{ "id": 1559027, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vargas", "decision_date": "1995-07-20", "docket_number": "No. 15611", "first_page": "416", "last_page": "420", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 N.M. 416" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "902 P.2d 571" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "117 N.M. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552752 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561332 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "910 F.2d 1367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10540848 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/910/1367-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.W.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10596840 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/456/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 F.3d 1331", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10515564 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/23/1331-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 P.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711350 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663-64" }, { "page": "9-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.W.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10653563 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/374/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 F.2d 822", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1816432, 3467525 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/874/0822-01", "/us-app-dc/277/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490215 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "1723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 U.S. 463", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1512280 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470-71" }, { "page": "2782-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/472/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "\"For a police action to be characterized as a 'search', the officer must somehow search or take an object in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.\"" }, { "page": "1318", "parenthetical": "\"For a police action to be characterized as a 'search', the officer must somehow search or take an object in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "834 P.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731539 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150-51" }, { "page": "866-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727687 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 P.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725505 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0546-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 11184, "ocr_confidence": 0.698, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5891868849458672e-07, "percentile": 0.6818011397575688 }, "sha256": "f4b057dcc9b3a69d10c29345be53684a63d173321c5b78a15d6a1fd06bdc0331", "simhash": "1:35f12983466db460", "word_count": 1847 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:50:53.788074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOSSON and WECHSLER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBLACK, Judge.\nDefendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to traffic, a second-degree felony under NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20 (Repl.Pamp.1989). After his motion to suppress was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser count of possession of cocaine. The suppression issue was preserved for appeal in the Plea and Disposition Agreement. We conclude that there was a sufficient factual basis for the police officer to entertain reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and we affirm.\nI. FACTS\nOfficer Palos of the Las Cruces Police Department was given a special assignment, in lieu of his routine patrol duties, when he came on duty at 11:00 p.m. on the evening of February 17, 1993. Specifically, he was told to be on the lookout for a white car with a loud muffler that had been involved in a drive-by shooting that evening. Officer Palos drove around Las Cruces looking for that white car.\nShortly after midnight, Officer Palos observed two cars. A blue car was driving with a white car following closely behind. Officer Palos witnessed the white car turn off its headlights and proceed down the street. The white car stopped and then backed up to where the blue car had turned into what appeared to be an alley next to a residence. Officer Palos testified that the white car travelled, without lights, from the corner of the street, which covered a distance of about one and one-half city lots.\nOfficer Palos further testified that he thought the circumstances appeared suspicious and was not quite sure what was happening. Officer Palos decided to investigate and to \u201cfind out what was going on.\u201d He admitted he was not specifically thinking about the drive-by shooting at that moment. Rather, he just saw a car operating without lights in a suspicious manner.\nOfficer Palos drove his patrol car to the alley and saw the white car parked with the engine running. Three persons were in the car. He turned his spotlight towards the car and called his dispatcher for a back-up unit. As soon as the spotlight was targeted at the white car, three men exited the car. The two passengers walked away from Officer Palos, and the driver walked towards him. Officer Palos got out of his car and told the three men to stop. They complied and walked towards Officer Palos, but blocked him from approaching the white car. The driver, later identified as Defendant, specifically told Officer Palos that he had no right to go near the car.\nRealizing that \u201csomething wasn\u2019t right,\u201d and because the back-up unit had not yet arrived, Officer Palos testified his immediate concern was for his personal safety. He therefore ordered the three men to put their hands on the patrol car; they complied. In the course of the pat-down search, Officer Palos recognized Defendant. Since Defendant had previously been implicated in other drive-by shootings, Officer Palos then recalled that a drive-by shooting involving a white vehicle had been reported. Officer Palos realized that the white car from which Defendant had emerged fit the description for his special assignment.\nDuring the pat-down search, Defendant had his left hand clenched. Defendant switched the item that was in his left hand to his right hand and then threw a packet across the hood of the patrol car. The packet was later determined to contain cocaine.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nOn appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustain a trial court\u2019s finding of a lawful seizure. State v. Affsprung, 115 N.M. 546, 547, 854 P.2d 873, 874 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872 (1993). A trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence viewed in this light. State v. Galloway, 116 N.M. 8, 9, 859 P.2d 476, 477 (Ct.App.1993). \u201cTo the extent the witnesses\u2019 testimony differs as to the facts, ... it is the trial court\u2019s prerogative to determine the credibility of the evidence.\u201d Affsprung, 115 N.M. at 547, 854 P.2d at 874. Whether those facts comply with constitutional requirements is, however, a legal question reviewed by the appellate court on a de novo basis. Id.; State v. Jones, 114 N.M. 147, 150-51, 835 P.2d 863, 866-67 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 62, 834 P.2d 939 (1992).\nIII. THE ACTIONS OF OFFICER PALOS WERE LEGALLY PROPER\nThe United States and New Mexico Constitutions guarantee the right of the people to be free from \u201cunreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV; N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 10. \u201cA police officer \u2018seizes\u2019 a person and subjects him to a \u2018search\u2019 when the officer takes hold of the person and pats down the outer surfaces of his clothing____\u201d 5 Mark S. Rhodes, Orfield\u2019s Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules \u00a7 41:15, at 613 (2d ed. 1987); cf. State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 386, 890 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1995) (\u201cFor a police action to be characterized as a \u2018search\u2019, the officer must somehow search or take an object in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.\u201d).\nWhether a violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has occurred depends upon an objective assessment of a police officer\u2019s actions based on all the facts confronting the officer, not on the officer\u2019s actual state of mind. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985). \u201c[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer\u2019s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\u201d Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). The absence of a subjective recognition of specific suspicious factors, then, cannot defeat an officer\u2019s objectively reasonable action. See United States v. Bonner, 874 F.2d 822, 829 (D.C.Cir.1989); Berge v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 733 n. 1 (Minn.1985); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.3, at 153 (2d ed. Supp.1995).\nDefendant argues that, at the time Officer Palos engaged his lights and spotlighted Defendant\u2019s car, he \u201cdid not connect [Defendant\u2019s] white car to his special assignment to look for a-white car with a loud muffler. He \u201cwasn\u2019t sure\u2019 what was happening, but thought it was suspicious for a car to turn off its lights and turn into a residence.\u201d We need not decide whether the color of the ear coupled with what the officer had been told to look for would, by itself, constitute reasonable suspicion. This information was complemented by Officer Palos\u2019 own observations that the car was operating on a public street without lights. Every vehicle being operated on a public road at night is required to \u201cdisplay lighted lamps.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-3-802 (Repl.Pamp.1994). Because operating a vehicle without lights is a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 66-1-1 to -8-139 (Repl.Pamp.1994), Officer Palos\u2019 observation of this violation alone provided a sufficient basis for him to stop the car. See State v. Mann, 103 N.M. 660, 663-64, 712 P.2d 6, 9-10 (Ct.App.1985), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556 (1986); see also United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir.1994) (observation of a traffic violation provides probable cause to stop a vehicle); State v. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d 295, 296 (N.D.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and, therefore, provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.\u201d). Again, the fact that the officer later articulated the wrong reason for stopping the car does not negate the adequate legal foundation created by his observance of a traffic violation. See United States v. Lewis, 910 F.2d 1367 (7th Cir.1990).\nCiting State v. Franks, 119 N.M. 174, 889 P.2d 209 (Ct.App.1994), Defendant argues that the State cannot now rely on the car\u2019s failure to display lights as a traffic violation because this argument was not specifically advanced in the trial court. Defendant argues that we should follow Franks, which, according to Defendant, \u201crefused to affirm the trial court\u2019s suppression of evidence on a ground, not presented below, when it was too \u2018fact-dependent.\u2019 \u201d The issue in Franks, however, was whether, after we had determined that the trial court erred in suppressing evidence under SCRA 1986, 11-403 (Repl.1994), the defendant should be allowed to argue on appeal that the evidence would have been excludable in any event under a different rule, SCRA 1986, 11-504 (Repl.1994). Franks, 119 N.M. at 177, 889 P.2d at 212. We recognized in Franks that \u201cit would be improper [for this Court] to make a finding on a fact relevant only to an issue that had not been raised below, because the appellant lacked an opportunity to present admissible evidence relating to the fact.\u201d Id.\nThe present record is, however, different than that in Franks, and we rely on it for a different purpose. In the present case, Defendant does not argue that there was other admissible evidence he could have offered had he known that the operation of the car without lights would be considered as a proper basis for the initial stop. (Defendant\u2019s theory below was that Defendant lived at the address next to the alley where the white car was stopped, but the car was not his and he was not driving it.) Furthermore, it is undisputed that Officer Palos saw a car operating on a public street without lights after midnight, and Defendant did not object to this evidence. Unlike Franks, we do not consider a new theory supporting the exclusion of evidence. Nor do we create a new legal theory and extract evidence from the record to support that theory. Rather, we recognize that, in evaluating'the propriety of a vehicle stop, the reasonable, experienced officer standard allows consideration of all facts that the officer knew at the time, whether or not the officer actually considered or later verbalized those factors as the reason for the stop.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nWe agree with the trial court that Officer Palos set forth sufficient grounds for the stop and his subsequent actions. We agree with the trial court. Thus, we do not rely on the arguments regarding affirmance based on the right-for-the-wrong-reason principle. See Westland Dev. Co. v. Romero, 117 N.M. 292, 298, 871 P.2d 388, 389 (Ct.App.1994) (\u201cAn appellate court will affirm a lower court\u2019s ruling if right for any reason.\u201d).\nThe totality of the circumstances was sufficient to allow the investigation performed by Officer Palos to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBOSSON and WECHSLER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BLACK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tom Udall, Attorney General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Sammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Bruce Rogoff, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "902 P.2d 571\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 15611.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJuly 20, 1995.\nCertiorari Denied Sept. 1, 1995.\nTom Udall, Attorney General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.\nSammy J. Quintana, Chief Public Defender, Bruce Rogoff, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0416-01", "first_page_order": 454, "last_page_order": 458 }