{ "id": 1561211, "name": "REX, INC., licensee, and Rex Wilson, qualifying party, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMITTEE OF the STATE OF NEW MEXICO, MANUFACTURED HOUSING DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Housing Committee", "decision_date": "1995-03-14", "docket_number": "No. 21831", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "513", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 N.M. 500" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "892 P.2d 947" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "467 U.S. 1251", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6342625, 6343723, 6342478, 6344175, 6343955, 6344403, 6343220, 6343414, 6342867, 6342259, 6342011 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/1251-04", "/us/467/1251-08", "/us/467/1251-03", "/us/467/1251-10", "/us/467/1251-09", "/us/467/1251-11", "/us/467/1251-06", "/us/467/1251-07", "/us/467/1251-05", "/us/467/1251-02", "/us/467/1251-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557099 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2791632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "noting potential for abuse with successive disqualifications" }, { "page": "1035", "parenthetical": "noting potential for abuse with successive disqualifications" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "\"Statutes should be construed so as to facilitate their operation and the achievement of the goals as specified by the legislature.\"" }, { "page": "445", "parenthetical": "\"Statutes should be construed so as to facilitate their operation and the achievement of the goals as specified by the legislature.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708443 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "administrative interpretations are persuasive" }, { "page": "1320", "parenthetical": "administrative interpretations are persuasive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592829 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731637 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 F.2d 1361", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1736333 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/823/1361-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 F.Supp. 782", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3606241 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786-87", "parenthetical": "holding that EEOC's claim for greater back pay than that awarded in settlement was not barred because it vindicated the public interest through deterrence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/573/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2489121, 2489031, 2489556, 2491254, 2492535 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0704-05", "/nc/325/0704-02", "/nc/325/0704-04", "/nc/325/0704-03", "/nc/325/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C.App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Ct.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "716 F.2d 1455", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1890849 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1462-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/716/1455-01" ] }, { "cite": "805 F.2d 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1111415 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/805/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 318", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182354 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "1704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 F.2d 1539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1689744 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1541-42" }, { "page": "1543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/813/1539-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 F.2d 1007", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1094819 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009" }, { "page": "1010" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/525/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 L.Ed.2d 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 S.Ct. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 994", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6446592, 6446881, 6446787, 6446692, 6446311, 6446410, 6447083, 6446487, 6446969 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0994-04", "/us/423/0994-07", "/us/423/0994-06", "/us/423/0994-05", "/us/423/0994-01", "/us/423/0994-02", "/us/423/0994-09", "/us/423/0994-03", "/us/423/0994-08" ] }, { "cite": "511 F.2d 1352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 153022 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1361" }, { "page": "1361" }, { "page": "1361", "parenthetical": "examining both claim and issue preclusion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/511/1352-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6207529 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 F.2d 1367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 644241 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/747/1367-01" ] }, { "cite": "836 F.2d 31", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542462 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/836/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 614", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204792 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "3354" }, { "page": "626-27" }, { "page": "3353-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 20", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216237 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" }, { "page": "1657" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "1656" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "1652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6197724 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "1801" }, { "page": "289-90" }, { "page": "1802-03", "parenthetical": "reaffirming the holding of the two prior cases" }, { "page": "290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 728", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6189685 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730-32" }, { "page": "1439-40", "parenthetical": "claiming violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171755 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-43" }, { "page": "1015-17", "parenthetical": "asserting Title VII claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Tul.L.Rev. 29", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Tul. L. Rev.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33-36", "parenthetical": "listing use of collateral estoppel for arbitration in other jurisdictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "475 N.W.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Wis.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8667036 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/163/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "868 P.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Wash.2d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "855 P.2d 1223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1225-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Wash.App. 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1745423 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/70/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801", "parenthetical": "\"Fundamental to our consideration of the present appeal is recognition that in general the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion between the same parties (more familiarly referred to as res judicata or direct estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "401 N.Y.S.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38-39", "parenthetical": "\"Fundamental to our consideration of the present appeal is recognition that in general the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion between the same parties (more familiarly referred to as res judicata or direct estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.Y.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2333235 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Fundamental to our consideration of the present appeal is recognition that in general the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion between the same parties (more familiarly referred to as res judicata or direct estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/43/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725416 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "25" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563647 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "noting but declining to reach this issue" }, { "page": "865", "parenthetical": "noting but declining to reach this issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 707986 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725469 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "1000" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "1001" }, { "page": "1002-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555112 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "569" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708201 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "966" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1694, "char_count": 45854, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3029236287798303e-07, "percentile": 0.7875750671178127 }, "sha256": "994324ac04271c2ab44173110e7662ab193f161ee6b89b42953756d2f7117162", "simhash": "1:1baa2fb30c6c561b", "word_count": 7299 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:52.429175+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "REX, INC., licensee, and Rex Wilson, qualifying party, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMITTEE OF the STATE OF NEW MEXICO, MANUFACTURED HOUSING DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFROST, Justice.\nPetitioner-Appellant Rex, Inc., (Rex) appeals from an order by Resp ondent-App ellee Manufactured Housing Committee (MHC) requiring that it repay, in full, a down payment made by Dimples Atkins (Atkins) on a mobile home. Rex argues that the MHC was collaterally estopped from ordering repayment because Atkins and Rex had already settled their claims by arbitration. Rex also contends that the MHC improperly allowed Rex only one peremptory challenge at the disciplinary hearing. We reverse in part and remand.\nI. FACTS\nOn August 20, 1991, Atkins entered into a contract to purchase a customized mobile home from Rex, a dealer of manufactured homes who is licensed by the State Manufactured Housing Division (MHD). The contract was expressly contingent upon the \u201cacceptance by a finance agency\u201d of a retail installment contract or security agreement. Atkins intended to purchase the mobile home for her disabled son, and she included payments she received for the care of her son as available income on the financing application.\nOver the next three months, Atkins made down payments on the mobile home totalling $15,250. On September 20,1991, Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., (Green Tree) a financing company, conditionally approved Atkins\u2019 financing of the mobile home. Green Tree conditioned final approval on, among other things, the actual delivery of the mobile home to Atkins and upon receipt of a check for titling fees. The next month, Rex ordered and received the custom mobile home from the factory and indicated to Atkins that it was prepared to deliver the home. However, due to inclement weather and muddy conditions at the intended site of the mobile home, Atkins requested that delivery be postponed.\nOn December 31, 1991, before the home had been delivered, Atkins\u2019 son died. As a result of the death, Atkins\u2019 income dropped significantly. Green Tree notified Atkins in January that she no longer qualified for financing, stating that her change in income \u201cmade the application a dead deal.\u201d Atkins, in turn, wrote to Rex on January 15, 1992, asking that it refund her $15,250 down payment in full. She also forwarded a copy of the demand letter to the MHD, which initiated an investigation,into the matter. In March 1992 Rex notified the MHD that it would not return any of the deposit and intended to enforce the contract for the full purchase price of $54,735. Atkins then filed a civil lawsuit against Rex seeking a refund of her down payment.\nOn May 4, 1992, the MHC issued a notice of contemplated action (NCA) against Rex for failure to refund Atkins\u2019 full deposit in violation of MHD Regulations 207(B) and 207(C). These Regulations provide:\nB. In the event financing is denied or terms of approval are unacceptable to buyer and seller[,] deposits will be refunded in full. For other circumstances for which the buyer fails to complete his obligation for the purchase, deposits will be refunded as follows:\n1. Deposits on units in stock will be refunded in full less a maximum of $150.00 to help defray dealer expenses in processing the sale.\n2. Deposits on special ordered units will be refunded in full less a maximum of 10 percent of the selling price to help defray dealer expenses.\nC. The timetable for refund of deposit is:\n1. Cash deposits should be refunded within one business day, but in no case, later than 5 business days after request for refund.\n2. Check deposits should be refunded within one business day after clearing the maker\u2019s bank, but in no case, later than 5 business days.\nDeposits, N.M. Manufactured Hous.Div.Reg. 207(B)-(C), 2 N.M. Reg. No. 7, 8 (Apr. 15 1991). The NCA advised Rex that the MHC had sufficient evidence, if not rebutted or explained, to suspend or revoke Rex\u2019s dealer\u2019s license and . attach Rex\u2019s consumer protection bond. The NCA also provided for an administrative hearing upon timely request.\nFour days after the MHC issued the NCA, Rex and Atkins settled their lawsuit. The settlement agreement provided that Rex refund all but 10% of the purchase price and pay Atkins\u2019 costs and attorney\u2019s fees. Both parties agreed to arbitrate the disposition of the remaining 10%. The MHC and MHD were not parties to the arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Green Tree had not denied financing to Atkins and that, under MHD Regulation 207(B), Rex was permitted to retain a portion of Atkins\u2019 deposit up to 10% of the purchase price in order to defray its expenses in the aborted sale. The arbitrator determined that Rex\u2019s expenses totalled $3,724.24 and awarded the balance of the remaining deposit money to Atkins.\nAfter reviewing the arbitrator\u2019s decision, the MHC decided to pursue its administrative action against Rex, and a hearing was set for November 19, 1992. At the hearing, Rex attempted to peremptorily disqualify two of the MHC members under the Uniform Licensing Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 61 \u2014 1\u2014 7(C) (Repl.Pamp.1989). The MHC ruled that Rex was entitled to only one peremptory disqualification at the hearing. On November 30, 1992, the MHC issued its ruling that Rex had violated both 207(B) and 207(C). It ordered Rex to return the remaining portion of the down payment, $3,724.24, to Atkins and attached Rex\u2019s consumer protection bond for that amount. It also suspended Rex\u2019s dealer\u2019s license for thirty days but provided that the suspension would be stayed if Rex returned the payment. Finally, the MHC placed Rex\u2019s license on probation for a period of six months. The district court upheld the order of the MHC on administrative appeal.\nRex now asks this Court to review the MHC\u2019s order on two grounds. First, it claims that the MHC was collaterally es-topped by the arbitration decision between Rex and Atkins. Second, Rex argues that the MHC violated Section 61-1-7(0 by allowing Rex only one peremptory challenge of the committee members at the hearing.\nIn examining any administrative order, this Court conducts the same review as the district court and, at the same time, determines whether the district court erred in the first appeal. Padilla v. Real Estate Comm\u2019n, 106 N.M. 96, 97, 739 P.2d 965, 966 (1987); see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 61-1-23 (Repl. Pamp.1993) (Appeal to Supreme Court). Our examination is limited to assessing whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority. Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 136, 138, 637 P.2d 567, 569 (1981). \u201cAlthough the reviewing court generally may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative decisionmaker, it may correct the decisionmaker\u2019s misapplication of the law.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nII. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL\nThe issues in this case present several novel questions involving the application of collateral estoppel. We previously noted in Shovelin v. Central New Mexico Electric Cooperative, Inc., 115 N.M. 293, 297, 850 P.2d 996, 1000 (1993), that the doctrine of collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of ultimate facts or issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in a previous suit. In order for the court to apply collateral estoppel, or \u201cissue preclusion,\u201d the moving party must show that:\n(1) the party to be estopped was a party [or privy] to the prior proceeding, (2) the cause of action in the case presently before the court is different from the cause of action in the prior adjudication, (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior adjudication, and (4) the issue was necessarily determined in the prior litigation.\nId. If the moving party demonstrates each element of this test, the court must then determine whether the non-moving party \u201chad a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in prior litigation.\u201d Id.; see also Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474, 745 P.2d 380, 382 (1987).\nIn Shovelin we addressed for the first time whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of issues resolved in an administrative agency adjudicative decision. After reviewing other jurisdictions and authorities on the issue, we concluded that \u201cadministrative adjudicative determinations may be given preclusive effect if rendered under conditions in which the parties have the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue at the administrative hearing.\u201d Shovelin, 115 N.M. at 298, 850 P.2d at 1001.\nA. Collateral Estoppel and Arbitration\nNow we must consider as a matter of first impression the threshold question of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to arbitration awards. See, Sundance Mechanical & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 118 N.M. 250, 254, 880 P.2d 861, 865 (1994) (noting but declining to reach this issue). Fortunately, this Court has already examined a closely related issue: the nature and degree of judicial review the courts should give to arbitration awards. In Fernandez v. Farmers Insurance Co., 115 N.M. 622, 625, 857 P.2d 22, 25 (1993), we reaffirmed \u201cthe strong public policy in this state ... in favor of resolution of disputes through arbitration.\u201d We noted that the arbitration process \u201callows for the informal, speedy, and inexpensive final disposition of disputes, and also aids in relieving the judiciary\u2019s heavily burdened caseload.\u201d Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, we concluded that \u201c[i]n order to promote judicial economy ..., the finality of arbitration awards [should be] enforced by strict limitations on court review of those awards.\u201d Id. These considerations similarly support applying collateral estoppel to issues necessarily decided by arbitration as if they were determined by a court. Thus, we hold that \u201c[w]hen arbitration affords opportunity for presentation of evidence and argument substantially similar in form and scope to judicial proceedings, the award should have the same effect on issues necessarily determined as a judgment has.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 84 cmt. c (1980).\nWe note that other jurisdictions that have considered the application of collateral estoppel to arbitration awards have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re American Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 184, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38-39, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 (1977) (\u201cFundamental to our consideration of the present appeal is recognition that in general the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion between the same parties (more familiarly referred to as res judicata or direct estoppel) apply as well to awards in arbitration as they do to adjudications in judicial proceedings.\u201d (Footnote omitted)); Neff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 70 Wash.App. 796, 855 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that an arbitration proceeding can be the basis for collateral estoppel when the parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1004, 868 P.2d 872 (1994); Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Sys., Inc., 163 Wis.2d 304, 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct.App.) (\u201cEssential to arbitration remaining useful is the elementary principle that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to arbitration awards.\u201d), review denied, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis.1991). See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 84 (1980); Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 Tul.L.Rev. 29, 33-36 (1988) (listing use of collateral estoppel for arbitration in other jurisdictions).\nOf course, in order for a court to apply collateral estoppel to an arbitration proceeding, the movant must still demonstrate the elements of collateral estoppel: the non-movant must be a party or privy to the prior proceeding; the present cause of action must be different from the one in the prior adjudication; and the issue to be precluded must have been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the prior litigation. In addition, because arbitration proceedings tend to be more informal than judicial proceedings, with fewer procedural safeguards, the court should be particularly vigilant in examining whether the arbitration proceeding provided the parties with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues. The Court in Shovelin set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be weighed in making such a determination for administrative hearings which are equally applicable to arbitration decisions. These factors included whether the non-movant had the incentive to vigorously litigate the prior action, whether procedural differences between the two actions, such as representation by counsel, presentation of evidence, questioning of witnesses, and appellate review, would make preclusion unfair, and whether policy considerations exist to deny any preclusive effect. Shovelin, 115 N.M. at 299-301, 850 P.2d at 1002-04. Additionally, the formality of the proceedings, the scope of the arbitration, and the definiteness of the decision will influence whether an arbitrator\u2019s factual findings should be given preclusive effect. Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 84 cmt. c (1980).\nB. Arbitration of Statutory Rights\nHaving established that an arbitration decision should be given issue-preclusive effect under appropriate circumstances, we turn to the main issue in contention: Can a private arbitration award bind an administrative body? The MHC argues that a private arbitration decision should not preclude an administrative agency when it is enforcing statutory rights. For support, the MHC cites to a trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases denying preclusive effect to arbitration awards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284,104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984). All three cases involved a similar set of circumstances. In each ease, an employee who claimed he was wrongfully discharged was forced to submit his claim to binding arbitration under his union\u2019s collective bargaining agreement. After losing in arbitration, the employee filed a federal suit claiming violation of a statutory right. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39-43, 94 S.Ct. at 1015-17 (asserting Title VII claim); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 730-32, 101 S.Ct. at 1439-40 (claiming violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 286, 104 S.Ct. at 1801 (alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983). Under these circumstances the U.S. Supreme Court refused to give the arbitration decision any preclusive effect in the subsequent suit involving the plaintiffs statutory rights. The Court held in each case that the arbitration proceedings required under the collective bargaining agreement did not provide an adequate forum for protecting the federal rights that statutes were designed to safeguard. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289-90, 104 S.Ct. at 1802-03 (reaffirming the holding of the two prior cases). It therefore allowed the individuals to pursue their statutory claims despite the prior arbitration.\nHowever, this trilogy of cases differs significantly from the case before us. As the Court later explained in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991),\nFirst, [Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald ] did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants there were represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present case.\nId. at 35, 111 S.Ct. at 1657. The Gilmer Court emphasized that, in the Gardner-Denver trilogy, the employees\u2019 contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement were distinct from their statutory rights. Therefore, in bringing suit, the employees were not seeking review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision but were instead asserting independent statutory rights. Id. at 34, 111 S.Ct. at 1656.\nAlthough Gilmer involved a different issue, whether an agreement to arbitrate statutory rights should be enforced, id. at 26, 111 S.Ct. at 1652, its analysis distinguishing the Gardner-Denver trilogy is applicable to the present case. Unlike the proceedings in the Gardner-Denver line of cases, Atkins and Rex specifically agreed to arbitrate then-statutory claims and the arbitrator was authorized to resolve those claims. In addition, Rex and Atkins were in control of their arbitration claims, as opposed to the union-controlled grievance process in the Gardner-Denver cases. Thus the factors in Gardner-Denver that compelled the U.S. Supreme Court to deny preclusive effect to arbitration with respect to statutory rights are absent here, and the holding of Gardner-Denver is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the fact that Atkins\u2019 arbitration proceedings involved statutory rights is not sufficient, in itself, to deny issue preclusive effect because she specifically agreed to arbitrate the statutory claims. As the Gilmer Court noted, \u201c[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.\u201d Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).\nC. Privity Between Agencies and Private Parties\nThe MHC next argues that it cannot be collaterally estopped by the arbitration agreement between Rex and Atkins because it was not a party or privy to the proceedings. The MHC cannot be deemed a party to the first cause of action, having not participated in the private suit or in the subsequent arbitration proceedings. However, it may still be bound as a privy of Atkins. The concept of privity with respect to issue preclusion has been defined as \u201cthat relationship between two parties which is sufficiently close so as to bind them both to an initial determination, at which only one of them was present.\u201d NLRB v. Donna-Lee Sportswear Co., 836 F.2d 31, 35 (1st Cir.1987) (applying issue preclusion to the NLRB); see also First Alabama Bank v. Parsons Steel, Inc., 747 F.2d 1367, 1378 (11th Cir.1984) (\u201cA finding of privity is no more than a finding that all of the facts and circumstances justify a conclusion that non-party preclusion is proper.\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 474 U.S. 518, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986); IB James W. Moore et al., Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00b60.411[1], at III-215 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that privity has generally been found to exist between parties who are representing the interests of the same individual).\nAlthough the question of privity between an agency and a private individual is new to New Mexico, it has previously been examined in several federal cases that provide us with guidance. In EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994, 96 S.Ct. 420, 46 L.Ed.2d 368 (1975), the court considered whether the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel barred the EEOC from bringing a claim of sex discrimination against Kimberly-Clark based on a prior private claim that had already been settled by the private parties. The court concluded that the EEOC was not a privy to the earlier settlement agreement because \u201cthe EEOC sues to vindicate the public interest, which is broader than the interests of the charging parties.\u201d Id. Thus the court held that the EEOC was not barred by res judicata from using the earlier charges against Kimberly-Clark as a basis for its complaint. Id.\nThe court in EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1009 (6th Cir.1975), addressed a similar situation when the EEOC charged McLean Trucking with violating Title VII. The EEOC charge was based on the complaint of an individual who had already accepted an arbitration award in settling his private suit against McLean Trucking. The McLean Trucking court followed the Kimberly-Clark decision, stating:\nEEOC argues that neither the acceptance of the arbitration award nor the filing or settlement of a separate action by Brown, the charging party, precludes EEOC\u2019s right to bring an action in the public interest to eliminate discriminatory practices uncovered during investigation of the Brown charge. With this position we agree.\nMcLean Trucking, 525 F.2d at 1010.\nIn EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1541-42 (9th Cir.1987), the court examined a related question whether an employee\u2019s settlement with her employer rendered an EEOC action based on her complaint moot. The court noted that although the employee\u2019s personal claims were rendered moot,\n[t]he EEOC\u2019s right of action is independent of the employee\u2019s private action rights. The EEOC \u201cis not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination,\u201d but \u201cacts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.\u201d Its interests in determining the legality of specific conduct and in deterring future violations are distinct from the employee\u2019s interest in a personal remedy.\nId, at 1543 (quoting General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980)) (citation omitted). Therefore, the court concluded: \u201cBy seeking injunctive relief \u2018the EEOC promotes public policy and seeks to vindicate rights belonging to the United States as sovereign.\u2019 ... [The employee\u2019s] settlement does not moot the EEOC\u2019s right of action seeking injunctive relief to protect employees as a class and to deter the employer from discrimination.\u201d Id. Although the court cast the issue in terms of mootness, the same considerations apply in determining whether an agency\u2019s action is precluded by the private settlement. See Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 694 (7th Cir.1986) (en banc) (holding that in an ERISA claim, the Secretary of Labor\u2019s interest is separate and distinct from the private plaintiffs\u2019 interests and thus cannot be barred by the doctrine of res judicata after the private plaintiffs settle); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1462-63 (5th Cir.1983) (noting in an ERISA claim that because the Secretary of Labor seeks to vindicate a broader public interest than the private litigants, the Secretary is not precluded from relitigating issues litigated in a prior private action), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251, 104 S.Ct. 3533, 82 L.Ed.2d 839 (1984).\nThese cases persuade us that an agency, enforcing a statutory scheme, is not in privity with the private complainant when the agency is acting to vindicate a broader public interest protected under the statute. Therefore, the agency cannot be bound by a private settlement to the extent that the settlement would prevent the agency from protecting that public interest. However, different considerations apply when the agency is acting solely for the private benefit of the complaining individual and is seeking a remedy which only benefits that individual.\nThe court in EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 491 (3d Cir.1990) articulated this distinction in considering an EEOC action to recover pension benefits for a group of employees who had already settled their pension-benefit claims. In that case, the EEOC argued that it was not in privity with the individual grievants when it sought enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on their behalf because it was protecting a broader public interest. Id. at 496. The court, however, held:\nThe Commission\u2019s description of its enforcement role under the ADEA is accurate and important, but this description fails to distinguish between the EEOC\u2019s role in protecting the public interest and its role in vindicating specific private claims. While it is true that the Commission has the responsibility to protect a vital public interest that transcends the interests of any or all aggrieved individuals, we have concluded ... that the Commission\u2019s responsibilities include the representation of these grievants when it seeks individual relief on their behalf. Thus, when the Commission seeks individualized benefits under the ADEA for particular grievants, as it did in this case, the Commission functions to that extent as their representative, and the doctrine of representative claim preclusion applies.\nId.\nThis public interest-private benefit distinction was first noted in dicta by the court in Kimberly-Clark. As discussed earlier, that court held that the EEOC was not barred by res judicata from pursuing its claim against Kimberly-Clark because it sought to vindicate the public interest. However, the court went on to note that an earlier settlement by the grievants \u201cmay well limit the scope of relief that the EEOC may seek for the [grievants\u2019] private benefit.\u201d Kimberly-Clark, 511 F.2d at 1361. The court in Goodyear Aerospace subsequently applied this distinction under similar circumstances, noting that although the EEOC\u2019s action was not rendered moot by the settlement, its claim for back pay on the claimant\u2019s behalf was moot. The court held: \u201c[A]ny recovery of back pay by the EEOC would go directly to [the claimant] who has freely contracted away her right to back pay. Under these circumstances, the public interest in a back pay award is minimal.\u201d Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d at 1543; see also FTC v. AMREP Corp., 705 F.Supp. 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting that the Federal Trade Commission\u2019s suit was barred to the extent that it sought redress for purchasers who had already settled their private claims); EEOC v. American Fed\u2019n of Gov\u2019t Employees Local 1617, 657 F.Supp. 742, 750-51 (W.D.Tex.1987) (noting that because the EEOC\u2019s claim was no broader than the private grievant\u2019s claim that had already been settled, the EEOC\u2019s claim was moot); Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C.App. 226, 382 S.E.2d 874, 883-84 (holding that the Commissioner of Labor\u2019s action for back pay under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina was barred by a private settlement), review denied, 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989). But see EEOC v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 573 F.Supp. 782, 786-87 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (holding that EEOC\u2019s claim for greater back pay than that awarded in settlement was not barred because it vindicated the public interest through deterrence).\nAccordingly, we are persuaded that when an agency acts on behalf of an individual claimant and seeks individual relief, it is in privity with that claimant and may be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. However, the agency will be precluded only to the extent that it is not acting to vindicate the public interest.\nIn the case at bar the MHC argues that the purpose of the Manufactured Housing Act is to protect the general public. It therefore claims that by enforcing the Act, it is acting on behalf of the public interest. We agree that the Act expresses a strong consumer protection policy. It provides in part:\nThe purpose of the Manufactured Housing Act [this article] is to insure the purchasers and users of manufactured homes the essential conditions of health and safety which are their right and to provide that the business practices of the industry are fair and orderly among the members of the industry with due regard to the ultimate consumers in this important area of human shelter.\nNMSA 1978, \u00a7 60-14-3 (Repl.Pamp.1989) (alteration in original). We also agree generally that when the MHC enforces the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, it is acting to vindicate an important public interest. Accordingly, the MHC\u2019s conclusion that Rex violated MHD Regulation 207(B) and its decision to place Rex\u2019s license on probation for six months cannot be barred by Atkins\u2019 arbitration because the probation serves the public interest. However, the same cannot be said for the MHC\u2019s order requiring Rex to pay Atkins.\nIn the earlier proceedings the arbitrator concluded that, under MHD Regulation 207(B), Atkins was only entitled to the remaining portion of her deposit less Rex\u2019s expenses of $3,724.24. The MHC, however, continued to pursue the 207(B) claim on Atkins\u2019s behalf for the $3,724.24 already resolved by arbitration. Yet, the benefit arising out of Rex\u2019s return of the remaining portion of the deposit would inure solely to Atkins. The public interest in such an award is clearly minimal. Accordingly, the MHC should have been found to be in privity with Atkins with respect to its claim for the return of the $3,724.24.\nAlthough a finding of privity does not end our inquiry into whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, privity was the only element of collateral estoppel contested by the MHC. Therefore, we shall discuss the other elements only briefly. First, we note that the cause of actions in the two disputes are different. The arbitration involved a private cause of action for recovery of damages, whereas the administrative action was a disciplinary proceeding. Second, the issue of how much relief Atkins was entitled to under MHD Regulation 207(B) was actually litigated in the arbitration proceedings and the arbitrator reached a clear and unequivocal conclusion that necessarily determined the issue in Rex\u2019s favor. Indeed, this issue was one of the main areas of contention between the parties in the arbitration.\nThird, it is clear that Atkins had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior hearing. Atkins had ample incentive to litigate the prior action. The arbitration was her only chance to personally enforce her claim for damages under 207(B). She had no control over whether the MHC would pursue a disciplinary action against Rex nor over its choice of enforcement measures. In the arbitration the parties were represented by counsel and were given an opportunity to present evidence and argument. The arbitrator in this case was an attorney and was specifically authorized to rule on the statutory question of the application of MHD Regulation 207(B), which both parties stipulated was controlling. Further, his decision included extensive findings of fact in support of his conclusion. Accordingly, all the requirements of collateral estoppel are met and the MHC is estopped from proceeding by the prior arbitration award with respect to the disposition of the refund.\nD. Waiver\nThe MHC next argues that, even if the elements of collateral estoppel are met, Rex waived his right to assert collateral estoppel by expressly consenting to the MHC proceeding. The MHC points to the settlement agreement between Rex and Atkins in which the parties agreed that \u201c[t]he State will make its own determination on whether it wishes to proceed.\u201d The MHC argues that with this statement Rex expressly consented to the relitigation of all issues by the MHC. However, this argument lacks merit. The relevant portion of the agreement states,\nWe have agreed that Ms. Atkins will not request the State suspend the licensing proceedings, however we also agreed that Ms. Atkins will not actively pursue or encourage those proceedings either. The State will make its own determination on whether it wishes to proceed. Ms. Atkins will of course, testify if asked to do so by either party.\nWhen read in context, it is apparent that the statement is merely an agreement by Atkins not to take any further action with regard to the MHC investigation and an acknowledgement that the parties have no control over the MHC\u2019s decision to pursue disciplinary action. The agreement makes no reference at all to collateral estoppel nor to a waiver of any defense.\nAn analogous argument was rejected in Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.1987). In Deutsch, defendants stated that they \u201cwould \u2018not oppose [plaintiffs] right to file a new complaint arising out of the matters involved in the case,\u2019 \u201d when plaintiff decided not to appeal the court\u2019s dismissal without prejudice of its claim. Id. at 1364 n. 2. The court noted that the letter made no mention of issue preclusion and that it was improbable that defendants would waive issue preclusion when plaintiff was entitled to refile the dismissed complaint. Accordingly, the court held that this statement was not a waiver, and instead merely confirmed \u201cthe uncontroversial legal proposition that [plaintiff] had the right to file a new action.\u201d Id. Similarly, we cannot read the agreement between Rex and Atkins as constituting any express waiver of the defense of collateral estoppel.\nFinally, the MHC contends that collateral estoppel should not affect its order against Rex because MHD Regulation 207(C) provided an alternate basis for its ruling. MHD Regulation 207(C) states that when no purchase is made, the buyer\u2019s deposit must be refunded within five days. The MHC found, and Rex does not contest, that several months passed before Rex returned any portion of Atkins\u2019 deposit in violation of MHD Regulation 207(C). The MHC argues that this conclusion is sufficient to support its decision, including its order requiring Rex to return the remaining deposit money to Atkins and its order attaching Rex\u2019s consumer protection bond for that amount. However, the portion of the Manufactured Housing Act governing consumer protection bonds provides that such bonds serve \u201cas indemnity for any loss sustained by any person damaged ... as a result of a violation of any regulation adopted by the division.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 60-14-6(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989) (emphasis added). Accordingly, for a violation of MHD Regulation 207(C), the MHC was only entitled to attach Rex\u2019s consumer protection bond to the extent Atkins was damaged by the delay in the return of her deposit, and it could only require that amount be returned to Atkins. In addition, while the MHC could properly suspend Rex\u2019s license for a violation of MHD Regulation 207(C), it could not condition the staying of the suspension on the return of the $3,724.24.\nThus, Rex\u2019s violation of MHD Regulation 207(C) does serve as an alternate basis for the MHC\u2019s order but only to the extent that the order compensates Atkins for her losses due to that violation. However, because the order does not draw any distinction between Atkins\u2019 losses resulting from the two violations, and because the losses are not coextensive, that portion of the order awarding a refund to Atkins cannot stand based on MHD Regulation 207(C) alone. Accordingly, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the order \u2014 the paragraphs requiring Rex to pay Atkins $3,724.24 and imposing a thirty day suspension of Rex\u2019s dealer\u2019s license contingent upon payment \u2014 are reversed and remanded back to the MHC for redetermination in light of our holding that collateral estoppel bars any award of money to Atkins based on the violation of MHD Regulation 207(B). Paragraph 4 of the order placing Rex\u2019s dealer\u2019s license on probation for six months is affirmed. We note that this opinion does not affect the MHC\u2019s determination that Rex violated MHD Regulation 207(B) and 207(C), and, consequently, upon remand the MHC is still entitled to discipline Rex, if it deems necessary, using the full panoply of measures under the Manufactured Housing Act designed to vindicate the public interest, including probation, license suspension, and civil penalties.\nIII. PEREMPTORY DISQUALIFICATIONS\nRex\u2019s second claim of error on appeal is that the MHC violated the Uniform Licensing Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 61-1-7(0 (Repl.Pamp.1989), by allowing Rex only one peremptory disqualification of a committee member at the hearing. At the time of the hearing Section 61-1-7(0 provided:\nAny board member or hearing officer may be disqualified by the filing of an affidavit of disqualification as in the case of judges, but this privilege of disqualification by affidavit may not be exercised in any case in which its exercise would result in less than a quorum of the board being able to hear or decide the matter. Any disqualification of a board member which would result in less than a quorum of the board being able to hear or decide the matter shall only be for good cause shown to the board, and in any case in which a combination of disqualifications by affidavit and for good cause would result in less than a quorum of the board being able to hear or decide the matter, the disqualification or disqualifications by affidavit which would result in removing the member or members of the board necessary for a quorum shall not be effective.\nId. (emphasis added). The MHC noted that the sentence allowing for disqualification by affidavit included the language \u201cas in the case of judges.\u201d The MHC interpreted this language to mean that it should follow the rules governing disqualification of judges. The relevant statute on disqualification of district court judges, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 38-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1987), provides, in relevant part: \u201cA party to an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, ... shall have the right to exercise a peremptory challenge to the district judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried and heard---- Each party to an action or proceeding may excuse only one district judge pursuant to the provisions of this statute.\u201d See also SCRA 1986, Rule 1-088.1(A) (Repl.Pamp.1992) (\u201cNo party shall excuse more than one judge.\u201d). Accordingly, the MHC permitted Rex only one disqualification by affidavit.\nRex counters that the phrase \u201cas in the case of judges\u201d should be read to modify the phrase \u201cfiling of an affidavit of disqualification\u201d and should be viewed as merely providing guidance in the method of preparing affidavits. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 38-3-10 (Repl.Pamp.1987) (discussing timing for filing an affidavit). Rex also points to the portion of the statute reading, \u201cthe disqualification or disqualifications by affidavit which would result in removing the member or members of the board necessary for a quorum shall not be effective.\u201d Section 61-1-7(C) (emphasis added). Rex argues that the phrase \u201cor disqualifications\u201d indicates that the legislature contemplated allowing more than one peremptory disqualification.\nIn contrast, the MHC argues that the legislature inserted \u201cor disqualifications\u201d in recognition of the fact that more than one party may appear before the board and assert a peremptory disqualification. It points out that this interpretation comports with the rule discussing peremptory disqualification of judges in which each party has the right to an excusal. See \u00a7 38-3-9; SCRA 1986, Rule 1-088.1(B).\nWe find that the use of the phrase \u201cas in the case of judges\u201d is ambiguous as to what it modifies and to what it refers. \u201cA statute is ambiguous when it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.\u201d State v. Elmquist, 114 N.M. 551, 552, 844 P.2d 131, 132 (Ct.App.1992). When a statute is ambiguous, it is within the authority of the agency charged with effecting that statute to interpret it. See State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 357, 871 P.2d 1352, 1363 (1994). \u201cAdditionally, a reviewing court may, where appropriate, accord substantial weight to the interpretation given a statute or regulation by a body charged with administering such law.\u201d State ex rel. Battershell v. City of Albuquerque, 108 N.M. 658, 662, 777 P.2d 386, 390 (Ct.App.1989); see also New Mexico Pharmaceutical Ass\u2019n v. State, 106 N.M. 73, 75, 738 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1987) (administrative interpretations are persuasive). \u201cHowever, a reviewing court will overturn a clearly incorrect administrative interpretation.\u201d New Mexico Pharmaceutical Ass\u2019n, 106 N.M. at 75, 738 P.2d 1318.\nWe find that the MHC\u2019s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and facilitates the operation and achievement of the goals of the statute. Cf. Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 251, 837 P.2d 442, 445 (1992) (\u201cStatutes should be construed so as to facilitate their operation and the achievement of the goals as specified by the legislature.\u201d). In providing for peremptory disqualification, the legislature intended to allow the parties some control over the makeup of the tribunal without having to meet the rigors of showing disqualification for cause. It did not intend to hamper the agency\u2019s ability to enforce the statutes. To read this statute as allowing more than one peremptory disqualification, however, would lead to contrary results. In the case in which the board has assigned a hearing officer to oversee the proceedings, permitting unlimited challenges would allow a party the opportunity to delay the hearing unnecessarily through repeated disqualifications. Cf. Rocky Mountain Life Ins. Co. v. Reidy, 69 N.M. 36, 41, 363 P.2d 1031, 1035 (1961) (noting potential for abuse with successive disqualifications). In addition, because peremptory challenges cannot be used to reduce the number of committee members below a quorum, in the case of multiple parties appearing before the board, one party could usurp all the available peremptory challenges by filing multiple affidavits first.\nRex suggests that this Court previously affirmed the use of multiple disqualifications under Section 61-1-7 in Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198 (1979). The Reid opinion does make reference to the plaintiff having disqualified two board members under Section 61-1-7. Id. at 415, 589 P.2d at 199. However, the opinion does not disclose whether those disqualifications were peremptory or for cause, the latter of which would still be permissible under the MHC\u2019s interpretation. More importantly, this reference, appearing in the facts of the case, is mere dictum. The Court clearly did not address the propriety of multiple peremptory disqualifications or the proper interpretation of the statute. Thus Reid is inapposite. Accordingly, we affirm the MHC\u2019s decision holding that a party is entitled to only one peremptory challenge.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons we affirm the MHC\u2019s decision to allow Rex only one peremptory challenge, and we reverse paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the MHC\u2019s order requiring Rex to pay Atkins $3,724.24 and imposing a thirty-day suspension of Rex\u2019s dealer\u2019s license to be stayed upon payment, and remand the order for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur.\n. The Manufactured Housing Division (MHD) is an investigative and administrative body that regulates the manufactured-housing industry. The Manufactured Housing Committee (MHC) is a seven-member board that provides technical and policy advice for the MHD and adjudicates disputes involving violations of the Manufactured Housing Act and MHD regulations. See Manufactured Housing Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 60-14-4 to -5 (Repl.Pamp.1989).\n. Initially, Rex appealed on a third ground as well, arguing that MHD Regulation 207 conflicted with the Uniform Commercial Code. However, Rex abandoned this claim at oral argument.\n. In the Gardner-Denver line of cases, the Court also expressed several misgivings about the arbitration process which it cited as support for denying preclusive effect to arbitration. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91, 104 S.Ct. at 1803-04 (reiterating the findings of the earlier cases). However, the Supreme Court has since reconsidered these misgivings. In Gilmer, the Court noted, \"[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.\u201d Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. at 1656 n. 5 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3353-54, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).\n. We note that the relevant cases focusing on this question have not consistently framed the issue in terms of privity. However, we conclude that the issue is best analyzed under that rubric. The common thread running through the various decisions limiting an agency\u2019s statutory claim is the courts\u2019 recognition that the agency is in fact acting on behalf of an individual claimant, as that claimant\u2019s representative. See IB Moore, supra, \u00b6 0.411 [12] n. 39, at III\u2014291 (\"In some cases an agency may act on complaint or otherwise pursue recovery on the part of individuals injured by infractions of the law. In such a case the government and the represented person are in privity and a judgment has res judicata effect.\u201d).\nIn addition, although this question of privity has arisen more commonly in the context of analyzing claim preclusion, the general rule framed by the federal courts is equally applicable in examining privily under issue preclusion. See 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 4475, at 771-72 (1981) (\"Thus issue preclusion is properly extended to bind or benefit nonparties who are closely related to the arbitration or the parties, so as to ensure reasonable finality to the award.\u201d). Cf. Kimberly-Clark, 511 F.2d at 1361 (examining both claim and issue preclusion).", "type": "majority", "author": "FROST, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul R. Smith and Cynthia A. Fry, Albuquerque, for appellants.", "Tom Udall, Atty. Gen. and Allen R. Ferguson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "892 P.2d 947\nREX, INC., licensee, and Rex Wilson, qualifying party, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMITTEE OF the STATE OF NEW MEXICO, MANUFACTURED HOUSING DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 21831.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 14, 1995.\nPaul R. Smith and Cynthia A. Fry, Albuquerque, for appellants.\nTom Udall, Atty. Gen. and Allen R. Ferguson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 592, "last_page_order": 605 }