{ "id": 142259, "name": "Larry M.P. ESPINOSA, Worker-Appellant, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees; Larry M.P. ESPINOSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, a partnership owned and operated by the Journal Publishing Company, and Glen Forbus, as agent for Albuquerque Publishing Company and as an individual, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Espinosa v. Albuquerque Publishing Co.", "decision_date": "1997-06-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 16701, 16929", "first_page": "605", "last_page": "611", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 N.M. 605" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "943 P.2d 1058" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1997-NMCA-072" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "98 N.M. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582444 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "1384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566666 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "citing Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 731, 764 P.2d at 502" }, { "page": "1392", "parenthetical": "citing Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 731, 764 P.2d at 502" }, { "page": "720-21" }, { "page": "1392-93", "parenthetical": "remanding for factual determination of whether employer's predecessor-in-interest became independent supplier as a result of change of ownership" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597100 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "730-31" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "502", "parenthetical": "remanding for factual determination of whether partnership in which employer participated could be considered worker's employer" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791", "parenthetical": "WCA provides exclusive remedy for injuries sustained while going to or from work where worker alleges his employer was negligent" }, { "page": "1286", "parenthetical": "WCA provides exclusive remedy for injuries sustained while going to or from work where worker alleges his employer was negligent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720228 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715044 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "WCA covers injuries sustained while moving worker's vehicle from employer's premises so premises could be secured for the night" }, { "parenthetical": "WCA covers injuries sustained while moving worker's vehicle from employer's premises so premises could be secured for the night" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715059 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590210 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 N.M. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586559 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "146-47" }, { "page": "688", "parenthetical": "Watson, J., concurring in result" }, { "page": "142-43" }, { "page": "685-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/36/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599004 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "746" }, { "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" }, { "page": "506-07" }, { "page": "746-47" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566712 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "noting that judges who \"set themselves above the law, to promote a personal belief about what the law should be, do a disservice to justice\"" }, { "page": "1035", "parenthetical": "noting that judges who \"set themselves above the law, to promote a personal belief about what the law should be, do a disservice to justice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795-96", "parenthetical": "Court of Appeals is bound to follow recent precedent of Supreme Court but is encouraged to express its rationale for any reservations about doing so" }, { "page": "1177-78", "parenthetical": "Court of Appeals is bound to follow recent precedent of Supreme Court but is encouraged to express its rationale for any reservations about doing so" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563431 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "904 P.2d 1061", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559022 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" }, { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725492 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "907 P.2d 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566529 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0503-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 923, "char_count": 20161, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.638206242339285e-08, "percentile": 0.40478498939513463 }, "sha256": "c46c6aa3ef441069b899ec847dc4688fa55fa534f6b4c80445ae88d5945f7467", "simhash": "1:40e6554efc4243f1", "word_count": 3219 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:16.892471+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOSSON, J., concurs.", "DONNELLY, J., specially concurs." ], "parties": [ "Larry M.P. ESPINOSA, Worker-Appellant, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees. Larry M.P. ESPINOSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, a partnership owned and operated by the Journal Publishing Company, and Glen Forbus, as agent for Albuquerque Publishing Company and as an individual, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nARMIJO, Judge.\n1. On October 22, 1991, Larry Espinosa was struck by a vehicle as he walked across an Albuquerque, New Mexico, street while in a designated crosswalk. The vehicle that struck Espinosa was owned by Albuquerque Publishing Company (the Company), and its driver was returning to his place of work after a \u201cmail run.\u201d It is undisputed that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the driver. The accident occurred some two miles from the Albuquerque Publishing Company offices. When the accident occurred, Espinosa was walking to work; his shift was to begin some thirty minutes later. He, too, worked for the Company.\n2. These consolidated appeals involve a question of statutory interpretation. We are asked to construe the exclusivity provisions in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (WCA), and the statutory definition of the course of employment, to determine whether the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for a worker who is injured on his way to work, in a traffic accident that occurred approximately half an hour before his shift began, approximately two miles away from his employer\u2019s premises, and as a direct result of an on-duty coworker\u2019s negligent driving of a vehicle owned by the common employer.\n3. We affirm the rulings of the district court and the workers\u2019 compensation judge (WCJ) and hold that Espinosa may not pursue a tort claim in district court to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in this accident because the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for Espinosa\u2019s injuries in this accident.\nI. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n4. In October of 1992, Espinosa filed a claim with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration to determine whether the injuries he sustained in this accident made him eligible for benefits under the WCA. NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (Repl.Pamp.1991 & Cum.Supp.1996). Espinosa filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that his accident was not covered by the WCA. The WCJ held a formal hearing on the matter and subsequently entered a summary judgment denying Espinosa\u2019s motion and holding instead that Espinosa was bound by the exclusive remedies of the WCA. We initially dismissed Espinosa\u2019s appeal from the WCJ\u2019s summary judgment order because this order was not final. Espinosa subsequently appealed from the WCJ\u2019s entry of a compensation order disposing of all issues in the workers\u2019 compensation proceeding.\n5. Espinosa filed a tort claim against the Company in district court in October of 1994. The Company filed a motion for summary judgment in which it claimed that Espinosa\u2019s tort claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions in Section 52-1-9 of the WCA. The district court agreed and entered summary judgment in the Company\u2019s favor, finding that the exclusivity provisions in Section 52-1-9 apply to Espinosa because \u201che was on his way to work and is subject to the [going-and-coming] rule because of the employers [sic] negligence.\u201d Espinosa appealed from the district court\u2019s order granting summary judgment. This Court granted Espinosa\u2019s motion to consolidate the appeals from the district court\u2019s entry of summary judgment and the WCJ\u2019s compensation order. Both appeals have been consolidated for purposes of our review.\nII. DISCUSSION\n6. Espinosa wishes to pursue a tort claim in district court against the Company to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident, while the Company maintains that Espinosa is limited to the relief afforded him under the WCA. Resolving this dispute turns on the purpose and effect of the exclusivity provisions contained in Section 52-1-9 of the WCA and the definition of \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment\u201d in Section 52-1-19 of the WCA. The issue was preserved below.\nA. Standard of Review\n7.The interpretation of Sections 52-1-9 and -19 of the WCA is a question of law that does not require us to defer to the statutory interpretation of the district court or the WCJ. See Cox v. Municipal Boundary Comm\u2019n, 120 N.M. 703, 705, 905 P.2d 741, 743 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 120 N.M. 636, 904 P.2d 1061 (1995). Generally, this Court interprets statutory provisions with the primary goal of determining and giving effect to the intent of the legislature. See Junge v. John D. Morgan Constr. Co., 118 N.M. 457, 463, 882 P.2d 48, 54 (Ct.App.1994). While we do not believe that the legislature intended the result achieved in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that we must follow our Supreme Court\u2019s prior interpretations of the WCA even though the result may be inequitable and contrary to the intent of the WCA\u2019s drafters. See State v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 795-96, 867 P.2d 1175, 1177-78 (1994) (Court of Appeals is bound to follow recent precedent of Supreme Court but is encouraged to express its rationale for any reservations about doing so); cf. In re Eastburn, 121 N.M. 531, 538, 914 P.2d 1028, 1035 (1996) (noting that judges who \u201cset themselves above the law, to promote a personal belief about what the law should be, do a disservice to justice\u201d). The applicable precedents of our Supreme Court compel us to affirm the rulings of the district court and the WCJ in this case.\nB. The Going-and-Coming Rule\n(8) Section 52-1-9 of the WCA states:\nThe right to the compensation provided for in this act ... in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons whomsoever, for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:\nA. at the time of the accident, the employer has complied with the provisions thereof regarding insurance;\nB. at the time of the accident, the employee is performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment; and\nC. the injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and is not intentionally self-inflicted.\nSection 52-1-19 defines the phrase \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment\u201d as used in the WCA as follows:\nunless the context otherwise requires, \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment\u201d shall include accidental injuries to workers and death resulting from accidental injury as a result of their employment and while at work in any place where their employer\u2019s business requires their presence but shall not include injuries to any worker occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which is not the employer\u2019s negligence.\nIn this case, the question is whether the injuries resulting from Espinosa\u2019s accident fall under the WCA\u2019s definition of \u201cinjuries to any worker occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which is not the employer\u2019s negligence.\u201d Section 52-1-19.\n8.Our Supreme Court has construed Section 52-1-19 as incorporating a general principle of workers\u2019 compensation law known as \u201cthe going-and-coming rule.\u201d See Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 506, 734 P.2d 743, 746 (1987). This rule arises from the recognition that, \u201cwhile admittedly the employment is the cause of the workman\u2019s journey between his home and the factory, it is generally taken for granted that workmen\u2019s compensation was not intended to protect him against all the perils of that journey.\u201d 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 15.11 (1996). Professor Larson describes the going-and-coming rule as a \u201ccompromise [that] has been arrived at, largely by case law, with a surprising degree of unanimity: for an employee having fixed hours and place of work, going to and from work is covered on the employer\u2019s premises.\u201d Id. (footnotes omitted). Off-premises injuries sustained while going to or from work are not covered under the WCA unless they fit within one of several specific exceptions to the going-and-coming rule. See generally 1 Larson, supra \u00a7 15 (discussing these exceptions).\n9. As the district court acknowledged, New Mexico has a \u201cpeculiar\u201d statutory version of the going-and-coming rule that appears to base its coverage for injuries sustained while going to and from work on the employer\u2019s negligence rather than the fact that the injury occurred on the employer\u2019s premises. See \u00a7 52-1-19. While recognizing the \u201cpeculiarity\u201d of requiring proof of negligence when \u201c[t]he idea of negligence as. an essential to recovery is generally foreign to the theory of workmen\u2019s compensation!,]\u201d Cuellar v. American Employers\u2019 Ins. Co., 36 N.M. 141, 143, 9 P.2d 685, 686 (1932), the New Mexico Supreme Court originally interpreted New Mexico\u2019s statutory version of the going-and-coming rule to require proof of the employer\u2019s negligence in order to obtain coverage for a worker who was injured while going from work even though the worker remained on the employer\u2019s premises. Id. at 145, 9 P.2d at 687.\n10. However, prior case law interpreting New Mexico\u2019s going-and-coming rule in this manner was overruled by the New Mexico Supreme Court in 1987, when New Mexico joined its sister states in extending workers\u2019 compensation coverage to injuries sustained while going to and from work on the employer\u2019s premises without requiring proof of the employer\u2019s negligence. See Dupper, 105 N.M. at 506-07, 734 P.2d at 746-47. The Dupper Court held that a worker, \u201cwhile on the employer\u2019s premises coming to or going from the actual workplace is in a place where the employee is reasonably expected to be, and that he is engaged in a necessary incident of employment.\u201d Id. at 506, 734 P.2d at 746. Subsequent decisions have explored the boundaries that the WCA ascribes to an employer\u2019s premises. See Lovato v. Maxim\u2019s Beauty Salon, 109 N.M. 138, 782 P.2d 391 (Ct.App.1989) (WCA covers injuries sustained while traveling to workplace from parking lot designated by employer for employee\u2019s use); Garcia v. Mount Taylor Millwork, Inc., 111 N.M. 17, 801 P.2d 87 (Ct.App.1989) (WCA covers injuries sustained at off-premises railway crossing that provided the only means of ingress and egress to employer\u2019s premises); Evans v. Valley Diesel, 111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991) (WCA covers injuries sustained while moving worker\u2019s vehicle from employer\u2019s premises so premises could be secured for the night); Constantineau v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 112 N.M. 38, 810 P.2d 1258 (Ct.App.1991) (WCA does not cover injuries sustained while traveling to workplace from off-premises parking lot not specifically designated by employer for employee\u2019s use).\n11. No one disputes that Espinosa\u2019s injuries in the present case occurred while he was on his way to work. However, Espinosa\u2019s injuries occurred so far from the Company\u2019s premises that they seem not to fit within any of the traditional variations of the premises exception to the going-and-coming rule. Cf. 1 Larson, supra \u00a7 15 (discussing exceptions for employer\u2019s premises and parking lots, travel between two portions of employer\u2019s premises, travel during lunch or rest periods, and special hazards).\n12. Nonetheless, we agree with the Company that the case authorities establishing exceptions to the \u201cemployer\u2019s negligence\u201d requirement in New Mexico\u2019s statutory version of the going-and-coming rule do not permit us to ignore the language in Section 52-1-19 regarding \u201cthe employer\u2019s negligence.\u201d Rather, we conclude that Dupper and its progeny have adopted and followed the concurring opinion in Cuellar, 36 N.M. at 146-47, 9 P.2d at 688 (Watson, J., concurring in result), which advocated a more far reaching approach to Section 52-1-19 that would make the WCA a worker\u2019s exclusive remedy in any going-and-coming situation, regardless of time, place or circumstances, as long as the injury was caused by the employer\u2019s negligence. Under this approach, a worker\u2019s injury which occurs while going to or coming from work falls within \u201cthe course of employment\u201d solely because it was caused by his or her employer\u2019s negligence.\n13. Our Supreme Court\u2019s prior interpretations of Section 52-1-19 lead us to the inescapable conclusion that injuries sustained while going to or from work may be brought within the statutory definition of \u201ccourse of employment\u201d by showing that these injuries were caused by the employer\u2019s negligence, even when the injuries occurred off-premises. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 91 N.M. 788, 791, 581 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1978) (WCA provides exclusive remedy for injuries sustained while going to or from work where worker alleges his employer was negligent). Because there is no dispute that the injuries sustained by Espinosa while going to work were caused by the negligence of an on-duty co-worker driving the Company\u2019s van on a \u201cmail run,\u201d we are compelled to hold that Espinosa\u2019s injuries arose \u201cout of and in the course of employment\u201d under the terms of Section 52-1-19.\nC. The Dual Persona Doctrine\n14. Espinosa contends that even if we interpret Section 52-1-19 to cover any going-and-coming situation involving an employer\u2019s negligence, the exclusivity provisions in Section 52-1-9 should not apply in this case because the person who caused Espinosa\u2019s injury cannot be considered Espinosa\u2019s \u201cemployer.\u201d Espinosa asks us to limit the meaning of \u201cemployer,\u201d as that term is used in Section 52-1-19, by construing it to include an exception to the WCA\u2019s exclusivity provisions known as the \u201cdual persona doctrine.\u201d We decline to do so under the facts of this case.\n15. New Mexico Courts have adopted the dual-persona doctrine and rejected a related theory known as the \u201cdual-capacity doctrine.\u201d See Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 107 N.M. 728, 731, 764 P.2d 499, 502 (Ct.App.1988). \u201cUnder the dual-persona doctrine, an employer may be treated as a third party, vulnerable to a tort suit by an employee, if, and only if, the employer possesses a second persona sufficiently independent from and unrelated to its status as employer.\u201d Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co., 121 N.M. 710, 720, 917 P.2d 1382, 1392 (1996) (citing Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 731, 764 P.2d at 502); see also 2A Larson, supra \u00a7 .72.81. In contrast, \u201c[t]he \u2018dual capacity\u2019 doctrine imposes liability outside the workers\u2019 compensation statutes where the facts show that employer\u2019s conduct contributed to the injury sustained and is conduct of a nature not associated with the employer\u2019s functions as an employer.\u201d Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 730-31, 764 P.2d at 501-02 (citing 2A Larson, supra \u00a7 72.81(a)).\n16. The dual-persona doctrine typically applies in situations where the injury results from a single transaction and \u201c[t]he effort is to subdivide the employer into two persons in relation to that transaction.\u201d 2A Larson, supra \u00a7 72.88; see, e.g., Garrity, 121 N.M. at 720-21, 917 P.2d at 1392-93 (remanding for factual determination of whether employer\u2019s predecessor-in-interest became independent supplier as a result of change of ownership); Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 731, 764 P.2d at 502 (remanding for factual determination of whether partnership in which employer participated could be considered worker\u2019s employer). However, one variation of this doctrine extends to \u201cdual transactions\u201d where a worker is involved in two transactions with the same person: one involving his work for his employer, and the other involving an injury that is entirely unrelated to his employment except for the fact that it happens to be caused by the same person who employs him. 2A Larson, supra \u00a7 72.88.\n17.New Mexico courts have noted, in dicta, two examples which fall under this dual-transaction concept. First, in Cuellar, 36 N.M. at 142-43, 9 P.2d at 685-86, the New Mexico Supreme Court discussed the example of \u201ca workman who had left his duties, was on his way home, and was injured by being negligently struck by the employer\u2019s automobile, driven by a chauffeur, conveying the employer\u2019s wife to keep a social engagement.\u201d Second, in Salswedel, 107 N.M. at 731, 764 P.2d at 502 (quoting Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 128, 645 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Ct.App.1982)), this Court offered another example of what Professor Larson would deem a \u201cdual transaction\u201d: an employee is injured in \u201c \u2018an automobile accident in which the employer, while returning from church, runs into the employee who is on his way to a baseball game____\u2019 \u201d Id. The Salswedel Court categorized its example of a dual transaction under the dual-personal doctrine, and not under the dual-capacity doctrine, which the Court rejected. Id.\n18. We conclude that neither the traditional dual-persona doctrine nor the dual-transaction concept apply to the facts of this case. The traditional dual-persona doctrine does not apply bec\u00e1use there is no evidence of differences in corporate form or ownership which might have transformed the Company into a separate persona as argued in Garrity or Salswedel. The dual-transaction concept does not apply because Espinosa\u2019s October 22.1991, accident was not a separate transaction that was entirely unrelated to Espinosa\u2019s duties at work. Unlike the examples discussed in Cuellar or Salswedel, the Company employee who caused Espinosa\u2019s injuries was on-duty performing a \u201cmail run\u201d for the Company in the Company\u2019s van at the time of the accident, and Espinosa was on his way to work at that time.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n19. We recognize Espinosa\u2019s contention that the circumstances of the accident \u2014 occurring some two miles away from the premises, on a cross-walk located on a public roadway, and approximately SO minutes prior to the beginning of his shift \u2014 are too remote in time and place so as to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of the WCA. However, our Supreme Court precedent compels us to affirm the rulings of the district court and the WCJ which conclude that the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for the injuries sustained in Espinosa\u2019s accident of October 22.1991.\n20. IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBOSSON, J., concurs.\nDONNELLY, J., specially concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARMIJO, Judge." }, { "text": "DONNELLY, Judge\n(Specially Concurring).\n21. I concur in the result. I write separately, however, because I believe the majority\u2019s expressed disagreement with our Supreme Court\u2019s statutory interpretation in Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987), is misdirected.\n22. The majority opinion states that it disagrees with Dupper and that it does not believe the legislature intended the language of the \u201cgoing and coming\u201d set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-19 (Repl.Pamp.1991) to apply to injuries such as those sustained by Worker here. My disagreement with this conclusion lies in its suggestion that the appropriate remedy is for the Supreme Court to revisit and modify the holding in Dupper, rather than suggest legislative amendment. Courts should avoid efforts to modify legislative policy and enactments by judicial decisions. See Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 121 N.M. 172, 177, 909 P.2d 732, 737 (Ct.App.) (courts cannot change statutory language or construe statute to mean something other than what the statute provides), cert. granted, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995).\n23. This Court has recently noted in Gutierrez that \u201cin the workers\u2019 compensation context ... certain situations call for legislative therapy, not judicial surgery.\u201d Id. at 178, 909 P.2d at 738; see also Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 122, 847 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct.App.1993) (modification or departure from language of exclusivity statute rests with the legislature and not the courts).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "DONNELLY, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Elizabeth Gabriel, Albuquerque, for Appellant.", "Mark J. Riley, Deborah S. Dungan, Padilla, Riley & Shane, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1997-NMCA-072\n943 P.2d 1058\nLarry M.P. ESPINOSA, Worker-Appellant, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees. Larry M.P. ESPINOSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, a partnership owned and operated by the Journal Publishing Company, and Glen Forbus, as agent for Albuquerque Publishing Company and as an individual, Defendants-Appellees.\nNos. 16701, 16929.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 20, 1997.\nCertiorari Granted Aug. 6, 1997.\nElizabeth Gabriel, Albuquerque, for Appellant.\nMark J. Riley, Deborah S. Dungan, Padilla, Riley & Shane, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees." }, "file_name": "0605-01", "first_page_order": 649, "last_page_order": 655 }