{ "id": 1561204, "name": "Ronald E. ANDREWS and Jill Andrews, husband and wife, and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles STALLINGS, a/k/a Chuck Stallings, and Frankie Jarrell, each individually and as employees of The Ruidoso News, and Raljon Publishing, Inc., d/b/a The Ruidoso News, a New Mexico corporation, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Andrews v. Stallings", "decision_date": "1995-02-14", "docket_number": "No. 15238", "first_page": "478", "last_page": "496", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 N.M. 478" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "892 P.2d 611" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "515 P.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2769888, 2771852, 2769854, 2770902 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0639-04", "/nm/85/0639-02", "/nm/85/0639-01", "/nm/85/0639-03" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2769888, 2771852, 2770902, 2769854 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0639-04", "/nm/85/0639-02", "/nm/85/0639-03", "/nm/85/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 974", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11779201, 11778875, 11779268, 11779013, 11779333, 11779140, 11779403, 11778955, 11778605, 11778673, 11778806, 11778747, 11778717, 11779071 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0974-11", "/us/504/0974-06", "/us/504/0974-12", "/us/504/0974-08", "/us/504/0974-13", "/us/504/0974-10", "/us/504/0974-14", "/us/504/0974-07", "/us/504/0974-01", "/us/504/0974-02", "/us/504/0974-05", "/us/504/0974-04", "/us/504/0974-03", "/us/504/0974-09" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 1062", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6882, 7139, 7046, 6760, 5930, 5644, 6316, 5839, 7919, 6523, 5751, 7899 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/1062-04", "/us/429/1062-11", "/us/429/1062-09", "/us/429/1062-05", "/us/429/1062-03", "/us/429/1062-08", "/us/429/1062-10", "/us/429/1062-12", "/us/429/1062-06", "/us/429/1062-07", "/us/429/1062-02", "/us/429/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 883", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6426144, 6426241, 6427266, 6425825, 6426346, 6426477, 6426607, 6426031, 6426960, 6427378, 6426864, 6427061, 6426741, 6427161 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0883-03", "/us/479/0883-04", "/us/479/0883-13", "/us/479/0883-01", "/us/479/0883-05", "/us/479/0883-06", "/us/479/0883-07", "/us/479/0883-02", "/us/479/0883-10", "/us/479/0883-14", "/us/479/0883-09", "/us/479/0883-11", "/us/479/0883-08", "/us/479/0883-12" ] }, { "cite": "860 S.W.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10001217 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/860/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 F.Supp. 214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. 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Rev.", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809067 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "938 F.2d 185", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "741 F.Supp. 764", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7392750 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" }, { "page": "776", "parenthetical": "reporting suspicion of wrongdoing to appropriate authorities not a basis for false light invasion of privacy claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/741/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 A.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "527 Pa. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Pa.Super. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 885274 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/398/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "882 P.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563605 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" }, { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 P.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2840624 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" }, { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 F.Supp. 223", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7857874 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/607/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 S.W.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9990662 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/802/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 F.Supp. 1231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3544681 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/559/1231-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-55", "parenthetical": "publication of confidential, but lawfully obtained, matrimonial court files is not outrageous" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "490 N.Y.S.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740-42", "parenthetical": "publication of confidential, but lawfully obtained, matrimonial court files is not outrageous" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.Y.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "publication of confidential, but lawfully obtained, matrimonial court files is not outrageous" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 A.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7980941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/382/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7623", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "authorizing payment of fees to such informants" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 F.2d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2063346 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/366/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 N.M.L.Rev. 425", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.M. L. Rev.", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing history and application of tort of outrageous conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872528 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "195" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Restatement (Second" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2764435 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 F.Supp. 1457", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7413388 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1467-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/789/1457-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 F.2d 507", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1671402 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/817/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13322 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Am.Bus.L.J. 665", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Am. Bus. L.J.", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "606 So.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7491507 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/606/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "846 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787-88", "parenthetical": "assertion that some threatened action will violate the law is nondefamatory" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 W.Va. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "case_ids": [ 8580547 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "assertion that some threatened action will violate the law is nondefamatory" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/176/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L.Ed.2d 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 S.Ct. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 923", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6421922, 6421794, 6421701 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0923-03", "/us/459/0923-02", "/us/459/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 P.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10431533 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/654/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 F.Supp. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3637089 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/578/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ga.App. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 689857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/203/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 A.2d 1086", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091-92", "parenthetical": "letter to the editor speculating that plaintiff mayor and city tax collector could be \"engaged in a huge coverup\" is protected opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.J. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 343141 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "letter to the editor speculating that plaintiff mayor and city tax collector could be \"engaged in a huge coverup\" is protected opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/89/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 L.Ed.2d 641", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 S.Ct. 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "454 U.S. 1099", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6498337, 6498759, 6498856, 6498409, 6498250, 6498156, 6498963, 6498582, 6498490, 6499068, 6498685 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/454/1099-03", "/us/454/1099-08", "/us/454/1099-09", "/us/454/1099-04", "/us/454/1099-02", "/us/454/1099-01", "/us/454/1099-10", "/us/454/1099-06", "/us/454/1099-05", "/us/454/1099-11", "/us/454/1099-07" ] }, { "cite": "629 P.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Cal.Rptr. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Cal.3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2257765 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/29/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 A,2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "529 Pa. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 Pa.Super. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 891674 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/402/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 So.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7621403 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/448/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Cal.Rptr. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "terms \"worst teacher\" and \"babbler\" not susceptible of being proved true or false" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Cal.App.3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4392475 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/225/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212323 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "2704" }, { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "2706", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "2704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 A.2d 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1012", "parenthetical": "\"The media would be unduly burdened if, in addition to reporting facts about public officers and public affairs correctly, it had to be vigilant for any possibly defamatory implication arising from the report of those true facts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Conn. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 557068 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The media would be unduly burdened if, in addition to reporting facts about public officers and public affairs correctly, it had to be vigilant for any possibly defamatory implication arising from the report of those true facts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/193/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2775801 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 L.Ed.2d 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 S.Ct. 2942", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "953 F.2d 724", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10519267 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729-30" }, { "page": "730-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/953/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.W.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Mich.App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 1863958 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/197/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 767", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6208571 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775" }, { "page": "1563" }, { "page": "775" }, { "page": "1563" }, { "page": "775" }, { "page": "1563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 So.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7563293 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/531/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 P.2d 1159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708097 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.Y.S.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 A.D.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3261439 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/84/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 U.S. 75", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167317 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "\"A theory that the column cast indiscriminate suspicion on the members of the group responsible for the conduct of this governmental operation is tantamount to a demand for recovery based on libel of government, and therefore is constitutionally insufficient.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"A theory that the column cast indiscriminate suspicion on the members of the group responsible for the conduct of this governmental operation is tantamount to a demand for recovery based on libel of government, and therefore is constitutionally insufficient.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 L.Ed.2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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ANDREWS and Jill Andrews, husband and wife, and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles STALLINGS, a/k/a Chuck Stallings, and Frankie Jarrell, each individually and as employees of The Ruidoso News, and Raljon Publishing, Inc., d/b/a The Ruidoso News, a New Mexico corporation, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBLACK, Judge.\nRonald Andrews (\u201cAndrews\u201d), Jill Andrews, and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc. (\u201cthe Corporation\u201d) filed suit against Raljon Publishing, Inc., owner of the Ruidoso News, Frankie Jarrell (\u201cJarrell\u201d), editor and general manager of the Ruidoso News, and Charles Stallings (\u201cStallings\u201d), a reporter for that newspaper. Plaintiffs sued for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and prima facie tort. Plaintiffs\u2019 claims are based upon a series of articles, editorials, and statements that they allege presented false accounts of public proceedings and drew unfair inferences from Andrews\u2019 actions as both a member of the Ruidoso Village Council (\u201cthe Village Council\u201d) and promoter of the Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally (\u201cthe Motorcycle Rally\u201d). After entertaining both briefs and oral argument, the district court dismissed the complaint. We affirm.\nI. DEFAMATION\nPlaintiffs allege that beginning the second year Andrews was on the Village Council, Defendants, \u201cwith reckless disregard and malice, published false, unfair and inaccurate accounts of public proceedings, more particularly with respect to the meetings of the Ruidoso Village Council, which accounts have contained repeated claims or innuendo of malfeasance of office on the part of plaintiff, Ronald E. Andrews, all with the intent to injure the good standing of said plaintiff.\u201d Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants \u201cnegligently, recklessly, and maliciously published defamatory statements relating to plaintiffs Jill Andrews and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc., which statements were understood to be defamatory, but which were false.\u201d Defendants\u2019 allegedly defamatory statements deal generally with the authors\u2019 opinions regarding the operation of the Village of Ruidoso and the use of Andrews\u2019 elected governmental position to promote the Motorcycle Rally.\nInitially, we consider the common law tort of defamation and the limitations placed upon that tort by the First Amendment, U.S. Constitution Amendment I. At common law, a statement is considered defamatory \u201cif it has a tendency to render the party about whom it is published contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men from associating with him.\u201d Bookout v. Griffin, 97 N.M. 336, 339, 639 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1982). \u201cA defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 566 (1976) [hereinafter Restatement]; cf. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 404, 649 P.2d 462, 472 (1982) (difference between fact and opinion depends on whether ordinary person would understand words as expression of speaker\u2019s or writer\u2019s opinion, or as statement of existing fact).\nIn 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment \u201cprohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with \u2018actual malice\u2019 \u2014 that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.\u201d New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The Sullivan decision constitutionalized the common law tort of defamation. \u201cIt set a single standard for libel suits by public officials against the press in every court in the nation.\u201d Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 7 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Sack & Baron].\nSullivan and its progeny are based on the premise that \u201c[i]t is vital to our form of government that press and citizens alike be free to discuss and, if they see fit, impugn the motives of public officials.\u201d Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). Indeed, the right to criticize public officials \u201clies near the core of the First Amendment.\u201d Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1541, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Thus, at least since Sullivan, fiery political dialogue, rhetoric, and public debate have been protected under the First Amendment. See Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 107 N.M. 721, 725, 764 P.2d 492, 496 (Ct.App.1988). Therefore, the courts have been \u201cparticularly assiduous in using protections given opinion by common and constitutional law as tools to shelter strong, even outrageous, political speech.\u201d Sack & Baron, supra, at 226.\n\u201cThe actual malice requirement was thought to be necessary, because if the makers of some inevitably false statements about public officials (that is, statements made without actual malice) were not insulated from defamation liability, then there would be substantial danger that the first amendment rights of speakers would be unduly chilled.\u201d Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 91, 96 (1987). The failure to dismiss an unwarranted libel suit might necessitate long and expensive trial proceedings that would have an undue chilling effect on public discourse. See Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922, 89 S.Ct. 1776, 23 L.Ed.2d 239 (1969); Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 50 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (on issues of public importance where even nonmeritorious claim may stifle robust debate, motion to dismiss is appropriate exercise for the court); see also State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 398, 839 P.2d 139, 142 (Ct.App.1992) (recognizing chilling effect of criminal libel statute). Therefore, \u201cevery defamation action governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan contemplates a threshold, constitutional inquiry by the court concerning whether the publication at issue is reasonably capable of bearing a false, defamatory meaning.\u201d C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 Iowa L.Rev. 237, 281 (1993) [hereinafter Dienes & Levine]; see, e.g., Chapin v. Greve, 787 F.Supp. 557, 562 (E.D.Va.1992) (mem. op.) (threshold inquiry is whether article is defamatory), aff'd sub nom. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir.1993); cf. Marchiondo, 98 N.M. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468 (courts must determine in the first instance whether alleged statement was constitutionally protected expression). Based on this standard, the trial court should determine, at the earliest possible stage, whether the plaintiff can establish that statements regarding a public figure are (1) false; (2) defamatory; and (3) evidence of actual malice. See Dienes & Levine, supra, at 281-83.\nThe Sullivan standard applies to Andrews as an elected official. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67, 85 S.Ct. 209, 212, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Where public figures are involved in issues of public concern, the Constitution contemplates a bias in favor of free speech. This bias sometimes works to the detriment of the right of public figures to obtain compensation for damage to their reputations. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977).\nIt is within this legal framework that we measure Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations.\nA. February U, 1991\nPlaintiffs identify an article regarding the departure of the city manager, Charles Norwood, as the opening salvo in Defendants\u2019 \u201cpattern of malicious, reckless and bad faith conduct, in both investigation and reporting, with the purpose and effect of defaming the good characters and reputations of plaintiffs.\u201d The article rhetorically raises ten questions as to why Norwood might have resigned. Plaintiffs specifically target question seven, \u201cDid you, Mr. Norwood, get tired of the village\u2019s appearance of impropriety by having the same people serve on several boards where money switches hands.\u201d However, because defamatory statements must be \u201cconcerning the plaintiff[,]\u201d SCRA 1986, 13-1002(B)(3) (Repl.1991), none of the Plaintiffs has a legal basis to complain about the question regarding the \u201cvillage\u2019s appearance of impropriety.\u201d\nIn Sullivan, the jury found that readers of a New York Times advertisement could fairly infer that the accusations of misconduct made against the police actually defamed Sullivan as Commissioner of Public Affairs. The United States Supreme Court rejected this finding of the Alabama jury and the state appellate courts that affirmed it, saying:\nThere is no legal alchemy by which a State may thus create the cause of action that would otherwise be denied for a publication which, as respondent himself said of the advertisement, \u201creflects not only on me but on the other Commissioners and the community.\u201d Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression. We hold that such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those operations.\nSullivan, 376 U.S. at 292, 84 S.Ct. at 732 (footnote omitted); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83, 86 S.Ct. 669, 674, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966) (\u201cA theory that the column cast indiscriminate suspicion on the members of the group responsible for the conduct of this governmental operation is tantamount to a demand for recovery based on libel of government, and therefore is constitutionally insufficient.\u201d).\nThis does not mean that the First Amendment should be read to automatically prohibit actions for group defamation, even if the group is composed of government officials. See Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793 n. 4 (1981). However, \u201c[i]n a close case on the issue of whether defamatory speech is \u2018of and concerning\u2019 an individual or the government itself, it should be construed as of and concerning the government.\u201d Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation \u00a7 2.28[3], at 2-99 (1994) [hereinafter Smolla]. Thus, when the criticism can legitimately be interpreted as criticism of a government entity, rather than a government official, the First Amendment requires adoption of the former interpretation. Id.; see Sack & Baron, supra, at 164-65; see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law \u00a7 12-12, at 863 (2d ed. 1988) (\u201c[Bjeeause critical discussion of government ordinarily involves attacks on individual officials as well as impersonal criticisms of government policy, all defamation claims of aggrieved public officials must be examined closely in order to close what would otherwise be a back door to official censorship.\u201d). The statement challenged by Andrews regarding \u201cthe Village\u2019s appearance of impropriety\u201d is, on its face, criticism of a government entity and therefore is not a proper basis for a defamation claim by a government official. See Saenz v. Morris, 106 N.M. 530, 534, 746 P.2d 159, 163 (Ct. App.) (impersonal criticism of government is not libel of government official), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987); cf. Johnson v. Delta-Democrat Publishing Co., 531 So.2d 811, 815 (Miss.1988) (editorial focusing on city council did not defame defendant individually).\nPlaintiffs also complain about the statement: \u201cAnd then there\u2019s Councilor Andrews who helped approve the members on the Lodgers Tax Committee and their budget, only to receive $3,000 from the same tax committee to help advertise his Golden Aspen (motorcycle) Rally, a for-profit corporation.\u201d The complaint alleges that this statement \u201cimplies malfeasance in office, which is untrue and unjustified.\u201d Andrews does not allege, however, that anything in the statement is untrue. These allegations are insufficient. \u201cTruth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned.\u201d Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. at 216. Thus, the First Amendment requires that \u201ca public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of. the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation.\u201d Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1563, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986). Since Plaintiffs do not claim that the statements are untrue, the mere allegation that such statements imply malfeasance is insufficient to support a claim of defamation.\nB. April 22, 1991\nThe Ruidoso News published an article by Stallings titled, \u201cLTC could be the goose that laid the golden egg for some.\u201d Without specifying any particular statement, the complaint alleges that the article \u201cinaccurately states facts and declares an inaccurate conflict of interest on the part of Andrews in the performance of his official duties, and further implies misrepresentation on the part of Ron Andrews, individually, in the preparation of the financial statement for plaintiff, Golden Aspen Rally, Inc.\u201d\nInitially, we note that Defendants do not bear the burden to discern how this article has defamed Plaintiffs. Rather, the latter \u201cmust plead precisely the statements about which they complain.\u201d Royal Palace Homes, Inc. v. Channel 7, 197 Mich.App. 48, 495 N.W.2d 392, 396 (1992); see also Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 728 n. 6 (1st Cir.) (because defendant is entitled to know precise language challenged, plaintiff is limited to complaint in defining scope of defamation), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974, 112 S.Ct. 2942, 119 L.Ed.2d 567 (1992); cf. Smolla, supra, \u00a7 12.05[5], at 12-26.1 (defamation pleading requirements have \u201ca tradition of greater factual detail and specificity with regard to most elements of the complaint than might otherwise be true in civil actions\u201d). Reading the April 22, 1991 article, there is no statement which is so obviously defamatory as to require us to reverse the judgment of the district court. See Bitsie v. Walston, 85 N.M. 655, 659, 515 P.2d 659, 663 (Ct.App.) (\u201cA defamatory meaning will not be given to words unless such a meaning is their plain and obvious import.\u201d), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d 643 (1973).\nSecond, the factual statements are true and therefore the \u201cimplication of misrepresentation\u201d cannot constitutionally serve as the predicate for a defamation complaint by a public official regarding a matter of public concern. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. at 215-16; see also Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 477 A.2d 1005, 1012 (1984) (\u201cThe media would be unduly burdened if, in addition to reporting facts about public officers and public affairs correctly, it had to be vigilant for any possibly defamatory implication arising from the report of those true facts.\u201d)\nC. September 26, 1991\nThe Ruidoso News published an editorial titled, \u201cLaw and order took a vacation.\u201d Plaintiffs argue that the article is untrue and \u201cimplies disloyalty and malfeasance\u201d based on the statement in the article that: \u201cWe don\u2019t agree with Ruidoso\u2019s mayor and council and Ruidoso Downs\u2019 mayor who say that the problems [with the Motorcycle Rally] were no big deal.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to this editorial contains at least two infirmities.\nFirst, we again note that this statement does not refer to any Plaintiffs individually, but rather to the \u201cmayor and council.\u201d Therefore, this statement is insufficient to support Plaintiffs\u2019 claim of defamation against them personally.\nSecond, the statement was advanced in an editorial context, which indicated that it was a forum for the expression of opinion, not the recitation of fact. See generally Smolla, supra, \u00a7 6.08[3][c], at 6-28 to -34 (discussing \u201cfact/opinion problem\u201d). Although confusion existed over whether opinion on such public matters was constitutionally protected per se prior to 1990, the United States Supreme Court addressed the problem in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). That case involved a high school wrestling coach, Milkovich, who brought a defamation action in state court against a local newspaper based on a column that discussed an investigation of an incident in which the coach was involved. The column concluded:\nAnyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.\nBut they got away with it.\nIs that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high school administrators and coaches?\nI think not.\nId. at 5 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. at 2699 n. 2.\nThe Milkovich Court refused to recognize a per se \u201cFirst Amendment-based protection for defamatory statements which are categorized as \u2018opinion\u2019 as opposed to \u2018fact.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 17,110 S.Ct. at 2704. However, the Court continued to recognize the truth requirement of Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775, 106 S.Ct. at 1563, saying:\nForemost, we think Hepps stands for the proposition that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved. Thus, unlike the statement, \u201cIn my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar,\u201d the statement, \u201cIn my opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin,\u201d would not be actionable. Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.\nMilkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706 (footnote omitted).\nMilkovich did not, then, eliminate constitutional protection for political opinion, \u201cMather, the Court chose to articulate the constitutional rules in terms of the requirement that state defamation actions be based upon statements of fact provable as false.\u201d Smolla, supra, \u00a7 6.01[2], at 6-4.1 to 6-5. Moreover, Milkovich\u2019s reliance on Hepps furthered the requirement that it is the plaintiff who must allege and prove the actual falsity of the statements, \u201cwhen the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, or when the statements are matters of public concern published by a media defendant.\u201d Moyer v. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 225 Cal.App.3d 720, 275 Cal.Rptr. 494, 497 n. 2 (1990); see Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16, 110 S.Ct. at 2704. Thus, after Milkovich', \u201c[o]pinion is not protected per se by the Constitution, yet because opinion can be proved neither true nor false and a plaintiff must prove falsity to succeed, it remains nonactionable as a matter of constitutional law.\u201d Sack & Baron, supra, at 213.\nWhether or not problems with the Motorcycle Rally were a \u201cbig deal\u201d is not something Plaintiffs can prove to be false. See Moyer, 275 Cal.Rptr. at 497 (terms \u201cworst teacher\u201d and \u201cbabbler\u201d not susceptible of being proved true or false). Under Milkovich, therefore, the editorial statement challenged by Plaintiffs is not actionable.\nD. April 22, 1992\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint also alleges: Stallings stated to others that the Ruidoso Police had been told to refrain from restricting the activities of the motorcyclists, because it might precipitate altercations, which might in turn cause Ron Andrews\u2019 (implying the Golden Aspen Rally, Inc.) liability insurance to increase, thereby implying a malfeasance of office or undue influence on the part of Counselor Ron Andrews, and which statement was untrue.\nOnce again, even assuming that Stallings made the described statement and that it was untrue, Plaintiffs were not defamed. Initially, we note that Plaintiffs do not allege that Councilor Andrews or either of the other Plaintiffs told police to refrain from restricting cyclists, so it is difficult to see how any of them are defamed. See Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So.2d 271, 275 (Miss.1984) (defamation must be clearly directed toward plaintiff and \u201cnot be the product of innuendo, speculation or conjecture\u201d).\nMoreover, although Councilor Andrews might infer that these statements implied misfeasance in office, such statements disclose the factual basis for Stallings\u2019 eonelusion that the risk of altercations might in turn cause Andrews\u2019 liability insurance to increase. Statements recognizable as opinion because the factual premises are fully revealed are not a proper predicate for a defamation claim. See Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 729-30; Mathias v. Carpenter, 402 Pa.Super. 358, 587 A.2d 1, 3 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 650, 602 A,2d 860 (1992). \u201cA simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be____\u201d Restatement, supra, \u00a7 566 emt. c.\nE. April 30, 1992\nThe Ruidoso News published an article by Stallings titled, \u201cCouncilor J.D. James lashes out at board\u2019s power play.\u201d The opening sentence captures the theme and sets the tone of the article: \u201cAn angry Ruidoso Councilor J.D. James scolded Lodgers Tax Advisory Board (LTAB) Chairman Jay Francis Tuesday for what he perceived as a plan to unseat Convention Bureau Director Kathleen Miehelena.\u201d In the course of the article, however, Stallings wrote:\nThe plan to unseat Miehelena has been rumored around village hall for many weeks.\nThe speculation is that Nancy Radziewicz, a good friend of Councilor Andrews, also a voting member of the chamber, was the heir apparent for the newly created job, which would duplicate Michelena\u2019s job.\nRadziewicz and husband, Michael, are long-time friends of Andrews. They sold their West Winds Lodge to the councilor and, according to a statement Andrews made last year, they still carry his mortgage.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that these statements were \u201cimplying a use of office on the part of Ron Andrews for personal financial protection or gain, which is untrue.\u201d However, there is no fair inference that Andrews was doing anything illegal Or immoral, only \u201cspeculation\u201d that a friend of his might get a job with the convention visitor\u2019s bureau. Such a statement is insufficient to support a claim of defamation by a public official. As the Supreme Court of California pointed out when considering a similar claim:\nThe implication that [city council members] were motivated by selfish interest rather than the public good is well within the bounds of protected political debate. A statement regarding (1) a public official\u2019s business, social, or political affiliations, and (2) how those affiliations seem reflected in decision-making hardly constitutes a libelous charge of bribery and corruption.\nOkun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.3d 442, 175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 162, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Cal.) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099, 102 S.Ct. 673, 70 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Moreover, any implication of impropriety is once again based on disclosed facts, which allows readers to form their own opinions and would therefore not even meet common law defamation standards. Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 730-31; see Restatement, supra, \u00a7 566 cmt. c.\nThe April 30, 1992 issue of the Ruidoso News also carried an article under the headline, \u201cQuick thinking really pays off.\u201d This article discusses how Lodgers Tax Advisory Board Chairman Jay Francis called the previous year\u2019s budget, \u201ca run away horse\u201d and attempted to \u201crecapture the spirit of LTC funding with new addendums to the LTC resolution.\u201d The complaint alleges that the \u201carticle states[:] \u2018Francis had said that organizations like Councilor Ron Andrews\u2019 Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally should not receive lodgers tax money\u2019, which statement is untrue, and the article further inaccurately and unfairly states what occurred at the Village Council meeting, implying malfeasance in office on the part of Councilor Ron Andrews.\u201d\nThis allegation is, at the least, ambiguous. Are Plaintiffs alleging that Francis did not say the Rally should not receive lodgers tax money or that it is untrue that the Rally should not receive such funding? Defendants are not obligated to guess how this statement is untrue, how the article \u201cinaccurately and unfairly states what occurred at the Village Council meeting,\u201d or how it was \u201cimplying malfeasance in office on the part of Councilor Ron Andrews.\u201d Our courts will not strain to find defamation. See Bitsie, 85 N.M. at 659, 515 P.2d at 663.\nF. May 11, 1992\nThe Ruidoso News published an editorial captioned, \u201cWhat happened?\u201d The editorial begins: \u201cRuidoso\u2019s Village Council is battling the budget, conducting hearings to form next year\u2019s financial plan and chip away at what Mayor Victor Alonso said is an $800,-000 deficit.\u201d The editorial also asks: \u201c[W]hat have these guys been doing while the deficit creeped up near the million dollar mark?\u201d Plaintiffs claim these statements imply \u201cthat the council had allowed or approved a budget which resulted in an $800,000 deficit, which is untrue, as opposed to balancing the budget, thereby implying a failure or misrepresentation in the performance of official duties.\u201d\nContrary to Plaintiffs\u2019 assertions, no such implication is required and such statements are not defamatory in the context of discussing the expenditure of public funds by public officials. See, e.g., Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086, 1091-92 (1982) (letter to the editor speculating that plaintiff mayor and city tax collector could be \u201cengaged in a huge coverup\u201d is protected opinion). And, once again, the statements about which Plaintiffs complain relate to actions allegedly taken by the government, i.e., the Village Council and the Mayor, not the Plaintiffs personally.\nG. June 22, 1992\nAn article by Stallings titled, \u201cCouncilor Ron Andrews lines out area law officers\u201d and another captioned, \u201cCouncilor misuses his office\u201d appeared in the June 22,1992 edition of the Ruidoso News. Plaintiffs allege that these articles \u201cmisrepresent what occurred at a Village Council meeting, misquote statements made by Andrews, and further inaccurately indicate that the council inadequately budgeted for and funded law enforcement.\u201d Once again, Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to specify in what particular way these statements were untrue justifies the district court\u2019s dismissal.\nThe June 22, 1992 edition of the Ruidoso News also carried a sketch of the new Civic Events Center with the caption:\nCouncilor Ron Andrews\u2019 Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally literature promotes that Ruidoso is building the rally a new home, which also happens to be the new Civic Events Center. The literature also claims that the rally is an official Aspenfest event of the Ruidoso Valley Chamber of Commerce. Chamber Officials disagree.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges: \u201cThe statement that the rally is not an official Aspen-fest event is untrue, and implies misrepresentation on the part of Ron Andrews, in both his official and individual capacities, as well as on the part of Golden Aspen Rally, Inc.\u201d A statement is not, however, necessarily defamatory merely because it is untrue. See Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 361, 417 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1992). In order to be defamatory, a statement must render the subject \u201ccontemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him to public hatred or contempt.\u201d Bookout, 97 N.M. at 339, 639 P.2d at 1193. Even if chamber officials disagree over whether the Motorcycle Rally is \u201can official Aspenfest event,\u201d neither Andrews nor the Corporation are defamed by such a disagreement.\nThis allegation of defamation also appears to be the only claim advanced by the Corporation. While a corporation has the right to bring a claim of defamation, \u201c[w]hether a corporation\u2019s standing in the community was actually diminished is not relevant if the publication at issue did not falsely charge the corporation itself with some kind of impropriety____\u201d Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 578 F.Supp. 266, 268 (D.Mass.1984). Therefore, this statement is insufficient to support a claim of defamation by either Andrews or the Corporation.\nH.July 2, 1992\nThe Ruidoso News published an article by Stallings titled, \u201cTaxpayers will pick up tab for rally security.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint challenges this article, arguing that:\n[The] article inaccurately implies special treatment for the Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally, in the security plan for it, as compared with other Village events, and further indicates malfeasance in office by \u201cRally owner and Village Councilor, Ron Andrews\u201d, in that he \u201cat no point in the discussion declared a conflict of interest, he voted twice\u201d, where in fact there was no conflict of interest, and his voting was lawful and appropriate. The article contains other inaccurate statements and innuendos with regard to security for and the cost of the rally.\nMerely alleging that the article \u201cimplies special treatment for the Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally\u201d or contains \u201cinnuendos with regard to security for and the cost of the rally\u201d is legally insufficient to support a claim of defamation when the matters under discussion are of public interest and involve the expenditure of public funds. The complaint does not allege any of the statements are untrue. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. at 215-16. Further, as previously discussed, whether Andrews had a conflict of interest is \u201cactionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.\u201d Restatement, supra, \u00a7 566.\nI.July 16, 1992\nStallings wrote an article titled, \u2018Where\u2019s Batman when you need him?\u201d Plaintiffs again complain that a statement in the article is misleading and inaccurate, and implies malfeasance in office. The statement at issue reads: \u201cIn the case of the indispensable motorcycle rally, we both spend and save. The trick is to be sure Andrews gets enough taxpayers\u2019 money for his private venture to add to an already handsome profit....\u201d\nAlong with the article\u2019s title and its appearance on the editorial page, the use of terms such as \u201cindispensable,\u201d \u201ctrick,\u201d and \u201chandsome\u201d indicate that this is not a factual statement which can be proven false. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775, 106 S.Ct. at 1563; cf. Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587, 594 (Okla.) (editorial stating that candidate \u201csunk to a new low\u201d and his words were \u201cdespicable and stupid\u201d insufficient to support defamation claim), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923, 103 S.Ct. 235, 74 L.Ed.2d 186 (1982).\nJ. August 10, 1992\nPlaintiffs challenge a statement in an editorial titled, \u201cLooking forward to civic center opening.\u201d The editorial focuses on the initial question: \u201cWho can speak \u2018officially\u2019 for the Village of Ruidoso?\u201d In the course of discussing various statements as to when the convention center would open, the editorial states:\nWicker recalled that this isn\u2019t the first time misinformation has been disseminated about the village\u2019s new civic events center. A couple of months ago, Councilor Ron Andrews printed in his motorcycle rally brochure that the village had built the center specifically as a home for his event. Apparently that statement was made without being cleared through the Convention and Visitors Bureau, the village manager or the council.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that \u201c[s]uch statements are untrue, and are misleading, and imply that Ron Andrews has misused his official position.\u201d Once again, a fair reading of the statements do not require such an implication, and the complaint fails to state a constitutionally permissible cause of action.\nK. August 17, 1992\nOn this date, Frankie Jarrell wrote a piece titled, \u201cThe truth shall set you free____\u201d The article begins with a quote from songwriter Bob Dylan, then states: \u201cFunny thing how some people are dying to get their names in the paper while others would give anything to slink off into anonymity. Take politicians, for example.\u201d Plaintiffs complain about the following:\nAl Junge wondered the other day what we would write about if we didn\u2019t have Councilor Ron Andrews.\nSo, Al, what\u2019s your point?\nHow many village councilors ask for and get tax money to promote their own enterprise? We can think of just one.\nHow many councilors helped draft a \u201cspecial events policy\u201d designed for their own rowdy event? We can think of only one.\nHow many councilors don\u2019t bother to declare a conflict when issues involving their business come up for debate and vote \u2014 issues like auditing lodgers? We know of one who just happens to be a lodger, and instead of declaring a conflict, participated in the debate and voted against audits, saying he wouldn\u2019t vote to have himself audited.\nHow many councilors have gone before the council asking for an amendment to an ordinance affecting land they just purchased? One that we can think of.\nHow many councilors, when they finally declare a conflict, continue to participate in discussions over their request, and even advise the council how to proceed? Just one.\nAnd, how many Ruidoso councilors have ever threatened to sue the council/village/themselves? We know of two on this council.\nWe don\u2019t make the news; we just print it.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that the foregoing \u201cinaccurately and unfairly states or represents the events as they actually occurred, and imply impropriety or malfeasance in office on the part of Ron Andrews.\u201d Once again, however, Plaintiffs do not challenge the truth of the factual statements but merely the \u201cimplication\u201d of impropriety and malfeasance. Thus, Plaintiffs do not state a claim that can withstand First Amendment scrutiny.\nL. September S, 1992\nStallings wrote an article titled, \u201cQuestions remain over motorcycle rally rules.\u201d The article begins:\nRuidoso residents may have the impression that something happened about controlling unruly bikers this year, but not much happened.\nAlthough residents called for the Ruidoso Village Council to institute protections against the violence and destruction that erupted during last year\u2019s Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally, the owner of the event won\u2019t have to do things much differently this year.\nThe majority of the article reiterates the alleged conflict of interest between Andrews acting both as an owner of the event and as a Village Councilor who supervises the Lodgers Tax Committee and the police department. Among other statements challenged by Plaintiffs are the following:\nAccording to state statutes, no elected municipal officer during his elected term shall acquire a financial interest in any new or existing business venture or business property of any kind when such officer believes or has reason to believe that the new financial interest will be directly affected by his official act.\nViolation of the provisions of that statute is grounds for removal or suspension from office.\nState statutes also contain a conflict clause that requires an elected official to disclose any conflict of interest to other members before a related vote and to have that conflict recorded in the official minutes.\nAndrews appears to have ignored that provision on several occasions such as his votes on lodgers tax allocations that included his own business, and when he vocally opposed any bond requirement or contribution toward police protection from owners of events impacting the village.\nThe article clearly discloses the factual basis for the conclusion that Andrews apparently ignored the state statute. Thus, these statements are not actionable. See Restatement, supra, \u00a7 566; cf. Long v. Egnor, 176 W.Va. 628, 846 S.E.2d 778, 787-88 (1986) (assertion that some threatened action will violate the law is nondefamatory).\nM. Conclusion\nFor the reasons discussed above, all of Andrews\u2019 defamation claims fail. In addition, the Corporation\u2019s one claim of defamation, which is based on the June 22, 1992 article, also fails. Finally, we note that we were unable to find any specific allegation that any of the articles defamed Jill Andrews. Since defamation is personal, a plaintiff has no cause of action for the defamation of his or her spouse. See Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So.2d 790, 791-92 (La.1992).\nThe district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 defamation claims. See 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1357, at 359 (1990) (\u201cWhen the claim alleged is a traditionally disfavored \u2018cause of action,\u2019 such as malicious prosecution, libel, or slander, the courts tend to construe the complaint by a somewhat stricter standard and are more inclined to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.\u201d).\nII. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS\nIn recent years, public figures increasingly have attempted to use the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim \u201cto make an end-run around the obstacles posed by defamation law\u2019s harm to reputation element and its constitutional aspects.\u201d Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the Refortification of Defamation Law\u2019s Constitutional Aspects, 26 Am.Bus.L.J. 665, 666 (1989) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Stopping the End-Run]. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988), the Supreme Court \u201cdrastically limited, if not eliminated, public officials\u2019 and public figures\u2019 ability to employ the emotional distress option to evade the obstacles imposed by defamation law.\u201d Stopping the End-Run, supra, at 668.\nMere insults, especially in the context of a political dispute, do not exceed the bounds of decency. See Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir.1987). Therefore, \u201c[t]he stringent requirements for stating a cause of action render the tort\u2019s usefulness as a weapon against pure expression, particularly by the media, rare.\u201d Sack & Baron, supra, at 678 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Conroy v. Kilzer, 789 F.Supp. 1457, 1467-68 (D.Minn.1992) (newspaper article disclosing that fire chief had interests in bars destroyed by possible arson insufficient to support claim).\nTo recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show that the defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous, and was done recklessly or with the intent to cause severe emotional distress. Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 480, 505 P.2d 68, 75 (Ct.App.1972), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 392, 564 P.2d 194, 195 (Ct.App.1977). Extreme and outrageous conduct is \u201cbeyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\u201d Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 (1965)); see generally X.E. \u201cJavier\u201d Acosta, The Tort of \u201cOutrageous Conduct\u201d in New Mexico: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm Without Physical Inju-. ry, 19 N.M.L.Rev. 425 (1989) (discussing history and application of tort of outrageous conduct).\nPlaintiffs claim intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from four specific instances.\nFirst, Plaintiffs allege that Stallings requested and received from Andrews copies of the Corporation\u2019s 1990 tax return. Plaintiffs allege that Stallings then gave information about Plaintiffs to the IRS. As a consequence of Stallings\u2019 \u201creport\u201d Plaintiffs claim that the IRS scheduled an audit of both Andrews personally and the Corporation. Plaintiffs allege that these audits were time-consuming, costly, and stressful. We cannot, however, consider it \u201catrocious\u201d that Stallings contacted the IRS to report his suspicions regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 income tax filings. Whatever Stallings\u2019 motivations, the law encourages citizens to report any suspected violation of the tax laws to the IRS. See Barker v. Lein, 366 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir.1966) (per curiam); see also 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7623 (1988) (authorizing payment of fees to such informants). Furthermore, we have not reached the point where a lawful attempt to assist law enforcement agents is considered odious. See Saunders v. Board of Directors, WHYY-TV, 382 A.2d 257 (Del.Super.Ct.1978). Therefore, such actions are not \u201cbeyond all possible bounds of decency.\u201d\nSecond, Plaintiffs allege that \u201cdefendants, and more particularly Chuck Stallings, have repeatedly attempted to interfere with or prevent the 1992 Golden Aspen Rally convention, by making [sic] and reporting that the insurance coverage therefore was totally inadequate for the event.\u201d Plaintiffs allege that Defendants accomplished this by making \u201creports\u201d to the New Mexico Department of Insurance as well as \u201cto public officials and local citizens of the Village of Ruidoso, and to the Naughton Insurance Company,\u201d which had previously insured the Motorcycle Rally. It was not, however, \u201cbeyond all possible bounds of decency\u201d for Stallings to contact the New Mexico Department of Insurance or Plaintiffs\u2019 insurance carrier while attempting to determine if the coverage was adequate. Cf. Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 740-42, 480 N.E.2d 349, 354-55 (1985) (publication of confidential, but lawfully obtained, matrimonial court files is not outrageous).\nThird, Plaintiffs claim that Stallings wrote and published an article on July 9, 1992, which reported that \u201chigh density development has been proposed for prime property across from White Mountain Meadows[.]\u201d This property had been purchased by Andrews and his wife. Plaintiffs allege that the article \u201cresulted in a protest by an adjacent land owner, who then accused the Village Council of impropriety, and thereby caused repeated confusion and delay in the lawful and appropriate lifting of a village ordinance as to such land, and resulted in a cloud on the title to the property and Ron Andrews\u2019 and Jill Andrews\u2019 inability to negotiate or complete the sales of two parcels within that property.\u201d A zoning request to a public board is, however, newsworthy. See Walters v. Linhof, 559 F.Supp. 1231, 1237 (D.Colo.1983) (mem. op.). Thus, coverage of such an event cannot be considered \u201cutterly intolerable,\u201d as Plaintiffs claim.\nFourth, the August 13, 1992 edition of the Ruidoso News carried an article by Stallings captioned, \u201cCouncilor Ron Andrews threatens to sue village.\u201d In this article Stallings wrote:\nAndrews failed in his bid at the council meeting Tuesday to delete a 1983 provision tied to his five-acre tract that limits lot size to no less than one acre.\nHowever, he said he intends to proceed with plans even if the final determination has to be brought before the courts.\nThat would have councilor Andrews suing the village he represents, which could be a bad political move if he intends to run for office in the future.\nAs a general proposition, accurate publication of newsworthy events does not give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex.Ct.App.), writ denied (June 12, 1991). More importantly, even if Andrews\u2019 statements were not intended as a threat, reporting his actual statements and concluding that the statements constituted a threat to sue the Village could hardly be \u201cbeyond all possible bounds of decency\u201d and \u201cutterly intolerable in a civilized community.\u201d See, e.g., Koch v. Goldway, 607 F.Supp. 223, 226 (C.D.Cal.1984) (rhetorical hyperbole in political dispute does not exceed bounds of decency), aff'd, 817 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.1987).\nThe district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nIII. INVASION OF PRIVACY\nNew Mexico recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy. McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162, 165, 538 P.2d 804, 807 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975). The tort is generally broken down into four categories: false light, intrusion, publication of private facts, and appropriation. See Moore v. Sun Publishing Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 383, 881 P.2d 735, 743 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 430, 882 P.2d 21 (1994). Plaintiffs\u2019 claim that Defendants placed them in a \u201cfalse light.\u201d\n\u201cFalse light\u201d invasion of privacy is \u201ca close cousin of defamation.\u201d Smolla, supra, \u00a7 10.01[2], at 10-3. In the absence of proof of a specific false statement of fact, \u201c[u]nfairness, improper tone, or unfounded implication or innuendo, even though they might sound as though they fit the phrase \u2018false light,\u2019 will no sooner support a recovery for false-light invasion of privacy than for defamation.\u201d Sack & Baron, swpra, at 565. Thus, public figures involved in matters of public concern must hurdle the same constitutionally-based limitations on false light recovery as apply to defamation claims. See Neish v. Beaver Newspapers, Inc., 398 Pa.Super. 588, 581 A.2d 619, 624-25 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 648, 593 A.2d 421 (1991); see also Hardge-Harris v. Pleban, 741 F.Supp. 764, 776 (E.D.Mo.1990) (discussing relationship between false light and defamation), aff'd, 938 F.2d 185 (8th Cir.1991). \u201c[T]he right of privacy is [therefore] generally inferior and subordinate to the dissemination of news.\u201d Blount v. T D Publishing Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 389, 423 P.2d 421, 424 (1966).\nWhile we are not willing to accept Defendants\u2019 invitation to abolish this version of the tort, Professor Kelso\u2019s observation that, \u201c[i]n the overwhelming majority of cases, false light is simply added on at the end of the complaint to give the complaint the appearance of greater weight and importance[,]\u201d appears to be apropos in the present case. J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 Santa Clara L.Rev. 783, 785 (1992). The body of Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint does almost nothing to elucidate this claim. Although the claim appears to be by all Plaintiffs, only individuals, not corporations, have a right to seek recovery for invasion of privacy. See Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Ctr., 374 F.Supp. 450, 456 (D.Md.1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048, 95 S.Ct. 2666, 45 L.Ed.2d 700 (1975). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed any such claim asserted by the Corporation.\nOnce again, as we did when discussing Plaintiffs\u2019 related defamation claims, we must note that Defendants do not bear the burden to discern how they have defamed Plaintiffs or placed them in a false light. Our review of the complaint discloses no obvious basis for a legally cognizable claim of false light invasion of privacy. Because the tort requires \u201cpublicity,\u201d the report to the IRS and investigation of or reports regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 insurance do not qualify. See, e.g., Hardge-Harris, 741 F.Supp. at 776 (reporting suspicion of wrongdoing to appropriate authorities not a basis for false light invasion of privacy claim). With regard to the media coverage of Plaintiffs\u2019 planned property development and the report of Andrews\u2019 potential suit against the Village, these are matters of public concern and, absent the showing required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, cannot be attacked under the false light rubric.\nThe district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 invasion of privacy claim.\nIV. PRIMA FACIE TORT\nNew Mexico first recognized a cause of action for prima facie tort in Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 394, 785 P.2d 726, 734 (1990). The elements of prima facie tort are: (1) defendant\u2019s lawful but intentional act; (2) defendant\u2019s intent to injure the plaintiff; (3) injury to the plaintiff; and (4) no justification for defendant\u2019s acts. Id. at 394, 785 P.2d at 734. The purpose of this newly recognized tort is \u201cto provide remedy for intentionally committed acts that do not fit within the contours of accepted torts[.]\u201d Id. at 396, 785 P.2d at 736. Thus, \u201cprima facie tort should not be used to evade stringent requirements of other established doctrines of law.\u201d Id. at 398, 785 P.2d at 738; accord Yeitrakis v. Schering-Plough Corp., 804 F.Supp. 238, 249 (D.N.M.1992) (\u201cPrima facie tort should not be permitted to duplicate, or remedy a defect in, another established cause of action.\u201d).\n\u201cAttempts to use a prima facie tort theory to overcome obstacles to suits for defamation or injurious falsehood have typically failed.\u201d Sack & Baron, supra, at 673-74. Thus, it also does not make sense to allow recovery under this new label for expressions that are protected against defamation claims. See National Nutritional Foods Ass\u2019n v. Whelan, 492 F.Supp. 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1980); see also James P. Bieg, Prima Facie Tort Comes to New Mexico: A Summary of Prima Facie Tort Law, 21 N.M.L.Rev. 327, 369 (1991) (\u201c[I]t would be incongruous to allow prima facie tort to eliminate a requirement or restrictive feature of a traditional tort, such as defamation, which expresses an important public policy \u2014 freedom of speech.\u201d). In the present case it is clear that prima facie tort is being asserted merely to circumvent the established defenses to defamation.\nPlaintiffs allege that Stallings provided information he had received from Plaintiffs regarding the Corporation\u2019s tax filings to the IRS, which led to an IRS audit. The law, however, does not support recovery in prima facie tort for Defendants\u2019 alleged reports to either the IRS or the New Mexico Department of Insurance. See, e.g., Quigley v. Hawthorne Lumber Co., 264 F.Supp. 214, 219 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (allegations that defendants furnished false reports leading to plaintiff\u2019s wrongful arrest insufficient to support prima facie tort claim).\nWith respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint regarding Defendants\u2019 coverage of Andrews\u2019 statements as a Village Councilor and the \u201chigh density\u201d development, such coverage cannot be said to be \u201cwithout justification.\u201d It is the role of a newspaper to report newsworthy events.\nThe district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 claim of prima facie tort. See Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 n. 9 (Mo.1993) (en banc) (although prima facie tort claim is normally not discarded until claim is submitted on another ground, it may be dismissed at pleading stage when claim is clearly being asserted merely to circumvent established law).\nV. CONCLUSION\nDefendants\u2019 allegedly defamatory statements against Andrews are all either protected opinion under the common law or are within the boundaries of First Amendment protection. Furthermore, we do not find any statements that could legitimately be read as defamatory of either the Corporation or Jill Andrews. Defendants\u2019 reports to public authorities regarding their concerns over Plaintiffs\u2019 taxes and insurance coverage are insufficient to support claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy, or prima facie tort.\nWe affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID, J., concurs.\nHARTZ, J., specially concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "BLACK, Judge." }, { "text": "HARTZ, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI concur in the result. I join in Sections II, III, and IV of Judge Black\u2019s thorough and thoughtful opinion. I also join in much of Section I. In particular, I agree that a complaint alleging defamation against a public official must be precise regarding (1) what statement in a newspaper article or editorial is false and (2) in what respect the statement is false. As I read the complaint, the alleged problem with the articles and editorials is that they suggested that what happened constituted misconduct by Andrews. But the complaint does not adequately allege that the newspaper either (1) falsely reported what happened or (2) expressed opinions implying the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 566 (1976).\nAlthough I agree with the result, I differ with the opinion in one respect. The opinion gives too little weight to context in determining whether a statement is \u201cof and concerning\u201d an individual.\nAn individual can sue for defamation only if the allegedly defamatory statement is \u201cof and concerning\u201d the individual. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288, 84 S.Ct. 710, 730, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The majority opinion appears to hold that an allegedly libelous statement cannot be \u201cof and concerning\u201d a public official if the statement names only \u201cthe village,\u201d \u201cthe Council,\u201d or some other public body, regardless of the nature of the statement or whether the context of the publication establishes that the statement is focused on a particular individual. The majority opinion states: \u201c[W]hen the criticism can legitimately be interpreted as criticism of a government entity, rather than a government official, the First Amendment requires adoption of the former interpretation.\u201d Majority Op., 119 N.M. at 484, 892 P.2d at 617.\nSuch a requirement is unnecessary to protect the First Amendment values espoused by the United States Supreme Court and is not required by Supreme Court precedent. Although there may be sound reasons to abolish defamation actions by public officials, \u201cthe knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy Constitutional protection.\u201d Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). \u201c[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.\u201d Id. Given this appraisal by the Supreme Court of false defamatory statements made with actual malice, it would be surprising if the Court cloaked such a statement with immunity just because the person making the statement was careful to refer to the defamed individual only by title rather than by proper name.\nIndeed, the two Supreme Court decisions that address the \u201cof and concerning\u201d requirement \u2014 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966) and Sullivan \u2014 suggest that it is the substance of the criticism (does it focus on government operations or on the individual office holder?) rather than the form (is the individual identified by official title or by proper name?) that matters.\nRosenblatt summarized the Supreme Court\u2019s position as follows: \u201c[I]n the absence of sufficient evidence that the attack focused on the plaintiff, an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations cannot be utilized to establish a libel of those administering the operations.\u201d 383 U.S. at 80, 86 S.Ct. at 673. The Court was not immunizing all attacks that name only governmental bodies. For example, the Court wrote: \u201cWere the statement at issue in this case an explicit charge that the Commissioners and Baer or the entire Area management were corrupt, we assume without deciding that any member of the identified group might recover.\u201d Id. at 81, 86 S.Ct. at 673.\nMore importantly, the Supreme Court has made clear that an individual may recover for an accusation naming a public entity if surrounding circumstances establish that the attack was directed at the individual. After all, the statement in Rosenblatt that impersonal attacks are immune from liability is prefaced by the qualification: \u201cin the absence of sufficient evidence that the attack focused on the plaintiff.\u201d Thus, Rosenblatt states, \u201cEven if a charge and reference were merely implicit, as is alleged here, but a plaintiff could show by extrinsic proofs that the statement referred to him, it would be no defense to a suit by one member of an identifiable group engaged in governmental activity that another was also attacked.\u201d Id. at 81-82, 86 S.Ct. at 673-74.\nIn Rosenblatt one of the Court\u2019s two holdings was that the trial court had erred by permitting the jury \u201cto infer both defamatory content and reference from the challenged statement itself, although the statement on its face is only an impersonal discussion of government activity.\u201d 383 U.S. at 82, 86 S.Ct. at 674. The article at issue did not mention the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court had adopted the view of the panel majority that a statement is privileged if it \u201ccan legitimately be interpreted as criticism of a government entity,\u201d then the fact that \u201cthe statement on its face is only an impersonal discussion of government activity\u201d should have disposed of the entire Rosenblatt litigation, because a \u201clegitimate interpretation\u201d of the article is that the plaintiff was not being criticized personally. But the Rosenblatt opinion implicitly rejects this view by going on to discuss the plaintiffs \u201csecond theory, supported by testimony of several witnesses, ... that the column was read as referring specifically to him[.]\u201d Id. at 83, 86 S.Ct. at 674. (The Court then disposed of this theory by holding that \u201c[e]ven accepting [plaintiff\u2019s] reading,\u201d id., the verdict must be set aside because the plaintiff may have been a public official yet the jury was not instructed that it must find actual malice. Id. at 83-88, 86 S.Ct. at 674-77.)\nSullivan is consistent with Rosenblatt. In Sullivan the Supreme Court was reviewing a jury verdict. The Court\u2019s conclusion that the newspaper advertisement criticizing the police was not \u201cof and concerning\u201d Sullivan, the police commissioner, did not rest exclusively on the language of the advertisement, which failed to mention Sullivan by name or official position. The Court wrote: \u201cAlthough the statements may be taken as referring to the police, they did not on their face make even an oblique reference to [Sullivan] as an individual. Support for the asserted reference must, therefore, be sought in the testimony of [Sullivan\u2019s] witnesses.\u201d Id. 376 U.S. at 289, 84 S.Ct. at 731. The Court then proceeded to review that testimony. Id. Such a review would have been totally unnecessary if the Court had adopted the view that the statement is immune from liability if it can be \u201clegitimately interpreted\u201d as not referring to Sullivan personally. The Court would simply have stated that Sullivan had no cause of action because the advertisement could legitimately be interpreted as criticism of the police department rather than as criticism of Sullivan himself.\nThe panel majority\u2019s approach is similar to that of the district court opinion reviewed in Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.1988), aff'd 653 F.Supp. 552 (N.D.Ill.1987). The appellate court summarized the district court\u2019s view as being \u201cthat a public official may never establish defamation by innuendo where such inferences must be drawn from allegedly defamatory statements which also render a critical assessment of governmental conduct.\u201d Id. at 1314. That view was rejected on appeal. After analyzing Sullivan and Rosenblatt, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had \u201crecognized that a public official could make out a claim where the allegedly defamatory charges were merely implicit, provided the official demonstrates that the accusations were made of and concerning him.\u201d Id. at 1316. Based on this authority, I do not believe that we can properly dismiss allegations in the complaint on the ground that they were not \u201cof and concerning\u201d Andrews just because the alleged defamatory statement does not mention Andrews by name, particularly when Andrews is mentioned by name later in the same article or editorial, or even in the same paragraph.\nI am sympathetic to the panel majority\u2019s effort to foreclose any civil action that smacks of a claim for seditious libel. But Sullivan and its progeny have already constructed a mighty fortress against such claims. \u201cA vast difference exists between a government\u2019s effort to punish speech critical of official policy or acts, where even truth was no defense, and an official\u2019s effort to clear his name of an allegation that he acted contrary to official policy and human decency, in a situation in which he must prove both falsity and actual malice.\u201d Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 538, 555 (S.D.N.Y.1984). In short, the panel majority has engaged in well-intended overkill.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "HARTZ, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles W. Durrett,' Charles W. Durrett, P.C., Alamogordo, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "William S. Dixon, Charles K. Purcell, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "892 P.2d 611\nRonald E. ANDREWS and Jill Andrews, husband and wife, and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles STALLINGS, a/k/a Chuck Stallings, and Frankie Jarrell, each individually and as employees of The Ruidoso News, and Raljon Publishing, Inc., d/b/a The Ruidoso News, a New Mexico corporation, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 15238.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 14, 1995.\nCharles W. Durrett,' Charles W. Durrett, P.C., Alamogordo, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nWilliam S. Dixon, Charles K. Purcell, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0478-01", "first_page_order": 570, "last_page_order": 588 }