{ "id": 1563501, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Allen MOTES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Motes", "decision_date": "1994-10-27", "docket_number": "No. 21941", "first_page": "727", "last_page": "730", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 N.M. 727" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "885 P.2d 648" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 N.M. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580083 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "1385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597084 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "in first-degree murder case, \"evidence supporting conviction was circumstantial does not mean it was not substantial evidence\"" }, { "page": "892", "parenthetical": "in first-degree murder case, \"evidence supporting conviction was circumstantial does not mean it was not substantial evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 717011 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731614 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "867" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597058 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" }, { "page": "1319" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "1319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "due process requires each element of crime be established beyond a reasonable doubt" }, { "page": "2787", "parenthetical": "due process requires each element of crime be established beyond a reasonable doubt" }, { "parenthetical": "due process requires each element of crime be established beyond a reasonable doubt" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 616, "char_count": 11490, "ocr_confidence": 0.687, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.309550137914964e-07, "percentile": 0.6240761527023391 }, "sha256": "8382679788110ab78c0345d4aa04bb498565f7704db88c218752dca9622538a8", "simhash": "1:dd402f1a5270fa38", "word_count": 1849 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:33:20.619055+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RANSOM and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Allen MOTES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBACA, Chief Justice.\nDefendant-Appellant Charles Allen Motes (\u201cAppellant\u201d) appeals from his conviction of first-degree murder under NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1994). The conviction stems from the murder of his ex-wife, Stella Motes, on June 27, 1993. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. On appeal we address one issue: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of deliberate intent, and therefore, a conviction of first-degree murder. We review this case pursuant to SCRA 1986, 12-102(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1992), and affirm.\nI.\nThe following facts were adduced at trial. Appellant and the victim, Stella Motes (\u201cMotes\u201d), were divorced in March 1993 after being married approximately thirty-two years. Motes, who initiated the divorce, moved to Levelland, Texas in early June 1993 to live with her daughter, Stella Anne Melton. Appellant lived in Eunice, New Mexico. On Saturday June 26, 1993, Motes traveled to Eunice to spend the night with Appellant and accompany him the following day to Mexico to have dental work done. Before Motes arrived, Appellant instructed his son, Charles Lee Motes, who lived with him, not to come home that night and to sleep elsewhere. Charles Lee drove by Appellant\u2019s house at 9:00 p.m. and saw his mother\u2019s car parked on the street. At approximately midnight Appellant telephoned Stella Anne to say Motes left with her bags to Arizona with a \u201clady trucker.\u201d At 5:30 the next morning Appellant\u2019s next door neighbor, John Lawson, noticed Appellant walking around his (Appellant\u2019s) backyard. Lawson said there had been a trench in Appellant\u2019s backyard for about three months, and he saw Appellant use a backhoe tractor to cover it. When Charles Lee arrived at Appellant\u2019s home that morning, Appellant said Motes had telephoned from a truekstop in Arizona.\nAnother of Appellant\u2019s daughters, Sue Anne Heady, testified that two weeks prior to her mother\u2019s killing she was at her parent\u2019s house when they were sorting out possessions from their marriage. It had been a very tense day between the couple, and Appellant told her, \u201cI should have put her [Motes] in the hole,\u201d gesturing to the trench in his backyard. Sue Anne testified that she became suspicious after Appellant told her that Motes left for Arizona. On Sunday afternoon, June 27, 1993, Sue Anne went to Appellant\u2019s house where she and Charles Lee used the backhoe to uncover the trench and discovered their mother\u2019s body. They immediately called the police. Appellant was arrested two days later in Loving, New Mexico, and charged with first-degree murder.\nMotes\u2019s body was found almost eight feet below the surface of the ground. A plastic trash bag covered the head. Motes\u2019s purse containing her social security card, driver\u2019s license, her cigarette case, and other personal effects was found in the trench. A can of Polar brand starting fluid was also found in the trench.\nDr. Michael Ward, who performed the autopsy on Motes\u2019s body, testified that there were significant amounts of an ether-like compound in Motes\u2019s breathing passages. He also testified the plastic bag contained traces of ether and that Polar brand starting fluid contains the same type of ether found in the body. The only physical injuries he found on the body were postmortem, inflicted when the body was excavated by the backhoe. He estimated that Motes had been dead twelve to eighteen hours before she was found. Ward testified the cause of death was a combination of chemical and mechanical asphyxiation. He testified Motes was probably rendered unconscious with an ether-like compound and then buried alive. The weight of more than six feet of dirt prevented her from breathing, and she suffocated without regaining consciousness.\nAfter the State presented its case at trial, Appellant moved for directed verdict, arguing that there was insufficient proof that he killed his ex-wife. Although the motion was denied, Appellant rested without presenting evidence. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. Appellant appeals from that conviction.\nII.\nOn appeal we address whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of deliberate-intent murder. Appellant argues that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with \u201cdeliberate intent\u201d in causing Motes\u2019s death. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (due process requires each element of crime be established beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988). We hold there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted with \u201cdeliberate intent\u201d in causing Motes\u2019s death.\nAppellant argues that the State\u2019s evidence of deliberate intent related primarily to the passage of enough time to allow Appellant to form deliberate intent, and that evidence alone was insufficient for a first-degree murder conviction. Additionally, Appellant argues the evidence of his acts following the killing were insufficient to prove that he acted with deliberate intent. Appellant relies almost exclusively on State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 837 P.2d 862 (1992). In Garcia this Court held evidence that only shows an opportunity to form deliberate intent or evidence of actions to conceal identity after a killing is insufficient to prove deliberate intent. Id. at 275, 837 P.2d at 868. Indeed, the burden is on the State to prove that a defendant not only had an opportunity to form deliberate intent but did in fact form a deliberate intent to kill. Id. In the case at bar the State met that burden.\n\u201cIn reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that defendant acted with deliberate intent, we inquire whether substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial in nature, exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d State v. Vigil, 110 N.M. 254, 255, 794 P.2d 728, 729 (1990). In applying this standard, an appellate \u201ccourt must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, resolving all conflicts therein and indulging all permissible inferences therefrom in favor of the verdict.\u201d Sutphin, 107 N.M. at 131, 753 P.2d at 1319. \u201c \u2018[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019\u201d Garcia, 114 N.M. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789). Further, application of this standard \u201cdoes not involve substituting the appellate court\u2019s judgment for that of the jury in deciding the reasonable-doubt question\u201d but instead requires \u201cappellate court scrutiny of the evidence and the jury\u2019s fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.\u201d Id.\nThe evidence against Appellant is largely circumstantial. We have held, however, that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold a first-degree murder conviction. See State v. Duran, 107 N.M. 603, 605, 762 P.2d 890, 892 (1988) (in first-degree murder case, \u201cevidence supporting conviction was circumstantial does not mean it was not substantial evidence\u201d).\n\u201c \u2018Intent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the case, as it is rarely established by direct evidence.\u2019 \u201d Vigil, 110 N.M. at 255, 794 P.2d at 729 (quoting State v. Sparks, 102 N.M. 317, 320, 694 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Ct.App.1985)). When viewed as a whole, the facts surrounding Motes\u2019s death is replete with evidence that demonstrates that Appellant acted with deliberate intent. The evidence indicates that, just two weeks before Motes\u2019s body was found buried in a trench in Appellant\u2019s backyard, Appellant told Sue Anne that he \u201cshould have put her [Motes] in the hole,\u201d gesturing to the trash trench in his backyard. Expecting his ex-wife to arrive at his house that evening, Appellant instructed his son Charles Lee not to come home and to find another place to sleep. At approximately midnight Appellant called one of his daughters and said that Motes had gone to Arizona with a \u201clady trucker.\u201d The next day Appellant told Charles Lee that Motes had called from Arizona where she was having breakfast with a lady trucker. Appellant told a neighbor that she had arrived the night before only to leave again. Appellant concocted reasons for Motes leaving her car with him \u2014 she left in someone else\u2019s ear. To further support his fabrication that Motes left with her personal effects, Appellant buried them with the body, out of sight.\nEven more telling, however, is the method by which Motes was killed. There was no evidence or any physical markings on the body to indicate she struggled with, or was bound by, her killer before death. The evidence indicates the killing was over an extended period of time: Around midnight, an ether-like substance was sprayed into a plastic bag; the bag was placed over Motes\u2019s head, rendering her unconscious but still alive; sometime during early morning Motes was placed in an eight-foot deep trench, still alive; later, Motes was covered with six feet of dirt so that she would inevitably asphyxiate under its weight. It is important to note that even if Appellant had not intended to kill his ex-wife before he rendered her unconscious, he may have formed the intent just prior to placing her in the trench and burying her, as is evidenced by the fact she was buried alive. However, this determination was for the jury. See Garcia, 114 N.M. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867.\nMoreover, there was evidence Appellant possessed the means to render Motes unconscious. One witness testified seeing a can of Polar brand starting fluid in Appellant\u2019s truck before the killing. The evidence indicated Polar brand starting fluid contains the type of ether-like compound found in Motes\u2019s body. Further, the evidence indicated a can of Polar brand starting fluid was found buried with the body.\nIt is uncontroverted by Appellant that he had sufficient motive to kill his ex-wife. There was evidence Appellant was distraught about the breakup of a lengthy marriage. There was also evidence that after a tense day of dividing marital property with Motes, Appellant expressed his bitterness to Sue Anne by saying he should have put Motes in the trench in the backyard.\nEach component of evidence, viewed alone, may not be enough to conclude that Appellant acted with the requisite state of mind. However, viewed as a whole, the evidence is overwhelming. As such, the verdict was not based on the mere perception that Appellant only had an opportunity to form deliberate intent. Instead, the verdict was based on evidence that Appellant in fact carefully and deliberately planned, executed, and concealed a most heinous deed. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRANSOM and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concur.\n. Appellant was also convicted of tampering with evidence under NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5 (Repl.Pamp.1994). He does not appeal that conviction.", "type": "majority", "author": "BACA, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tom Udall, Atty. Gen., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee.", "Sammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Susan Gibbs, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "885 P.2d 648\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Allen MOTES, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 21941.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nOct. 27, 1994.\nTom Udall, Atty. Gen., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee.\nSammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Susan Gibbs, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant." }, "file_name": "0727-01", "first_page_order": 757, "last_page_order": 760 }