{
  "id": 723262,
  "name": "Sheya BADER-RONDEAU, Claimant-Appellant, v. TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, self-insured, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bader-Rondeau v. Truth or Consequences Municipal Schools",
  "decision_date": "1991-12-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 13343",
  "first_page": "218",
  "last_page": "220",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "113 N.M. 218"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "824 P.2d 358"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.",
    "id": 9025,
    "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "108 N.M. 124",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        1592854
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/108/0124-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "97 N.M. 585",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        1555121
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/97/0585-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "83 N.M. 570",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        5341341
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/83/0570-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "92 N.M. 112",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        1557049
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/92/0112-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 380,
    "char_count": 5954,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.749,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.560457787785445e-08,
      "percentile": 0.40200741433187803
    },
    "sha256": "58abb3da7539fafa068b5f345b792edf1d7b5b9d53d60e1a25159351ad51e4e0",
    "simhash": "1:30e9088e8ee21fda",
    "word_count": 946
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:24.348281+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "MINZNER and PICKARD, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Sheya BADER-RONDEAU, Claimant-Appellant, v. TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, self-insured, Respondent-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, Judge.\nThis case requires that we consider the question of whether anonymous bomb threats made by a co-employee to Worker\u2019s employer, and which demanded that Worker be fired or the school would be bombed, provides a legal basis for Worker to recover for alleged psychological injury under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nWorker appeals from an order of the workers\u2019 compensation judge (WCJ) dismissing her claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Our second calendar notice proposed summary affirmance and Worker has responded with a memorandum in opposition. For the reasons stated herein and in our calendar notices, we affirm.\nOur second calendar notice proposed to hold that Worker\u2019s injury was outside the scope of NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-24(B) (Repl.Pamp.1987), because the motivation for the bomb threats resulted from the personal animosity of a co-employee against Worker for reasons which were not occasioned by Worker\u2019s employment. See Gutierrez v. Artesia Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 112, 583 P.2d 476 (Ct.App.1978) (where the employee\u2019s death or resulting injury was caused by the willful assault of a third person intending to injure him because of personal reasons unconnected with the employee\u2019s employment, the injury did not arise out of the employment, and the resulting death or injury was not compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act). See also Valdez v. Glover Packing Co., 83 N.M. 570, 494 P.2d 983 (Ct.App.1972) (trial court\u2019s finding that the worker\u2019s injury was the result of personal animosity, and thus was not reasonably incident to his employment, held supported by substantial evidence). Although Worker in the instant case challenged the finding of the WCJ that the bomb threats were the result of personal animosity directed toward her because of events which occurred outside the scope of her employment, she does not press argument on this matter in her second memorandum in opposition. See State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 642 P.2d 188 (Ct.App.1982) (party may abandon an issue by failing to argue it in the memorandum in opposition). Moreover, the finding of the WCJ as to this issue was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct.App.1988).\nWorker\u2019s main argument seeks to distinguish the decision in Gutierrez from the instant case on two grounds. First, Worker argues that the setting of her employment, an elementary school, increased the risk of the assault. We disagree. Even if we were to conclude that bomb threats constituted a risk incident to her position as a teacher\u2019s aide, which we decline to do, Worker is not entitled to compensation because the \u201cpositional-risk\u201d doctrine she urges us to adopt only applies where the assault is not motivated by personal animosity toward an individual worker. See 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 10.00 (1990).\nWorker\u2019s second attempt to distinguish this case from Gutierrez is also related to her argument concerning the doctrine of \u201cpositional risk.\u201d She contends that her injuries are compensable because the assault \u201cwould not have taken place\u201d if she had not been employed at the school. This \u201cbut-for\u201d theory has been adopted in a limited number of jurisdictions, see Arthur Larson, supra, \u00a7 11.16(c); however, we need not reach the issue of whether New Mexico should recognize a \u201cbut-for\u201d theory in cases involving assaults against employees, because we determine that such a doctrine would not apply in any event in the instant case because the incident leading to her psychological condition arose out of and was rooted in personal animosity by a co-employee toward Worker involving matters unrelated to her employment. Id. at 3-271. When the origin of the assault arises because of private or personal reasons, and the worker\u2019s employment has not engendered or exacerbated the quarrel or facilitated the assault, Larson notes that \u201cthe assault should be held noncompensable even in states fully accepting the positional-risk test, since that test applies only when the risk is \u2018neutral.\u2019 \u201d Arthur Larson, supra, \u00a7 11.21(c) (footnote omitted).\nWorker contends that her psychological condition is compensable because the co-employee\u2019s threats were directed at Worker\u2019s employment. Thus, she reasons that the mechanism causing injury here was the employment itself, and her injury was therefore caused by a risk incident to her employment. We believe an analogous argument could have been made in Valdez, where the worker was injured in a fight with a co-worker when the co-worker threw several tools at him, including a butcher knife. Valdez, however, shows that it is not the mechanism of injury or its relationship to the employment that is dispositive; rather, it is the motivation behind the altercation or assault. Here, there was sufficient evidence upon which the WCJ could have found that the motivation leading to Worker\u2019s injury was personal and not job related. This accords with the general rule that even where the employer supplies a weapon for use in carrying out the work of the employer and the weapon is used by a co-worker to injure an employee in the course of an otherwise intentional and personal assault, the mere fact of furnishing such weapon does not provide a sufficient causal link to require a finding that the injury arose out of the employment. See Arthur Larson, supra, \u00a7 11.23(e).\nWe therefore affirm the denial of workers\u2019 compensation benefits for the reasons stated herein and in our second calendar notice.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nMINZNER and PICKARD, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "DONNELLY, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jerald A. Valentine, Las Cruces, for claimant-appellant.",
      "David L. Skinner, Beall, Pelton, O\u2019Brien & Brown, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "824 P.2d 358\nSheya BADER-RONDEAU, Claimant-Appellant, v. TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, self-insured, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 13343.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 27, 1991.\nJerald A. Valentine, Las Cruces, for claimant-appellant.\nDavid L. Skinner, Beall, Pelton, O\u2019Brien & Brown, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0218-01",
  "first_page_order": 256,
  "last_page_order": 258
}