{ "id": 720164, "name": "Harold DOUGLASS, Claimant-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, REGULATION AND LICENSING DEPARTMENT, a self-insured employer, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Douglass v. State, Regulation & Licensing Department", "decision_date": "1991-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 12408", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "190", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 N.M. 183" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "812 P.2d 1331" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "92 N.M. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716941 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 P.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "employer is required to pay medical expenses only in cases where he is charged with duty to pay other compensation under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Colo.App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo. App.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "employer is required to pay medical expenses only in cases where he is charged with duty to pay other compensation under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590315 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2790542 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2847313 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/65/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580026 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580030 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Pa.Commw. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1370715 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/114/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 So.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7601366 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/472/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 So.2d 970", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7607436 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/482/0970-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573234 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575589 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" }, { "page": "1032" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590275 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597081 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590347 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599029 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580008 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580063 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "legislative intent is determined, first and foremost, by reference to the language of the statute" }, { "parenthetical": "legislative intent is determined, first and foremost, by reference to the language of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590347 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599029 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1003, "char_count": 21930, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.412024069618609e-07, "percentile": 0.647144099906983 }, "sha256": "bd393f0de7b20f95a63edcc1ba0e92784813ea597f85d4f6bd86284f8fd1396c", "simhash": "1:1348c5cf5eca26d6", "word_count": 3405 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:39.380170+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HARTZ, J., concurs.", "CHAVEZ, J., (dissenting)." ], "parties": [ "Harold DOUGLASS, Claimant-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, REGULATION AND LICENSING DEPARTMENT, a self-insured employer, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, Judge.\nWorker appeals from a judgment denying him benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (Repl.Pamp.1987) (New Act). Five issues are raised on appeal: (1) whether the workers\u2019 compensation judge (judge) erred as a matter of law in concluding that worker did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) whether worker\u2019s stress-induced depression is a \u201cphysical impairment\u201d under Section 52-l-24(A); (3) whether the judge\u2019s finding that worker was not temporarily totally disabled was supported by substantial evidence; (4) whether worker is entitled to recover medical expenses pursuant to Section 52-1-49, even if he sustained no \u201cimpairment\u201d as defined by Section 52-1-24; and (5) whether the judge\u2019s failure to find that worker\u2019s medical expenses were reasonable and necessary constituted prejudicial error. Other issues raised in the docketing statement but not briefed are deemed abandoned. See State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 701 P.2d 374 (Ct.App.1985). We affirm.\nFACTS\nWorker was employed with New Mexico State Financial Institutions Division (Division) from 1971 through March 4, 1988. His position as a financial institutions examiner supervisor required that he examine credit unions and thrift institutions for compliance with state regulatory standards. During his period of employment with the Division, worker was subject to supervision and direction by a number of directors and different management styles. In 1987 a new director took over the Division and shifted its priorities. As a result, a reduction was made in the number of employees under worker\u2019s control.\nIn March 1987 worker started to work evenings and weekends to offset the staff reduction, and experienced anxiety about his ability to perform all of the work assigned to him. By November 1987 worker was graded down in his performance and development plan and sought psychiatric treatment from Dr. James Jaramillo. Dr. Jaramillo observed symptoms of depression, anxiety, confusion, fatigue and disorientation and diagnosed worker as suffering from neuro-chemical depression. The diagnosis was evidenced by blood and urine tests and the success of chemotherapeutic medication. Worker was placed on sick leave in March 1988. Dr. Jaramillo subsequently concluded that worker was in need of intensive psychiatric treatment and he was hospitalized from April 12, 1988, until May 2, 1988, and thereafter treated on an outpatient basis for depression.\nWorker sought benefits for temporary total disability and reimbursement of medical expenses. Following a hearing on the merits, the judge entered an order determining that worker\u2019s claim was not compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and that he was not entitled to medical benefits because no compensable claim or disability had been established.\nI. CLAIM OF MENTAL IMPAIRMENT\nWorker argues that the judge erred in concluding he had not sustained a compensable claim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nThe New Act defines both \u201ctotal disability\u201d and \u201cpartial disability\u201d in terms of suffering an \u201cimpairment.\u201d Section 52-1-24, as revised by the legislature, states:\nAs used in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act ...:\nA. \u201cimpairment\u201d includes physical impairment, primary mental impairment and secondary mental impairment;\nB. \u201cprimary mental impairment\u201d means a mental illness arising from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury involves no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker\u2019s usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances, but is not an event in connection with disciplinary, corrective or job evaluation action or cessation of the worker\u2019s employment; and\nC. \u201csecondary mental impairment\u201d means a mental illness resulting from a physical impairment caused by an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.\nWorker concedes that his injury does not come within the definition of \u201cprimary\u201d or \u201csecondary mental impairment\u201d as defined in Section 52-1-24. Worker argues, however, that his work-related, stress-caused neurochemical depression is a \u201cphysical impairment\u201d under Section 52-1-24 of the New Act. The judge, however, concluded that the depression was \u201cmental\u201d rather than \u201cphysical\u201d and did not constitute a compensable \u201cprimary mental impairment\u201d under Section 52-l-24(B) because no single psychologically traumatic event triggered the injury. We agree.\nComparison of the current provisions of Section 52-1-24 with the language of the prior statute as interpreted by Candelaria v. General Electric Co., 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct.App.1986), we think evinces a legislative intent to restrict recovery under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for physical and mental injuries to those types of injuries defined in Section 52-1-24. Considering the plain language of Section 52-1-24, in light of the statute\u2019s former provisions and legislative history, we conclude the legislature intended to ex-elude from coverage claims of mental illness resulting from work-related stress, unaccompanied by either a \u201cpsychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker\u2019s usual experience,\u201d or mental illness \u201cresulting from a physical impairment caused by an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d \u00a7 52-l-24(B), (C).\nIn Candelaria we held that stress-induced mental injuries should be treated like any other injury for purposes of receiving benefits under the Act. There, we reasoned that \u201c[i]f both physical trauma leading to psychological disability, and emotional stress, leading to physical disability are compensable, it [also] follows that emotional stress leading to psychological disability comes within the Act.\u201d Id., 105 N.M. at 171, 730 P.2d at 474. Following this court\u2019s decision in Candelaria the legislature substantially rewrote Section 52-1-24. See Jensen v. New Mexico State Police, 109 N.M. 626, 788 P.2d 382 (Ct.App.1990).\nSection 52-1-24 as rewritten by the legislature in the New Act allows recovery for mental impairment where the impairment is shown to have been caused by a psychologically traumatic event outside of the worker\u2019s usual experience, or where the mental illness results from a work-related physical impairment. In adopting the New Act the legislature, inter alia, also rewrote the provisions of Sections 52-1-19 (accidental injury), -24 (definition of impairment), -25 (total disability), and -26 (partial disability).\nIn construing the meaning of \u201cphysical impairment,\u201d our primary concern is to determine and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Security Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1988). When construing a statute which has been amended, the amended provisions must be read together with other parts of the act so as to give effect to each part and implement legislative intent. See State ex rel. Stratton v. Serna, 109 N.M. 1, 780 P.2d 1148 (1989); Barela v. Midcon of N.M., Inc., 109 N.M. 360, 785 P.2d 271 (Ct.App. 1989).\nUnder the provisions of the Interim Act (NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 to -68 (Orig. Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1986), \u201cPhysical impairment\u201d as defined in Section 52-1-24 (Cum.Supp.1986), did \u201cnot include impairment of function due solely to psychological or emotional conditions, including mental stress.\u201d Examination of the provisions of Section 52-1-24 of the New Act indicates a legislative intent to revise the definition of \u201cimpairment\u201d and to broaden a worker\u2019s right to recover for a work-related mental impairment. However, the New Act continues to limit a worker\u2019s right to recover benefits for work-related \u201cmental impairment\u201d sustained by a worker to instances which are shown to fall within the perimeters of Section 52-l-24(B) and (C).\nUnder the New Act, Section 52-1-24 restricts the rights to recover for work-related \u201cmental impairment\u201d to those types of impairment expressly specified in the statute. The findings of the judge determined, among other things, that the reduction of worker\u2019s staff in March of 1987 triggered \u201canxiety about his ability to perform\u201d his work, and that the \u201cstress of [the] increased workload caused him to develop a chemical depression.\u201d The judge specifically determined that worker suffered a \u201cneuro-chemical imbalance\u201d that was objectively observable through blood and urine tests and was treatable with chemotherapeutic medication. Based upon the record, the judge properly concluded that worker\u2019s clinical depression was mental rather than physical and that the injury and impairment were not covered under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nExamination of the provisions of Section 52-1-24 and the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as a whole, we think, indicates the legislature\u2019s intent to make gradual, stress-caused mental injuries non-compensable under the New Act. See Jensen v. New Mexico State Police, 109 N.M. at 629, 788 P.2d at 385. In Perez v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 95 N.M. 628, 635, 624 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Ct.App.1981), we stated:\nWhat is meant by \u201cimpairment of a physical function\u201d ... ?\nGlover v. Sherman Power Tongs, 94 N.M. 587, 613 P.2d 729, 735 (Ct.App. 1980), Sutin, J., concurring in the result, set forth the only definition of \u201cphysical impairment\u201d noted to date:\n\u201cGiving \u2018physical impairment\u2019 the ordinary meaning as used in common speech, the term denotes a defect or infirmity limiting or making useless a member or limb of the body____\u201d\nDespite worker\u2019s insistence to the contrary, we think that depression, whether or not traceable to a biochemical origin, is commonly used to denote a \u201cmental illness\u201d as used in Section 52-l-24(B) and (C). Worker argues that his position is supported by Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equipment Co., 482 So.2d 970 (La.Ct.App. 1986); Guillot v. Sentry Insurance Co., 472 So.2d 197 (La.Ct.App.1985), and Leo v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Borough of Charleroi), 114 Pa.Commw. 6, 537 A.2d 399 (1988). We find these cases unpersuasive. The courts in these cases were engaged in the same task as we were in Candelaria \u2014 attempting to determine, in the absence of legislative guidance, when psychological injuries were compensable. In none of these cases did the court consider a specific statute like that contained in the New Act which enunciates definite restrictions on a worker\u2019s right to recover for mental impairments. Thus, we conclude the legislative intent surrounding the adoption of the New Act distinguishes our Act from the out-of-state cases relied upon by worker.\nWe are confident that the legislature was well aware that mental illness is often treated biochemically (which implies a biochemical basis for the disorder) and that medical researchers continually seek medicines to cure or alleviate various forms of mental illness. To carve out from the limitations on recovery for mental impairment all mental illness with a biochemical component, would be to potentially carve out the limitations altogether. The New Act gives no hint of such a purpose. We give the term \u201cmental illness\u201d its common meaning, a meaning also apparently used by mental health professionals, who characterize depression as a \u201cmental disorder.\u201d See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. rev. 1987). The New Act distinguishes between \u201cmental impairment\u201d and \u201cphysical impairment.\u201d \u00a7 52-1-24. Depression falls within the ambit of \u201cmental\u201d impairment as defined in Section 52-1-24.\nIn view of our determination that the judge below correctly ruled that worker suffered a mental rather than a physical impairment, we need not address worker\u2019s argument that he was entitled to temporary total disability benefits.\nII. CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO MEDICAL BENEFITS\nWe next address worker\u2019s argument that he is entitled to medical benefits pursuant to Section 52-1-49, even though he sustained no \u201cimpairment\" as defined by Section 52-1-24. Section 52-l-49(A) entitles a worker to receive medical benefits \u201c[ajfter injury and continuing as long as medical or related treatment is reasonably necessary.\u201d Worker contends that recovery of medical expenses is not contingent upon receipt of an award of total or partial disability where there has been proof that the medical bills arose from a work-related accident and are otherwise reasonable and necessary. Barela v. Midcon ofN.M., Inc. Based on our decision, however, that the legislative intent as expressed in Section 52-1-24 modifies the definition of a compensable \u201cinjury\u201d under the New Act and Section 52-1-49, we conclude that medical benefits recoverable under the law are limited to those types of injuries which are defined in Section 52-1-24 and which are not otherwise expressly excluded from coverage.\nEmployer argues that the common thread running through the decisions relating to the right to recover medical benefits requires a showing that worker has suffered a \u201ccompensable injury\u201d before medical benefits may be awarded. See Board of Educ. of Espa\u00f1ola Mun. Schools v. Quintana, 102 N.M. 433, 697 P.2d 116 (1985); Salcido v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 102 N.M. 217, 693 P.2d 583 (1985); State ex rel. J.P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc. v. District Court of the Fifth Judicial Dist., 65 N.M. 1, 330 P.2d 964 (1958). We agree.\nAlthough Section 52-l-49(A) simply provides for medical benefits \u201cafter injury,\u201d without defining what type of \u201cinjury\u201d is required, our supreme court observed in State ex rel. J.P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc.:\nWe are of opinion ... that the medical and surgical treatment which the employee is entitled to receive by Section 59-10-19 of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is incidental to and a concomitant part of a compensable injury for which the employer is liable under the Act; and the employer is only liable for such services where the employee would be entitled to compensation. [Emphasis added.]\nId. at 3, 330 P.2d at 965.\nNasci v. Frank Paxton Lumber Co., 69 N.M. 412, 367 P.2d 913 (1961), applying the policy of liberal construction in favor of the worker and noting that proper medical care can prevent an injury from becoming disabling, held that medical expenses could be recovered in the absence of disability. Any disability, however, resulting from the injury must be compensable under the Act. Id. Accord Barela v. Midcon of N.M., Inc. (recovery of medical expenses not contingent upon receipt of an award of total or partial disability where there has been proof that the medical bills arose from a work-related accident and are otherwise reasonable and necessary). No decision suggests that the disability and medical provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act can be divorced in the manner suggested by worker, who proposes that medical benefits can be recoverable even if the injury is of a type for which disability benefits are never recoverable. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides fundamentally for a disability compensation scheme. To divorce the medical benefits component of that scheme from the disability scheme we conclude departs from legislative intent and would be to let the tail wag the dog.\nSection 52-1-24 evinces a.clear legislative policy that, in the absence of a showing that the worker has sustained an impairment as defined in the statute, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act does not apply to mental disorders caused by stress in the workplace. Although the legislature could have simplified our task by defining \u201cinjury\u201d in Section 52-1-49, we note that the section has never even been expressly limited by the requirements of Sections 52-1-19 and -28. Application of those limitations to the injuries covered by Section 52-1-49 has been simply a natural consequence of reading the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as a whole. That is all we do today. See Bare-la v. Midcon of N.M., Inc. (requirement imposed explicitly in one section of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and omitted from a second section should nevertheless be read into the second section).\nWe think the judge here correctly applied the law to the facts under the New Act. In order for medical benefits to be payable as a result of an injury sustained by the worker within the contemplation of Section 52-1-49, we conclude that the injury must be of such nature that any impairment which may result therefrom would be compensable under the New Act. See State ex rel. J.P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc. v. District Court of the Fifth Judicial Dist. (payment of medical benefits under Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is incidental to a finding that employee suffered a compensable injury under the Act); Bowles v. Los Lunas Schools, 109 N.M. 100, 781 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App.1989) (medical benefits must be related to compensable injury and be shown to be reasonable and necessary); City of Little-ton v. Schum, 38 Colo.App. 122, 553 P.2d 399 (1976) (employer is required to pay medical expenses only in cases where he is charged with duty to pay other compensation under the Act). See also Holford v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 110 N.M. 366, 796 P.2d 259 (Ct.App.1990) (where dependents seek to recover death benefits under Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, decedent\u2019s original accidental injury must be found to be compensable).\nBecause we have upheld the judge\u2019s determination below that worker did not suffer a compensable injury eligible for medical benefits within the contemplation of the New Act and the evidence herein, we need not address worker\u2019s claim that the judge erred in refusing to determine that the medical expenses incurred by worker as a result of stress, anxiety and depression were reasonable and necessary.\nIII. ATTORNEY\u2019S FEES\nLastly, worker argues that we should award attorney\u2019s fees for work on appeal and remand for an award of fees for legal work below, pursuant to Section 52-1-54. Unless worker is entitled to compensation or medical benefits, however, an allowance of attorney\u2019s fees is improper. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 92 N.M. 47, 582 P.2d 819 (1978).\nIV. CONCLUSION\nThe order denying the award of benefits is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nHARTZ, J., concurs.\nCHAVEZ, J., (dissenting).", "type": "majority", "author": "DONNELLY, Judge." }, { "text": "CHAVEZ, Judge\n(dissenting).\nI respectfully dissent. I do not think that the legislative reaction to Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct.App.1986), is as broad as the majority\u2019s interpretation of NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-24 (Repl.Pamp.1987). Specifically, I view Section 52-1-24 as a definitional section limited to eligibility for income benefits. As such, our prior definitions of \u201caccidental injury\u201d for purposes of coming within the Act, including gradual, stress-induced injuries, remain intact.\nUnder the Act, \u201cimpairment\u201d is only used to define total or partial disability in NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-25 and -26 (Repl.Pamp.1987). \u201cTotal disability\u201d and \u201cpartial disability,\u201d in turn, are used to prescribe eligibility for income benefits under NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-41 and -42. The plain language of the statute therefore supports worker\u2019s contention that Section 52-1-24 relates to income benefits and does not establish which injuries come within the Act as a whole. See Smith Mach. Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., 102 N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501 (1985) (legislative intent is determined, first and foremost, by reference to the language of the statute).\nThere is no indication that the legislature intended to equate \u201cimpairment\u201d with \u201cinjury\u201d for purposes of coming within the Act. As worker points out, the legislature could have precluded all gradual, stress-induced claims from coverage by simply including a definition of \u201caccident\u201d or \u201cinjury\u201d in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-1.1 (Repl. Pamp.1987). This would be consistent with the approach taken in other jurisdictions. See IB Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, 42.23(b) (1991); Fla.Stat. \u00a7 440.02(1) (1988); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 23.1021(7) (West 1990); Wis.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 102.01(c) (West 1990).\nInstead, we are asked to interpret a statute that, on its face, appears to strike a balance between the duty of an employer to compensate workers who suffer an on-the-job injury with the need to limit potential fraud and contain costs. The majority has failed to point to anything in the Act that justifies departing from its plain meaning, other than the fact that the 1987 addition of an \u201cimpairment\u201d definition in Section 52-1-24 was a response to Candelaria. See Jensen v. New Mexico State Police, 109 N.M. 626, 788 P.2d 382 (Ct.App. 1990). Even if we assume, for example, that lowering premiums was a central purpose underlying the 1987 amendments, a plain reading of the Act does not threaten a contrary result because (1) it is doubtful that a worker will fake a mental injury where no income benefits are available; and (2) medical benefits must still be reasonable and necessary. In short, there is very limited applicability. Accordingly, worker in this case was entitled to medical benefits because he met the threshold requirement of suffering an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CHAVEZ, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jane Bloom Yohalem, Carol Oppenheimer, Morton S. Simon, The Law Offices of Simon & Oppenheimer, Santa Fe, for claimant-appellant.", "Scott P. Hatcher, Mariana G. Geer, Felker & Ish, P.A., Santa Fe, for respondent-appellee.", "David L. Skinner, Christopher W. Nickels, Beall, Pelton, O\u2019Brien & Brown, Albuquerque, for N.M. Defense Lawyers Ass\u2019n, amicus curiae.", "William H. Carpenter, Carpenter and Goldberg, Albuquerque, Chairman, amicus Committee, N.M. Trial Lawyers Ass\u2019n, amicus curiae.", "Michael B. Browde, Albuquerque, for N.M. Trial Lawyers Ass\u2019n, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "812 P.2d 1331\nHarold DOUGLASS, Claimant-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, REGULATION AND LICENSING DEPARTMENT, a self-insured employer, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 12408.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 16, 1991.\nCertiorari Denied May 22, 1991.\nJane Bloom Yohalem, Carol Oppenheimer, Morton S. Simon, The Law Offices of Simon & Oppenheimer, Santa Fe, for claimant-appellant.\nScott P. Hatcher, Mariana G. Geer, Felker & Ish, P.A., Santa Fe, for respondent-appellee.\nDavid L. Skinner, Christopher W. Nickels, Beall, Pelton, O\u2019Brien & Brown, Albuquerque, for N.M. Defense Lawyers Ass\u2019n, amicus curiae.\nWilliam H. Carpenter, Carpenter and Goldberg, Albuquerque, Chairman, amicus Committee, N.M. Trial Lawyers Ass\u2019n, amicus curiae.\nMichael B. Browde, Albuquerque, for N.M. Trial Lawyers Ass\u2019n, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 217, "last_page_order": 224 }