{ "id": 1561319, "name": "George S. KITCHENS and James Thomas, individually and as father, next friend, and guardian of Adam Thomas, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-in-Intervention/Appellee, Raymond Guzman and Benjamin Guzman, d/b/a Quality Auto Detailing and Bob Turner's Ford Country, Inc., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Kitchens v. Houston General Insurance", "decision_date": "1995-04-27", "docket_number": "No. 22227", "first_page": "799", "last_page": "802", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 N.M. 799" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "896 P.2d 479" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 N.M. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711390 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107-08", "parenthetical": "discussing policy of requiring motorists to file proof of financial responsibility with division of motor vehicles" }, { "page": "884-85", "parenthetical": "discussing policy of requiring motorists to file proof of financial responsibility with division of motor vehicles" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "887", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "885" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561220 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "holding that omnibus clause extends coverage \"to any subsequent permittee operating an insured vehicle as long as the named insured has given his or her initial permission to use the vehicle\"" }, { "page": "541", "parenthetical": "holding that omnibus clause extends coverage \"to any subsequent permittee operating an insured vehicle as long as the named insured has given his or her initial permission to use the vehicle\"" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "541", "parenthetical": "applying initial permission rule to second permittees based on policy of MFRA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590203 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0584-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 13586, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.05835900085294548 }, "sha256": "91e44aada102ebc392b200fe0de097b9a3e2679f803151217dbf1790b4d891a1", "simhash": "1:21dad15e1f2e953d", "word_count": 2196 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:52.429175+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "George S. KITCHENS and James Thomas, individually and as father, next friend, and guardian of Adam Thomas, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-in-Intervention/Appellee, Raymond Guzman and Benjamin Guzman, d/b/a Quality Auto Detailing and Bob Turner\u2019s Ford Country, Inc., Defendants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBACA, Chief Justice.\nGeorge Kitchens and James Thomas, individually and as father, next friend, and guardian of Adam Thomas (collectively \u201cAppellants\u201d), appeal from an order by the district court in favor of Appellees Houston General Insurance Company (Houston) denying Appellants declaratory relief. We address one issue on appeal: Whether an individual working in a business of servicing vehicles, having been given initial permission to use a covered vehicle, is subject to an exclusion for persons using covered vehicles while in the business of servicing vehicles if an accident occurs while the individual is using the vehicle solely for personal reasons. We note jurisdiction under SCRA 1986, 12-102(A)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1992), and reverse.\nI.\nOn April 24, 1991, Raymond Guzman worked at Quality Auto Detailing (Quality), an automobile detailing shop owned by his brother, Benjamin Guzman. The shop is located on the automobile sales lot of Bob Turner\u2019s Ford Country, Inc., (Turner) in Albuquerque at the corner of Interstate 25 and Lomas Boulevard (the Lomas shop). Benjamin operates another detailing shop in Albuquerque on Wyoming Boulevard (the Wyoming shop) approximately ten miles east of the Lomas shop. At both locations, Quality provides detailing services for used cars sold by Turner. Turner managers accepted the practice of Quality employees driving Turner vehicles to the Wyoming shop as being within ordinary business.\nOn April 24, 1991, Robert Scott, a Turner manager, gave Raymond the keys to a 1987 Ford with instructions to detail it. Raymond drove the vehicle to the Wyoming shop for detailing. Raymond testified that Scott was aware that he drove the car to the Wyoming shop. Scott, on the other hand, testified that he instructed Raymond to detail the vehicle at the Lomas shop. Instead of detailing the vehicle at the Wyoming shop that day, Raymond decided to detail it the following day. He locked the Wyoming shop and drove the vehicle to his brother\u2019s home where he and a fellow employee consumed one and one-half quarts of beer. Afterwards, Raymond dropped off the fellow employee. On the way home Raymond collided with another vehicle occupied by Appellants. Appellants all were injured in the accident.\nOn January 14, 1992, Appellant Kitchens filed suit against Raymond and Turner, alleging that at the time of the accident, Raymond was an employee of Turner acting within the course and scope of his employment. On May 11, 1992, Turner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Raymond was not an employee of Turner or acting within the course and scope of employment. On August 4, 1992, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Turner. On October 15, 1992, Appellant Kitchens filed a motion to amend the complaint and add Benjamin as a defendant. On November 3, 1992, Houston was given leave to file a complaint in intervention. On January 12,1993, Appellants Thomases filed a complaint in intervention against Raymond and Benjamin. On December 22, 1993, the trial court set aside the summary judgment granted in favor of Turner. On February 14, 1994, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of Turner and against Appellants, concluding that Raymond was not an employee of Turner and was not in the course and scope of employment with Turner at the time of the accident. On April 11, 1994, the trial court granted judgment for declaratory relief in favor of Houston, concluding inter alia that because Raymond was not covered by the Houston policy, Houston was not obligated to provide defense and indemnity to Raymond for Appellants\u2019 claims. Appellants appeal from the judgment for declaratory relief.\nII.\nWe address whether the trial court erred in concluding that Raymond is not covered by Houston\u2019s garage policy. Houston argues the trial court was correct to conclude that under an exclusion provision in the policy, Raymond was not insured. The provision defines \u201cinsured\" as:\n(1) You [named insured] for any covered \u201cauto.\u201d\n(2) Anyone else while using with your permission a covered \u201cauto\u201d you own, hire or borrow except:\n(c) Someone using a covered \u201cauto\u201d while he or she is working in a business of selling, servicing, repairing, parking or storing \u201cautos\u201d unless that business is your \u201cgarage business.\u201d (Emphasis added).\nHouston argues that \u201cdetailing\u201d, is within the meaning of \u201cservicing.\u201d Therefore, Houston argues, Raymond is excluded as an insured because he was using the vehicle while working in a business of servicing autos at the time of the accident. We disagree and hold that the exclusion provision is inapplicable and, that under Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 109 N.M. 584, 788 P.2d 340 (1990), Raymond is covered under Houston\u2019s insurance policy.\nContrary to Houston\u2019s assertion, the exclusion provision does not apply here. The plain language of the exclusion provision is clear to exclude from coverage those persons who use the vehicle while working in the business of \u201cservicing\u201d vehicles. At the time the accident occurred, however, Raymond was not using Turner\u2019s vehicle while working in the business of \u201cservicing\u201d autos. Instead, the accident occurred while Raymond was using the vehicle on a lark. Although Raymond had driven the vehicle to the Wyoming shop for detailing, he decided to not do the job until the next day. Instead, he locked the shop and quit for the day. From the time Raymond locked the Wyoming shop for the day, he was no longer working. It follows then that Raymond was not \u201cservicing\u201d autos after he arrived at his brother\u2019s home where he drank beer and socialized. Certainly, Raymond cannot be said to be \u201cservicing\u201d autos while on his way home after he left his brother\u2019s home and when the accident occurred. The exclusion provision of Houston\u2019s policy does not apply.\nThe question remains, however, of whether Raymond is covered under Houston\u2019s policy for an accident that occurred while he was using Turner\u2019s vehicle outside the scope of Turner\u2019s (Scott\u2019s) permission. We believe Jensen is dispositive. In Jensen, we addressed whether a driver, although given permission by the owner to drive a vehicle, was excluded from coverage by an insurance policy which limited coverage to use of the vehicle within the scope of permission. In doing so, we first recognized that an insurance policy could not be more restrictive than NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-221(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1994), of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 66-5-201 to -239 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (MFRA). Jensen, 109 N.M. at 586, 788 P.2d at 342. Section 66-5-221(A)(2) requires an owner\u2019s certified motor vehicle liability policy to \u201cinsure the person named in the policy and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured.\u201d We also recognized that the express purpose of the MFRA is to\nrequire and encourage residents of the state of New Mexico who own and operate motor vehicles upon the highways of the state to have the ability to respond in damages to accidents arising out of the use and operation of a motor vehicle. It is the intent that the risks and financial burdens of motor vehicle accidents be equitably distributed among all owners and operators of motor vehicles within the state.\nJensen, 109 N.M. at 587, 788 P.2d at 343 (quoting \u00a7 66-5-201.1). Because the purpose of automobile liability insurance \u201cis for the benefit of the public generally, as well as insured,\u201d Section 66-5-221(A)(2) must be broadly interpreted. Id.; see also United Servs. Auto. Ass\u2019n v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cos., 119 N.M. 397, 400, 891 P.2d 538, 541 (1995) (holding that omnibus clause extends coverage \u201cto any subsequent permittee operating an insured vehicle as long as the named insured has given his or her initial permission to use the vehicle\u201d). In Jensen we held that an omnibus clause to an insurance policy \u201cmust provide coverage to any person using the insured vehicle with the owner\u2019s consent, without regard to any restrictions or understanding between the parties on the particular use for which the permission was given.\u201d 109 N.M. at 587, 788 P.2d at 343 (emphasis added).\nAlthough we need not address whether Scott gave Raymond permission to drive the vehicle to the Wyoming shop, we do note there clearly is evidence that Scott gave Raymond permission to drive the vehicle. Accordingly, Raymond, with initial permission to drive the vehicle, and without regard to any restriction by Scott on its use, would be covered under Houston\u2019s policy.\nThe initial permission rule should not discourage owners from imposing restrictions upon the use of borrowed vehicles. These restrictions will not, however, operate to exclude from coverage a driver who, with express or implied permission, uses an insured vehicle. See id.\nHouston also argues Jensen applied the initial permission rule to only certified motor vehicle liability policies. We do not agree.\nIn Jensen, the Court noted the parties had agreed Section 66-5-201(A)(2) applied to the insurance policy in question. We also recognized that it was not clear that the statute, which refers to \u201ccertified\u201d motor vehicle liability policies, applied to all motor vehicle liability policies. We deferred judgment, however, as the question was not properly before the Court. Id. at 586 n. 2, 788 P.2d at 342 n. 2. We deem this case appropriate to resolve the issue.\nUse of the phrase \u201ccertified motor vehicle liability policies\u201d was significant before the MFRA was enacted. Before that time, the Financial Responsibility Act conditioned motor vehicle registration on proof of financial responsibility only in those \u201ccases such as an unsatisfied judgment against a motorist.\u201d Id.; see also Estep v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 105, 107-08, 703 P.2d 882, 884-85 (1985) (discussing policy of requiring motorists to file proof of financial responsibility with division of motor vehicles). In that situation, a motorist could avoid suspension of a driver\u2019s license or vehicle registration by filing a certificate of insurance with the New Mexico Division of Motor Vehicles. The certificate must have verified that the \u201cmotorist had in effect at the time of the accident a policy meeting the minimum liability coverage of the Financial Responsibility Act.\u201d- Jensen, 109 N.M. at 586 n. 2, 788 P.2d at 342 n. 2. After such a filing, the insurance policy was \u201ccertified\u201d and could not be canceled before notifying the division. With passage of the MFRA, this limited application of verifying financial responsibility no longer applies.\nNonetheless, Section 66-5-221 refers to a \u201ccertified motor vehicle liability policy.\u201d In view of the overriding policy of the MFRA, we see no practical distinction between a certified motor vehicle liability policy and a motor vehicle liability policy except insofar as they simply are alternate methods of proving financial responsibility.\nA certified policy, under the old law as well as under the new means simply the certificate of the insurance company, filed with the motor vehicle division, verifying that the person required to furnish evidence of financial responsibility has in effect a policy meeting the minimum liability coverage provisions of the [MFRA].\nEstep, 103 N.M. at 110, 703 P.2d at 887 (citations omitted). Moreover, Houston has offered no useful grounds to exempt one type of insurance policy and not another from the express purposes of the MFRA.\nAdditionally, if we were to somehow exempt Houston based on this artful distinction, we would totally emasculate the purpose of the MFRA, which is to protect the public as a whole. See id. at 108, 703 P.2d at 885. It is the MFRA in its entirety and not its individual sections that effectuate the overriding policy. Indeed, it is the policy of the MFRA to which we must continually defer. See United Servs. Auto. Ass\u2019n, 119 N.M. at 400, 891 P.2d at 541 (applying initial permission rule to second permittees based on policy of MFRA); Estep, 103 N.M. at 108, 703 P.2d at 885. We hold the initial permission rule is not limited to \u201ccertified\u201d motor vehicle liability policies.\nIII.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the exclusion provision of Houston\u2019s insurance policy does not apply to this case. We also hold that if Raymond had Turner\u2019s initial permission to use the vehicle, he would be covered under Houston\u2019s insurance policy even though the accident occurred outside the scope of Turner\u2019s permission. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur.\n. We express no opinion on whether auto \"detailing\u201d is within the meaning of \"servicing\u201d or \"garage operations\u201d under the exclusion provision. The determination of this question is of no significance to our holding. Similarly, we express no opinion on whether the exclusion provision is valid in light of our discussion of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 109 N.M. 584, 788 P.2d 340 (1990), and the scope of permission.", "type": "majority", "author": "BACA, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Cynthia A. Fry, Dennis R. Francish, Albuquerque, for appellants.", "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Edward Ricco, Charles E. Stuckey, Albuquerque, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "896 P.2d 479\nGeorge S. KITCHENS and James Thomas, individually and as father, next friend, and guardian of Adam Thomas, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-in-Intervention/Appellee, Raymond Guzman and Benjamin Guzman, d/b/a Quality Auto Detailing and Bob Turner\u2019s Ford Country, Inc., Defendants.\nNo. 22227.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nApril 27, 1995.\nRehearing Denied June 9, 1995.\nCynthia A. Fry, Dennis R. Francish, Albuquerque, for appellants.\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Edward Ricco, Charles E. Stuckey, Albuquerque, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0799-01", "first_page_order": 891, "last_page_order": 894 }