{ "id": 1552553, "name": "Dale A. SCHUELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathy SCHUELLER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Schueller v. Schueller", "decision_date": "1994-01-31", "docket_number": "No. 14009", "first_page": "197", "last_page": "199", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.M. 197" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "870 P.2d 159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 N.M. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720233 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Okla. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla.", "case_ids": [ 8899876 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/okla/206/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "738 P.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708474 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598906 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.W.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10143480 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/515/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 P.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10409353 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/740/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590327 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731537 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" }, { "page": "1236" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "1235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.W.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10663245 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/436/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 So.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9539411 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/419/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731607 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "standard of review for motions for summary judgment" }, { "page": "985", "parenthetical": "standard of review for motions for summary judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725462 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0135-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 7365, "ocr_confidence": 0.7, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.761213564420382e-08, "percentile": 0.4951696025521179 }, "sha256": "7a9c56fc18c8a416d3410bc68775b473b4787fe3c63d79adc0d8a2fded32d573", "simhash": "1:1b36cb8f083b9525", "word_count": 1185 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:41.727131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHAVEZ and FLORES, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Dale A. SCHUELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathy SCHUELLER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\n.BLACK, Judge.\nThe parties were divorced in 1989. The district court entered a supplemental decree in June of 1990 dividing the parties\u2019 property. Schueller Construction Ltd. (the Corporation) was determined to be community property and awarded to Dale Schueller (Plaintiff), but he was required to pay and assume all corporate debts and hold Kathy Schueller (Defendant) harmless on such debts. At the time of the divorce proceeding, the person hired to prepare the parties\u2019 tax returns testified that all of the returns had been filed. Plaintiff filed the present action alleging that no tax returns had been filed for the period 1982-89, and that the Corporation and both of the parties had substantial tax liabilities for that period. Plaintiff further alleged that he had satisfied accounting and legal fees and a portion of the tax liability, and he sought reimbursement from Defendant.\nDefendant moved to dismiss on the ground the supplemental decree assigned all corporate debts to Plaintiff and was dispositive. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in failing to accept the allegations of the complaint as true, see Phifer v. Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 139, 848 P.2d 5, 9 (Ct.App.1993) (standard of review for motions to dismiss), and, if the district court actually considered the affidavit he submitted, there were questions of material fact, see Barreras v. New Mexico Corrections Department, 114 N.M. 366, 368, 838 P.2d 983, 985 (1992) (standard of review for motions for summary judgment). Given our disposition of the case, we need not consider whether the district court\u2019s order of dismissal was issued pursuant to SCRA 1986, 1-012 or SCRA 1986, 1-056.\nWe hold that the supplemental decree was ambiguous as to tax liability and therefore reverse and remand.\nFACTS\nPlaintiffs complaint alleged, inter alia:\n5.At the time of the divorce trial, it was the testimony of Tim Nesbitt, the person who had been hired to prepare the parties\u2019 tax returns, that the returns for the period of 1982 through 1989 had been filed. In fact, they had not been filed.\n6. The parties were unaware that the returns had not been filed and that taxes due had not been paid.\n7. The joint tax returns for the parties are the joint obligation of the parties. Both parties were shareholders and officers of the Corporation, and both parties are jointly liable for any tax liability arising out of the Corporation.\n8. The debt incurred for tax liability for 1982 through 1989, a period during the marriage, was not disposed of in the divorce proceedings.\nDefendant responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing, \u201c[t]he parties having had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matters in the divorce action, the divorce decree being dispositive on the issue, the [district court] should dismiss Plaintiffs complaint[.]\u201d\nPrior to the hearing set on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of Tim Williams, the tax attorney for both Plaintiff and the Corporation. Williams stated he was retained \u201cin mid 1990\u201d and subsequently discovered that neither the Corporation, Plaintiff, nor Defendant had filed tax returns for the period 1983-92. Williams further testified that since the Corporation was a sub-chapter S corporation \u201cthe bottom line income or loss would pass through to the Schuellers\u2019 individual return(s)\u201d and therefore the individual returns could not be completed until the corporate return was completed.\nDISCUSSION\nPlaintiff contends that, since the parties believed and presented testimony to the district court that all tax returns had been filed, the district court did not, indeed could not, consider the allocation of the various tax liabilities. In response, Defendant argues that even though the word \u201ctax\u201d does not appear in the supplemental decree, the clear and unambiguous language of the supplemental decree makes Plaintiff responsible to \u201cpay and assume, and hold the Petitioner [Defendant] harmless therefrom, all debts\u201d of the Corporation. The outcome, then, turns on whether the term \u201call debts\u201d clearly includes the various' taxes which allegedly accrued during the marriage but were not discovered until after entry of the supplemental decree.\nDivorce decrees are to be construed as other written instruments. Satterfield v. Satterfield, 419 So.2d 601, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.1982); Sieren v. Bauman, 436 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa 1989). A district court determination that a written instrument is unambiguous as a matter of law is therefore not binding on the appellate court which may consider the legal effect of the document itself. Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 114 N.M. 778, 782, 845 P.2d 1232, 1236 (1993). Thus, we review the issue de novo as a question of law. Id.\nA contract will be found ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to different constructions. Trujillo v. CS Cattle Co., 109 N.M. 705, 709, 790 P.2d 502, 506 (1990). Whether the term \u201cdebts\u201d in a property settlement agreement or judgment includes taxes has been subject to diametrically opposed legal constructions. Compare Nelson v. Nelson, 740 P.2d 939, 940 (Wyo.1987) (\u201cdebt\u201d includes taxes) with Brooks v. Brooks, 515 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.1974) (\u201cdebt\u201d does not include taxes), writ refd n.r.e., (March 26, 1975). In interpreting this language, however, the court is not restricted to the bare words of the document but may consider the context from which it derived. Mark V, Inc., 114 N.M. at 781, 845 P.2d at 1235. The district court has an obligation to consider the tax implications of its division of the marital property. Mattox v. Mattox, 105 N.M. 479, 485, 734 P.2d 259, 265 (Ct.App.1987). The trial judge therefore will usually assign recognized tax liability when dividing the property. See, e.g., Fenner v. Fenner, 106 N.M. 36, 41, 738 P.2d 908, 913 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 7, 738 P.2d 125 (1987).\nIn the present case, the only evidence before the district court at the time the court entered the supplemental decree was that all individual and corporate tax returns had been filed appropriately. The district court obviously could not, then, consider apportionment of a tax liability of which it was totally unaware. Therefore, to conclude the phrase \u201call debts\u201d in the supplemental decree assigned all tax liability to Plaintiff is a leap we are unable to make. See Titsworth v. Titsworth, 206 Okla. 399, 244 P.2d 295, 298 (1952) (per curiam) (where divorce decree did not indicate court had considered a question of property ownership, later court should not add new terms to decree). If there is ambiguity in a written instrument, it is up to the finder of fact to initially resolve the ambiguity. C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 507, 817 P.2d 238, 241 (1991).\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse and remand for a resolution of the meaning of \u201call debts\u201d as it relates to the personal and corporate taxes allegedly discovered subsequent to the supplemental decree.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nCHAVEZ and FLORES, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": ".BLACK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Manuel I. Arrieta, Weinbrenner, Richards, Paulowsky & Ramirez, P.A., Las Cruces, for plaintiff-appellant.", "James A. Roggow, Cresswell & Roggow, P.A., Las Cruces, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "870 P.2d 159\nDale A. SCHUELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathy SCHUELLER, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 14009.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 31, 1994.\nManuel I. Arrieta, Weinbrenner, Richards, Paulowsky & Ramirez, P.A., Las Cruces, for plaintiff-appellant.\nJames A. Roggow, Cresswell & Roggow, P.A., Las Cruces, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0197-01", "first_page_order": 233, "last_page_order": 235 }