{ "id": 827434, "name": "In the Matter of the Protest of Frank D. ALEXANDER and Violet Alexander, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. ANDERSON, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee; In the Matter of the Protest of Edward J. Gerety and M.H. Gerety, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. Anderson, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, DefendantAppellee; In the Matter of the Protest of Paul R. Duncan and Marilyn H. Duncan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. Anderson, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, DefendantAppellee; In the Matter of the protest of David B. Mosely, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Bernalillo County Valuation Board, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Alexander v. Anderson", "decision_date": "1999-01-05", "docket_number": "No. 18041, 18135, 18161, 18484", "first_page": "632", "last_page": "641", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 N.M. 632" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "973 P.2d 884" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1999-NMCA-021" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "114 N.M. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731591 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322289 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "\"The choice of sanctions [for discovery violations] lies within the discretion of the trial court, and it will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.\"" }, { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "\"The choice of sanctions [for discovery violations] lies within the discretion of the trial court, and it will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-020", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834209 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575511 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "138-39" }, { "page": "583-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594917 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715074 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "736" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723255 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 U.S. 180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6160082 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183", "parenthetical": "holding that federal tax authority could retroactively revoke prior ruling granting taxpayer an exemption where prior ruling was erroneously granted" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that federal tax authority could retroactively revoke prior ruling granting taxpayer an exemption where prior ruling was erroneously granted" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that federal tax authority could retroactively revoke prior ruling granting taxpayer an exemption where prior ruling was erroneously granted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 402", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11435 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "\"The Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal impression.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal impression.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal impression.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 259", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184507 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 421", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131295 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183131 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561298 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 N.M. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "noting legislative inaction indicates acquiescence to judicial interpretation" }, { "page": "1308", "parenthetical": "noting legislative inaction indicates acquiescence to judicial interpretation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/41/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Md. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2068073 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/309/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Md. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2041118 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that longstanding legislative acquiescence to administrative construction of statute \"gives rise to a strong presumption that the interpretation is correct\" (quoting Sinai Hosp. v. Department of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987))" }, { "page": "1354", "parenthetical": "holding that longstanding legislative acquiescence to administrative construction of statute \"gives rise to a strong presumption that the interpretation is correct\" (quoting Sinai Hosp. v. Department of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/319/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 A.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "noting when a legislature authorizes an agency to promulgate regulations, it \"is presumed to know what rules were extant pursuant to that authority\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Pa. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 464105 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting when a legislature authorizes an agency to promulgate regulations, it \"is presumed to know what rules were extant pursuant to that authority\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/352/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "831 P.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "\"[A] presumption that the Legislature is aware of an administrative construction of a statute should be applied if the agency's interpretation of the statutory provisions is of such longstanding duration that the Legislature may be presumed to know of it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Cal.Rptr.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[A] presumption that the Legislature is aware of an administrative construction of a statute should be applied if the agency's interpretation of the statutory provisions is of such longstanding duration that the Legislature may be presumed to know of it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Cal.4th 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 4th", "case_ids": [ 2005398 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-4th/2/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563456 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "noting that agency's power to craft rules and regulations is not strictly limited to the terms of its enabling act, \"but also includes those powers that arise from the statutory language by fair and necessary implication\"" }, { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "noting that agency's power to craft rules and regulations is not strictly limited to the terms of its enabling act, \"but also includes those powers that arise from the statutory language by fair and necessary implication\"" }, { "page": "504-05" }, { "page": "545-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6209106 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725403 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "\"In interpreting a statute, a court not only looks to the plain meaning of the language employed, but also to the object of the legislation.\"" }, { "page": "1056", "parenthetical": "\"In interpreting a statute, a court not only looks to the plain meaning of the language employed, but also to the object of the legislation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "\" 'Primary use' connotes primacy in utility or essentiality, in quality as well as quantity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ohio St.3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1734516 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "\" 'Primary use' connotes primacy in utility or essentiality, in quality as well as quantity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/71/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 142282 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566487 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566662 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727650 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "\"If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect[.]\"" }, { "page": "1159", "parenthetical": "\"If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566648 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" }, { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573086 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the legislative intent behind this special method of property tax valuation is to aid the small subsistence farmers in our state.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0395-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1445, "char_count": 32582, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2711170393650863e-07, "percentile": 0.6147949166148297 }, "sha256": "2bab0dd4ccbfad73fd9ab873b109f90e66d8e23b3ee9dd2620d9694a3603b1a3", "simhash": "1:0c7206906fc72fd2", "word_count": 5089 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:14.526620+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "APODACA and BOSSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of the Protest of Frank D. ALEXANDER and Violet Alexander, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. ANDERSON, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee. In the Matter of the Protest of Edward J. Gerety and M.H. Gerety, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. Anderson, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, DefendantAppellee. In the Matter of the Protest of Paul R. Duncan and Marilyn H. Duncan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. Anderson, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, DefendantAppellee. In the Matter of the protest of David B. Mosely, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Bernalillo County Valuation Board, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nARMIJO, Judge.\n{1} Frank D. Alexander, Violet Alexander, Paul R. Duncan, Marilyn H. Duncan, Edward J. Gerety, M.H. Gerety, and David B. Moseley (collectively, Taxpayers) appeal from decisions of the Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board (the Board) affirming the Bernalillo County Assessor\u2019s (the Assessor) denials of \u201cagricultural use\u201d tax exemptions for the 1996 tax year. The \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption presents a favorable method of property tax valuation which grants significant tax relief to qualifying property owners. This consolidated appeal presents this Court with a question of first impression: we must construe the Legislature\u2019s intent in its provision of the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption and give explicit meaning to its chosen words. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 7-36-20(A) (1973, as amended through 1997). We also review the Board\u2019s application of Section 7-36-20 to the facts of each Taxpayer\u2019s request for an \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption. Upon this review, we affirm the Board\u2019s decision below as to each Taxpayer.\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE\n{2} The Assessor issued each denial for the 1996 tax year after having consistently granted Taxpayers the exemption in previous years. No change in law or Taxpayers\u2019 use of the subject properties precipitated the denials. Rather, the Assessor based its contested decisions on site visits and assessments, a procedure it contends it was unable to conduct thoroughly in prior years due to budget constraints. The legal issues presented in these appeals apply uniformly to each taxpayer. However, we discuss individually the facts specific to each appellant.\n(A) Frank D. Alexander and Violet Alexander\n{3} The Alexanders purchased their property, four contiguous parcels comprising 2.25 acres located in Albuquerque\u2019s North Valley, in 1982. At that time, alfalfa grew on the land. In previous years, they sold the alfalfa, later planting hay and pasture grass. They have since sold some of the grass on occasion; however, it has primarily served as feed for their horses. Upon its review of the record, the Board upheld the Assessor\u2019s denial of the Alexanders\u2019 \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption application, finding that the primary use of the property is to raise or sustain their recreational horses.\n(B) Paul R. Duncan and Marilyn H. Duncan\n{4} The Duncans own 2.09 acres, also in Albuquerque\u2019s North Valley. On this appeal, however, the tax treatment of only 1.59 acres is at issue. The subject property supports \u201cK-31 grass,\u201d a vegetable garden, and twelve to thirteen fruit trees, all of which surround \u201cand [are] made part of the house, swing-set/play area, driveway area, ... landscaping and other appurtenant portions of the residence.\u201d Once each year since 1988, the Dun-cans have paid someone to cut and bale their hay. However, they maintain the grass primarily as a lawn, saving only a small portion to be cut and baled each year. Finally, the Duncans own no livestock. Upon its review of the record, the Board upheld the Assessor\u2019s denial of the Duncans\u2019 \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption application, finding that the primary use of the property is a residential \u201chomesite\u201d and not land primarily put to agricultural use.\n(C) Edward J. Gerety and M.H. Gerety\n{5} The Geretys have owned two lots in the North Valley of Albuquerque since 1969. They use the first, a 3.79-acre parcel, of which the tax treatment of only 3.29 acres is here at issue, to graze horses, grow hay, and support an orchard and garden. They use the second, a 2.13-acre lot, for the same purposes. The Board upheld the Assessor\u2019s denial of the Geretys\u2019 \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption application, finding that the properties do not primarily serve an agricultural purpose.\n(D) David B. Moseley\n{6} Moseley owns the largest tract of property affected by this appeal: approximately ten acres in Albuquerque\u2019s North Valley which he has owned for nearly four decades. The property, zoned for agricultural use, consists of irrigated land and contains several outbuildings. Barbara Moseley, the occupant, grows grass and grazes horses upon the land. In past years, mares have foaled on the property, but currently it is occupied by aging race horses which the occupant cannot bring herself to send to slaughter. She has not sold any horses for three years, nor maintained a stud on the property for two years. Finally, the property contains some twenty-four fruit and nut trees, the products of which are primarily consumed by birds. Upon its review, the Board upheld the Assessor\u2019s denial of Moseley\u2019s application for an \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption, finding that the property is primarily used as a residence.\nTHE \"AGRICULTURAL USE\u201d EXEMPTION\n{7} The \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption grants qualifying owners \u201ca dramatic tax-break.\u201d County of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 94 N.M. 395, 395, 611 P.2d 218, 218 (1980). Entitlement to this taxbreak is premised upon proof that the applicant primarily puts his property to agricultural use. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 7-36-20(A) (1973, prior to 1997 amendment) (\u201c[T]he owner of the land ... must produce objective evidence of bona fide agricultural use[.]\u201d). This showing is the applicant\u2019s burden. See id. The parties disagree as to whether this burden was satisfied on the record presented. Whether they have met their burden depends on the scope attributed to the phrase \u201cbona fide agricultural use\u201d as that phrase is defined by both statute, see id., and regulation, see 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1 (1983); see also \u00a7 7-36-20(C)(dele-gating to agency authority to promulgate implementing regulations). We discuss each in turn.\n(A) The Statutory Provision\n{8} We begin our analysis with a question of law: what is the appropriate construction of the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption\u2019s unambiguous statutory provision? See Romero Excavation & Trucking, Inc. v. Bradley Constr., 121 N.M. 471, 473, 913 P.2d 659, 661 (1996); see also Draper v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 116 N.M. 775, 777, 867 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1994) (\u201cIf the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect[.]\u201d). Our responsibility in this task is \u201cto search for and effectuate the legislative intent \u2014 the purpose or object\u2014 underlying the statute.\u201d State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). We determine, and the parties do not contest, that our interpretation of Section 7-36-20 is governed by the plain meaning of the statutory language. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, 121 N.M. 764, 768-69, 918 P.2d 350, 354-55; Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc., 1996-NMSC-035, \u00b6 44, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321. We therefore begin with the statute\u2019s plain language.\n{9} Section 7-36-20(A) provides:\nThe value of land used primarily for agricultural purposes shall be determined on the basis of the land\u2019s capacity to produce agricultural products. The burden of demonstrating primary agricultural use is on the owner of the land, and he must produce objective evidence of bona fide agricultural use for the year preceding the year in which application is made for his land to be valued under this section. The fact that land was devoted to agricultural use in the preceding year is not of itself sufficient when there is evidence that the agricultural use was subordinate to another use or purpose of the owner, such as holding for speculative land subdivision and sale, commercial use of a nonagricultural character, recreational use or other nonagrieultural purpose.\nTaxpayers advocate a broad reading of \u201cagricultural use\u201d in this provision. For example, they refer the Court to common definitions of \u201cagriculture\u201d and \u201cuse.\u201d See, e.g., Webster\u2019s Third International Dictionary 44 (defining \u201cagriculture\u201d as \u201cthe science or art of cultivating the soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock ... production of plants and animals useful to man and in varying degrees the preparation of these products for man\u2019s use and their disposal (as by marketing)\u201d); see id. at 2523 (defining \u201cuse\u201d as \u201cthe act or practice of using something ... continued exercise or employment ... habitual or customary practice: accustomed or usual procedure\u201d). They further point to the statute\u2019s subsequent definition of \u201cagricultural use\u201d and argue that it should be given meaning broad enough to encompass their uses of the subject properties. See \u00a7 7-36-20(B) (defining \u201cagricultural use\u201d as \u201cuse of land for the production of plants, crops, trees, forest products, orchard crops, livestock, poultry, or fish\u201d).\n{10} Adoption of Taxpayers\u2019 construction, however, would effectively expand Section 7-36-20 to entitle owners of residential, yet pastoral, lands generally to its generous tax relief. Such a broad interpretation of the statute, we believe, would obviate the need for application of the TRD regulation. Additionally, this oversimplified and incomplete construction is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. See State v. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, \u00b6 29,123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (\u201cWe are distrustful of any formulaic approach in our efforts to facilitate and promote legislative purpose.\u201d).\n{11} Furthermore, Taxpayers give short shrift to additional statutory language. Notably, it is not merely \u201cagricultural use\u201d which qualifies a property under this provision, but \u201cbona fide agricultural use.\u201d Section 7-36-20(A) (emphasis added); see Webster\u2019s Third International Dictionary 250 (defining \u201cbona fide\u201d as \u201cmade in good faith without fraud or deceit ... made with earnest or wholehearted intent ... not specious or counterfeit\u201d). Moreover, these bona fide uses must be the \u201cprimary \u201d uses to which the owner puts the land. Section 7-36-20(A) (emphasis added); see Webster\u2019s Third International Dictionary 1800 (defining \u201cprimary\u201d as \u201csomething that stands first in order, rank or importance: FUNDAMENTAL\u201d); see also AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 11, 13, 641 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1994) (\u201c \u2018Primary use\u2019 connotes primacy in utility or essentiality, in quality as well as quantity.\u201d). Taxpayers\u2019 construction avoids these explicitly narrowing terms.\n{12} We note also that the Legislature distinguished bona fide agricultural uses from other, nonqualifying uses. See \u00a7 7-36-20(A) (including in definition of nonqualifying uses \u201cholding for speculative land subdivision and sale, commercial use of a nonagricultural character, recreational use or other nonagrieultural purpose\u201d). Giving meaning to Section 7-36-20 as a whole, and rejecting Taxpayers\u2019 piecemeal approach, we therefore determine that the provision\u2019s plain terms contradict Taxpayers\u2019 argument.\n{13} Finally, reading the provision more closely than do Taxpayers, we find that Section 7-36-20 evinces a legislative intent to deny tax relief to those who demonstrate mere passive or incidental cultivation of their lands. See Do\u00f1a Ana Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Dofflemeyer, 115 N.M. 590, 592, 855 P.2d 1054, 1056 (1993) (\u201cIn interpreting a statute, a court not only looks to the plain meaning of the language employed, but also to the object of the legislation.\u201d); Ambell, 94 N.M. at 397, 611 P.2d at 220 (\u201cIt is clear that the legislative intent behind this special method of property tax valuation is to aid the small subsistence farmers in our state.\u201d). Accordingly, we reject Taxpayers\u2019 construction of the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption\u2019s statutory provision.\n(B) The Regulatory Provision\n{14} The Taxation and Revenue Department (TRD) promulgated a regulation to implement the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption in 1983. See 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1. This regulation provides:\nA. The owner of the land bears the burden of demonstrating that the use of the land is primarily agricultural. This burden cannot be met without submitting objective evidence that:\n1. the plants, crops, trees, forest products, orchard crops, livestock, poultry or fish which were produced or which were attempted to be produced through use of the land were:\n(a) produced for sale or home consumption in whole or in part; or\n(b) used by others for sale; or\n(c) used, as feed, seed, or breeding stock, to produce other such products which other products were to be held for sale or home consumption.\n2. The use of the land met the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government.\n3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1. Taxpayers claim that because Section 7-36-20(B) already defines \u201cagricultural use,\u201d TRD cannot further attempt to define the term by regulation. Specifically, Taxpayers argue that the regulation\u2019s requirement that anything produced on or from the land be produced for sale, commereial use, or home consumption, see 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.l(a-c), is ultra vires. We do not agree.\n{15} TRD acted within its expressly delegated power in promulgating Regulation 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 7-36-20(0 (\u201cThe department shall adopt regulations for determining whether or not land is used primarily for agricultural purposes.\u201d). The parties have failed to demonstrate that TRD\u2019s exercise of this expressly delegated legislative power is \u201carbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.\u201d Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also Howell v. Heim, 118 N.M. 500, 504, 882 P.2d 541, 545 (1994) (noting that agency\u2019s power to craft rules and regulations is not strictly limited to the terms of its enabling act, \u201cbut also includes those powers that arise from the statutory language by fair and necessary implication\u201d).\n{16} Despite Taxpayers\u2019 challenge to this regulation, we find that 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1 is consistent with the statute\u2019s manifest intent. Indeed, as Taxpayers note, Section 7-36-20(B) provides a definition of \u201cagricultural use.\u201d The regulations, in turn, provide objective standards by which to determine if any claimed \u201cagricultural use\u201d further satisfies the statute\u2019s requirements of \u201cbona fide\u201d and \u201cprimary\u201d use. In other words, the regulations provide a reasonable means for determining whether a claimed agricultural use is actually \u201csubordinate to another use or purpose of the owner.\u201d Section 7-36-20(A).\n{17} Moreover, we note that TRD adopted this regulation in 1983. Taxpayers point to the Legislature\u2019s rendering 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1 .1 obsolete by amending Section 7-36-20 in 1997. See NMSA 1997, \u00a7 7-36-20(A) (1997). However, this 1997 amendment is no evidence of the Legislature\u2019s intent in passing the original statute in 1975. We note that for approximately fifteen years, the Legislature, which is presumed to have known of the regulation\u2019s existence and effect, see Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 2 Cal.4th 999, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 358, 831 P.2d 798, 809 (1992) (\u201c[A] presumption that the Legislature is aware of an administrative construction of a statute should be applied if the agency\u2019s interpretation of the statutory provisions is of such longstanding duration that the Legislature may be presumed to know of it.\u201d); see also Ruch v. Wilhelm, 352 Pa. 586, 43 A.2d 894, 904 (1945) (noting when a legislature authorizes an agency to promulgate regulations, it \u201cis presumed to know what rules were extant pursuant to that authority\u201d), apparently accepted it as valid and consistent with the previous Section 7-36-20, see Morris v. Prince George\u2019s County, 319 Md. 597, 573 A.2d 1346, 1354 (1990) (holding that longstanding legislative acquiescence to administrative construction of statute \u201cgives rise to a strong presumption that the interpretation is correct\u201d (quoting Sinai Hosp. v. Department of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987))); cf. In re Morrow\u2019s Will, 41 N.M. 117, 130, 64 P.2d 1300, 1308 (1937) (noting legislative inaction indicates acquiescence to judicial interpretation). Therefore, we determine that TRD\u2019s promulgation of 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1 was a legal exercise of delegated legislative authority. See generally Howell, 118 N.M. at 504-05, 882 P.2d at 545-46.\nTAXPAYERS\u2019 ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT\n{18} Having reviewed the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, we address Taxpayers\u2019 claim that since no use of the subject lands has changed and the county assessor has consistently granted Section 7-36-20 exemptions for the past several years, Taxpayers\u2019 properties are entitled to a presumption of primary agricultural use. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 119 N.M. 29, 42, 888 P.2d 475, 488 (Ct.App.1994) (noting that \u201can unexplained reversal of previous [administrative] interpretation or consistent practice\u201d generally merits little deference of a reviewing court).\n{19} Taxpayers\u2019 argument appears to be one of estoppel. They argue that the Assessor has consistently interpreted the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption in Taxpayers\u2019 favor; therefore, it should be estopped from changing its interpretation absent some change in circumstances. We do not agree.\n{20} The Bernalillo County Assessor \u201cis not disqualified from changing its mind.\u201d NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351, 98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586 (1978). While dramatic shifts in administrative interpretation of law generally entitle a new agency interpretation \u201cto considerably less deference,\u201d INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)), this rule does not preclude an agency from correcting its mistakes, see Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) (\u201cThe Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal impression.\u201d) (citing Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183, 77 S.Ct. 707, 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957) (holding that federal tax authority could retroactively revoke prior ruling granting taxpayer an exemption where prior ruling was erroneously granted)).\n{21} The Assessor has provided justification for the change in application of Section 7-36-20 to Taxpayers. As the Assessor noted, 1996 was the first year in the immediate past wherein it had the resources to conduct thorough site investigations and verifications of Section 7-36-30 applications. Accordingly, the Assessor appears not to be arbitrarily deviating from prior practice and procedure as much as it is now doing a more capable and competent job of administering its office according to the applicable law. This is not grounds for reversing the appealed administrative decisions.\n{22} Furthermore, in this regard, the structure and language of the statute itself limits the weight to be afforded prior issuances of \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemptions. For example, under the statute in force at all times relevant to these appeals, it was Taxpayers\u2019 burden to demonstrate primary agricultural use each year. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 7-36-2(A) (prior to 1997 amendment). Qualification for the exemption during prior years, therefore, is not dispositive of the question of entitlement for the 1996 tax year. See id. While such evidence has persuasive force, it is rebutted if \u201cthere is evidence the agricultural purpose was subordinate to another use or purpose of the owner.\u201d Id. Accordingly, the law regulating issuance of \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemptions for the tax year at issue leaves ample room for detailed annual review of applications.\nTAXPAYERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SECTION 7-36-20 EXEMPTIONS FOR THE 1996 TAX YEAR\n{23} We now turn to the facts on appeal. In reviewing the record presented, we must determine whether the Board\u2019s decision was \u201csupported by substantial evidence or whether the decision is arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable, or capricious.\u201d In re Protest of Cobb, 113 N.M. 251, 253, 824 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Ct.App.1991). In making this determination, we will not substitute our own judgment. See Herman v. Miners\u2019 Hosp., 111 N.M. 550, 552, 807 P.2d 734, 736 (1991). Rather, we review the whole record below and will uphold the Board\u2019s decision if we \u201cfind evidence that is credible in light of the whole record and that is sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the agency.\u201d Id. \u201c[AJlthough the evidence may support inconsistent findings, we will not disturb the agency\u2019s finding if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.\u201d Id.; see also Plaza del Sol v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 104 N.M. 154, 161, 717 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Ct.App.1986) (noting that county tax board decision will be \u201cviewed in the light most favorable to support the findings\u201d). Finally, even under the whole record review employed here, we will afford deference to the fact finder below. See Herman, 111 N.M. at 552, 807 P.2d at 736.\n{24} Review of a taxpayer\u2019s application for an \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption will necessarily implicate, as the Board correctly noted, consideration of \u201call the facts and circumstances with respect to the subject property during the relevant period ... as a whole to determine if the primary use of the subject property is agricultural or something else.\u201d As a group, Taxpayers allege primary agricultural use of their properties and entitlement, therefore, to the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption. In making their argument, Taxpayers adduced evidence regarding their: (1) grazing horses; (2) growing grasses, fruit trees and vegetable gardens; and (3) qualifying for participation in a federal soil conservation program. The Board found that this evidence was insufficient to support Taxpayers\u2019 claims to the entitlement. We agree.\n(A) Crops Produced for Sale or Home Consumption\n{25} First, we find that the Board\u2019s conclusion that Taxpayers were not primarily employing their properties to produce crops within the meaning of the law is supported by the record. Taxpayers argue that growing various agricultural grasses, vegetables, fruit and nuts constitutes producing crops and therefore qualifies as \u201cagriculture\u201d under Section 7-36-20. In support, Taxpayers cite to Black v. Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board, 95 N.M. 136, 139, 619 P.2d 581, 584 (Ct.App.1980), to argue that alfalfa is an agricultural product, and therefore, by extension, their properties are agricultural lands. This argument fails.\n{26} The taxpayer in Black grazed more than 350 head of cattle on his property and earned \u201cno income from any source other than agriculture.\u201d Black, 95 N.M. at 138-39, 619 P.2d at 583-84. It was in light of these facts that the Court found him entitled to the \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption. The language in Black upon which Taxpayers rely merely provides a generic definition of alfalfa. As such, it provides no analytical support for their argument: agricultural lands grow alfalfa therefore lands that grow alfalfa are agricultural.\n{27} Moreover, while growing alfalfa, fruits, nuts, and vegetables may constitute producing crops, the regulations further require that \u201cplants, crops, ... orchard crops ... which were produced ... were: (a) produced for sale or home consumption; or (b) used by other for sale[.]\u201d 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1 (emphasis added). As the Board noted, this language requires more than merely passive or incidental activity. Rather, it requires evidence of intent to produce a crop. No Taxpayer produced objective evidence on this point.\n{28} For example, the Duncans testified that they gave away the grass they paid someone to cut each year. The Alexanders claim to have sold \u201ca portion\u201d of the alfalfa which originally grew on their property, but they adduced no evidence of any attempt to sell hay or grass in 1995. On the record presented, the primary consumers of Moseley\u2019s fruits and nuts appear to be the birds. Finally, the Board, acting as a trier of fact, found that any sale of the Geretys\u2019 grass was \u201cinsignificant.\u201d We cannot fairly construe this record as satisfying Taxpayers\u2019 burden to demonstrate an intent to produce a crop. In so concluding, however, we wish to make clear that we do not read the subject provisions as requiring proof of actual sales. All that an applicant is required to demonstrate is an objective intent to produce a crop for sale or home consumption.\n{29} Second, we affirm the Board\u2019s finding that the grazing of recreational horses on Taxpayers\u2019 property does not satisfy the regulatory provision for \u201chome consumption.\u201d Taxpayers attempt, on this point, to equate \u201cconsumption\u201d with \u201cuse.\u201d Accordingly, their \u201cuse\u201d of grasses by feeding it to their horses, they argue, constitutes \u201chome consumption\u201d within the meaning of 3 NMCA 6.5.27 .1.1(a). We disagree. Such logic deprives the regulation of any meaning. First, the proposed interpretation means virtually any use of, for example, plants would qualify a property owner to an \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption. Thus, a residential property owner, who \u201cuses\u201d for aesthetic purposes his front lawn or xeriscaped yard, could legitimately claim \u201chome consumption\u201d and entitlement to this tax break. Second, such expansive reading of subsection (a) renders subsections (b) and (c), which further provide for specific qualifying uses, mere surplusage. For example, 3 NMCA 6.5.27.1.1(c) provides for crops which are \u201cused, as feed[.]\u201d If we were to accept Taxpayers\u2019 proposed definition of \u201chome consumption\u201d as meaning any \u201cuse\u201d of crops occurring at or near the home, the regulation\u2019s latter provision for \u201cuse\u201d of crops as \u201cfeed\u201d would be redundant. Accordingly, we reject the argument. See Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico v. Fed\u2019n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, \u00b6 21, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236.\n{30} We hold instead that the Board appropriately applied subsection (c) to Taxpayers\u2019 claimed grazing uses. Taxpayers did indeed feed crops to their horses. However, the regulation imposes the further requirement that \u201cfeed\u201d uses of crops be intended \u201cto produce ... other products ... to be held for sale or home consumption.\u201d 3 NMCA 6.5.27.1.1(c). The Board interpreted this language in a manner consistent with its reading of subsection (a); that is, it interpreted the regulation as requiring any livestock fed by crops grown on a Taxpayer\u2019s property to have been intended for sale or food. Taxpayers failed to produce evidence of such intent.\n(B) Participation in Federal Soil Conservation Program\n{31} The Geretys argued that their property qualified for participation in a federal soil conservation program and that they were therefore entitled to an \u201cagricultural use\u201d exemption. See 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1 (providing that land which \u201cmet the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government\u201d qualifies as land used primarily for agricultural purposes). The Board found that they failed to prove participation in any program, and we agree. The regulatory language implies a prerequisite \u201cagreement with an agency of the federal government.\u201d Id. The Geretys demonstrated no such agreement.\n{32} The Geretys did present evidence showing that their land potentially qualified for participation in a USDA administered soil conservation program. However, they tendered no evidence indicating that they had taken advantage of this opportunity. For example, they introduced a letter from the USDA\u2019s National Resources Conservation Service informing them that their \u201cfarm along with the others that would be benefited from this improved irrigation water conveyance system are eligible for technical assistance[.]\u201d However, the letter further notes that the USDA wrote only in regard to \u201cthe option of constructing a plastic irrigation pipeline[.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) They further provided evidence that in 1994 they commissioned a study investigating the feasibility of exercising this option. However, as of June 1996, they had not exercised this option nor had they become members of the local soil and water conservation district. As of that date, they had not procured their neighbors\u2019 signatures on a cooperative \u201cpooling agreement\u201d regarding the potential pipeline, a prerequisite to implementing the proposed project. Accordingly, the record does not demonstrate that they had a soil conservation agreement with the USDA,,and they are not, therefore, entitled to an \u2018agricultural use\u2019 exemption per 3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1.2.\nCLAIMED DISCOVERY AND EVIDEN-TIARY VIOLATIONS\n{33} The Duncans further claim prejudicial procedural error below. However, we find that this argument has no merit.\n{34} They first claim error in the Board\u2019s failure to issue sanctions for the Assessor\u2019s alleged refusal to respond to a discovery request. See Rule 1-034 NMRA 1998. The Duncans made the discovery request in a letter dated October 22, 1996. Rule 1-034(B) mandates compliance with such requests within thirty days. The Board convened the hearing on November 8, 1996, and as of that time, the Assessor had not responded to the request. Nonetheless, the Duncans rejected the Board\u2019s suggestion of a continuance. The Board, finding that they had failed to show a violation of the rule, then declined to issue sanctions. Upon these facts, we find no error in the Board\u2019s ruling. See Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 523, 787 P.2d 433, 442 (1990)(\u201cThe choice of sanctions [for discovery violations] lies within the discretion of the trial court, and it will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.\u201d); see also Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, \u00b6 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (\u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.\u201d).\n{35} The Duncans next claim error in the Board\u2019s exclusion of an affidavit alleging bias on the part of the Assessor. At the hearing, the Assessor objected to the affidavit, claiming it was hearsay and prejudicial. After hearing the parties\u2019 arguments, the Board sustained the objection and refused to admit the affidavit, taking notice of it instead. We see no basis for holding that the Board abused its discretion in so ruling. See State v. Aguayo, 114 N.M. 124, 128, 835 P.2d 840, 844 (Ct.App.1992) (\u201cAdmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court\u2019s determination will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.\u201d). The affidavit was hearsay. Moreover, the Duncans already had available a witness who had attended the same meeting upon which the affidavit was based. Moreover, they failed to show why the affiant could not be called to testify in person. Accordingly, we find no error in the Board\u2019s ruling.\nCONCLUSION\n{36} Because of the great potential for abuse, tests for determining whether property qualifies as used primarily for agricultural purposes must be objective to the extent possible. In each case, the Taxpayers put their lands to something less than \u201cbona fide agricultural use,\u201d the narrow standard imposed by statute and regulation. For the reasons discussed above, we determine that the Board could 'reasonably determine that Taxpayers failed to meet their burden of showing primary' agricultural use of their properties. We further determine that the Board\u2019s decision as to each taxpayer is supported by substantial evidence. We accordingly affirm the decision of the Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board as to each Taxpayer.\n{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nAPODACA and BOSSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARMIJO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Kirk, Albuquerque, for Frank D. and Violet Alexander.", "Raymond G. Sanchez, Robert J. Desiderio, Albuquerque, for Edward J. Gerety, M.H. Gerety, Paul R. Duncan, and Marylin H. Duncan.", "Hessel E. Yntema, III, Oman, Gentry & Yntema, P.A., Albuquerque, for David B. Mosely.", "Frank D. Katz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Amicus Curiae.", "Tito D. Chavez, Bernalillo County Attorney, M. David Chacon, II, Assistant County Attorney, Jeffrey S. Landers, Assistant County Attorney, Albuquerque, for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1999-NMCA-021\n973 P.2d 884\nIn the Matter of the Protest of Frank D. ALEXANDER and Violet Alexander, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. ANDERSON, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee. In the Matter of the Protest of Edward J. Gerety and M.H. Gerety, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. Anderson, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, DefendantAppellee. In the Matter of the Protest of Paul R. Duncan and Marilyn H. Duncan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David K. Anderson, Assessor of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, DefendantAppellee. In the Matter of the protest of David B. Mosely, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Bernalillo County Valuation Board, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 18041, 18135, 18161, 18484.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 5, 1999.\nJames E. Kirk, Albuquerque, for Frank D. and Violet Alexander.\nRaymond G. Sanchez, Robert J. Desiderio, Albuquerque, for Edward J. Gerety, M.H. Gerety, Paul R. Duncan, and Marylin H. Duncan.\nHessel E. Yntema, III, Oman, Gentry & Yntema, P.A., Albuquerque, for David B. Mosely.\nFrank D. Katz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Amicus Curiae.\nTito D. Chavez, Bernalillo County Attorney, M. David Chacon, II, Assistant County Attorney, Jeffrey S. Landers, Assistant County Attorney, Albuquerque, for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0632-01", "first_page_order": 670, "last_page_order": 679 }