{ "id": 834309, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bradley WASSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wasson", "decision_date": "1998-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 18646", "first_page": "656", "last_page": "661", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 N.M. 656" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "964 P.2d 820" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1998-NMCA-087" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "49 F.3d 658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7416288 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "affirming conviction for concealing identity where the defendant refused requests to produce written identification" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/49/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590286 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" }, { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580050 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561332 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.Y.S.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 A.D.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3462570 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/115/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12039546 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/636/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Cal. App.4th 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 2405440 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/32/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "779 P.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1482165 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/161/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "863 P.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "ruling on issue of intent to defraud in context of pretrial motions" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "114-15", "parenthetical": "vacating orders dismissing forgery charges where the defendants presented police with identification cards that revealed the defendants' true identities but were not authentic" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Wash.App. 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1787035 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/71/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561267 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2769946 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" }, { "page": "778" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "778" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 N.M. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1553031 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204-05" }, { "page": "1009" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/32/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 So.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7428672 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/684/0856-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2742490 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142280 ], "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-074", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142248 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b64" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711395 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "1010" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561306 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "1331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557061 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688-89" }, { "page": "348-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563429 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-41", "parenthetical": "authorizing limited evidentiary hearing regarding factual basis for aggravating circumstances in capital-murder prosecution" }, { "page": "849-52", "parenthetical": "authorizing limited evidentiary hearing regarding factual basis for aggravating circumstances in capital-murder prosecution" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 836, "char_count": 17398, "ocr_confidence": 0.698, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6559430317273324e-07, "percentile": 0.8244667932377525 }, "sha256": "741afb57716619303b99c889311b3975d945005bce52377b9f1237d2276a788e", "simhash": "1:d8054e93d64d87ea", "word_count": 2776 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:04.972911+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HARTZ, C.J. and ALARID, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bradley WASSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nARMIJO, Judge.\n{1} The State appeals the district court\u2019s order dismissing three counts of forgery arising from allegations that Defendant signed his brother\u2019s name to a set of traffic citations issued by a sheriffs deputy. Because we determine that these allegations fall within the forgery statute, NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-10(A) (1963), we reverse the district court\u2019s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} On February 28, 1997, a San Juan County sheriffs deputy stopped a vehicle driven by Defendant. According to the sheriffs deputy, Defendant identified himself as \u201cRyan Wasson\u201d and said his birth date was September 14, 1978. After determining that there was no driver\u2019s license corresponding to the name and date of birth given by Defendant, the sheriffs deputy issued three traffic citations for failure to stop at a stop sign, no insurance, and no driver\u2019s license. Defendant allegedly signed the name \u201cRyan Wasson\u201d to all three traffic citations. The sheriffs deputy later ascertained that \u201cRyan Wasson\u201d is Defendant\u2019s brother.\n{3} On March 27, 1997, the State filed a criminal information alleging that Defendant committed three counts of forgery by making false signatures on the traffic citations. Defendant waived the preliminary examination on March 13, 1997, and responded with a motion to dismiss all the forgery charges on June 12, 1997. Defendant\u2019s motion asserted that his alleged conduct did not constitute the crime of forgery or, in the alternative, that his alleged conduct could be prosecuted only under the statute making it a petty misdemeanor to conceal one\u2019s identity. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-22-3 (1963).\n{4} On June 23, 1997, the district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that Defendant destroyed the legal efficacy of the traffic citations by signing his brother\u2019s name on them. Without any legal efficacy, the district court reasoned, the citations could not evince any intent to injure or defraud Defendant\u2019s brother. This appeal followed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Standard of Review\n{5} For purposes of this appeal, we assume the truth of the factual allegations in the State\u2019s pleadings. Cf. Rule 5-601(B) NMRA 1998 (defense may be raised by pretrial motion if it is \u201ccapable of determination without a trial on the merits\u201d); 1 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 194, at 714 (1982) (standard of review for pretrial motion attacking sufficiency of indictment or information under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)). But cf. State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 238-41, 880 P.2d 845, 849-52 (1994) (authorizing limited evidentiary hearing regarding factual basis for aggravating circumstances in capital-murder prosecution). Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss does not attempt to contradict these allegations, see State v. Mares, 92 N.M. 687, 688-89, 594 P.2d 347, 348-49 (Ct. App.1979), and thus it presents a purely legal issue of whether forgery charges can be predicated on Defendant\u2019s alleged conduct, see State v. Foulenfont, 119 N.M. 788, 790, 895 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ct.App.1995); State v. Tabaha, 103 N.M. 789, 789, 714 P.2d 1010, 1010 (Ct.App.1986).\n{6} Whether forgery charges can be predicated on Defendant\u2019s alleged conduct is a question of statutory interpretation to which we afford de novo review. See State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, \u00b6 3, 123 N.M. 589, 943 P.2d 1042. \u201c[T]he language of penal statutes should be given a reasonable or common sense construction consonant with the objects of the legislation, and the evils sought to be overcome should be given special attention.\u201d Ogden, 118 N.M. at 243, 880 P.2d at 854.\nB. Legal Efficacy of Uniform Traffic Citations\n{7} We first address the district court\u2019s conclusion that forgery charges could not be predicated on the traffic citations because Defendant destroyed their legal efficacy by signing his brother\u2019s name on them. The forgery statute provides, in relevant part, that \u201c[fjorgery consists of ... falsely making or altering any signature to, or any part of, any writing purporting to have any legal efficacy with intent to injure or defraud.\u201d Section 30-16-10(A). Interpreting the forgery statute, this Court has defined the element of \u201clegal efficacy\u201d in terms of \u201c \u2018an instrument which upon its face could be made the foundation of liability\u2019 and \u2018an instrument good and valid for the purpose for which it was created.\u2019 The writing must be such that, if genuine, it would apparently operate to the legal prejudice of another.\u201d State v. Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, \u00b6 14, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098 (quoting State v. Cowley, 79 N.M. 49, 52, 439 P.2d 567, 570 (Ct.App.1968)). Although forgeries often involve documents relied upon to establish financial obligations and entitlements in the conduct of private business, see id. \u00b6\u00b6 13, 15, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098, they also may involve \u201cany document required by law to be filed or recorded or necessary or convenient to the discharge of a public official\u2019s duties.\u201d 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law \u00a7 491, at 94 (15th ed.1996).\n{8} Uniform traffic citations are relied upon in the discharge of a law enforcement officer\u2019s duties. When an arrested person does not contest the violations with which he or she is charged, the uniform traffic citation functions as an agreement to pay a penalty assessment. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-8-123 (1989). When the arrested person declines to accept a penalty assessment notice, the uniform traffic citation functions as a complaint which provides the arrested person with notice to appear in court. See id.; NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-8-131 (1990). Moreover, uniform traffic citations may have legal efficacy because, \u201c[i]n order to secure his release, the arrested person must give his written promise to appear in court or to pay the penalty assessment prescribed.\u201d Section 66-8-123(D). Even when the arrested person does not assume a financial obligation by agreeing to pay the penalty assessment, uniform traffic citations provide the foundation for liability because \u201c[i]t is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-8-126(A) (1978). For these reasons, other states have analogized a traffic citation to an appearance bond. See Rushing v. State, 684 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996).\n{9} Based on these authorities, we conclude that the forgery statute includes uniform traffic citations among the types of writings which may purport to have legal efficacy. The district court\u2019s concern that Defendant\u2019s false signatures may have destroyed the legal efficacy of the traffic citations at issue here does not alter this conclusion because the statute plainly is not limited to writings which actually have l\u00e9gal efficacy. Rather, the statute applies to any writing which purports to have legal efficacy, see \u00a7 30-16-10(A), and the crime of forgery is complete as soon as the false signature is made on such a writing with the requisite intent, see Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, \u00b6 16, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098. Here the allegations are sufficient to show that the traffic citations purported to have legal efficacy because Defendant allegedly made the signatures to appear as if they were valid acknowledgements that he agreed to pay a penalty assessment or appear in court to answer the charges. See \u00a7 66-8-123; Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1236 (6th ed.1990) (defining \u201cpurport\u201d as \u201cto have the appearanee of being, intending, claiming, etc.\u201d). Thus, it was error to dismiss the information based on a lack of purported legal efficacy.\nC. Intent to Injure or Defraud\n{10} We next address the trial court\u2019s ruling that Defendant\u2019s conduct did not provide a basis for charging him with forgery because he had no intent to injure or defraud his brother, Ryan Wasson. The forgery statute does not require that the forger intend to injure or defraud a particular person. See State v. Smith, 32 N.M. 191, 204-05, 252 P. 1003, 1009 (1927); 4 Torc\u00eda, supra \u00a7 477, at 73. In addition, there is no requirement that the person whom the forger intends to defraud or injure be the same person whose name is forged. See State v. Nation, 85 N.M. 291, 292, 511 P.2d 777, 778 (Ct.App.1973) (forger had requisite intent to injure or defraud pharmacist by knowingly presenting prescription containing doctor\u2019s false signature); 4 Torcia, supra \u00a7 477, at 73 (intent may relate to person not named in the forged writing). Hence, the inquiry is not limited to whether Defendant intended to injure or defraud his brother.\n{11} Moreover, a forgery conviction does not depend on whether Defendant actually succeeded in defrauding or injuring someone. The forgery is complete when the forger makes the false signature with the requisite intent, regardless of whether its falsity is detected before the forger absconds with the fruits of the crime or shifts liability to another person. See Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, \u00b6 16, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098; Nation, 85 N.M. at 292, 511 P.2d at 778. Thus, the forgery charges against Defendant are not precluded by the allegation that the arresting officer detected the falsity of the signatures before any further effort was made to hold Defendant or his brother liable for a penalty assessment or a failure to appear.\n{12} The current procedural posture of this case presents an additional obstacle to Defendant\u2019s contention that he lacked the requisite intent to sustain a forgery conviction. A defendant\u2019s knowledge or intent generally presents a question of fact for a jury to decide. See Nation, 85 N.M. at 292, 511 P.2d at 778. Further, since a defendant\u2019s intent is rarely subject to direct proof, it may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pisio, 119 N.M. 252, 259, 889 P.2d 860, 867 (Ct.App.1994); cf. State v. Esquivel, 71 Wash.App. 868, 863 P.2d 113, 115 (Wash.Ct.App.1993) (intent to commit forgery may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances if they plainly indicate such intent as a matter of logical probability). Thus, in the context of a pretrial motion that simply tests the legal sufficiency of the criminal information and assumes the State\u2019s factual allegations to be true, we must limit our inquiry to the purely legal question of whether Defendant\u2019s false signatures on the traffic citations were capable of evincing an intent to injure or defraud anyone under the facts and circumstances alleged by the State. Cf. Esquivel, 863 P.2d at 115 (ruling on issue of intent to defraud in context of pretrial motions).\n{13} In answering this question, we need not speculate about what injury might befall the person whose name Defendant falsely signed on the traffic citations because we determine that such false signatures are sufficiently capable of evincing an intent to injure or defraud the arresting officer and the court in which the traffic citations are filed. The signatures on the traffic citations were to serve as Defendant\u2019s promise that he would pay the penalty assessments or appear in court. See \u00a7 66-8-123(D). The arresting officer was required to secure such a promise as a condition of Defendant\u2019s immediate release. See id. However, making false signatures on the citations would render Defendant\u2019s promises meaningless, thus allowing him to obtain his release without actually agreeing to pay a penalty assessment or appear in court. See State v. Bedoni 161 Am. 480, 779 P.2d 355, 359 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1989).\n{14} Under these circumstances, making a false signature could give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant intended \u201cto obtain the release, without incarceration, of someone not entitled to release.\u201d Id. at 359; see also Esquivel, 863 P.2d at 115. For the purposes of the forgery statute, such a fraudulent intent to obtain an individual\u2019s release from custody is essentially the same as the fraudulent intent involved in other cases where people forge documents in order to obtain something that is not rightfully theirs. See People v. Gaul-Alexander, 32 Cal. App.4th 735, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 180 (Cal. Dist.Ct.App.1995). In addition, Defendant\u2019s false signatures on the traffic citations may evince an intent to injure or defraud law enforcement officers or the courts by \u201cconcealing] the true identity of the perpetrator of the alleged crime,\u201d Bedoni, 779 P.2d at 359, \u201c \u2018temporarily hiding] from the authorities his prior criminal history[, and] hampering his identification by the police in future investigations.\u2019 \u201d Thornton v. State, 636 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (quoting People v. Kirk, 115 A.D.2d 758, 497 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1985)).\n{15} We determine that the forgery statute encompasses the above-described types of fraudulent intent. Thus, it was error to dismiss the information based on a lack of intent to injure or defraud.\nD. GeneraNSpecific Rule\n{16} Defendant\u2019s next contention is that the general-specific rule requires Defendant to be charged with concealing his identity under Section 30-22-3 instead of forgery. The district court did not rely on the general-specific rule in its order dismissing the criminal information. However, we may affirm the district court\u2019s order on grounds not relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require us to look beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below. See State v. Franks, 119 N.M. 174, 177, 889 P.2d 209, 212 (Ct.App.1994). Defendant\u2019s contention regarding the general-specific rule does not require us to look beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below. However, in light of these allegations, we determine that the general-specific rule does not provide a basis for affirming the district court\u2019s order.\n{17} When the same conduct is punishable under both a general statute and a more specific statute, the general-specific rule ordinarily requires the State to prosecute only under the more specific statute if the two statutes cannot be harmonized. See Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, \u00b64, 123 N.M. 589, 943 P.2d 1042. However, for purposes of the general-specific rule, there is not an irreconcilable conflict between two statutes if each defines an offense containing an element that the other does not. See State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985). When each offense contains an element that the other does not, it may be problematic to determine which one is more specific and which one is more general. See Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, \u00b6 9, 123 N.M. 589, 943 P.2d 1042. Hence, a court should not strain to apply the general-specific rule in such instances. See id.\n{18} Applying these principles in the present case, we determine that the forgery statute and the concealing-identity statute can be harmonized because each defines an offense containing an element that the other does not. The elements of forgery include falsely making or altering a writing which purports to have legal efficacy, or knowingly issuing or transferring a forged writing. See \u00a7 30-16-10; State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 668, 670, 789 P.2d 616, 618 (1990). The elements of concealing identity include concealing one\u2019s true name or identity, or disguising oneself. See \u00a7 30-22-3; United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 662 (10th Cir.1995).\n{19} Forgery differs from concealing identity because only the former crime specifically requires the use of a writing, and only the latter crime specifically pertains to one\u2019s own true name or identity. Thus, it is possible to commit the crime of concealing identity without making, altering, issuing, or transferring any writing. See, e.g., Stenzel, 49 F.3d at 662 (affirming conviction for concealing identity where the defendant refused requests to produce written identification). It is equally possible to commit the crime of forgery without concealing one\u2019s true name or identity or disguising oneself. See, e.g., Esquivel, 863 P.2d at 114-15 (vacating orders dismissing forgery charges where the defendants presented police with identification cards that revealed the defendants\u2019 true identities but were not authentic). See generally 4 Torcia, supra, \u00a7 481 (use of one\u2019s own name in commission of forgery). Moreover, it is problematic to discern which of the two statutes is the more specific one because forgery may be more specific with regard to the use of a particular physical object (a writing), while concealing identity may be more specific with regard to the use of a particular subject matter (one\u2019s true name or identity). For these reasons, we determine that the general-specific rule is inapplicable in this case and does not preclude the State from charging Defendant with forgery.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{20} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court\u2019s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nHARTZ, C.J. and ALARID, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARMIJO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tom Udall, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellant.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Will O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1998-NMCA-087\n964 P.2d 820\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bradley WASSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 18646.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 16, 1998.\nCertiorari Denied June 24, 1998.\nTom Udall, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Will O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0656-01", "first_page_order": 696, "last_page_order": 701 }