{ "id": 834231, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Katcv SHIJE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Shije", "decision_date": "1998-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 18359", "first_page": "581", "last_page": "583", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 N.M. 581" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "964 P.2d 142" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1998-NMCA-102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1997-NMCA-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142229 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580044 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" }, { "page": "1082" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142261 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552643 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "1116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 18717 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566485 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "\"If the meaning of a statute is clear, it is to be applied as written.\"" }, { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "\"If the meaning of a statute is clear, it is to be applied as written.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590280 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790", "parenthetical": "\"When a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\"" }, { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "\"When a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\"" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597222 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582555 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580008 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0775-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 457, "char_count": 7413, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1136709282731009e-07, "percentile": 0.5713168991705694 }, "sha256": "309b49db41d842e5630bdd5d431726c890fa8ec5a64b52bc30dd7a7faf269600", "simhash": "1:97f45c087abc0944", "word_count": 1202 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:04.972911+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ALARID and PICKARD, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Katcv SHIJE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} Katcv Shije (Defendant) appeals his sentence for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, arguing that the sentence impermissibly exceeded that prescribed by statute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Defendant\u2019s sentence.\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n{2} A criminal information was filed June 14, 1996, charging Defendant with an open count of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The charges stemmed from the beating death of Jeffrey Lucero by Defendant, Defendant\u2019s cousin, and Defendant\u2019s brother.\n{3} On February 28, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant was adjudged guilty of second degree murder, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years on the murder charge, eighteen months on the contributing to delinquency charge, and fifteen years on the conspiracy charge. Defendant only challenges his sentence on the conspiracy charge. See State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 777, 701 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1985) (issues raised in the docketing statement but not briefed are deemed abandoned).\nDISCUSSION\n{4} In this ease of first impression, we are called on to decide the proper application and extent of NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A) (1994). This subsection provides in relevant part:\nA. If a person is convicted of a noncapital felony, the basic sentence of imprisonment is as follows:\n(2) for a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, fifteen years imprisonment;\n(3) for a second degree felony, nine years imprisonment.\nIt is undisputed that conspiracy to commit first degree murder is a second degree felony. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-28-2 (1979). The only real question is whether the conspiracy resulted in the death of a person as contemplated by Section 31-18-15(A)(2).\n{5} Defendant argues that \u201c[cjonspiracy simply is not a felony resulting in the death of a human being.\u201d He maintains that since conspiracy is an initiatory crime resulting solely from an agreement to commit a crime, the agreement in and of itself could never result in the death of another person. In other words, he contends that the crime is complete once the agreement is reached. Since the crime was complete, the conspiracy could not and did not result in Lucero\u2019s death. Defendant would have us hold that all second degree conspiracies are subject to the sentencing stricture in Section 31-18-15(A)(3) of nine years.\n{6} In answering the question posited, we are guided by certain principles of statutory interpretation. Foremost, \u201cwhere the meaning of the statutory language is plain, and where the words used by the Legislature are free from ambiguity, there is no basis for interpreting the statute.\u201d State v. Mobbley, 98 N.M. 557, 558, 650 P.2d 841, 842 (Ct.App.1982); accord State v. Michael R., 107 N.M. 794, 796, 765 P.2d 767, 769 (Ct.App.1988); see also State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 790, 791 P.2d 64, 65 (1990) (\u201cWhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d); State v. Long, 121 N.M. 333, 335, 911 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct.App. 1995) (\u201cIf the meaning of a statute is clear, it is to be applied as written.\u201d). The express language of Section 31-18-15(A)(2) requires only that the second degree felony\u2014here conspiracy\u2014result in the death of a human being. There is no requirement that the death occur in the commission of the conspiracy nor is there a requirement that the conspiracy physically cause the death. See State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, \u00b6 38, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (differentiating between an act done \u201cin the commission of\u2019 a conspiracy and one which is the ultimate \u201cresult\u201d of the conspiracy); State v. Wood, 117 N.M. 682, 685, 875 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Ct.App.1994) (\u201cThis Court will not read language into a statutory provision which is clear on its face.\u201d).\n{7} Here, the Defendant and his co-eonspirators agreed to kill and then proceeded to kill. If they had entered into the agreement but had not carried out the agreement, then the appropriate sentence would have been nine years. But, they agreed to murder Mr. Lucero and then carried out then-agreement. The conspiracy set in motion the events which led to the killing. It cannot seriously be denied that this conspiracy resulted in the death of a human being. See Jonathan M., 109 N.M. at 790, 791 P.2d at 65; Mobbley, 98 N.M. at 558, 650 P.2d at 842.\n{8} Defendant also argues that the 1994 amendments to second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes, coupled with the enhanced penalties in Section 31-18-15 (amended at the same time), evince a legislative intent to limit the applicability of the enhanced penalties to only those identified as \u201cresulting in the death of a human being.\u201d He contends that since conspiracy to commit first-degree murder does not have this magic language, his sentence was illegal. In support he relies on our recent ease of State v. Alvarado, 1997-NMCA-027, \u00b6 10, 123 N.M. 187, 936 P.2d 869, in which we said that the express purpose of the legislative changes at issue in this case was to increase the sentences for second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.\n{9} Under Defendant\u2019s interpretation, the only crime subject to the fifteen year sentence in Section 31-18-15(A)(2) would be second degree murder. However, the plain language of this subsection gives no indication that it is limited only to this one crime, and it certainly would have been easy enough for the legislature to have so limited it. This interpretation would require us to read words into the statute. See State v. Gutierrez, 102 N.M. 726, 730, 699 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Ct.App.1985) (when statute makes sense as written, this Court does not need to read words into the statute). We can discern a reasonable legislative objective from the language of Section 31-18-15(A)(2). See State v. Andrews, 1997-NMCA-017, \u00b6 5, 123 N.M. 95, 934 P.2d 289. Namely, it is to prevent crimes that result in people\u2019s deaths.\n{10} We have previously stated that \u201c[pjenal statutes are not subjected to strained or unnatural constructions in order to infer exemptions from their provisions.\u201d We must read a statute \u201cliterally if its words are plain and unambiguous, provided such a construction would not lead to an injustice, absurdity, or contradiction.\u201d Id. Here, Defendant and his two cohorts agreed to kill Mr. Lucero and then proceeded to carry out the agreement. There is no injustice, absurdity, or contradiction in Defendant\u2019s increased penalty because the conspiracy resulted in Mr. Lucero\u2019s death. Indeed, applying this penalty to Defendant would appear to give effect to the legislature\u2019s apparently broader intent than to simply increase the penalties for only second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.\nCONCLUSION\n{11} The district court judge did not exceed his sentencing authority. His decision is affirmed.\n{12} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID and PICKARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tom Udall, Attorney General, Elizabeth Blaisdell, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Hilary Lamberton, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1998-NMCA-102\n964 P.2d 142\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Katcv SHIJE, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 18359.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 1, 1998.\nTom Udall, Attorney General, Elizabeth Blaisdell, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nHilary Lamberton, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0581-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 623 }