{ "id": 723211, "name": "Richard SCHROTH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW MEXICO SELF-INSURER'S FUND, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Schroth v. New Mexico Self-Insurer's Fund", "decision_date": "1992-05-21", "docket_number": "No. 20122", "first_page": "708", "last_page": "711", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.M. 708" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "832 P.2d 399" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 N.M. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5323819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580087 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "1356" }, { "page": "291" }, { "page": "1356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723301 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 F.2d 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 829000, 829155 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/359/0484-01", "/f2d/359/0484-02" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.W.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10125793 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/531/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 So.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7610999 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/474/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.W.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Mich.App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2089142 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/35/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 P.2d 1316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Wash.App. 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1866947 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/5/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 P.2d 1272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Wash.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1099545 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/92/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 P.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Wash.App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 469151 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/21/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2764926 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" }, { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ohio St.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6703920 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-2d/33/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.M. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2832613 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "quoting Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665, 666 (1973)" }, { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "quoting Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665, 666 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0327-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 552, "char_count": 10120, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.228869522036539e-08, "percentile": 0.2685853499566963 }, "sha256": "71db6fb3825d450fe046315e3dca2348c68f7b5afa3b260127d87227885e3a0f", "simhash": "1:8783dbfa50609cf8", "word_count": 1656 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:24.348281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BACA and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Richard SCHROTH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW MEXICO SELF-INSURER\u2019S FUND, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRANCHINI, Justice.\nThis is an appeal from a declaratory judgment which found coverage under the New Mexico Self-Insurer\u2019s Fund\u2019s (NMSIF) contract of insurance for uninsured motorist benefits. Following a non-jury trial, the court entered its declaratory judgment on July 15, 1991, ruling that Richard Schroth may pursue uninsured motorist benefits from NMSIF. NMSIF appeals the court\u2019s judgment. We affirm.\nI.\nOn September 9,1987, while employed by the City of Farmington (City), Schroth was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Robert L. Homrich. Schroth reported the accident to the City\u2019s Risk Management Department and an accident report was made. Terry Darby, the City\u2019s safety officer, investigated the accident. The City was self-insured with respect to workers\u2019 compensation coverage and to date has paid Schroth various workers\u2019 compensation benefits, including all of his medical bills. At the time of the accident, NMSIF provided auto and general liability coverage to the City and its employees. NMSIF\u2019s insurance policy included uninsured motorist benefits for the employees of the City. The auto and general liability coverage contained the following notice provision: \u201cYou must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an \u2018occurrence\u2019 which may result in a claim.\u201d\nThe City\u2019s Risk Management Department had a policy of not notifying insurers of an occurrence until the insured obtained legal counsel and made an uninsured motorist claim. In this particular case, there was no indication of a potential uninsured motorist claim because the accident was not the City\u2019s fault, there was no liability exposure, property damage was below the deductible, and the City was self-insured for workers\u2019 compensation. Also, the police report of the accident had indicated that Homrich was insured. On April 29, 1989, the City learned that Homrich was uninsured. Schroth did not realize he had an uninsured motorist claim until he was named as an involuntary plaintiff in the City\u2019s subrogation suit against Homrich. After consulting a lawyer, Schroth sent notice to NMSIF within sixty days of being informed Homrich was uninsured. Additionally, the City notified NMSIF of the claim on November 30, 1989. NMSIF did not invoke their reservation of rights when first notified of the claim.\nII.\nThe trial court found that no evidence was produced to support any claim of prejudice against NMSIF concerning the seven month interval between the knowledge of a possible claim of the City and the actual notice. Additionally, the trial court concluded that under the terms of the policy, the City should have given notice on April 29, 1989, when it became aware that Homrich was uninsured. The specific issues on appeal are whether adequate notice was provided to NMSIF under the terms of the policy, and whether NMSIF was prejudiced by any delay.\nIII.\nThe purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to place the injured policyholder in the same position as if the tortfeasor was insured. Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 329, 533 P.2d 100, 102 (1975) (quoting Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665, 666 (1973)). As with uninsured motorist coverage in general, compliance with conditions precedent to recovery is often liberally construed so as to effect the statutory purpose. 12A Mark S. Rhodes, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law \u00a7 45:629 (2d.Ed.1981). Applying a liberal construction to the policy language, we agree with the trial court that notice should have been given on April 29, 1989, and not after the date of the accident.\nThe policy in question states: \u201cYou must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an \u2018occurrence\u2019 which may result in a claim.\u201d (emphasis added). We find this sentence to be ambiguous as to what \u201coccurrence\u201d means and we will construe that ambiguity in favor of the insured. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co. v. Northeastern New Mexico Fair Ass\u2019n, 84 N.M. 779, 782, 508 P.2d 588, 591 (1973).\nNMSIF contends that the \u201coccurrence\u201d was the auto accident and notice should have been given after the accident. We disagree. Notice requirements for uninsured motorist claims do not become operative until an insured reasonably believes such a claim exists. Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 21 Wash.App. 601, 586 P.2d 519, 524 (1978), aff'd, 92 Wash.2d 748, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979) (en banc). Conditions only become operative when the insured, acting as a reasonably prudent person, believed he would have an uninsured motorist claim. Thomas v. Grange Ins. Ass\u2019n, 5 Wash.App. 820, 490 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1971). The evidence established that the City did not give formal notice soon after the accident because they justifiably believed that no claim for uninsured motorist coverage would be made and that Schroth\u2019s only claim would be covered by workers\u2019 compensation. Furthermore, it was the policy of the City\u2019s Risk Management Department not to notify insurers of an occurrence until the insured obtained legal counsel and made an uninsured motorist claim. The insurance policy did not contain a requirement that every accident have a claim notice completed and sent to NMSIF. We agree with the trial court that the language of this policy gives the insured the discretion to decide what may or may not result in a claim.\nThe trial court\u2019s interpretation of the policy is bolstered by the meaning of the phrase \u201cas soon as practicable.\u201d This term has been interpreted to mean a reasonable time, dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 13A Mark S. Rhodes, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law \u00a7 49:120 (2d.Ed.1982); see also Motor State Ins. Co. v. Benton, 35 Mich.App. 287, 192 N.W.2d 385, 387 (1971), State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 474 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala.1985). We agree with the Tennessee Court of Appeals that \u201c[t]he term \u2018practicable\u2019 not only means reasonable, but has the additional connotation of what might be termed common or \u2018horse\u2019 sense. Being practicable about a matter means eliminating the purely formal or useless acts which serve no real or valid purpose.\u201d Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Parrott, 531 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tenn.Ct.App.1975). In Transamerica, the court held that notice \u201cas soon as practicable\u201d is \u201cfrom the time the insured knew or should have known that the event for which coverage is sought might reasonably be expected to produce a claim against the insurer.\u201d Id. Because the accident was not the City\u2019s fault, there was no liability exposure, property damage was below the deductible, the City was self-insured for workers\u2019 compensation, and the police report incorrectly indicated that Homrich was insured, the City did not know, nor should it have known, that the accident might reasonably be expected to produce a claim. Thus, the language in the policy supports the trial court\u2019s finding that notice should have been given on April 29, 1989, and not after the date of the accident.\nIV.\nNMSIF also argues that they were prejudiced by the twenty-seven month delay of the City in giving notice. The City notified NMSIF of the claim on November 30, 1989. Because we agree with the trial court that notice should have been given on April 29, 1989 \u2014 the date the City became aware that Homrich was uninsured \u2014 the delay at most was seven months.\n\u201cWhether the delay in giving notice is reasonable in view of all circumstances is a question of fact for determination by the trier of the facts.\u201d Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Day, 359 F.2d 484, 486 (10th Cir.1964). The trial court did not address whether the seven month delay was reasonable. The court instead addressed whether NMSIF was prejudiced by the delay.\nIn Roberts Oil Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 113 N.M. 745, 833 P.2d 222 (1992), we recently held that \u201ceven when there has been a substantial and material breach of the insured\u2019s obligation and a resulting failure of a condition precedent to the insurer\u2019s liability, the breach and nonoccurrence of condition does not discharge the insurer absent a showing that the insurer has been substantially prejudiced.\u201d Id. at 750, 833 P.2d at 227. Here, the trial court found that \u201c[n]o evidence was produced to support any claim of prejudice against [NMSIF] concerning the seven month interval between the knowledge of a possible claim of the City of Farmington, on April 29, 1989, and the actual notice of the claim on November 30, 1989.\u201d The court also found that any prejudice was a result of NMSIF\u2019s failure to invoke their reservation of rights when first notified by the City, and its failure to immediately investigate the case thereafter.\nWe will not disturb findings made by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence. Elephant Butte Resort Marina, Inc. v. Wooldridge, 102 N.M. 286, 291, 694 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1985). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 291, 694 P.2d at 1356. This court will indulge all reasonable inferences and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the trial court\u2019s findings. Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 89, 428 P.2d 625, 628 (1967). In any event, historically, NMSIF would have handled this matter the same way even if notified sooner. Earlier notification would not have changed any of the basic facts. Additionally, NMSIF had no written rules or policy for reporting accidents. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the delay did not result in any prejudice to NMSIF. Finally, because the trial court found no prejudice, there is no need for us to address whether or not the seven month delay was reasonable.\nFor the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBACA and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRANCHINI, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Felker, Ish, Hatcher, Ritchie, Sullivan & Geer, Scott P. Hatcher, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.", "Victor A. Titus, Farmington, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "832 P.2d 399\nRichard SCHROTH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW MEXICO SELF-INSURER\u2019S FUND, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 20122.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMay 21, 1992.\nFelker, Ish, Hatcher, Ritchie, Sullivan & Geer, Scott P. Hatcher, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.\nVictor A. Titus, Farmington, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0708-01", "first_page_order": 746, "last_page_order": 749 }