{ "id": 723286, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CODY R., a Child, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cody R.", "decision_date": "1991-11-08", "docket_number": "No. 12849", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "144", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.M. 140" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "823 P.2d 940" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "100 N.M. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the fact that the children's court heard evidence of the advantages and disadvantages of two alternatives was indicative that it had considered the matter within the provisions of the statute" }, { "parenthetical": "the fact that the children's court heard evidence of the advantages and disadvantages of two alternatives was indicative that it had considered the matter within the provisions of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2836476 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580036 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597222 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568753 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 P. 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.M. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4734670 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/25/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582987 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2772204 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "1283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716983 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0517-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 691, "char_count": 14596, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.666970501906556e-08, "percentile": 0.29214328711828375 }, "sha256": "68ea172a7faae946f6f60de420613cce47e185b3537b91bd13488ecca821326d", "simhash": "1:91fafb6fa74a97f1", "word_count": 2301 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:24.348281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BIVINS and PICKARD, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CODY R., a Child, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, Judge.\nThe child appeals from an order committing him to the custody of the New Mexico Youth Authority following his plea of no contest to a charge of involuntary manslaughter. The single issue raised on appeal is whether the children\u2019s court abused its discretion in ordering the child\u2019s transfer to the custody of the Youth Authority for an indeterminate period not exceeding two years. Other issues listed in the docketing statement but not briefed are deemed abandoned. State v. Haar, 110 N.M. 517, 797 P.2d 306 (Ct.App.1990). We affirm.\nFACTS\nThe events culminating in the death of the victim arose out of a dispute between the child and the victim, a fellow high school student. The child had been engaged in an extended argument with the victim about alleged statements he had made concerning the child\u2019s girlfriend. The child warned the victim about spreading rumors and, at one point, the victim and the child met with the assistant principal and a school counselor in an attempt to resolve the problems. Shortly after that meeting, however, the child confronted the victim in a school hallway and began attacking him. At the dispositional hearing, the child admitted to striking and kicking the victim several times. According to some of the witnesses, the victim did not fight back, and the child continued to beat the victim after he had fallen to the floor. As a result of injuries received from the beating, the victim died.\nThe state charged the child with an open count of murder and moved to have the child transferred to district court for trial as an adult. The children\u2019s court denied the motion and found that the child was amenable to treatment and rehabilitation as a child through available facilities. Thereafter, an adjudicatory hearing was held at which the child agreed to the entry of a consent decree and entered a plea of no contest to involuntary manslaughter. The children\u2019s court ordered the child committed to the New Mexico Youth Diagnostic and Development Center (YDDC) for purposes of diagnosis, rehabilitation, and education. The court also ordered that a report be prepared by the YDDC indicating what disposition appeared to be most suitable for the best interests of both the child and the public.\nAt the dispositional hearing, the children\u2019s court heard testimony from various witnesses and had before it a number of reports and recommendations concerning dispositional alternatives. Dr. Daniel B. Matthews, a clinical psychologist, testified, outlining his findings and recommendations. He stated that he had worked with the court-appointed psychologist who had performed an evaluation of the child and that he had reviewed the report prepared by Dr. Art Brambila, a psychologist for Valencia Counseling Services. Dr. Matthews stated that he had found a remarkable accord among the conclusions reached by the various individuals who had examined the child, despite the fact that several different diagnostic findings had been made. Dr. Matthews expressed his belief that the child was in need of treatment, that the child was capable of accepting responsibility for his actions, and he recommended that the child receive outpatient treatment without incarceration. On cross-examination, Dr. Matthews was asked about those portions of the YDDC report indicating that the child suffered from intermittent explosive personality disorder, that he had a potential for future violent acts, and that the prognosis for the child was poor. Dr. Matthews testified that he had found no symptoms of intermittent explosive disorder in the child, and that such diagnosis generally was reached only upon a showing of multiple incidents or incidents wherein the attacks were unprovoked.\nOrlando R. Sais, the child\u2019s juvenile probation and parole officer, also recommended that the child be placed on probation and testified that he believed the child was amenable to treatment without being placed in the custody of the Youth Authority. The child testified at the dispositional hearing as well, expressing his remorse over the events leading to the victim\u2019s death.\nAfter hearing closing arguments, the children\u2019s court ordered that the child be placed in the custody of the Youth Authority, noting that it might have considered probation as a dispositional alternative if the child had stopped the attack on the victim after he had knocked him to the floor. The court also stated that it could not overlook the fact that the child pursued the attack on the victim after he was defenseless, that the victim had died as a result of the beating, and that \u201ceven juveniles, especially one that\u2019s seventeen years old, [have] to face the consequences of [their] actions.\u201d Additionally, the court remarked that none of the reports indicated that the family of the victim had been contacted in order to determine the impact of the incident upon them.\nDISCUSSION\nThe child contends that the children\u2019s court abused its discretion in failing to follow recommendations of the various counselling and probation authorities who urged that he not be incarcerated, and that, instead, he be treated on an outpatient basis. The child also asserts that the statements made by the court at the dispositional hearing indicate that in imposing sentence the court disregarded evidence presented at the hearing concerning his best interests and welfare.\nIn determining the appropriate disposition to be entered following the court\u2019s finding that the youth is a delinquent child, the children\u2019s court is vested with discretion concerning the weight and effect to be accorded the evidence and matters presented at the dispositional hearing. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-34(E) (Repl.Pamp.1989); see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-31(E) (Repl.Pamp.1989). Determination of the final disposition to be imposed under the Children\u2019s Code following adjudication that a child has committed a delinquent act is vested in the sound discretion of the children\u2019s court under the provisions of the Code and the facts of each particular case. See \u00a7 32-1-34. Cf. State v. Madrigal, 85 N.M. 496, 513 P.2d 1278 (Ct.App.1973) (sentencing alternatives are within the discretion of the trial court). See generally ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Dispositional Procedures, Part VII, \u00a7 7.1 (1980). The court in Madrigal observed:\nJudicial discretion is a discretion \u201c * * * guided by law, caution, and prudence; it is an equitable determination of what is just and proper under the circumstances.\u201d State v. Alaniz, 55 N.M. 312, 232 P.2d 982 (1951). It is \u201c * * * not a mere whim or caprice, but an honest attempt, in the exercise of power and duty, to see that justice is done. * * *\u201d Independent Etc. Co. v. N.M.C.R. Co., 25 N.M. 160, 178 P. 842 (1918).\nState v. Madrigal, 85 N.M. at 501, 513 P.2d at 1283.\nSection 32-l-31(G) states:\nIn that part of the hearings held under the Children\u2019s Code on dispositional issues, all relevant and material evidence helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not competent had it been offered during the part of the hearings on adjudicatory issues and the issue of need for care and rehabilitation.\nThe child argues that since this court has previously held that the children\u2019s court must consider uncontradicted evidence of amenability to treatment before transferring a juvenile offender to district court to be tried as an adult, a similar requirement should be recognized to exist concerning the final disposition to be imposed. See State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 481, 601 P.2d 451 (Ct.App.1979); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-30(A)(4) (Repl.Pamp.1989). We do not agree. It is true that Section 32-1-30(A)(4) has been interpreted as requiring the children\u2019s court to consider uncontradicted evidence of amenability to treatment or rehabilitation as a child prior to transferring the matter to the district court. See State v. Doe, 93 N.M. at 482, 601 P.2d at 452. In contrast, however, Section 32-l-31(G) evinces a legislative intent to permit the children\u2019s court to exercise its discretion concerning what disposition should be made for a child who has been adjudicated a delinquent. See State v. Michael R., 107 N.M. 794, 765 P.2d 767 (Ct.App.1988).\nThe child also argues that the children\u2019s court must consider the recommendations regarding rehabilitation at sentencing as it must consider amenability to treatment at a transfer proceeding. Comparison of Sections 32-l-30(A)(4) (discretionary transfer), 32-l-31(G) (dispositional matters), and 32-l-34(E) (options for disposition of delinquent child) indicates that in adopting the Children\u2019s Code, our legislature imposed different criteria between transfer proceedings and dispositional decisions for delinquent children. The dispositional authority of the children\u2019s court is restricted to that which is conferred by the legislature under the Children\u2019s Code. Cf. State v. Jennings, 102 N.M. 89, 691 P.2d 882 (Ct.App.1984) (trial court\u2019s sentencing authority must be consistent with legislative authority). The child contends that the evidence was uncontradicted that he should not be committed to the Youth Authority and instead be placed on probation with outpatient treatment.\nThe only prerequisite to the determination that a child is delinquent is the finding that the child has committed a delinquent act. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-3(P) (Repl.Pamp.1989); State v. Michael R., 107 N.M. at 795, 765 P.2d at 768. However, a finding of need for care and rehabilitation is a prerequisite to ordering that a child be placed in the custody of Youth Authority. \u00a7 32-l-31(E). The record indicates that the children\u2019s court properly entered its findings that the child had committed a delinquent act and that the child was in need of care and rehabilitation. The children\u2019s court\u2019s dispositional order will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. See In re Doe, 88 N.M. 505, 542 P.2d 1195 (Ct.App.1975).\nIn formulating its decision concerning the appropriate disposition to be imposed, the court must consider the best interests of the child, the child\u2019s family, and the public. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-2(A)-(C) (Repl.Pamp.1989). The court should also consider \u201cany other matters relevant to the need for treatment or [the] appropriate disposition of the case.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-32(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989). This authority allows the court to consider the seriousness of the child\u2019s conduct.\nIn the instant case, the disposition of the children\u2019s court was supported by the record and was in accordance with the provisions of the Children\u2019s Code. Contained in the various recommendations submitted to the court were findings which supported its disposition. The YDDC report stated that the child did not perceive any wrongdoing regarding his behavior aside from the end result of the victim\u2019s death, and that the child had intermittent tendencies toward explosive behavior, the unpredictability of which posed a risk toward the personal safety and well-being of others. Additionally, the report stated that, without significantly altering his perceptions and attitude, the child\u2019s potential for future acts of violence is strong and his prognosis poor. Despite the existence of countervailing testimony, in light of the evidence detailed above, the dispositional order was consistent with the evidence and the dispositional authority invested in the children\u2019s court. See In re Doe.\nNor do we agree with the child\u2019s contention that the children\u2019s court failed to consider the recommendations before it or to weigh the options specified in Section 32-l-34(E) prior to entering its dispositional order. The record reveals that the court received evidence favorable to the child from Dr. Matthews and from Mr. Sais, the child\u2019s juvenile probation and parole officer. See State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 674 P.2d 1109 (1983) (the fact that the children\u2019s court heard evidence of the advantages and disadvantages of two alternatives was indicative that it had considered the matter within the provisions of the statute). The children\u2019s court also received and examined letters recommending leniency toward the child. The children\u2019s court even remarked that it might have considered probation but for the existence of certain facts. These factors indicate that the court evaluated and weighed the matters presented by both the child and the children\u2019s court attorney at the dispositional hearing.\nSimilarly, we are unpersuaded by the child\u2019s contention that the children\u2019s court in fashioning its dispositional order failed to consider the primary purposes of the Children\u2019s Code. Section 32-l-2(B) states that the Code shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate the following legislative purpose:\n[Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the adult consequences of criminal behavior, but to still hold children committing delinquent acts accountable for their actions to the extent of the child\u2019s age, education, mental and physical condition, background and all other relevant factors, and to provide a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation * * *.\nAnother stated purpose of the Code is \u201cto provide effective deterrents to acts of juvenile delinquency, including an emphasis on community-based alternatives^]\u201d \u00a7 32-1-2(F).\nConsidering these purposes, we find no abuse of discretion in the children\u2019s court\u2019s dispositional order. The court\u2019s remarks emphasized that in reaching its decision it had considered, among other things, the child\u2019s age, the manner in which the attack occurred, and the fact that the victim died. Given the circumstances under which the death occurred, the children\u2019s court could have reasonably determined that in view of the evidence and matters presented, transferring the custody of the child to the Youth Authority was consistent with the child\u2019s best interests, the interests of the child\u2019s family, and the interests of the public. \u00a7 32-l-2(AHC).\nCONCLUSION\nThe disposition of the children\u2019s court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBIVINS and PICKARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "DONNELLY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Hugh W. Dangler, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.", "Tom Udall, Atty. Gen., Gail MacQuesten, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiffappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "823 P.2d 940\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CODY R., a Child, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 12849.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 8, 1991.\nCertiorari Denied Dec. 12, 1991.\nSammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Hugh W. Dangler, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.\nTom Udall, Atty. Gen., Gail MacQuesten, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiffappellee." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 182 }