{ "id": 723295, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Richardson", "decision_date": "1992-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 13195", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "743", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 N.M. 740" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "832 P.2d 801" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "108 N.M. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592866 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580063 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.W.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10172461 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/306/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575595 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "legislative intent is to be given effect by adopting a construction that will not lead to unreasonable, unjust, or contradictory results" }, { "parenthetical": "legislative intent is to be given effect by adopting a construction that will not lead to unreasonable, unjust, or contradictory results" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590323 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 706781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court looks not only to language used in statute, but also to object legislature sought to accomplish and wrong it sought to remedy" }, { "parenthetical": "court looks not only to language used in statute, but also to object legislature sought to accomplish and wrong it sought to remedy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2775643 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 A.L.R.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623294 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.W.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Mich.App. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2315469 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/176/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597081 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2867662 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573193 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0381-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 672, "char_count": 12243, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7949834623630803e-07, "percentile": 0.7155461573242301 }, "sha256": "9deb38bbe03888dea29e83df7da4e5196040839cd6298aac09bbeaf206775cbf", "simhash": "1:d86a573a4d1a9af5", "word_count": 1975 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:24.348281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "DONNELLY, J., concurs.", "HARTZ, J., specially concurs." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nAPODACA, Judge.\nThe state appeals the district court\u2019s order dismissing the state\u2019s complaint against defendant. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (a criminal charge commonly referred to by the acronym DWI, which we also use in this opinion to describe the charge) in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(A) (Cum.Supp.1991) (the DWI statute). The specific issue we address on appeal is whether a farm tractor with a mower attachment is a \u201cvehicle\u201d under the language of the DWI statute, which is a part of the Motor Vehicle Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 66-1-1 through 66-12-23 (the Code). We answer this question affirmatively and therefore reverse the district court\u2019s dismissal order.\nBACKGROUND\nOn August 27,1990, defendant was operating a John Deere tractor with an attached rotary mower. Defendant was mowing weeds on the south side of a non-paved roadway maintained by the county. A dispute exists with respect to whether at least one wheel of the tractor was in the traffic lane of the road, a fact we consider inconsequential to our disposition. While operating the tractor, defendant unknowingly snagged a fence, dragged it, and caused a mailbox attached to the fence to be uprooted. A short time later, defendant was stopped by a sheriff\u2019s deputy. Defendant had difficulty dismounting the tractor and had to be helped by the deputy. The deputy detected a strong odor of alcohol. Defendant told the deputy he had consumed approximately ten beers. Defendant was convicted in the magistrate court of DWI. On appeal to the district court, defendant moved for dismissal on the basis that a farm tractor is not a vehicle under the DWI statute. The district court agreed and granted defendant\u2019s motion. This appeal followed.\nDISCUSSION\nThe DWI statute states that \u201c[i]t is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle within this state.\u201d \u00a7 66-8-102(A) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Code elsewhere defines the term \u201cvehicle\u201d as \u201cevery device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, including any frame, chassis or body of any vehicle or motor vehicle, except devices moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-1-4.19(B) (Cum.Supp.1991). The Code also defines the more-limited term \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as \u201cevery vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails.\u201d \u00a7 66-1-4.11(1) (Cum.Supp.1991).\nIn addressing the question raised in this appeal, our primary focus is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. See Arnold, v. State, 94 N.M. 381, 610 P.2d 1210 (1980). In doing so, we examine the language used in the relevant statutes. See State v. Roland, 90 N.M. 520, 565 P.2d 1037 (Ct.App.1977). If the language is clear and the meaning of the words used is unambiguous, then a common-sense reading of the statutes will suffice, with no construction necessary. See State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 791 P.2d 64 (1990); Security Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1988).\nThe Code defines \u201cfarm tractor\u201d as \u201cevery motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines and other implements of husbandry.\u201d \u00a7 66-l-4.6(A) (Cum.Supp.1991) (emphasis added). As noted earlier, a motor vehicle is defined as every vehicle that is self-propelled. Thus, because a farm tractor is expressly defined by the pertinent statute as a motor vehicle, it necessarily follows that it is also a vehicle (we reason that a \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category \u201cvehicle\u201d). Because the DWI statute\u2019s language is directed against a person driving \u201cany vehicle within this state,\u201d Section 66-8-102(A) (emphasis added), it consequently follows that a farm tractor clearly falls within the language of the DWI statute. This approach is consistent with that taken in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harder v. Harder, 176 Mich.App. 589, 440 N.W.2d 53 (1989); State v. Green, 251 N.C. 141, 110 S.E.2d 805 (1959); see generally H.B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, What is a \u201cMotor Vehicle\u201d Within Statutes Making it an Offense to Drive While Intoxicated, 66 A.L.R.2d 1146 (1959).\nDefendant first argues that, because a farm tractor is used primarily for agricultural purposes off the highway, it is not a vehicle under the DWI statute. In response to this argument, we first note that applicability of the DWI statute is not expressly limited to a type of vehicle with a particular function \u2014 all vehicles are included. Nor does the prohibitive language of the statute require that the DWI incident actually occur on a highway. \u00a7 66-8-102. Because the language used is clear and unambiguous, we cannot read words into the statute that do not exist. See Security Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t.\nAdditionally, the term \u201cvehicle,\u201d as defined in the Code, Section 66-l-4.19(B), and as used in the DWI statute, Section 66-8-102(A), does not require that the vehicle in question be regularly used on a highway, as implicitly argued by defendant. Rather, the Code contemplates a device by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway. See \u00a7 66-1-4.19(B). Although the Code may not contemplate frequent highway use by farm tractors, numerous Code provisions that contemplate highway use nonetheless exist. See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 66-1-4.16(J) (Cum.Supp.1991); 66-3-826(B) (Repl. Pamp.1989); 66-7-412 (Repl.Pamp.1987); 66-7-413.1 (Repl.Pamp.1987); 66-7-414 (Repl.Pamp.1987).\nClearly, a farm tractor is a vehicle that is or may be used on a highway. It would be unreasonable to hold that, merely because a farm tractor is not primarily used on a highway, it is not a \u201cvehicle\u201d under the DWI statute. If we adopted defendant\u2019s rationale, contrary to the clear import of Section 66-8-102(A), we would be holding that the frequency of use of a vehicle on the highway constitutes a factor in determining whether the DWI statute applies to that vehicle. We believe such reasoning would not comport with the policy behind the DWI statute, which is to prevent individuals who, either mentally or physically, or both, are unable to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety both to the individual and the public. See State v. Dutchover, 85 N.M. 72, 509 P.2d 264 (Ct.App.1973); see also Miller v. New Mexico Dep\u2019t of Transp., 106 N.M. 253, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987) (court looks not only to language used in statute, but also to object legislature sought to accomplish and wrong it sought to remedy); Griego v. Bag \u2019n Save Food Emporium, 109 N.M. 287, 784 P.2d 1030 (Ct.App.1989) (statutes are to be interpreted in a way that facilitates their operation and achievement of their goals). Surely, no one would argue that a farm tractor suddenly veering into oncoming traffic on a highway would be any less dangerous than an automobile operated in the same manner. Either of these hypotheticals exemplifies the risk or danger we believe the legislature sought to prevent in enacting the DWI statute.\nIt is also apparent to us that farm tractors were intended to come within the provisions governing safety. See \u00a7 66-7-414 (implements of husbandry include farm tractors; \u201c[a]ny person responsible for the movement of implements of husbandry ... shall comply with all safety precautions set forth in the Motor Vehicle Code and in regulations of the state highway commission.\u201d). To recognize that farm tractors are subject to the Code\u2019s safety precautions, but not to the DWI statute, would be nonsensical. See New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 95 N.M. 588, 624 P.2d 530 (1981) (legislative intent is to be given effect by adopting a construction that will not lead to unreasonable, unjust, or contradictory results).\nIn further support of our holding, we also consider significant the fact that the legislature expressly exempted farm tractors from some of the Code\u2019s provisions. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 66-1-4.160) (special mobile equipment includes farm tractors); 66-1-4.11(1) (special mobile equipment not subject to Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act); 66-3-1(D) (Repl.Pamp.1989) (farm tractors exempted from the Motor Vehicle Code\u2019s registration requirements). These exemptions indicate to us that the legislature considered a farm tractor to be a \u201cvehicle\u201d under the Code and Section 66-8-102(A). Otherwise, the exemptions would be unnecessary and superfluous. Thus, the fact that the legislature created exceptions for farm tractors with respect to some provisions of the Code, but not with respect to the DWI provision, evidences a legislative intent to include farm tractors under the language of the DWI statute. See State v. Powell, 306 S.W.2d 531 (Mo.1957).\nDefendant relies heavily on two New Mexico cases that previously examined whether a particular mechanical device was a \u201cvehicle\u201d or \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d within the meaning of the Code. These cases are Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., 102 N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501 (1985), and State v. Eden, 108 N.M. 737, 779 P.2d 114 (Ct.App.1989). We address defendant\u2019s reliance on Eden first.\nThere, this court interpreted the language of former Section 66-l-4(B)(74) (now Section 66-l-4.19(B)) \u201c \u2018is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway\u2019 \u201d as indicative of \u201ca legislative intent to define a device typically and lawfully used upon a highway to transport persons and property.\u201d State v. Eden, 108 N.M. at 739, 779 P.2d at 116. In Eden, we held that, because a snowmobile could not be lawfully operated on public highways, it was not a vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Code. In contrast, here, the statutory scheme generally provides that tractors may be used lawfully on highways.\nDefendant contends that our supreme court's holding in Smith Machinery requires a holding in this appeal that a farm tractor with an attached mower is not a vehicle. In that case, the court held that a detachable windrower header unit was not a vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 57-16-1 to -16 (Repl.Pamp.1987) (Franchising Act). The supreme court adopted an ad hoc, case-by-case approach for determining application of the Franchising Act. Smith Machinery, however, is distinguishable. First, it dealt with the definition of \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d under the Franchising Act, not with the definition contained in the Code. Second, the opinion distinguishes between windrowers and farm tractors; Smith Machinery does not hold that tractors are not motor vehicles under the Franchising Act or under the Code. Thus, Smith Machinery does not require us to hold that a tractor with an attached mower is not a vehicle.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that a farm tractor with an attached mower is a \u201cvehicle\u201d under the DWI statute. We therefore reverse the district court\u2019s order dismissing the state\u2019s complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nI CONCUR:\nDONNELLY, J., concurs.\nHARTZ, J., specially concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "APODACA, Judge." }, { "text": "HARTZ, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI concur in the result and virtually all of Judge Apodaca\u2019s opinion. Judge Apodaca\u2019s opinion thoroughly examines the usage of the terms \u201cvehicle\u201d and \u201cfarm tractor\u201d in the Motor Vehicle Code and establishes that the word \u201cvehicle\u201d encompasses \u201cfarm tractor.\u201d When the language of a statute so convincingly compels a particular construction, I do not think that we should then \u201cthrow in\u201d a policy argument to buttress the result. In particular, I find it irrelevant whether a farm tractor veering into highway traffic would be more or less dangerous than a similarly operated automobile.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "HARTZ, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tom Udall, Atty. Gen. and Joel K. Jacob-sen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.", "A.J. Olsen, Hennighausen & Olsen, Roswell, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "832 P.2d 801\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 13195.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 3, 1992.\nCertiorari Denied May 13, 1992.\nTom Udall, Atty. Gen. and Joel K. Jacob-sen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.\nA.J. Olsen, Hennighausen & Olsen, Roswell, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 778, "last_page_order": 781 }