition that other tenants were \u201chaving a hard time\u201d with Hahn (i.e., being discriminated against because of their race or ethnic background), he could not name these tenants. There is thus no substantial evidence in the record to substantiate Goradia\u2019s charge that Hahn discriminated against other tenants.\nGoradia maintains that the court erred in granting summary judgment because he has established a prima facie case that has not been rebutted by Hahn. He relies principally on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the standard in McDonnell Douglas, Goradia argues, having established his prima facie case without rebuttal from Hahn, the remaining fact questions should be tried by a factfinder. Hahn relies on the same case, arguing that Goradia has not established the proof required by McDonnell Douglas.\nHahn notes that it is La Fama that was refused the lease and not Goradia, and that even if the reason for refusal was the shop\u2019s selling Indian clothing, refusal on this ground does not constitute actionable discrimination. In essence, Hahn argues that if it chooses one type of goods to be sold in its store over another, that fact alone does not establish a violation of the Human Rights Act. It notes that it rejected the sandwich company because that shop wanted to sell pizza, but that does not mean it was discriminating against Italians.\nGoradia contends:\nIn attempting to justify the grant of summary judgment, the Hahn Company asks this Court to believe that it refused to renew Mr. Goradia\u2019s lease solely because it wanted to use the property for something other than ... the sale of women\u2019s clothing with some indicia of Indian origin. The entire crux of this case is whether, as a matter of law, a jury would have been obligated to believe the Hahn Company\u2019s position in this regard.\n[T]he issue before the Court is whether Mr. Goradia produced sufficient evidence such that a jury could find that the elements of the McDonnell Douglas methodology has [sic] been met.\nWe agree with Goradia\u2019s premises but not his conclusions and thus affirm the grant of summary judgment. That is, we find .as a matter of law, as did the trial court, that a jury could not have found that Hahn had racially discriminatory motives for not renewing the lease. Thus, the jury could not have found a violation of the Human Rights Act simply because Hahn did not renew the lease on the basis of the kind of goods that Goradia sold or because it wanted a different tenant in the space. Therefore, we disagree with Goradia that \u201cthe evidence in this case would justify a determination that Mr. Goradia was the victim of discrimination,\u201d or, at least, we disagree that he was the victim of invidious, racial discrimination that is actionable under the Human Rights Act.\nTrue, Goradia was discriminated against, but so was the sandwich company, and so, perhaps would have been a shop that sold cowboy boots or New England Ladies fashions in a \u201cgarage sale\u201d atmosphere. There is nothing in the record to suggest that La Fama\u2019s lease would have been renewed if, for example, an Irish person had been selling Indian clothing in Goradia\u2019s shop in a \u201cgarage sale\u201d atmosphere. In other words, from the evidence presented to the trial court it is clear to us that but one conclusion could be drawn from the evidence \u2014 namely, that Hahn discriminated against Goradia for valid business reasons and not for invalid racial or ethnic reasons.\nPursuant to SCRA 1986,1-056, summary judgment must be granted as a matter of law when there are no genuine issues of material fact. See generally Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 793, 498 P.2d 676, 680 (1972); Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 666, 726 P.2d 341, 343 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed\u2019n, 497 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).\n\u201cOne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses____\u201d Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The court\u2019s role on motion for summary judgment is \u201cto determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. \u201c[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party\u2019s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.\u201d Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Goradia, while having raised certain vague suspicions about Hahn\u2019s conduct, has failed to establish a prima facie case of invidious discrimination.\nIf from the facts presented, \u201cbut one reasonable conclusion\u201d can be drawn, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, then summary judgment must be granted. Only if a fair minded factfinder, on the facts presented in Hahn\u2019s motion, could return a verdict for Goradia, can Hahn\u2019s motion be denied. See, e.g., Chen v. Metropolitan Ins. and Annuity Co., 907 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir.1990) (construing Anderson).\nApplying these standards, the motion must be affirmed. But one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts presented to the trial court on the motion\u2014 namely, that Hahn discriminated against Goradia for valid business reasons and not for invalid racial or ethnic reasons. Goradia has not shown that Hahn did not want Goradia in the store; Goradia has shown at best that Hahn did not want Goradia\u2019s goods in the store. We know of no authority that compels a lessor to allow a tenant to sell whatever kind of goods the tenant wants to sell, or that prohibits a lessor from declining to have a certain type of goods sold in the leased premises. Rights inhere in people and not in goods.\nUnder the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas, assuming arguendo that McDonnell Douglas, an employment discrimination case, applies to a landlord-tenant discrimination case, Goradia has not carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on Hahn\u2019s part. Thus, no rebuttal is called for by Hahn. Even if rebuttal were required, however, we find that Hahn\u2019s \u201cevidence in rebuttal,\u201d the facts it presented to support its motion, completely negate any prima facie case that Goradia might have established. Thus, whether by summary judgment standards or by McDonnell Douglas standards, Goradia\u2019s case fails.\nAccordingly, summary judgment is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBACA and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur.\n. Goradia alleges violation of the Human Rights Act, particularly, NMSA 1978, Section 28-l-7(G) (Repl.Pamp.1987) (unlawful practice to discriminate in leasing on the grounds of national origin), which he compares to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e et seq.\n. The lease expired on March 31, 1988, and Goradia surrendered the premises some time before April 29, 1988.\n. Some eight months elapsed between Goradia\u2019s departure and the new tenant's taking possession. Hahn maintains that a substantial portion of that time was spent in readying the location for a different kind of business.\n.At oral argument, Goradia\u2019s counsel speculated that the original leasing representative for Hahn, Mr. Laubert, was not prejudiced against Goradia, but that Hahn's leasing representative who would have handled the new lease, was motivated by prejudice.\n. There is no evidence in the record showing the ethnic background of the new proprietor. For all the record discloses, the new proprietor may be from a minority group, as were several of Hahn\u2019s tenants.", "type": "majority", "author": "SOSA, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sager, Curran, Sturges & Tepper, Matthew P. Holt, Las Cruces, Sager, Curran, Sturges & Tepper, Christopher P. Bauman, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Richard M. Leverick, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "810 P.2d 798\nRavindra GORADIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAHN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 19496.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nApril 30, 1991.\nSager, Curran, Sturges & Tepper, Matthew P. Holt, Las Cruces, Sager, Curran, Sturges & Tepper, Christopher P. Bauman, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRichard M. Leverick, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0779-01", "first_page_order": 811, "last_page_order": 814 }