{ "id": 142185, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Reginald JONES, Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "1997-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 23424", "first_page": "73", "last_page": "76", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 N.M. 73" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "934 P.2d 267" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1997-NMSC-016" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "728 F.2d 1195", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 57543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1202", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/728/1195-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552727 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)" }, { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590330 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715048 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 F.2d 803", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532125 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/866/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "972 F.2d 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1871046 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/972/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 F.3d 1368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1883058 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" }, { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/2/1368-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 F.3d 921", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1844490 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/32/0921-01" ] }, { "cite": "929 F.2d 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542489 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/929/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599050 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" }, { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "1866-67", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 765", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1340390 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "766" }, { "page": "1770" }, { "page": "768" }, { "page": "1771" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "1723-24" }, { "page": "96" }, { "page": "1722-23" }, { "page": "96-98" }, { "page": "1722-24" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "1724" }, { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "1723-24" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "1723-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "910 P.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566564 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" }, { "page": "894" }, { "page": "896" }, { "page": "897-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0383-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 602, "char_count": 10686, "ocr_confidence": 0.704, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.287274981237874e-07, "percentile": 0.6189984435386001 }, "sha256": "f165b44fedfac32e767836147398e8f0188efddd60ebc97cf8575c52445fe613", "simhash": "1:dde03d0430a34d0c", "word_count": 1695 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:16.892471+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BACA and MINZNER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Reginald JONES, Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nRANSOM, Justice.\n1. Reginald Jones was convicted of armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-16-2 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (robbery) and NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-28-1 (Repl. Pamp.1994) (attempt). The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Jones, 121 N.M. 383, 386, 911 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct.App.1995). We granted certiorari to review questions of racial discrimination in the peremptory challenge of a juror. State v. Jones, 121 N.M. 299, 910 P.2d 933 (1996). First, we hold that, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the prosecutor responded to Jones\u2019 prima facie showing of discrimination with a race-neutral explanation that the prospective juror was peremptorily excused because he was non-assertive and failed to make eye contact; second, we observe that the Batson analysis is here unaffected by Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam); and third, we apply a de novo standard in reviewing the legal adequacy of the prosecutor\u2019s explanation under our Batson jurisprudence. We affirm the convictions.\n2. Facts. During jury selection, the State peremptorily challenged an African-American juror. Jones objected with a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in that he is African-American and the challenged juror was the only African-American in the venire who could serve on the jury. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. The prosecutor stated that he challenged the juror \u201cbecause he absolutely failed to establish eye contact with the State during questioning, and in the State\u2019s amateur psychological opinion, seemed not to be possessed of a certain degree of assertiveness which the State prefers to have in jurors.\u201d Jones replied that the prosecutor\u2019s explanation was insufficient because it was subjective and there was no indication of how the prosecutor tried to establish eye contact. Jones adduced no further evidence that the prosecutor\u2019s race-neutral explanation was pretextual. The trial court found the prosecutor\u2019s explanation to be \u201creasonable\u201d and overruled Jones\u2019 objection.\n3. Step two under Batson. In Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court outlined a three-step procedure for trial courts to determine whether a prosecutor has discriminated on the basis of race in the use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24. In the first step, the defendant must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Next, the prosecutor is required to \u201carticulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.\u201d Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866-67, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion), the Court noted that \u201c[a]t this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor\u2019s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor\u2019s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.\u201d However, \u201cthe prosecutor [may not] rebut the defendant\u2019s case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive.\u201d State v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 700, 736 P.2d 501, 505 (Ct.App.1987) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24). If the trial court finds the explanation to be facially valid, then, in step three, the defendant is allowed to refute the stated reason or otherwise prove purposeful discrimination. If, on the other hand, the prosecutor\u2019s explanation is not \u201ca [race-]neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried,\u201d then the trial court may find purposeful discrimination without requiring a further showing by the defendant. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24.\n4. Jones asserts that the State\u2019s explanation for challenging the African-American juror is too subjective insofar as failure to make eye contact and lack of assertiveness are not easily verified by objective assessment. While it is true that explanations based on subjective judgments such as these \u201care particularly susceptible to the kind of abuse prohibited by Batson,\" United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir.1991), it is equally true that \u201c[j]ury selection is inherently subjective,\u201d United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 925 (5th Cir.1994). \u201c[M]any of the judgments made by counsel in picking a jury are purely intuitive and based upon inarticulable factors.\u201d United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1374 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, while \u201c \u2018subjective considerations might not be susceptible to objective rebuttal or verification^] ... [they are permitted] because of the inherent nature of peremptory challenges, with the understanding that ultimate Batson findings \u201clargely will turn on evaluation of credibility\u201d of counsel\u2019s explanations.\u2019\u201d Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d at 1374 (quoting Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 83, 86 (5th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (quoting Thomas v. Moore, 866 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir.1989))).\n5. As these cases demonstrate, a reason for using a peremptory challenge is not inherently discriminatory merely because it is subjective. Therefore, a lawyer\u2019s subjective feeling about a juror may suffice for step two provided that the reason for the strike is \u201ca racially neutral, specific reason for the challenge.\u201d State v. Gonzales, 111 N.M. 590, 597, 808 P.2d 40, 47 (Ct.App.1991). Because challenging a juror for failure to make eye contact and lack of assertiveness is a racially neutral, specific reason, the prosecutor met his step-two burden. The trial court could have found the explanation unpersuasive, but it did not do so. Therefore, Jones was required to adduce rebuttal evidence, such as that eye contact was made. However, Jones did not do so and thereby failed to refute the prosecutor\u2019s explanation or otherwise prove the prosecutor had intentionally discriminated.\n6. Purkett. Jones contends that because Purkett undermines Batson and New Mexico cases interpreting Batson, see State v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16 (1989); Gonzales, 111 N.M. at 601, 808 P.2d at 51, we should recognize, under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, a standard more stringent than that announced in Purkett. See N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 18 (guaranteeing equal protection of the laws). We decline to do so because Purkett is not controlling in this case.\n7. In Purkett, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a prosecutor had intentionally discriminated against a juror by exercising a peremptory challenge against him for having long hair and facial hair. 514 U.S. at 766, 115 S.Ct. at 1770. In holding that the prosecutor\u2019s reason satisfied step two of Batson, the Court stated that the prosecutor\u2019s burden at this stage \u201cdoes not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.\u201d Id. 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. According to the Purkett court, \u201csilly or superstitious\u201d reasons may satisfy step two: \u201cWhat [Batson] means by a \u2018legitimate reason\u2019 is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.\u201d Id.\n8. In this case, by contrast, the reasons offered by the prosecutor, that the juror failed to make eye contact and evidenced a lack of assertiveness, are neither silly nor superstitious. As discussed above, these are legitimate grounds for exercising a peremptory challenge. The prosecutor\u2019s reasons were plausible and made sense. Therefore, Purkett is not controlling and there is no need for considering a stricter standard here.\n9. However, if we were faced with a case in which the prosecutor\u2019s reasons were silly or superstitious, we might be inclined to consider whether the New Mexico Constitution provides more protection from discrimination than is apparently provided under the Fourteenth Amendment after Purkett. When a prosecutor gives an explanation for a peremptory challenge prima facially shown to be discriminatory, it is most emphatically not the case that \u201canything goes\u201d. A trial court may err in requiring of the defendant the refutation of a reason that is legally inadequate under the Batsm. jurisprudence of this Court.\n10. Standard of review. The Court of Appeals reviewed Jones\u2019 appeal under an abuse of discretion standard, reasoning that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s determination of whether Defendant has carried his burden of showing that the State has intentionally discriminated on the basis of race or gender is a finding of fact.\u201d Jones, 121 N.M. at 388, 911 P.2d at 896. Jones argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to review .de novo whether the prosecutor\u2019s stated reason meets minimum constitutional standards. He analogizes between this issue and the determination of exigent circumstances in the context of a search, which we review de novo. See State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144, 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). Jones contends that evaluation of the prosecutor\u2019s explanations also \u201crequires [this Court] to consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles.\u201d Id.\n11. While an appellate court need not defer to a trial court on whether a reason is constitutionally adequate, the Court of Appeals appropriately reviewed the trial court\u2019s action under a deferential standard because, as we hold today, the prosecutor\u2019s subjective belief was not a legally insufficient explanation for a peremptory challenge of the juror. With this legal threshold having been met, the only questions remaining were factual: whether Jones proved that the prosecutor had purposefully discriminated, and whether the prosecutor\u2019s claim that the juror did not make eye contact was truthful. See 121 N.M. at 389-90, 911 P.2d at 897-98. It was the trial court\u2019s actions with respect to these factual questions that the Court of Appeals reviewed deferentially. Therefore, we disagree with Jones that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of review.\n12. Conclusion. We hold that Purkett is not controlling and that the prosecutor\u2019s explanation that the juror was excused because he was non-assertive and failed to make eye contact met the step-two burden under Bat-son. Consequently, a de novo standard of review for legal adequacy is of no avail to Jones.\n13. IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBACA and MINZNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "RANSOM, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender and Bruce Rogoff, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Petitioner.", "Tom Udall, Attorney General and Steven S. Suttle, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1997-NMSC-016\n934 P.2d 267\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Reginald JONES, Defendant-Petitioner.\nNo. 23424.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 6, 1997.\nT. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender and Bruce Rogoff, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Petitioner.\nTom Udall, Attorney General and Steven S. Suttle, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0073-01", "first_page_order": 117, "last_page_order": 120 }