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    "judges": [
      "BACA, C.J., and RANSOM and FROST, JJ., concur."
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    "parties": [
      "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Randall REYNOLDS and David Johnson, Defendants-Respondents."
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      {
        "text": "OPINION\nFRANCHINI, Justice.\nOn petition of the State of New Mexico, we issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals under NMSA 1978, Sections 34-5-14(B)(3) and (4) (Repl.Pamp.1990) (significant question of constitutional law; issue of substantial public interest). In a consolidated appeal, that Court reversed a district court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to a search warrant. State v. Reynolds, 117 N.M. 23, 24, 868 P.2d 668, 669 (Ct.App.1993). There are two issues on appeal: (1) whether, under NMSA 1978, Sections 66-2-12(A)(3), 66-3-13, and 66-5-16 (Repl.Pamp.1994), a law enforcement officer is permitted to ask for a driver\u2019s license, registration, and proof of insurance once an officer stops an automobile for safety reasons; and (2) whether those statutes are consistent with the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. We answer both questions affirmatively.\nIt is uncontroverted that the police in this case made a lawful automobile stop to warn its passengers of a safety concern. The Court of Appeals held that because \u201cdetention beyond the time necessary for the purpose of [a] stop is improper,\u201d Reynolds, 117 N.M. at 26, 868 P.2d at 671, the officer\u2019s subsequent request to see the driver\u2019s license of the driver, registration, and proof of insurance was an unreasonable detention, id. at 27, 868 P.2d at 672. The detention having been unreasonable in the Court\u2019s view, the Court ordered suppression of all evidence subsequently acquired as \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree.\u201d Id.\nWe reverse and hold that when a vehicle is lawfully stopped for safety reasons, an officer may reasonably detain the vehicle and its passengers for the purpose of asking for identification, registration, and/or proof of insurance. See \u00a7 66-3-13 (stating that person operating vehicle shall display registration upon demand of police officer); \u00a7 66-5-16 (stating that person operating vehicle shall display license upon demand of police officer).\nStandard of review. Because this case involves a mixed question of law and fact, we use the substantial evidence standard for review of the facts and then make a de novo review of the trial court\u2019s application of the law to those facts. See State v. Werner, 117 N.M. 315, 317, 871 P.2d 971, 973 (1994); State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144, 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994).\nFacts and proceedings. Defendants Randall Reynolds and Frank Johnson were passengers in the cab of a small pickup truck traveling at night with its emergency lights flashing along Interstate 10. Three men were riding on the tailgate of the truck with their feet hanging close to the road surface. State police officer Frank Musitano was concerned for the safety of the tailgate passengers and stopped the truck. After approaching the truck, Officer Musitano requested identification from the tailgate passengers and for the license, registration, and proof of insurance from the driver, Patricia Bowman. He discovered that the three tailgate passengers were hitchhikers who recently had been picked up. Bowman gave Musitano a valid driver\u2019s license but could not produce registration or proof of insurance papers. Musitano noticed Reynolds \u201cfiddling around,\u201d and the officer began feeling unsafe because of the number of men, the physical .conditions, and the fact that no registration or insurance papers had been produced. Based on this feeling, he requested identification from the two Defendants and returned to his patrol car. He ran a \u201cwant and warrant check\u201d on all of the truck\u2019s occupants and ran a computer check on the truck\u2019s license plate number. After fifteen to twenty minutes, he learned that Johnson was wanted in Delaware and that the license plate belonged to a different car. Officer Musitano obtained'the VIN number from the truck and discovered that the truck had been stolen. Musitano let the hitchhikers leave but arrested Bowman, Reynolds, and Johnson. Later, officers obtained a search warrant and discovered other stolen property in the truck.\nAt a suppression hearing, Defendants argued that after the valid initial stop the detention and request for driver\u2019s identification was illegal under State v. Creech, 111 N.M. 490, 806 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.1991). The trial court denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that while it is appropriate for police officers to stop vehicles for a specific safety concern, the scope of an intrusion following that stop has to be \u201cstrictly tied to and justified by\u201d the purposes of the stop. Reynolds, 117 N.M. at 26, 868 P.2d at 671 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), for authority and example, the Court found it \u201cdifficult to see why it would be \u2018reasonable\u2019 ... to require production of a license, registration, and/or proof of insurance to facilitate a safety warning.\u201d Reynolds, 117 N.M. at 26, 868 P.2d at 671. Without addressing the statutes that require production of driver and automobile information on demand, the Court concluded that the officer in this case \u201cexceeded the scope of a reasonable inquiry\u201d after making the safety stop, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 27, 868 P.2d at 672.\nIn continuing detention cases, to determine reasonableness reviewing court must balance policeman\u2019s and government\u2019s interest in detention against the nature and scope of the intrusion. The Court of Appeals used the single quote from Terry and the narrow holding of Prouse to define its analysis as whether the particular conduct (asking for a license) was related to or justified by the reason for the initial detention (to warn passengers of a potentially unsafe situation). In our view, however, the Court of Appeal\u2019s focus was misdirected to a \u201csearch\u201d analysis instead of to a \u201cseizure\u201d analysis.\nTerry is not controlling. In Terry (a seizure and subsequent search without a warrant), the Supreme Court expressed the test as a dual one: \u201cwhether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. In order to assess the reasonableness of a particular seizure and search, the reviewing court must first \u201cfocus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen\u201d and this is done \u201cby balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.\u201d Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734-35, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)) (alteration in original). Under the facts of this case, the only question posed is whether Officer Musitano\u2019s request for identification was \u201cjustified at its inception.\u201d\nIn Prouse, the Supreme Court held that police may not randomly stop a vehicle solely to check a driver\u2019s license or car registration because a seizure of this nature is arbitrary. 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. The Court used only the balancing approach in determining reasonableness, testing the validity of the law enforcement practice \u201cby balancing its intrusion on the individual\u2019s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\u201d Id. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. Although Terry was cited in Prouse, the Court did not engage in a \u201csearch\u201d analysis insofar as it did not refer to the request for license as a \u201csearch\u201d.\nThe same year the Court wrote Prouse it published its opinion in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). There, the Court characterized the detention of an individual for purposes of ascertaining his identity as a \u201cseizure,\u201d not a \u201csearch\u201d. Id. at 50, 99 S.Ct. at 2640. Using the same balancing test as Prouse, the Court concluded that the random stop of a pedestrian to request identification was unreasonable because it was arbitrary. Id. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641. In this case, however, there is no question that Officer Musitano lawfully and properly stopped the truck. Under these circumstances, it was not arbitrary to make the stop. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (stating that purpose of Fourth Amendment is to safeguard against arbitrary invasions).\nRequesting a driver\u2019s license, registration, and proof of insurance is not a \u201csearch\u201d. For a police action to be characterized as a \u201csearch\u201d, the officer must somehow search or take an object in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring) (stating that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis of a search is whether the person has a constitutionally-protected reasonable expectation of privacy); cf. State v. Haar, 110 N.M. 517, 524, 797 P.2d 306, 313 (Ct.App.) (holding that police testing of a rifle did not compromise a legitimate interest in privacy and, consequently, was not a \u201csearch\u201d under the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 330, 795 P.2d 1022 (1990).\nA driver\u2019s license is a document specifically created for the purpose of proving that an individual is qualified to drive. It is intended to be a public document and individuals regularly display their licenses for, among other things, demonstrating their right to drive, for cashing checks, for getting into bars, or for buying liquor. Similarly, registration and insurance documents are created for the purpose of proving that the driver has complied with certain laws that must be satisfied before a person may legally operate a vehicle. When the legislature created the duty to carry a license, it also created the duty to produce the license upon request by a police officer. See \u00a7 66-5-16. Likewise, car registration and proof of insurance documents are intended to be public documents to prove that an individual has comported with the motor vehicle statutes. See \u00a7 66-5-13. Based on these facts, we believe that individuals have no legitimate subjective expectation of privacy in their license, registration, or insurance documents when they are operating a motor vehicle and an officer requests to see such documents. Consequently, it is not a \u201csearch\u201d to request those documents. See, e.g., Holder v. City of Allentown, 151 F.R.D. 552, 554 (E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that a person has no privacy interest in information in motor vehicle registration records because they are a matter of public record and are readily accessible); People v. Herrera, 124 Cal.App.3d 386, 177 Cal.Rptr. 288, 289 (1981) (stating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained in a license because it is a public record displayed routinely for purposes of identification); People v. Brooks, 405 Mich. 225, 274 N.W.2d 430, 437 (1979) (stating that the seizure and unfolding of a temporary driver\u2019s license is not a search because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a driver\u2019s license); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582-83, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (stating, in case upholding the warrantless installation of a pen register, that the Supreme Court has consistently held that individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily turn over to third parties).\nThe officer\u2019s action was a continuing detention or seizure. The question before us, then, is whether a continuing seizure was reasonable based on the officer\u2019s statutory authority to request the documents. Specifically, in this case we determine whether there is a valid government interest in holding Bowman for the period of time to check for a license, registration, and insurance; if so, we balance that interest against the degree and nature of the intrusion of her personal security. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. As in Terry, the police officer\u2019s personal interest in his own safety and protection must weigh in favor of the reasonableness of the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881.\nCases cited by Court of Appeals are distinguishable. Citing State v. Farley, 308 Or. 91, 775 P.2d 835, 836 (1989), State v. DeAr-man, 54 Wash.App. 621, 774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1989), and State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240-41 (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 182, 83 L.Ed.2d 116 (1984), for authority, the Court of Appeals asserted that \u201c[t]he majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held that a police officer who stops a vehicle under similar circumstances is not entitled to request a driver\u2019s license.\u201d Reynolds, 117 N.M. at 26, 868 P.2d at 671. We find, however, that these cases are all distinguishable from the case at bar.\nIn Farley the court based its conclusion on the fact that the Oregon legislature has expressly limited by statute an officer\u2019s scope of investigation for traffic stops. 775 P.2d at 836. Under the Oregon statutes, an officer may \u201cdetain any individual reasonably believed to have committed a violation ... only so long as is necessary to determine, for the purposes of issuing a citation, the identity of the violator and such additional information as is appropriate for law enforcement agencies in the state.\u201d Id. The court interpreted its statutes to mean that an officer could ask a \u201cdefendant to show his driver license only for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the stop.\u201d Id. In the court\u2019s opinion, the officer had no authority to ask for the driver\u2019s license in that case because the officer discovered that \u201cthe traffic infraction he was investigating had not actually occurred.\u201d Id. While we do not necessarily agree with the Farley court\u2019s reasoning that inclusion of a standard excludes all other conduct regardless of the reasonableness of the conduct under the circumstances, our statutes do not contain such a limitation.\nIn DeArman the court found that the stop was unlawful because there was no reasonable suspicion that the driver had engaged in criminal activity. 774 P.2d at 1249. As we stated above, the stop in this case was not unlawful because it was not arbitrary.\nIn Chatton an officer stopped a car when he could not see a license plate. 463 N.E.2d at 1237. He asked for identification after he walked up to the car and saw that it did in fact have temporary tags. Id. The court used the principle stated in Terry that a \u201cdetention by a law enforcement officer of an individual must ... be justified by \u2018specific and articulable facts\u2019 indicating that the detention was reasonable\u201d to determine the reasonableness of the continuing detention. Id. at 1239. In this case, however, the safety reasons were \u201cspecific and articulable facts\u201d for the initial detention, and thus the Terry initial-seizure principles are inapplicable. As stated above, after a lawful stop has been made the correct test is whether the continuing detention is reasonable in light of the \u201cbalance between the public interest and the individual\u2019s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.\u201d United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The Chatton court based its decision on its fear that allowing an officer to ask for identification after he saw that a vehicle bore valid tags would allow \u201cthe detention of the driver of any vehicle bearing temporary tags\u2014 The potential for abuse if such a rule were in effect, through arrogant and unnecessary displays of authority, cannot be ignored or discounted.\u201d Id. at 1240. The court compared the detention for request for driver\u2019s license to the random detentions struck down in Prouse. Id. We do not agree that allowing detention for identification after a lawful stop will promote arbitrary or random stops.\nOther case law addressing the issue. There are several cases that address the reasonableness of a detention for identification after a lawful stop. In State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992), a police officer stopped a car because of an equipment violation. When the car pulled over, another car traveling ahead of it also pulled to the side of the road. Another officer saw the situation and went up to the second car because he was concerned for the safety of the other officer and to determine whether the driver of the second car needed assistance. Id. 826 P.2d at 456. The driver of the first car could not produce her license and claimed that it was in her purse in the second car. After discovering that the license was not in the purse, the officer asked the driver of the second car for identification and ran a warrant check. Finding that the seizure of the second driver to run a check on his license was both reasonable and appropriate, the court stated:\nIn making any stop, whether the stop is to enforce the traffic laws or to carry out the officer\u2019s community caretaker function, an officer should be allowed to identify, with certainty, the person with whom he is dealing. This is necessary to protect himself ... from danger, to accurately prepare any required reports concerning his contact with the motorist, and to allow the officer to adequately respond to allegations of illegal conduct or improper behavior.\nId. (quoting State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 517, 826 P.2d 478, 481 (Ct.App.1991)).\nThe court in Godwin cited State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91, 464 N.W.2d 427 (Ct.App.1990), review denied, 468 N.W.2d 28 (Wis.1991), for support. In Ellenbecker, an officer asked for identification and ran a license check after determining that the driver of a car parked on the side of the road did not need assistance. Id. 464 N.W.2d at 428. The court stated that \u201c[i]n a community caretaker case, reasonableness is determined by balancing the public need and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree of and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen.\u201d Id. at 429. The court stated several reasons for permitting an officer performing a motorist assist to ask for identification, including officer reporting requirements and protecting the officer if a claim of improper behavior is made, and cited Wisconsin statutes (similar to ours) that implicitly recognize the public interest by requiring drivers to be validly licensed and to display their licenses on demand. Id. at 430. Holding that a status check is a minimal intrusion, the court held that \u201c[t]he public interest in asking for the license and conducting a status check outweighs the minimal intrusion involved.\u201d Id. The courts in God-win and Ellenbecker each held that their holdings did not conflict with the prohibition against arbitrary stops found in Delaware v. Prouse. Godwin, 826 P.2d at 457; Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d at 430.\nOther courts have held that generally, whenever a driver is validly stopped for whatever reason, it is reasonable for the officer to ask for identification and proof of insurance. See State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 57, 782 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1989); State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423, 434-35 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972, 101 S.Ct. 2051, 68 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981).\nDetention in this case was reasonable. We do not know exactly how long it took Officer Musitano to ask Bowman to produce her license and for her to produce it; apparently it took a minute or two for her to tell him that she could not find the truck\u2019s registration and proof of insurance. Given the fact that the privacy interest in the documents was nonexistent as to a police officer and the detention period de minimis, we find that requesting production of such documents after the lawful stop was reasonable. If a driver invites the attention of a police officer by engaging in unsafe driving conduct, or whenever an officer is reasonably called upon to make contact with a driver (such as at border checkpoints and community caretaker functions), the officer has the right to know with whom he is talking and may check to see that the driver is both licensed and driving a car that is registered and insured. Under the facts of this case, therefore, the detention was not unreasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.\nConclusion. The initial stop in this case was lawful, the government has a legitimate interest in making sure that all drivers are licensed and driving vehicles that are registered and insured, and the intrusion of requesting a driver\u2019s license and proof of registration and insurance was minimal; therefore, the continuing detention after the valid initial stop was reasonable. The trial court properly reftised to suppress the evidence obtained with the search warrant. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court and remand to the Court of Appeals for disposition of the other issues Defendants raised on appeal to that Court.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBACA, C.J., and RANSOM and FROST, JJ., concur.\n. Because it is the propriety of the continuing detention to check the driver\u2019s documents that is at issue and not the lawfulness of the stop or of the request of identification from Defendants, we question whether Defendants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the officer\u2019s actions in this case. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2549, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72, 89 S.Ct. 961, 965, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). This issue, however, was not raised, briefed, or argued either in the trial court or on appeal. We therefore address only the issue raised by the parties. See Galvan v. City of Albuquerque, 87 N.M. 235, 236, 531 P.2d 1208, 1209 (1975).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "FRANCHINI, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Tom Udall, Atty. Gen., Margaret McLean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for petitioner.",
      "Sammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Susan Roth, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for respondents."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "890 P.2d 1315\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Randall REYNOLDS and David Johnson, Defendants-Respondents.\nNo. 21922.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 9, 1995.\nTom Udall, Atty. Gen., Margaret McLean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for petitioner.\nSammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Susan Roth, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for respondents."
  },
  "file_name": "0383-01",
  "first_page_order": 475,
  "last_page_order": 480
}