{ "id": 1552781, "name": "Paul VIGIL, Claimant-Appellant, v. THRIFTWAY MARKETING CORPORATION and Travelers Insurance Company, Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Vigil v. Thriftway Marketing Corp.", "decision_date": "1994-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 14411", "first_page": "176", "last_page": "180", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.M. 176" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "870 P.2d 138" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 N.M. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711330 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723274 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Md. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2070114 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/310/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590275 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "1150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716948 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "1141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 P.2d 1197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588599 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711403 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59-60", "parenthetical": "when the Supreme Court promulgates rules, those rules supersede previous judicial opinions and the rules are controlling" }, { "page": "1004-05", "parenthetical": "when the Supreme Court promulgates rules, those rules supersede previous judicial opinions and the rules are controlling" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584686 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2865042 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586474 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0355-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 713, "char_count": 13927, "ocr_confidence": 0.705, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2125237492771782e-07, "percentile": 0.7766804165030471 }, "sha256": "c6aa4f45640c409aae41f650995fce82ce1934d1b0d68ec3806d1d4804fa20df", "simhash": "1:281d2de4f855d4d3", "word_count": 2287 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:41.727131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "APODACA and PICKARD, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Paul VIGIL, Claimant-Appellant, v. THRIFTWAY MARKETING CORPORATION and Travelers Insurance Company, Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBLACK, Judge.\nThe issue we decide today is the meaning of \u201cgood cause\u201d within the context of SCRA 1986, 1-041(E)(2) (Repl.1992). Paul Vigil (\u201cWorker\u201d) appeals from an order denying his motion for reinstatement after his case was dismissed sua sponte by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge (\u201cthe Judge\u201d) for lack of action. Thriftway Marketing Corp. (\u201cEmployer\u201d) and Travelers Insurance Co. (together, \u201cRespondents\u201d) argue that Worker\u2019s appeal is not timely. We disagree. Worker argues that: (1) the Judge should be es-topped from enforcing the dismissal order because it was not mailed to the parties in a timely manner; (2) the findings are not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the Judge erred in requiring Worker to demonstrate a \u201ccompelling excuse\u201d for lack of action; and (4) the Judge abused his discretion in refusing to reinstate Worker\u2019s case. We agree with Worker\u2019s third and fourth arguments, and we reverse.\nI. FACTS\nWorker filed a claim on April 27, 1990, for injuries suffered in an automobile accident in late 1988. Discovery was authorized and conducted. Trial was set for January 15, 1991, but was continued on the unopposed motion of Employer. Trial was re-set for February 15, 1991, but continued on Worker\u2019s unopposed motion. Trial was again rescheduled for March 8, 1991.\nShortly before the March trial date, Worker disclosed to his attorney that he had suffered spells of unconsciousness and incontinence. Worker\u2019s attorney began investigating whether these new symptoms were related to the accident underlying Worker\u2019s claim. On March 8,1991, Worker moved to continue the hearing indefinitely so that he could conduct further investigation of these symptoms. The motion was granted.\nWorker\u2019s attorney received a final doctor\u2019s report on Worker\u2019s condition in October 1991. Worker\u2019s attorney then waited to see if Worker\u2019s condition would stabilize. In August of 1992, Worker\u2019s attorney prepared a supplemental response to Respondents\u2019 interrogatories and requests for production regarding Worker\u2019s condition. He also prepared and served a second set of interrogatories on Respondents and served a notice to take a deposition.\nOn August 16, 1992, Worker requested a setting on the merits. At this time, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration informed Worker\u2019s attorney the ease had been dismissed sua sponte. The case had been dismissed some three months earlier, but the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration had failed to send copies of the dismissal order to the parties. Thus, August 16 was the first time Worker or his attorney heard of the dismissal.\nWorker\u2019s attorney finally received his copy of the dismissal on August 28, 1992. On September 21, Worker\u2019s attorney filed a petition to reopen the case. A hearing was held on October 1, 1992. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Judge orally denied Worker\u2019s petition for reinstatement. Worker moved for reconsideration; at the end of a hearing on November 19, 1992, the Judge orally denied both the motions to reopen and to reconsider. A written order denying both motions was issued on November 23, 1992, and Worker filed a notice of appeal on December 23, 1992.\nII. TIMELINESS OF APPEAL\nRespondents argue that Worker did not perfect a timely appeal because denial of Worker\u2019s motion for reinstatement was not \u201c \u2018a separate appealable event[,]\u2019 \u201d and, even if it was, Worker failed to appeal within thirty days after his motion was deemed automatically denied under NMSA 1978, Section 39-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1991). Respondents\u2019 argument assumes that the Judge\u2019s oral denial of the motion for reinstatement at the end of the October 1, 1992, hearing was a final, appealable judgment. It was not. Oral rulings are not final and therefore not a proper basis for an appeal. Smith v. Love, 101 N.M. 355, 356, 683 P.2d 37, 38 (1984); Peterson Properties v. Valencia County Valuation Protests Bd., 89 N.M. 239, 242, 549 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Ct.App.1976).\nThere was no -final order denying reinstatement until the Judge issued a written order on November 23, 1992. Nor was Worker\u2019s motion for reinstatement deemed denied by operation of law under Section 39-1-1. Worker\u2019s motion for reinstatement was not filed pursuant to Section 39-1-1; it was filed pursuant to SCRA 1-041(E), which does not contain a provision saying that motions filed pursuant to it are deemed denied if not acted upon within a certain amount of time. Worker\u2019s notice of appeal filed on December 23 was therefore timely.\nIII. WORKER\u2019S MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT\nThroughout the hearings on Worker\u2019s motion for reinstatement, Worker cited the applicable rule as SCRA 1-041(E) while Employer referred to SCRA 1-041(B). The Judge\u2019s findings and conclusions show that he relied on SCRA 1-041(B) and his inherent authority in denying Worker\u2019s motion for reinstatement. We hold that the Judge erred by failing to follow SCRA 1-041(E)(2).\nSCRA 1-041 was amended effective January 1, 1990. Compare SCRA 1986, 1-041 (Repl.1992) (\u201cnew SCRA 1-041\u201d) with SCRA 1986, 1-041 (Recomp.1986) (\u201cold SCRA 1-041\u201d). The amendment did not make any significant changes in Subsection (B). Both the new and the old SCRA 1-041(B) provide: \u201cFor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action.... \u201d\nSubsection (E), however, was substantially rewritten. Before the 1990 amendment, Subsection (E)(1) provided that the defendant could move to have an action dismissed with prejudice if the complaining party \u201cfailed to take any action to bring such action or proceeding to its final determination for a period of at least three (3) years[.]\u201d The 1990 amendment shortened that period to two years. More importantly, that amendment added language specifically authorizing trial judges to review their dockets and, sua sponte, dismiss cases showing no action within the previous 180 days.\nBoth Subsections (B) and (E)(1) now provide for dismissal upon motion by the opposing party, but only the new Subsection (E)(2) specifies the procedures for a court to dismiss \u201con its own motion.\u201d The adoption of this rule by the New Mexico Supreme Court dictates how cases are to be dismissed without prior notice by a trial judge. Where a rule of civil procedure addresses the specific situation before a court, a trial judge is not free to ignore the dictates of the rule and rely instead on inherent authority. See State v. Doe, 99 N.M. 460, 463, 659 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct.App.1983); cf. Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 59-60, 702 P.2d 1001, 1004-05 (1985) (when the Supreme Court promulgates rules, those rules supersede previous judicial opinions and the rules are controlling). In the present case, the Judge failed to follow the dictates of new SCRA 1-041(E)(2).\nA.Notice of Dismissal\nFirst, Subsection (E)(2) allows the court to dismiss a ease if the party filing the case has failed to take any significant action within the previous one hundred and eighty days. When the court takes such action, however, \u201c[a] copy of the order of dismissal shall be forthwith mailed by the court to all parties of record in the case.\u201d In this ease, no notice of dismissal was mailed to either party, and Worker\u2019s attorney discovered the dismissal only when he requested a setting on the merits. SCRA 1-041(E)(2) provides that: \u201cWithin thirty (30) days after service of the order of dismissal, any party may move for reinstatement of the case.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that the order of dismissal was not mailed to Worker until August means that Worker had until September to file his motion to reinstate the case.\nB. Standard for Reinstatement\nSecond, Subsection (E)(2) directs the court to reinstate the case \u201c[ujpon good cause shown.\u201d When Worker moved for reinstatement, however, the Judge found that Worker had \u201cfailed to demonstrate any compelling excuse for failure to prosecute or to demonstrate any reason for reopening the Order of Dismissal.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The Judge should have determined whether Worker had shown \u201cgood cause\u201d for his lack of action; \u201ccompelling excuse\u201d is not the correct standard under SCRA 1-041(E)(2). The standard adopted by the Judge indicates that he required a greater showing than \u201cgood cause\u201d. Cf. Chase v. Contractors\u2019 Equip. & Supply Co., 100 N.M. 39, 43, 665 P.2d 301, 305 (Ct.App.) (\u201cgood cause\u201d under one rule requires lesser showing for setting aside default judgment than the \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d required by another rule), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 740, 663 P.2d 1197 (1983).\nC. Amendment of the Rule\nThe fundamental principle behind any attempt at statutory interpretation is to further the purposes underlying the statute. Giant Indus. Arizona, Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 110 N.M. 442, 445, 796 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Ct.App.1990). When dealing with a statute or rule which has been amended, the amended language must be read within the context of the previously existing language, and the old and new language, taken as a whole, comprise the intent and purpose of the statute or rule. State ex rel. Stratton v. Serna, 109 N.M. 1, 3, 780 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1989). In examining the 1990 amendment that added the language in Subsection (E)(2), at least three features of the revised rule seem significant to the resolution of the present issue: first, SCRA 1-041(B) and 1-041(E)(1) provide a serious sanction for extremely dilatory parties and their counsel; second, the addition of SCRA 1-041(E)(2) was therefore designed to serve a different purpose; and third, SCRA 1-041(E)(2) was apparently intended to provide a standardized procedure for trial courts to evaluate the intentions of parties and their counsel and to rid their dockets of cases that should not be carried as active cases. If we are correct in interpreting the purpose of SCRA 1 \u2014 041(B)(2), it seems logical that the \u201cgood cause\u201d required for reinstatement of a case dismissed without notice and following the relatively shorter 180-day period should be construed liberally. Subsections (B) and (E)(1) require longer periods of inaction and have very strict standards before there can be a dismissal. It makes little sense to interpret SCRA 1-041(E)(2) to allow dismissals after a much shorter period under a lesser standard.\nThe Maryland Court of Appeals construed a rule functionally similar to SCRA 1-041(E)(2) in Powell v. Gutierrez, 310 Md. 302, 529 A.2d 352 (1987). Under the Maryland rule, cases were subject to dismissal after no activity for a period of one year. Id. 529 A.2d at 354. The clerk would then notify the parties of a proposed dismissal and the plaintiff would be obligated to show \u201cgood cause\u201d in order to avert the proposed dismissal. Id. After being served with such a notice by the clerk, Powell\u2019s counsel filed a motion to defer dismissal (the equivalent of our motion to reinstate) and informed the court he was in the process of answering interrogatories and was ready to pursue the claim diligently. Id. 529 A.2d at 356. The trial court found this insufficient to satisfy the good cause standard and dismissed the case. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. That court established the following criteria for \u201cgood cause\u201d for legal inaction in this context:\nTo show \u201cgood cause,\u201d the party filing the motion to defer dismissal must demonstrate to the court that he is ready, willing, and able to proceed with the prosecution of his claim and that the delay in prosecution is not wholly without justification. If the party makes this showing, the court should regard the case as viable and defer dismissal. This deferral, however, should be subjeet to a schedule for prosecution and should be made on such terms as the court determines are appropriate under the circumstances.\nId. 529 A.2d at 355.\nIn reversing, the Maryland court recognized the legitimate policy behind such a rule, allowing trial courts to prune \u201cdeadwood\u201d from their docket, but tipped the balance in favor of deciding cases on their merits:\nIn reaching our decision, we realize that judges and administrators are appropriately concerned with ease flow and efficiency. Nevertheless, our concern with expeditious case management should not blind us to the true goal of our system, which is to provide a fair determination of legitimate issues brought before us. We therefore find that the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the case.\nId. 529 A.2d at 356.\nWe believe the Powell standard on \u201cgood cause\u201d is appropriate in the context of SCRA 1-041(E)(2). Under that rule, a trial judge should reinstate a claim previously dismissed sua sponte if a party \u201ccan demonstrate to the court that he is ready, willing, and able to proceed with the prosecution of his claim and that the delay in the prosecution is not whol-. ly without justification.\u201d Powell, 529 A.2d at 355. In the present case Worker made such a showing. We therefore reverse the order of the Judge and remand with directions to reinstate the case and proceed to hearing.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nSCRA 1-041(E)(2) is designed to allow trial judges to clear deadwood from the docket, not to penalize plaintiffs or workers who have lax attorneys. Penalties for laxness may be assessed in appropriate circumstances, including dismissal under SCRA 1-041(B) or SCRA 1\u2014031(E)(1). See generally Lowery v. Atterbury, 113 N.M. 71, 823 P.2d 313 (1992); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 103 N.M. 45, 702 P.2d 990 (1985). SCRA 1-041(E)(2), however, does not permit the dismissal to stand under the facts of this ease.\nWe reverse and remand with directions to reinstate Worker\u2019s case.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nAPODACA and PICKARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BLACK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "John R. Westerman, Farmington, for claimant-appellant.", "Robert D. Benson, Benson & Associates, Farmington, for respondents-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "870 P.2d 138\nPaul VIGIL, Claimant-Appellant, v. THRIFTWAY MARKETING CORPORATION and Travelers Insurance Company, Respondents-Appellees.\nNo. 14411.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 25, 1994.\nJohn R. Westerman, Farmington, for claimant-appellant.\nRobert D. Benson, Benson & Associates, Farmington, for respondents-appellees." }, "file_name": "0176-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 216 }