{ "id": 257665, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert DICK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dick", "decision_date": "1999-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 18969", "first_page": "382", "last_page": "388", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 N.M. 382" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "981 P.2d 796" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 N.M. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599007 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "1356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 U.S. 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6142476 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, 34 S.Ct. 396" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, 34 S.Ct. 396" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, 34 S.Ct. 396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/302/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 U.S. 442", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3672504 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/232/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 P.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10451800 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800, 801, 802" }, { "page": "799-800" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "800-01" }, { "page": "803, 804" }, { "page": "803" }, { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/594/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 U.S. 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 414135 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "holding that a state has no jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Indian against an Indian in \"Indian country\"" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a state has no jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Indian against an Indian in \"Indian country\"" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a state has no jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Indian against an Indian in \"Indian country\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/327/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 U.S. 375", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3518946 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/118/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-093", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142227 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6, 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715077 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 F.3d 1531", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7415702 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1545" }, { "page": "1545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/52/1531-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1151", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Stat. 248", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Public Law 567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 S.Ct. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 7345730 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "953" }, { "page": "952" }, { "page": "955", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" }, { "page": "955" }, { "page": "953" }, { "page": "955" }, { "page": "953" }, { "page": "954" }, { "page": "953-54" }, { "page": "955" }, { "page": "954-55" }, { "page": "956" }, { "page": "955" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/am-tribal-law/1/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 520", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11472434 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0520-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 882, "char_count": 21427, "ocr_confidence": 0.678, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6081124769280563e-07, "percentile": 0.6851071240060714 }, "sha256": "8d189343f8646dd649f4f7a6f153863a201f5fe5e0ed1fc1460aab006b144a4a", "simhash": "1:9e0fe3042ccad743", "word_count": 3535 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:57:01.529900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BUSTAMANTE and ARMIJO, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert DICK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nPICKARD, Chief Judge.\n{1} Defendant was arrested in McKinley County, and charged in state court, for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI). He filed a motion to dismiss that challenged the jurisdiction of the McKinley County District Court, arguing that the arrest occurred in \u201cIndian country\u201d and as a result fell outside the state court\u2019s jurisdiction. The district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, and Defendant now appeals that denial. In light of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s recent discussion of this issue in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998), we reverse.\nFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n{2} Defendant, a member of the Navajo Nation, was arrested for DWI near the intersection of State Road 118 and State Road 400 in McKinley County, New Mexico. State Road 118 is the former Route 66, which runs north of and nearly parallel to Interstate 40. State Road 400 runs north-south through Fort Wingate. Defendant was charged in McKinley County District Court, where he challenged that court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction. Because this jurisdictional issue was common to six known defendants, a unified hearing concerning state jurisdiction on this land, Fort Wingate, was held. This appeal, however, concerns only Defendant Dick.\n{3} \u201cFort Wingate\u201d refers to a tract of 100 square miles designated in 1870, and an additional 30 square miles designated in 1881, as a military reservation. In 1950, Congress enacted a public law retaining title to 13,150 acres of Fort Wingate in the United States, but transferring the land to the Department of the Interior for the use of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). See Public Law 567, 64 Stat. 248 (1950) (Public Law 567). The Fort Wingate area remains titled in the United States government, with the exception of sixteen acres that are privately owned (the Merrill Property).\n{4} The United States government\u2019s holdings in Fort Wingate are now four separately administered parcels, as indicated on the following representational map.\nParcel one, to the north, is administered by the BIA in trust for the Navajo Nation. Parcel two, south of parcel one and west of parcels three and four, is administered by the United States Department of Defense. Parcel three, south of parcel one and east of parcel two, is administered by the BIA.'Parcel four is directly south of parcel three, and is administered by the United States Forestry Service. Defendant was arrested on parcel three.\n{5} The district court viewed parcels two, three, and four as the proper community of reference on which to base the determination of whether Fort Wingate is properly considered a \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1151(b) (1994). The district court went on to apply the four-factor test set forth in Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1545 (10th Cir.1995), for assessing whether Fort Wingate is a \u201cdependent Indian community.\u201d The district court found that parcel three housed a high school and an elementary school, that the high school\u2019s student body was 90% Navajo, the remainder being from other Indian tribes, and that about 75% of the students lived on campus. The district court concluded that \u201c[pjarcel 3 is land held by the BIA for purposes of primarily educating Indian children, but not specifically for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.\u201d\n{6} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of second-offense DWI, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.\nDISCUSSION\nA. Standard of Review\n{7} Upon review, this Court will defer to the trial court\u2019s determinations of fact if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Munoz, 111 N.M. 118, 120, 802 P.2d 23, 25 (Ct.App.1990). As to matters of law, this Court conducts a de novo review. See State v. Frank, 1997-NMCA-093, \u00b6 4, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464.\nB. \u201cIndian Country \u201d\n{8} Defendant contends that because he was stopped in \u201cIndian country,\u201d the state had no jurisdiction over him. As a general principle, a state has no jurisdiction over crimes committed by an Indian in \u201cIndian country.\u201d See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886); cf. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 962 (1946) (holding that a state has no jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Indian against an Indian in \u201cIndian country\u201d).\n{9} Congress defines \u201cIndian country\u201d at 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1151. That provision states:\n\u201cIndian country,\u201d as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.\nIn this appeal, however, only the second form of \u201cIndian country,\u201d that is, \u201cdependent Indian communities,\u201d is at issue.\n1. \u201cDependent Indian Community \u201d\n{10} The United States Supreme Court recently revisited the question of what is a \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998). In Venetie, the Court stated that the determination of whether a given community is a \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d under Section 1151(b) turns on two elements: (1) a federal set-aside of lands for Indian use; and (2) federal superintendence of such lands. See id. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 953. Compared to existing precedent in the circuits, the Venetie opinion indicates a change in the focus of the \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d analysis by shifting the emphasis from the inhabitants and their day-to-day relationship with the government to a land-based inquiry. See id. at---n. 5,118 S.Ct. at 954-55 n. 5.\n{11} Prior to Venetie, the test for determining whether a \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d existed varied by jurisdiction. Here in New Mexico, we decided this issue most recently in State v. Frank, In Frank, we adopted the Tenth Circuit\u2019s analysis in Watchman. See Frank, 1997-NMCA-093, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 13, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464. In Watchman, the Tenth Circuit required an initial determination of the community of reference and a four-prong test to be applied to the designated community of reference to determine whether that community is a \u201cdependent Indian community.\u201d See Watch man, 52 F.3d at 1545. The four prongs are: (1) whether the United States has retained title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy and authority to enact regulations and laws governing the property; (2) the nature of the area in question, the relationship of its inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government, and the practice of the government toward the area; (3) whether there is an element of cohesiveness in the area; and (4) whether the lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples. See Frank, 1997-NMCA-093, \u00b6 13, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464.\n{12} The Supreme Court in Venetie disapproved of the multi-factored tests for \u201cdependent Indian communities\u201d as it rejected the Ninth Circuit\u2019s six-factored \u201ctextured\u201d analysis. See id. at-n. 7, 118 S.Ct. at 955 n. 7. The six factors referred to by the Ninth Circuit are the same as the four factors from Watchman, except that compound factors in Watchman are separated out into individual factors. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 952. While the Supreme Court did not eliminate the other factors outright, it did declare that the federal set-aside and superintendence considerations take priority over other considerations. See id. at--- & n. 7, 118 S.Ct. at 954-55 & n. 7. The Court criticized the Ninth Circuit\u2019s relegation of \u201cthe federal set-aside and superintendence requirements to mere considerations.\u201d Id. at -n. 7, 118 S.Ct. at 955 n. 7. The Court explained the relationship between the Venetie analysis and the articulations of the different Circuit Courts of Appeal:\nThe federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an \u201cIndian community\u201d; the federal superintendence requirement guarantees that the Indian community is sufficiently \u201cdependent\u201d on the Federal Government that the Federal Government and the Indians involved, rather than the States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land in question.\nId. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 955 (footnotes omitted).\n{13} In our ease, the trial court concluded, in its application of the Watchman analysis, that the relevant community of reference in this case consisted of parcels two, three, and four of Fort Wingate. The district court offered no support for its exclusion of parcel one, which it found to be Indian trust land, or its inclusion of parcels two and four, which are used for military and national forest purposes, respectively. As stated above, we review this legal conclusion de novo.\n{14} The first prong of Venetie, federal set-aside, seems to obviate, to some extent, the need for defining the relevant community. By congressional enactment, approximately 13,150 acres of Fort Wingate, of which there is no dispute that parcel three is a part, were set aside \u201cfor the use of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\u201d See Public Law 567. The title of Public Law 567 states that it is \u201cAn Act [t]o make available for Indian use certain surplus property.\u201d According to Venetie, this express set-aside ensures that the land is occupied by an Indian community. See id. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 955.\n{15} Even if this were not the case, the same result would obtain if we utilized the \u201ccommunity of reference\u201d concept of Frank to assist in making this determination. See Frank, 1997-NMCA-093, \u00b6\u00b6 9-10, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464. The overarching concern in determining the appropriate community is the element of cohesiveness. See id. \u00b6 10. This can be evaluated by looking to the common interests as well as the infrastructure of an area. See id. Also, we acknowledged in Frank the geographical definition of an area as a factor in separating out a community. See id. \u00b6 11. In light of these factors, parcel three, the BIA school community, stands out as the relevant community. Defendant was stopped on a road in parcel three. Parcel three, as shown by the record, is administered by the BIA for the primary purpose of educating Indian children. In fact, it is an educational community where, primarily, Indian students board and some faculty live. Given the different uses of parcels two and four, we hold that the trial court erred in including lands that serve unrelated purposes as a part of the relevant \u201ccommunity.\u201d It is parcel three that serves as the basis for our decision.\na. Federal Setr-Aside\n{16} The district court made no specific finding of whether or not the land in question was \u201cset aside\u201d for Indian use. The district court found that \u201c[p]arcel 3 was administratively assigned to the BIA in 1950 for school purposes\u201d and that \u201cthere is no trust language in the administrative assignment directing the BIA to hold the land for use, occupancy or protection of any Indian tribe.\u201d However, all that is required under the first prong of the Venetie test is that the land be \u201cset aside\u201d by the federal government for Indian use. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 953. Public Law 567 did, in fact, set aside the land \u201cfor use by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\u201d Although specific trust language is not used in the Act, it need not be. The statement that \u201cTitle to the land so transferred shall remain in the United States for the use of the Bureau of Indian Affairs\u201d is sufficient to satisfy Venetie\u2019s federal set-aside requirement.\n{17} The status of the land as housing a school community does not remove it from the set-aside requirements set out in Venetie. Rather, \u201c[t]he federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an \u2018Indian community.\u2019 \u201d Venetie, 522 U.S. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 955. The use of land for schooling of an Indian community appears to be a \u201cuse\u201d consistent with the set-aside requirement.\n{18} The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a similar land area, used and administered by the BIA for Indian schools, met the requirement that the land be \u201cvalidly set apart for the use of Indians as such, under the superintendence of the government\u201d when an executive order \u201cset aside [the land] for the settlement of such friendly Indians ... as have been or who may hereafter be educated at the Chilocco Indian Industrial School\u201d and when Congress ratified an agreement between the Cherokee Nation and the United States stating the lands were reserved \u201cfor use of and in connection with the Chilocco Indian Industrial School,\u201d as well as for the purposes set forth in the executive order. C.M.G. v. Oklahoma, 594 P.2d 798, 800, 801, 802 (Okla.Crim.App.1979).\n{19} In C.M.G., the circumstances were similar to those facing us in the instant case. All students enrolled at the BIA schools were at least one-quarter Indian and from various tribes, although non-Indians were permitted to attend. See id. at 799-800. The vast majority of the school\u2019s employees were Indian, and some were housed at the school. See id. at 799. The school property was owned by the United States government. See id. at 800-01. The court in C.M.G. found that the land had been set aside by executive order and was federally superintended. See id. at 803, 804. Although the Oklahoma court was applying a different iteration of the test we apply here, it found that an analogous set-aside requirement was integral to that test. The land in that case had been \u201creserved by Congress for an Indian school and for the \u2018settlement of such friendly Indians ... as have been or may hereafter be educated at the Chilocco Indian Industrial School.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 803. The court held that the land had been set apart for Indian use. See id. at 802.\n{20} The State also contends that the Indian country precedent requires that qualifying land must be set aside for an Indian residential community or settlement, and that because parcel three was not so set aside, it fails the Venetie analysis. At oral argument before this Court, the State relied on an interpretation of wording from United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449, 34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676 (1914), that is cited in Venetie. The Venetie Court noted \u201c[w]e stated that the original reservation was Indian country \u2018simply because it had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.\u2019 \u201d Venetie, 522 U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 953, (quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, 34 S.Ct. at 399) (emphasis omitted). Under the State\u2019s proposed analysis, \u201cas such\u201d refers to land set aside for occupation and residence by Indians and does not encompass parcel three.\n{21} We disagree with the State\u2019s theory. Although the cases relied upon by Venetie and Venetie itself address lands that were allotments, villages, reservations, or otherwise home to Indians, there is no indication that the set-aside requirement is so limited. Rather, the \u201cas such\u201d language permits two reasonable interpretations. First, it may require only that the land be set aside for the use of the Indians as Indians. See id. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 954; see also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539, 58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410 (1938) (quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, 34 S.Ct. 396). We interpret this as being set aside for Indian use.\n{22} Alternatively, as the State argues, the meaning of the \u201cas such\u201d phrase in Pelican can be interpreted to mean use of the land as a reservation or for residence by Indians. We are, however, not persuaded and conclude that the first alternative applies. As noted in Venetie, in McGowan, the Supreme Court held land to be Indian country even though it was not a reservation because it had been set apart for Indian use and benefit. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at---, 118 S.Ct. at 953-54. In Pelican, the land had been a reservation and was later broken up into various parcels of land. The Court could not have meant that land had to be set-aside as reservation-type land. Otherwise, there would have been no need for the passage of Section 1151, which separately discusses reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities. Because \u201c[t]he federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an \u2018Indian community,\u2019 \u201d Venetie, 522 U.S. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 955, the State\u2019s semantic argument is misplaced.\n{23} Even were we to subscribe to the State\u2019s theory, however, the BIA schools and housing on parcel three do, in fact, comprise a \u201ccommunity.\u201d As the district court found, the property houses a high school and an elementary school primarily for the education of Indian children. The occupancy of parcel three is controlled and regulated by the BIA, and all housing is for the use and occupancy of students, school employees, and employees\u2019 families. Occupancy of campus housing is entirely conditioned on a relationship with the schools. The high school population is 100% Indian, and about 75% of the students from the schools board on campus. Fifty-five percent of the employees living on campus are Indian. This population, and the occupants of the Merrill property, are the sole occupants of parcel three. Even if a residential community of some sort were required, the BIA schools on parcel three would constitute such a community.\nb. Federal Superintendence\n{24} The Venetie analysis also requires that the land be subject to federal superintendence. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at ---, 118 S.Ct. at 954-55. The district court made findings to support a holding that this requirement was met. For example, the district court found the land to be \u201ccontrolled by the U.S. Department of Interi- or, Bureau of Indian Affairs.\u201d Also, the district court found that \u201c[a]ll occupancy on Parcel 3, except on the Merrill Property, is controlled and regulated by the BIA without participation by any Indian tribe and tribal government.\u201d The court concluded that \u201c[i]f the educational or employment relationship of a Parcel 3 occupant with the schools is terminated, occupancy must cease forthwith except on the lands comprising the Merrill Property,\u201d and found that \u201c[gjrazing animals in Parcel 3 are regulated by the BIA and branded with BIA brands.\u201d All of these findings indicate that the BIA, a federal agency, has control over the land at issue.\n{25} The fact that sixteen acres of parcel three were private land does not defeat the finding of a set-aside' or federal superintendence in this case. Defendant was not arrested on the private Merrill property. In addition, we have held that privately held land can constitute \u201cIndian country\u201d when it is within the boundaries of land that is properly considered \u201cIndian country.\u201d See State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 312, 731 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Ct.App.1986).\n{26} The State further relies on the fact that emergency fire, police, and medical services and utilities for parcel three are predominantly provided by the state. However, this alone does not change the analysis. As in Venetie, where the Supreme Court held that the provision of services by federal entities did not render the land a dependent community, here the provision of services by the state does not defeat a finding of a dependent Indian community. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 956. The circumstances of parcel three are such that the federal superintendence requirement was met.\n.{27} The status of parcel three as a \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d is consistent with the ultimate consideration that federal authorities and the Indians themselves should exercise primary jurisdiction over the land. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 955. The commonality among the members of the parcel three\u2019s BIA school community is such that the state should not have jurisdiction over Indians committing crimes on that land.\nCONCLUSION\n{28} The area in question in this case, parcel three of the former Fort Wingate Military Reservation, meets the two-pronged test for a \u201cdependent Indian community\u201d set out by the United States Supreme Court in Venetie. Therefore, the State did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the case against Defendant, who was stopped and arrested for DWI on that parcel. We reverse and re-' mand with instructions to dismiss the charges.\n{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBUSTAMANTE and ARMIJO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PICKARD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Ass\u2019t Attorney General, Santa Fe, for appellee.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Laurel A. Knowles, Ass\u2019t Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant.", "Herb Yazzie, Navajo Nation Attorney General, Marcelino R. Gomez, Ass\u2019t Attorney General, Window Rock, AZ, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "981 P.2d 796\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert DICK, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 18969.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 18, 1999.\nCertiorari Granted, No. 25,691, May 7,1999.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Ass\u2019t Attorney General, Santa Fe, for appellee.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Laurel A. Knowles, Ass\u2019t Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant.\nHerb Yazzie, Navajo Nation Attorney General, Marcelino R. Gomez, Ass\u2019t Attorney General, Window Rock, AZ, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0382-01", "first_page_order": 418, "last_page_order": 424 }