{ "id": 257795, "name": "Maria Stella FLORES and Dan Flores, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dorothy DANFELSER, individually and as Secretary of Human Services Department, Sandra Corriveau, individually and as District Manager of the Income Support Division, and New Mexico Human Services Department, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Flores v. Danfelser", "decision_date": "1999-06-04", "docket_number": "No. 19,157", "first_page": "571", "last_page": "581", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 N.M. 571" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "985 P.2d 173" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1999-NMCA-091" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "15 F.3d 1338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1527597 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/15/1338-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559013 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02" }, { "page": "1239-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 58", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6210401 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64-66", "parenthetical": "neither the state nor its officials acting in an official capacity are deemed \"persons\" within the scope of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983" }, { "parenthetical": "neither the state nor its officials acting in an official capacity are deemed \"persons\" within the scope of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983" }, { "parenthetical": "neither the state nor its officials acting in an official capacity are deemed \"persons\" within the scope of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176818 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "931 P.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10331826 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/931/1150-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6188632 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315-16", "parenthetical": "defendants have duty to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from harm" }, { "parenthetical": "defendants have duty to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from harm" }, { "parenthetical": "defendants have duty to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from harm" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193451 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-45", "parenthetical": "recognizing duty to furnish medical care to individual held in custody of police" }, { "parenthetical": "recognizing duty to furnish medical care to individual held in custody of police" }, { "parenthetical": "recognizing duty to furnish medical care to individual held in custody of police" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 F.3d 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414165 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "where third party, not a state actor, causes the injury complained of, plaintiff must allege a constitutionally cognizable danger" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/64/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 F.3d 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7410754 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" }, { "page": "276-77" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/73/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 F.3d 1253", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1615509 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1260" }, { "page": "1261", "parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiff must show involuntary restraint by the government official in order to establish a duty to protect under the special relationship theory.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/159/1253-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031841 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198-200" }, { "page": "199-200" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "193-94" }, { "page": "196-97" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 U.S. 115", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221570 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126-27", "parenthetical": "Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of safe working environment" }, { "parenthetical": "Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of safe working environment" }, { "parenthetical": "Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of safe working environment" }, { "page": "126-27" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/503/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559019 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "1044" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-081", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834213 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5317986 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275-76" }, { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561257 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "applying two-step analysis to summary judgment motion wherein defendant asserted qualified immunity defense" }, { "page": "214", "parenthetical": "applying two-step analysis to summary judgment motion wherein defendant asserted qualified immunity defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 226", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221077 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 635", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28199 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "907 F.2d 129", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10535022 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/907/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834277 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 U.S. 511", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1512327 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" }, { "page": "526" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/472/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566483 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" }, { "page": "1328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322271 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-054", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 17405 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557149 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" }, { "page": "1203" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "1204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575458 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142220 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566631 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-014", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716926 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725492 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-179", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827375 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552738 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "employee who alleges wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim is not barred by exclusivity provisions of Workers' Compensation Act" }, { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "employee who alleges wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim is not barred by exclusivity provisions of Workers' Compensation Act" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558990 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653", "parenthetical": "worker's claim against employer for spoliation of evidence is not barred by exclusivity provisions" }, { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "worker's claim against employer for spoliation of evidence is not barred by exclusivity provisions" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "test of whether claim forms basis for common-law action for damages turns on issue of whether employer or his or her alter ego had actual intent to injure worker" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 257601 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24", "parenthetical": "\"The [Workers' Compensation Act] only covers work-related accidents and only injuries that fall within the act's coverage.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The [Workers' Compensation Act] only covers work-related accidents and only injuries that fall within the act's coverage.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The [Workers' Compensation Act] only covers work-related accidents and only injuries that fall within the act's coverage.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N.M. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 142206 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727690 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561233 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-13" }, { "page": "1234-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2773683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715073 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "quoting Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85 N.M. 708, 710, 516 P.2d 679, 681 (1973)" }, { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "quoting Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85 N.M. 708, 710, 516 P.2d 679, 681 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 16, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1424, "char_count": 31929, "ocr_confidence": 0.669, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.469519126998404e-08, "percentile": 0.4451356044309919 }, "sha256": "534212c9d60e1d88a695e1f093894a507565592ab3255d867cf9a54e1ea7a43b", "simhash": "1:2d0316f554ce07dd", "word_count": 5054 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:57:01.529900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WECHSLER and ARMIJO, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Maria Stella FLORES and Dan Flores, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dorothy DANFELSER, individually and as Secretary of Human Services Department, Sandra Corriveau, individually and as District Manager of the Income Support Division, and New Mexico Human Services Department, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, J.\n{1} Plaintiffs Maria Stella Flores (hereafter Stella Flores) and Dan Flores, her husband, appeal from an order dismissing their tort claims and claims alleging a violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1994) filed against Defendants. Plaintiffs have asserted nine claims on appeal which we consolidate and discuss as follows: (1) whether Plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims are barred under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act; and (2) whether Plaintiffs alleged viable claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Stella Flores was employed as an income support specialist with the New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) in Do\u00f1a Ana County, New Mexico. On February 13, 1996, Theodore Osborne, an individual who had been receiving food stamp allotments, went to the district office, pushed his way past the doorway of the public waiting room, and went into an area designated for staff offices. Osborne, believing that Stella Flores was responsible for reducing his benefits, entered her office and physically attacked her and stabbed her repeatedly. Stella Flores was taken to the hospital and Osborne was subsequently apprehended and criminally charged for the assault.\n{3} After the attack, HSD began paying Stella Flores workers\u2019 compensation and medical benefits. On May 7, 1997, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants Dorothy Danfelser, individually, and as Secretary of HSD; Sandra Corriveau, individually, and as district manager of the Do\u00f1a Ana County office of the Income Support Division; and the HSD. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Defendants were \u201caware ... that security measures at the ... branch office ... were inadequate\u201d; that \u201c[d]espite having knowledge of the dangers of allowing clients and the general public access to the office area where Stella Flores ... worked, Defendants made a deliberate and intentional policy decision to allow such access\u201d; that \u201c[d]espite recommendations ... to implement such security measures, ... Defendants failed to take any steps to implement such security measures\u201d; and that Defendants\u2019 actions resulted from a \u201cdeliberate and intentional policy decision ... based upon a combination of economic and philosophical considerations.\u201d\n{4} Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint contained five counts: Count I, a tort claim against HSD, Danfelser, and Corriveau under the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 41-4-1 to -29 (1976, as amended through 1996); Count II, against Danfelser and Corriveau, both individually and in their official capacities, alleging a violation of Stella Flores\u2019 constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; Count III, a claim against HSD alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; Count IV, a claim against all Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count V, a claim by Dan Flores, Stella\u2019s husband, against Defendants for loss of consortium.\n{5} On July 2, 1997, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed each of the claims against Defendants.\nANALYSIS\nTort Claims\n{6} Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in determining that the tort claims filed by Plaintiffs against Defendants were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\n{7} In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, an appellate court applies the same analysis as the trial court, \u201caecept[s] as true all facts well pleaded and question only whether the plaintiff might prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim.\u201d California First Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 66, 801 P.2d 646, 648 (1990) (quoting Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85 N.M. 708, 710, 516 P.2d 679, 681 (1973)).\n{8} As a preliminary matter, we note that Plaintiffs contend that the district court did not treat Defendants\u2019 motion as one for a dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA 1999; instead, they argue, it decided the motion as one for summary judgment and call upon this Court to therefore apply the appropriate standard of appellate review. However, upon our examination of Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and the matters considered below, we conclude that the district court ruled based upon Plaintiffs\u2019 original complaint, not on matters outside the pleadings. See Quintana v. Los Alamos Med. Ctr., Inc., 119 N.M. 312, 312-13, 889 P.2d 1234, 1234-35 (Ct.App.1994); Rummel v. Edgemont Realty Partners, Ltd., 116 N.M. 23, 25, 859 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct.App.1993). We accordingly apply the standard of review appropriate under Rule 1-012(B)(6).\n{9} Based upon our review of the pleadings and the record before us, it is clear that the district court\u2019s decision determining that Plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was grounded upon its interpretation of NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-6(C), (D), and (E) (1990, effective Jan. 1, 1992) and \u00a7 52-1-9 (1973). We discern no error in this ruling. Examination of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act reveals several legislative provisions restricting the right of both employers and employees from pursuing other remedies involving claims arising out of work-related injuries. For example, Section 52-1-6 provides in applicable part:\nC. Every worker shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act if his employer is subject to the provisions of that act and has complied with its requirements, including insurance.\nD. Such compliance with the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act ... shall be, and construed to be, a surrender by the employer and the worker of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation ... or to any cause of action at law, suit in equity or statutory or common-law right to remedy or proceeding whatever for or on account of personal injuries or death of the worker____[Emphasis added.]\nE. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides exclusive remedies. No cause of action outside the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act shall be brought by an employee or dependent against the employer or his representative, including the insurer, guarantor or surety of any employer, for any matter relating to the occurrence of or payment for any injury or death covered by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act....\nNMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-8 (1989) states in pertinent part that employers who have complied with the Act\nshall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act____\nSimilarly, Section 52-1-9 provides in part:\nThe right to the compensation provided for in this act ... [is] in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons whomsoever, for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:\nA. at the time of the accident, the employer has complied with the provisions thereof regarding insurance;\nB. at the time of the accident, the employee is performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment; and\nC. the injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and is not intentionally self-inflicted.\nFinally, in declaring the legislative intent behind the statute, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-5-1 (1990, effective Jan. 1, 1991), makes clear that \u201c[t]he workers\u2019 benefit system in New Mexico is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.\u201d\n{10} In an effort to escape the force of these statutory provisions, Plaintiffs emphasize that their complaint rests in part on allegations that \u201cthe deliberate, intentional and aggravated assault and battery visited upon Stella Flores\u2019 person by Osborne placed [her] outside the course and scope [of her employment] and was not reasonably incident to her employment with HSD.\u201d\n{11} On appeal, we review a district court\u2019s dismissal of a tort claim based upon the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as a question of law. See Gallegos v. State of N.M. Bd. of Educ., 1997\u2014 NMCA-040, \u00b6 11, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468 (appellate court reviews de novo questions of law decided by trial court). Applying this test to the case before us, we conclude that Plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. None of the exceptions to the exclusivity provisions contained in Section 52-1-9(C) and reli\u00e9d upon by Plaintiffs are applicable here. Cf. Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, \u00b6 24, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999 (1999) (\u201cThe [Workers\u2019 Compensation Act] only covers work-related accidents and only injuries that fall within the act\u2019s coverage.\u201d); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 653, 905 P.2d 185, 193 (1995) (worker\u2019s claim against employer for spoliation of evidence is not barred by exclusivity provisions); Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, Inc., 117 N.M. 91, 93, 869 P.2d 279, 281 (1994) (employee who alleges wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim is not barred by exclusivity provisions of Workers\u2019 Compensation Act).\n{12} The relevant inquiry here is not whether Defendants Danfelser and Corriveau knew or should have known that Stella Flores might be injured by a third party, but whether they had an actual intent to injure Stella Flores. See Coleman, 120 N.M. at 653, 905 P.2d at 193 (test of whether claim forms basis for common-law action for damages turns on issue of whether employer or his or her alter ego had actual intent to injure worker); Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, \u00b6 6, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182; Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 119, 847 P.2d 761, 764 (Ct.App.1993) (hereafter Johnson Controls) (basis for subjecting employer to liability outside Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is an actual intent to injure the worker on the part of employer); cf. Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 110 N.M. 609, 613, 798 P.2d 210, 214 (Ct.App.1990) (tort claims by worker against employer for injuries received by worker from explosion during course and scope of employment held precluded by exclusivity provisions of the interim Workers\u2019 Compensation Act).\n{13} Plaintiffs emphasize several opinions of New Mexico\u2019s appellate courts that modify the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. See, e.g., Sabella v. Manor Care, Inc., 1996-NMSC-014, \u00b6 16, 121 N.M. 596, 915 P.2d 901; Michaels, 117 N.M. at 93, 869 P.2d at 281; Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 1997-NMCA-022, \u00b6 15, 123 N.M. 145, 934 P.2d 1074; Gallegos v. Chastain, 95 N.M. 551, 554, 624 P.2d 60, 63 (Ct.App.1981). Extending the reasoning of these opinions, Plaintiffs urge this Court to recognize a new exception to the exclusivity provisions, which would apply where an employer\u2019s negligent acts or omissions result in a third party inflicting an injury upon an employee.\n{14} An analogous argument was presented in Sanford v. Presto Manufacturing Co., 92 N.M. 746, 747, 594 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Ct.App.1979). In Sanford this Court reviewed an appeal from an order dismissing the plaintiffs tort claim against her employer. The plaintiff alleged that her employer had intentionally installed a commercial oven designed for baking Teflon on small appliances which created toxic fumes injurious to human health. The plaintiff asserted that she sustained injuries when she was exposed to the fumes in the workplace and that such exposure amounted to a battery upon her and which was intentionally or maliciously committed by the employer. The Court in Sanford rejected the plaintiffs argument and quoted with approval from 2A Arthur Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 68.13 (1976), noting:\nEven if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, wilfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, or even wilfully and unlawfully violating a safety statute, this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character.\nIf these decisions seem rather strict, one must remind oneself that what is being tested here is not the degree of gravity or depravity of the employer\u2019s conduct, but rather the narrow issue of intentional versus accidental quality of the precise event producing injury....\nSanford, 92 N.M. at 748, 594 P.2d at 1204.\n{15} In accord with the rationale articulated by Larson, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims against Defendants. See Larson, supra \u00a7 68.13; see also Johnson Controls, 115 N.M. at 122, 847 P.2d at 767. We also determine that the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act apply with equal force, barring the claim of Dan Flores for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from Stella Fores\u2019 injuries sustained during her employment with HSD. See Singhas v. New Mexico State Highway Dep\u2019t, 1997-NMSC-054, \u00b6 10, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645 (Exclusivity provisions of \u201c \u2018the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act [bar] an action for loss of consortium by the spouse of an injured worker.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 1997-NMSC-003, \u00b6 16, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155)).\n{16} Plaintiffs, although acknowledging the holding in Johnson Controls regarding the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, argue that subsequent decisions of our Supreme Court and this Court have eroded the rationale and force of such holding. For example, they assert that our Supreme Court in Harger v. Structural Services, Inc., 1996-NMSC-018, 121 N.M. 657, 661, 916 P.2d 1324, 1328; Sabella, 1996-NMSC-014, \u00b6 16, 121 N.M. 596, 915 P.2d 901; Coleman, 120 N:M. at 653, 905 P.2d at 193; and Michaels, 117 N.M. at 93, 869 P.2d at 281, recognized specific exceptions to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Similarly, Plaintiffs point out decisions of this Court recognizing exceptions to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, such as Eldridge, 1997-NMCA-022, \u00b6 15, 123 N.M. 145, 934 P.2d 1074; and Gallegos 95 N.M. at 554, 624 P.2d at 63. Pursuing this reasoning, Plaintiffs assert that the injuries suffered by Stella Flores were not accidentally sustained and that an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should exist in instances where the acts or omissions of an employer which result in injury to an employee by a third party. Plaintiffs also argue that \u25a0 Stella Flores\u2019 injuries are not logically embraced within the definition of an \u201caccidental injury.\u201d We do not believe these arguments correctly assess the decisions relied upon or the multiple declarations of legislative intent.\n{17} Absent a demonstrated legisla-' tive intent to exclude specific acts of an employer from the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, the litmus test for determining whether a worker\u2019s injury is controlled by the exclusivity rules is whether such injury stems from an actual intent on the part of the employer, or his or her alter ego, to injure the worker. See Coleman, 120 N.M. at 653, 905 P.2d at 193; Markm-Martinez, 1998-NMCA-179, \u00b6 6, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182; Johnson Controls, 115 N.M. at 118, 847 P.2d at 763. Here, neither the pleadings nor the record support such showing.\n{18} Perhaps anticipating the foregoing result, Plaintiffs alternatively argue that this Court should revisit Johnson Controls and limit or modify its holding. We decline such invitation, particularly in view of the fact that our Supreme Court in Coleman expressly approved the test articulated in Johnson Controls, noting that \u201c[t]he test in such cases is whether the injury stems from an actual intent [by the employer] to injure the worker.\u201d Coleman, 120 N.M. at 653, 905 P.2d at 193.\n{19} In their final challenge to the district court\u2019s dismissal of their tort claims against Defendants under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants\u2019 suspension of the payment of workers\u2019 compensation benefits when suit was filed herein constituted a waiver of the exclusivity provisions. We disagree. Defendants\u2019 suspension of the payment of benefits was accompanied by a letter indicating that workers\u2019 compensation benefits would resume upon determination by the court that Stella Flores suffered a compensable injury. Moreover, Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint was expressly premised upon their contention that Plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims were governed by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\n{20} Because we determine that Plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims are controlled by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, we need not address Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion that Section 41\u20144-6 of the Tort Claims Act waives immunity from civil actions grounded upon claims of negligent operation or maintenance of public buildings.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 Claims\n{21} Plaintiffs next challenge the district court\u2019s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claims upon Defendants\u2019 assertion of qualified immunity.\n{22} When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss a claim alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, an appellate court, like the trial court, reviews the plaintiffs\u2019 pleadings to determine whether they have pleaded facts which, if true, set forth a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable public official, viewed under an objective standard, would or should have known. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Williams v. Board of County Comm\u2019rs, 1998-NMCA-090, \u00b6 22, 125 N.M. 445, 963 P.2d 522.\n{23} We further note that qualified immunity \u201cis an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.\u201d Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. Qualified immunity may be \u201ceffectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.\u201d Id. Where qualified immunity is raised as a defense to a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, it is the plaintiffs burden to point to allegations of particular facts to overcome the assertion of such defense. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. The Tenth Circuit has noted:\n[T]he plaintiff must do more than identify a clearly established legal test and then allege that the defendant has violated it. The plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing that the defendant\u2019s actions were clearly prohibited. The \u201ccontours of the right must be sufficiently dear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.\u201d\nHannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 131 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). (Citation omitted.)\n{24} In Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for ascertaining whether or not a claim overcomes a defense of qualified immunity. First, the court inquires whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. This inquiry involves a purely legal question. See id. Second, the court inquires whether the existence of the legal right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. See id. at 233, 111 S.Ct. 1789; cf. Williams, 1998-NMCA-090, \u00b6 23, 125 N.M. 445, 963 P.2d 522 (applying objective standard to determine whether defendant violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known); Romero v. Sanchez, 119 N.M. 690, 692, 895 P.2d 212, 214 (1995) (applying two-step analysis to summary judgment motion wherein defendant asserted qualified immunity defense).\n{25} In asserting their claimed violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged, among other things, that:\n84. Defendants had an affirmative constitutional duty to provide Stella Flores with a reasonably safe work environment at the Las Cruces branch office....\n85. Defendants had a custom or policy of failure to provide adequate security, install safety devices, provide training for employees, and implement policies for dealing with violence in the workplace. Such policies or customs encouraged or implicitly authorized the attack which resulted in violation of Stella Flores\u2019 constitutional rights. The policies or customs promoted acts of violence such as perpetrated by Osborne, thereby creating a special danger and increasing the risk of harm to Stella Flores.\n87. Defendants breached their affirmative duty to Stella Flores while she was at the workplace, and violated her constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the due process clause and the equal protection clause, and Defendants further acted intentionally, willfully and with deliberate indifference in a grossly negligent manner and in wanton disregard of the consequences by establishing, following and maintaining policies or customs which resulted in the injuries to Stella Flores.\n88. Defendants at all material times knew or should have known that the actual battery upon Stella Flores could reasonably have been expected to occur.\n{26} In furtherance of their 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claims, Plaintiffs assert that a worker has a right to be protected from known or obvious acts of violence and that Defendants\u2019 disregard of such risks render them liable for such violation. Although New Mexico courts have long recognized the duty of employers to provide employees with a reasonably safe working environment, see, e.g., Montoya v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 N.M. 268, 275-76, 299 P.2d 84, 89-90 (1956); Stock v. Grantham, 1998-NMCA-081, \u00b6 8, 125 N.M. 564, 964 P.2d 125; Hinger v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 120 N.M. 430, 441, 902 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Ct.App.1995), the duty of an employer to provide a safe working place does not, except in certain limited instances, rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 126-27, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of safe working environment).\n{27} Additionally, as observed by the United States Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), as a general rule, the civil rights laws do not impose an affirmative duty to protect another from injury at the hands of a third party. See id. at 198-200, 109 S.Ct. 998; see also Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.1998); Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dep\u2019t, 73 F.3d 274, 276-77 (10th Cir.1996). This general rule, however, is not without recognized exceptions. See Liebson, 73 F.3d at 276-77; Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995). As observed by the court in Liebson, two exceptions have been recognized:\nThe first exception, known as the special relationship doctrine, \u201cexists when the state assumes control over an individual sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to provide protection to that individual____\u201d The second exception, sometimes referred to as the \u201cdanger creation\u201d theory, provides that a state may also be liable for an individual\u2019s safety \u201cif it created the danger that harmed the individual____\u201d\nId., 73 F.3d at 276 (quoting Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 572 and DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998) (citation omitted)).\n{28} In order to bring an individual within the ambit of the \u201cspecial relationship\u201d exception, a plaintiff must show that the state has in some manner restrained an individual\u2019s freedom to act to protect himself from others by imposing restraints upon that individual\u2019s personal liberty. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (recognizing duty to furnish medical care to individual held in custody of police); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (if state restrains individual by placing restraints on individual\u2019s freedom to protect self, this may create \u201cspecial relationship\u201d); Armijo ex rel. Chavez, 159 F.3d at 1261 (\u201c[A] plaintiff must show involuntary restraint by the government official in order to establish a duty to protect under the special relationship theory.\u201d); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (defendants have duty to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from harm). After careful review of Plaintiffs\u2019 pleadings, we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants\u2019 actions were subject to the special relationship exception because Plaintiffs have not alleged that the state has restrained their freedom to act to protect themselves.\n{29} Nor do the matters alleged by Plaintiffs indicate a basis for subjecting Defendants to liability under the creation of danger exception. See Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 572 (where third party, not a state actor, causes the injury complained of, plaintiff must allege a constitutionally cognizable danger); Henderson v. Gunther, 931 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Colo.1997) (en banc) (defendants not liable under \u201ccreation of danger\u201d exception to civil rights law to prison employee attacked and held hostage by inmate); see also Collins, 503 U.S. at 126-27, 112 S.Ct. 1061 (declining to characterize work-related hazards that resulted in death of decedent as violation of decedent\u2019s civil rights). The Court in Collins, after reviewing the allegations contained in the petitioner\u2019s complaint alleging a violation of the decedent\u2019s Due Process rights, observed:\nFairly analyzed, [the petitioner\u2019s] claim advances two theories: that the Federal Constitution imposes a duty on the city to provide its employees with minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace, or that the city\u2019s \u201cdeliberate indifference\u201d to Collins\u2019 safety was arbitrary government action that must \u201cshock the conscience\u201d of federal judges.\nId. at 126, 112 S.Ct. 1061.\n{30} The Collins Court, however, dispensed with the petitioner\u2019s contention that the case came within the scope of the creation of danger exception, noting that \u201c[n]either the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner\u2019s claim that the governmental employer\u2019s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.\u201d Id. The Court also observed that the Due Process Clause does not constitute \u201c !a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 129, 112 S.Ct. 1061 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)).\n{31} The United States Supreme Court further explored the parameters of the \u201ccreation of danger\u201d exception in DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193-94, 109 S.Ct. 998. In DeShaney, a four-year-old child was severely beaten by his father, causing permanent brain damage. The child and his mother brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the county, its department of social services, and certain individual social services employees. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the child\u2019s constitutional rights by failing to intervene when they knew or should have known that the child was a victim of child abuse. The trial court dismissed the claim, holding that the defendants\u2019 failure to render protective services to the child did not violate the child\u2019s due process rights under the United States Constitution. See id.-\n{32} The Supreme Court in DeShaney affirmed the order of dismissal and observed that the harm suffered by the child occurred while he was in the custody of his father. The Court further concluded that the defendants did not create the dangers that the child faced and did not do anything to render the child more vulnerable to such dangers. The Court held that except in certain limited situations, such as where an individual is under the direct care or custody of the defendants or the defendants have created the danger visited upon the plaintiff, state actors are not liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for the violent acts of third persons. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97, 109 S.Ct. 998.\n{33} The facts alleged by Plaintiffs show that the injuries suffered by Stella Flores were caused by the acts of a third party, and not the acts of Danfelser or Corriveau. Measured by the criteria articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Collins and De-Shaney, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Defendants\u2019 conduct, as characterized in Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, did not infringe upon Plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights. As discussed above, the matters alleged by Plaintiffs do not fall within either the special relationship exception or the state-created danger exception. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061 (Due Process Clause held not to guarantee city employees a workplace free of unreasonable risks of harm; only the most egregious official conduct or actions which shock the conscience can be said to be \u201carbitrary ... in a constitutional sense.\u201d); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199, 200 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 998; Liebson, 73 F.3d at 276-77 (removal of guard from prison library, leaving librarian unprotected and subject to sexual assault did not fall within ambit of \u201ccreated danger\u201d exception so as to render defendants liable to claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983).\n{34} Plaintiffs concede that HSD and the individual Defendants in their official capacities are not \u201cpersons\u201d within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep\u2019t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (neither the state nor its officials acting in an official capacity are deemed \u201cpersons\u201d within the scope of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Daddow v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 120 N.M. 97, 101-02, 898 P.2d 1235, 1239-40 (1995).\n{35} Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the district court\u2019s dismissal of their complaint with prejudice was improper because the order did not specify the reasons for dismissal, did not permit the complaint to be amended, and did not permit an opportunity for discovery. We find these arguments without merit. A district court is not required to state reasons for granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 1 \u2014 012(B)(6). Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to specify in the proceedings below and before this Court how the filing of an amended complaint would materially differ from the prior complaint. Cf. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir.1994) (dismissal without leave to amend upheld where plaintiff did not request such relief and failed to point out how complaint would be amended to avoid dismissal).\n{36} Plaintiffs have failed to show an error in the order dismissing their tort or civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\nCONCLUSION\n{37} The district court\u2019s order dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against Defendants is affirmed.\n{38} IT IS SO ORDERED,\nWECHSLER and ARMIJO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "DONNELLY, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carmen E. Garza, Joseph M. Holmes, The Personal Injury Law Clinic, Las Cruces, for Appellants.", "Douglas A. Baker, Martha G. Brown, Mary T. Torres, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1999-NMCA-091\n985 P.2d 173\nMaria Stella FLORES and Dan Flores, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dorothy DANFELSER, individually and as Secretary of Human Services Department, Sandra Corriveau, individually and as District Manager of the Income Support Division, and New Mexico Human Services Department, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 19,157.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 4, 1999.\nCarmen E. Garza, Joseph M. Holmes, The Personal Injury Law Clinic, Las Cruces, for Appellants.\nDouglas A. Baker, Martha G. Brown, Mary T. Torres, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees." }, "file_name": "0571-01", "first_page_order": 607, "last_page_order": 617 }