{ "id": 1552592, "name": "SUNWEST BANK OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Michael A. COLUCCI, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque, N.A. v. Colucci", "decision_date": "1994-03-10", "docket_number": "No. 20673", "first_page": "373", "last_page": "380", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 N.M. 373" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "872 P.2d 346" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 N.M. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38", "parenthetical": "statute governing interest is statute in effect at time case is filed" }, { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "statute governing interest is statute in effect at time case is filed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 P.2d 1365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599029 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723238 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "776" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "stating that discretionary award of prejudgment interest is allowed in all cases" }, { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "stating that discretionary award of prejudgment interest is allowed in all cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716933 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "1100" }, { "page": "1100" }, { "page": "1110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715050 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414-15", "parenthetical": "reversing trial court's denial of prejudgment interest because court did not make findings on equities" }, { "page": "63-64", "parenthetical": "reversing trial court's denial of prejudgment interest because court did not make findings on equities" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731536 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "considering equities of award of prejudgment interest" }, { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "considering equities of award of prejudgment interest" }, { "page": "691" }, { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725395 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 717019 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "12-13" }, { "page": "463-64" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727621 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "quoting Kueffer v. Kueffer, 110 N.M. 10, 12, 791 P.2d 461, 463 (1990)" }, { "page": "1063", "parenthetical": "quoting Kueffer v. Kueffer, 110 N.M. 10, 12, 791 P.2d 461, 463 (1990)" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "1063", "parenthetical": "\"An award of prejudgment interest is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, except when such interest should be awarded as a matter of right.\"" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575592 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-88" }, { "page": "1231-32" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "1232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720193 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" }, { "page": "1320" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "1320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 F.2d 518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 430405 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/236/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 F.2d 1391", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10551440 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/833/1391-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582436 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197", "parenthetical": "\"With a joint account, the law presumes a right of survivorship in the surviving party.\"" }, { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "\"With a joint account, the law presumes a right of survivorship in the surviving party.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727694 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "1045" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5358522 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that payments made as a result of a material mistake of fact are regarded as involuntary and are recoverable.\"" }, { "page": "374", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that payments made as a result of a material mistake of fact are regarded as involuntary and are recoverable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 F.2d 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1035000 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/541/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "905 F.2d 716", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1807276, 6122815 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/905/0716-01", "/br/115/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" }, { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716909 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "citing Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 1 and stating that restitution is created by courts for reasons of justice and equity" }, { "page": "857", "parenthetical": "citing Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 1 and stating that restitution is created by courts for reasons of justice and equity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { 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"casebody": { "judges": [ "FRANCHINI and FROST, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "SUNWEST BANK OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Michael A. COLUCCI, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMONTGOMERY, Chief Justice.\nThe principal issue in this case, discussed later in this opinion, relates to a subject arising frequently in New Mexico caselaw\u2014 prejudgment interest. We seek to clarify the circumstances under which each of the two New Mexico statutes governing an award of prejudgment interest, NMSA 1978, Sections 56-8-3 (Repl.Pamp.1986) and 56-8-4(B) (Cum.Supp.1993), is applied.\nThe ease consists of an appeal and a cross-appeal from a judgment awarding a bank restitution for a mistaken payment. On appeal, the recipient of the payment argues that the trial court misapplied the doctrine of unjust enrichment. On cross-appeal, the bank argues that the trial court erred by failing to award prejudgment interest and by awarding postjudgment interest at a variable rate. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.\nI. FACTS\nIn October 1964, Mona Florence and Sue Rutter were joint tenants in checking account No. 24-1987-4 (\u201cthe Account\u201d) at Sun-west Bank of Albuquerque (\u201cthe Bank\u201d). Mona Florence married Michael Colucci (\u201cColucci\u201d) in 1978, and at some point she and Ms. Rutter directed Sunwest Bank to add Colucci as a P.O.D. (payable on death) beneficiary to the Account. Mona Florence Colucci died in May 1990.\nAfter his wife\u2019s death, Colucci called the Bank about the Account and was told that the money in the Account did not belong to him. On June 5, 1990, Colucci went to the Bank and spoke to Arnold Cordova, who was relieving the\u2019 branch manager during the manager\u2019s vacation, about withdrawing the funds in the Account. Cordova mistakenly reviewed the signature card to another account, No. 24-79-001, a joint account between Colucci and Mrs. Colucci, rather than the correct card for the joint account (the Account) between Mrs. Colucci and Ms. Rutter. He then issued a cashier\u2019s check for the balance in the Account, $12,256.51, and gave it to Colucci.\nOn September 14, 1990, the Bank filed a complaint against Colucci for money paid by mistake and unjust enrichment, requesting interest on the money due from the date of the mistaken payment. The Bank claimed that it had mistakenly paid Colucci funds from the Account and that the money in that account belonged to Ms. Rutter, not Colucci, upon Mrs. Colucci\u2019s death. The court conducted a bench trial in April 1992 and in May entered judgment in favor of the Bank. The court concluded that the balance in the Account had been paid to Colucci by mistake and that he had been unjustly enriched. Colucci was ordered to pay the Bank $12,256.31, with postjudgment interest to be calculated \u201cat a variable rate equal to the rate paid by [the Bank] to the Federal Reserve for funds borrowed.\u201d No prejudgment interest was awarded. Colucci, by the personal representative of his estate, appeals from the judgment; and the Bank cross-appeals.\nOn appeal, Colucci argues that (1) the trial court misapplied the doctrine of unjust enrichment because it failed to consider whether Colucci was in fact unjustly enriched, and whether the enrichment was at the Bank\u2019s expense, and (2) that the Bank should not be entitled to restitution because the harm was caused by its repeated negligence and failure to exercise due diligence. We affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of the Bank.\nThe Bank contends on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to permit it to recover prejudgment interest and in setting postjudgment interest at a variable rate. We reverse the trial court on the Bank\u2019s cross-appeal and remand for further proceedings.\nII. COLUCCI\u2019S APPEAL\nWe now address the issues raised by Colucci on his direct appeal. We begin by reiterating the time-worn axioms that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the findings of fact entered by the trial court are supported by substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the judgment, e.g., Whorton v. Mr. C\u2019s, 101 N.M. 651, 653, 687 P.2d 86, 88 (1984), and that substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, e.g., Haaland v. Baltzley, 110 N.M. 585, 588, 798 P.2d 186, 189 (1990). We also note that when a party is challenging a legal conclusion, the standard of review is whether the law was correctly applied to the facts. Golden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 113 N.M. 9, 12, 820 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1991).\nColucci contends that the trial court erred in finding that he had been unjustly enriched. There is no question that \u201c[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.\u201d Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 1 (1937); see Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 110 N.M. 173, 175, 793 P.2d 855, 857 (1990) (citing Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 1 and stating that restitution is created by courts for reasons of justice and equity). Therefore, if Colucci was unjustly enriched at the Bank\u2019s expense he must make restitution to the Bank. Colucci argues that if he was enriched, it was not at the Bank\u2019s expense; he also asserts that he was not unjustly enriched.\nA person who receives a benefit has been enriched. Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 1 cmt. a. A person who receives any sort of advantage, such as possession of or some other interest in money, has been conferred a benefit. Id. \u00a7 1 cmt. b. Colucci received a benefit when the Bank gave him a cashier\u2019s check for more than $12,000, and he was thus enriched.\nColucci maintains, however, that he was not enriched at the Bank\u2019s expense, because the Bank had no interest in the funds he received except as custodian for Ms. Rutter. This argument misapprehends the relationship between a bank and its depositor. \u201cThe relationship between a bank and its depositor is a contractual relationship of debtor and creditor.\u201d Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat\u2019l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 743; 418 P.2d 191, 197 (1966). When money is deposited in a bank, the money becomes the property of the bank and the bank becomes a debtor to the depositor. 1 Raymond Natter et al., Banking Law \u00a7 9.05, at 9-19 (1994); see also In re Nat Warren Contracting Co. (Alexander & Jones v. Sovran Bank, N.A.), 905 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir.1990) (money deposited in bank becomes bank\u2019s property and depositor is creditor of bank). The funds that Colucci received belonged to the Bank, and so Colucci benefitted at the Bank\u2019s expense.\nSince Colucci clearly benefitted at the Bank\u2019s expense, the question remains whether the facts support the court\u2019s conclusion that he was unjustly enriched. A person receiving a benefit has been unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 1 cmt. a. It is often considered unjust to retain a benefit where there has been a mistake in conferring the benefit. See id. \u00a7\u00a7 15 to 55 (stating conditions under which there is right to restitution because of mistake in conferring a benefit). For example, \u201cWhere a plaintiff has paid money in the mistaken belief that an enforceable contract exists, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the money paid, as restitution.\u201d Reynolds v. Slaughter, 541 F.2d 254, 256 (10th Cir.1976) (applying New Mexico law); see also Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 15 (person is entitled to recover money paid another pursuant to supposed contract person erroneously believed to exist); Rabbit Ear Cattle Co. v. Frieze, 80 N.M. 203, 204, 453 P.2d 373, 374 (1969) (\u201cThe general rule is that payments made as a result of a material mistake of fact are regarded as involuntary and are recoverable.\u201d).\nThe Account, owned by Mrs. Colucci and Ms. Rutter, was a joint account. See Johnston v. Sunwest Bank, 116 N.M. 422, 424, 863 P.2d 1043, 1045 (1993). When Mr. Cordova, acting on behalf of the Bank, mistakenly closed out the Account, a section of the Probate Code, NMSA 1978, Section 45-6-104(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989), provided in part:\nSums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.\nMs. Rutter, as the surviving party, was the owner of the funds remaining in the Account on the death of Mrs. Colucci in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parties had a different intention when creating the account. See Barham v. Jones, 98 N.M. 195, 197, 647 P.2d 397, 399 (1982) (\u201cWith a joint account, the law presumes a right of survivorship in the surviving party.\u201d). Colucci, as a P.O.D. beneficiary of the Account, would be entitled to the account balance only upon the deaths of both Mrs. Colucci and Ms. Rutter. See \u00a7 45-6-104(B) (providing that if account is P.O.D. account, sums remaining on deposit on death of survivor of two or more original payees belong to P.O.D. payee).\nThe Bank\u2019s employee, Mr. Cordova, testified that he reviewed the wrong signature card before disbursing the funds in the Account to Colucci and that Ms. Rutter was in fact entitled to those funds. We hold that this was substantial evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the account balance was mistakenly paid to Colucci. We also hold that this finding supports the court\u2019s judgment. Because the Bank mistakenly believed that a debtor-creditor relationship existed between it and Colucci obligating it to pay the balance in the Account to him, the Bank was entitled to restitution for Colueci\u2019s unjust enrichment.\nColucci contends that the Bank should not receive restitution because of its negligence and failure to exercise due diligence. We disagree. The Restatement states: \u201cA person who has conferred a benefit upon another by mistake is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitution by the fact that the mistake was due to his lack of care.\u201d Restatement of Restitution \u00a7 59. This is so because one is not penalized for lack of care unless it results in harm to someone else. Id. \u00a7 59 cmt. a. Although the Bank may have been negligent in disbursing the funds to Colucci, its negligence caused no harm to anyone except itself and Ms. Rutter\u2014certainly not to Colucci. Colucci thus benefitted at the Bank\u2019s expense and must make restitution. See Naugle v. O\u2019Connell, 833 F.2d 1391, 1398 (10th Cir.1987) (\u2018\u201c[Restitution, based on mistake of fact, will not be denied because of forgetfulness of once known facts or negligent failure to ascertain the true facts.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Sawyer v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 236 F.2d 518, 521 (10th Cir.1956) (applying New Mexico law)). We therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment awarding the Bank $12,256.31 in restitution for money mistakenly paid.\nIII. THE BANK\u2019S CROSS-APPEAL\nWe turn now to the Bank\u2019s cross-appeal from the trial court\u2019s rulings on prejudgment and postjudgment interest. The court denied the Bank\u2019s request for prejudgment interest and awarded postjudgment interest on the judgment at a variable rate. The Bank argues that it was entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right and that the court did not have discretion to set the rate of postjudgment interest at other than the statutory rate. We basically agree with these arguments (subject to the qualification noted below concerning \u201ccountervailing equities\u201d) and reverse the trial court for the reasons given in the remainder of this opinion.\nA. Prejudgment Interest\nPrejudgment interest may be awarded under either Section 56-8-3 or Section 56-8-4(B). Section 56-8-3 allows prejudgment interest in cases on money due by contract, money received to the use of another and retained without the owner\u2019s consent, and money due on the settlement of matured accounts. Section 56-8-4(B) allows prejudgment interest in the discretion of the court after the court considers, among other things, whether the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of his or her claims and whether the defendant had previously made a reasonable and timely offer of settlement.\nThe obligation to pay prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-3 arises by operation of law and constitutes an obligation to pay damages to compensate a claimant for the lost opportunity to use money owed the claimant and retained by the obligor between the time the claimant\u2019s claim accrues and the time of judgment (the loss of use and earning power of the claimant\u2019s funds). See Economy Rentals, Inc. v. Garcia, 112 N.M. 748, 762, 819 P.2d 1306, 1320 (1991). Section 56-8-3 is construed according to Restatement of Contracts \u00a7 337 (1932); which takes the view that prejudgment interest should be awarded as a matter of right under certain circumstances. Shaeffer v. Kelton, 95 N.M. 182, 187-88, 619 P.2d 1226, 1231-32 (1980). As we recently noted:\nPrejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of right only when a party has breached a duty to pay a definite sum of money or \u201cthe amount due under the contract can be ascertained with reasonable certainty by a mathematical standard fixed in the contract or by established market prices.\u201d\nSmith v. McKee, 116 N.M. 34, 36, 859 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1993) (quoting Kueffer v. Kueffer, 110 N.M. 10, 12, 791 P.2d 461, 463 (1990)).\nIn cases falling under Section 56-8-3, where the amount owed is not fixed or readily ascertainable, the trial court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest of not more than fifteen percent. Aztec Well Servicing Co. v. Property & Casualty Ins. Guar. Ass\u2019n, 115 N.M. 475, 486, 853 P.2d 726, 737 (1993); see also Smith, 116 N.M. at 36, 859 P.2d at 1063 (\u201cAn award of prejudgment interest is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, except when such interest should be awarded as a matter of right.\u201d).\nIn past cases we have recognized that the trial court must consider the equities in each case before awarding prejudgment interest pursuant to Section 56-8-3, even when interest is otherwise awardable as a matter of right. Shaeffer, 95 N.M. at 188, 619 P.2d at 1232; see also Bellet v. Grynberg, 114 N.M. 690, 693, 845 P.2d 784, 787 (1992) (considering equities of award of prejudgment interest); Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 111 N.M. 410, 414-15, 806 P.2d 59, 63-64 (1991) (reversing trial court\u2019s denial of prejudgment interest because court did not make findings on equities). When a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right, the burden rests on the defendant to demonstrate a sufficient basis for denying such an award. Ranch World of N.M., Inc. v. Berry Land & Cattle Co., 110 N.M. 402, 404, 796 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1990). However, when the amount owed is fixed or readily ascertainable, \u201cprejudgment interest [under Section 56-8-3] generally should be awarded absent peculiar circumstances.\u201d Id.\nSection 56-8-4(B) provides for prejudgment interest from the date of filing of the complaint, not as damages, but as a management tool or penalty to foster settlement and prevent delay in all types of litigation. See Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Colleges, Inc., 117 N.M. 269, 272, 871 P.2d 365, 368 (1994) (stating that discretionary award of prejudgment interest is allowed in all cases); Southard v. Fox, 113 N.M. 774, 777, 833 P.2d 251, 254 (Ct.App.1992) (holding that \u00a7 56-8-4(B) permits award of prejudgment interest in personal injury cases). While the purpose of Section 56-8-3 is to compensate the plaintiff for damages resulting from loss of use of the funds in cases where money is due by contract, received to the use of another, or due on settlement of matured accounts, Section 56-8-4(B) helps ease the burden on our crowded court system by fostering settlement and preventing delay. Southard, 113 N.M. at 778, 833 P.2d at 255. Under Section 56-8-4(B), the trial court is given discretion to award prejudgment interest, but only after considering, among other things, whether the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay and whether the defendant made a reasonable and timely offer of settlement. Id. at 776, 833 P.2d at 253.\nColucci contends that Section 56-8-4(B) applies to the present case and that therefore an award of prejudgment interest was in the trial court\u2019s discretion. Our review of the facts has shown that Colucci received $12,256.31 from the Bank by virtue of a mistaken payment. The Bank realized its mistake and sought return of the money. Section 56-8-3(B), allowing prejudgment interest in the case of \u201cmoney received to the use of another and retained without the owner\u2019s consent expressed or implied,\u201d applies under these circumstances. See Kueffer, 110 N.M. at 12-13, 791 P.2d at 463-64 (applying \u00a7 56-8-3(B)). Colucci retained and had the use of the Bank\u2019s money without its consent; the Bank was therefore entitled (absent countervailing equities) to an award of prejudgment interest at a rate of not more than fifteen percent. Because Colucci breached a duty to pay a definite sum of money, the Bank should have been awarded prejudgment interest as a matter of right (absent countervailing equities). See Smith, 116 N.M. at 36, 859 P.2d at 1063.\nThe trial court did not offer any explanation for its denial of prejudgment interest. The defendant has the burden to demonstrate a sufficient basis for denial of prejudgment interest when Section 56-8-3 applies and the amount owed is ascertainable with reasonable certainty. See Ranch World, 110 N.M. at 404, 796 P.2d at 1100. In the absence of any findings by the trial court to justify its denial of prejudgment interest, we hold that the denial was an abuse of discretion (again, assuming there were no countervailing equities). See id. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for consideration of the question whether any equities dictate that the Bank should not receive what we have held it is otherwise entitled to as a matter of right \u2014 prejudgment interest, at a rate also to be determined in the court\u2019s discretion.\nWith respect to the rate of interest on an award of prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-3, we hold that the statute fixes the maximum rate (fifteen percent per annum), but does not specify the rate to be awarded in all cases. In many \u2014 perhaps most \u2014 cases, the claimant will be entitled to prejudgment interest at the fifteen-percent rate; and many of our eases have held that prejudgment interest, in the particular cases, was to be awarded \u201cat the statutory rate.\u201d See, e.g., Bellet, 114 N.M. at 691, 845 P.2d at 785; Economy Rentals, 112 N.M. at 762, 819 P.2d at 1320; Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 415, 806 P.2d at 64; Ranch World, 110 N.M. at 404, 796 P.2d at 1110; Kueffer, 110 N.M. at 12, 791 P.2d at 463. Nevertheless, Section 56-8-3 is explicit that interest \u201cshall not be more than fifteen percent\u201d (emphasis added), so we think it clear that the rate of prejudgment interest to be awarded under this statute is to be determined by the trial court in its discretion, subject to the statutory maximum of fifteen percent.\nB. Postjudgment Interest\nThe Bank contends that the trial court erred by awarding it postjudgment interest calculated at a variable rate equal to the rate paid by the Bank to the Federal Reserve Bank for funds borrowed. We agree that the court erred by awarding a variable rate of postjudgment interest. Post-judgment interest on judgments and decrees for payment of money is mandatory and accrues at the statutory rate from the date of entry of judgment, unless the judgment is based on a written instrument bearing a different rate. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 56-8-4(A) (Repl.Pamp.1986); Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 176, 730 P.2d 470, 479 (Ct.App.) (postjudgment interest is mandatory under \u00a7 56-8-4(A)), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 111, 729 P.2d 1365 (1986). The judgment in this case was not rendered on a written contract, and therefore postjudgment interest should have been calculated at the statutory rate of fifteen percent in effect at the time the complaint was filed. See Hillelson v. Republic Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 36, 38, 627 P.2d 878, 880 (1981) (statute governing interest is statute in effect at time case is filed).\nIV. CONCLUSION\nWe hold that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings and judgment that Colucci was unjustly enriched at the Bank\u2019s expense and that he should make restitution. We reverse the trial court on its failure to award prejudgment interest and on its award of post-judgment interest at a variable rate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nFRANCHINI and FROST, JJ., concur.\n. Michael Colucci died during the pendency of this appeal. On June 21, 1993, after the briefs had been filed and the case had been argued. Dawn E. Colucci, as personal representative of his estate, was substituted as a party in place of Michael Colucci pursuant to SCRA 1986, 12-301(A) (Repl.Pamp.1992).\n. A \u201cdepositor\u201d is \u201cone whose money is commingled with the general funds of a bank, who is acknowledged by the bank to be a creditor in the amount of the deposit, and who is under no obligation to permit the money to remain in the bank.\u201d 1 Natter, supra, \u00a7 9.03, at 9-15. Ms. Rutter was a depositor on the Account and was thus a creditor of the Bank in the amount of the funds deposited in that account.\n. Under the law governing the transactions at issue in this appeal, a \u201cjoint account\" was \"any account payable on request to one or more of two or more parties whether or not any mention is made of any right of survivorship.\" NMSA 1978, \u00a7 45-6-101(D) (Repl.Pamp.1989), repealed by N.M. Laws 1992, ch. 66, \u00a7 71, as of July 1, 1992. This definition of \u201cjoint account\u201d applies to the term \u201cmultiple-party account\u201d in the current version of the statute. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 45-6-201(E) (Repl.Pamp.1993).\n.Section 45-6-104(A) was repealed by N.M. Laws 1992, ch. 66, \u00a7 71, effective July 1, 1992. Current New Mexico law is substantially to the same effect. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 45-6-212(A) (Repl.Pamp.1993).\n. Section 56-8-3 provides:\nThe rate of interest, in the absence of a written contract fixing a different rate, shall be not more than fifteen percent annually in the following cases:\nA. on money due by contract;\nB. on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner\u2019s consent expressed or implied; and\nC. on money due upon the settlement of matured accounts from the day the balance is ascertained.\n. Section 56-8-4(B) provides:\nThe court in its discretion may allow interest of up to ten percent from the date the complaint is served upon the defendant after considering among other things:\n(1) if the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of the plaintiff's claims; and\n(2) if the defendant had previously made a reasonable and timely offer of settlement to the plaintiff.\n. This version of Section 56-8-4(A), in effect at the time the complaint in this case was filed, provided: \"Interest shall be allowed on judgments and decrees for the payment of money from entry and shall be calculated at the rate of fifteen percent per year, unless the judgment is rendered on a written instrument having a different rate of interest, in which case interest shall be computed at the rate specified in the instrument.\u201d\nThe statute was amended, effective June 18, 1993, to read: \"Interest shall be allowed on judgments and decrees for the payment of money from entry and shall be calculated at the rate of eight and three-quarters percent per year, unless the judgment is rendered on a written instrument having a different rate of interest, in which case interest shall be computed at a rate no higher than specified in the instrument or the judgment is based on tortious conduct, bad faith, intentional or willful acts, in which case interest shall be computed at the rate of fifteen percent.\u201d 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 112, \u00a7 1 (compiled as \u00a7 56-8-4(A) (Cum.Supp.1993)). The current statute thus sets two different rates for postjudgment interest, depending on the nature of the judgment, and continues to allow for the contract on which the judgment is based to set its own rate of post-judgment interest. In any event, an award of postjudgment interest is mandatory and is to be computed at the statutory rate.", "type": "majority", "author": "MONTGOMERY, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bruce C. Redd, Clara Ann Bowler, Albuquerque, for appellant and cross-appellee.", "Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., R. Alfred Walker, Albuquerque, for appellee and cross-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "872 P.2d 346\nSUNWEST BANK OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Michael A. COLUCCI, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.\nNo. 20673.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 10, 1994.\nBruce C. Redd, Clara Ann Bowler, Albuquerque, for appellant and cross-appellee.\nModrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., R. Alfred Walker, Albuquerque, for appellee and cross-appellant." }, "file_name": "0373-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 416 }