{ "id": 106582, "name": "Nancy RAMIREZ, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jose Ramirez, Deceased, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. DAWSON PRODUCTION PARTNERS, INC., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees; Gabriel Alvarez, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees; and Jesus Cervantes, Worker-Appellant, v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ramirez v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-01-11", "docket_number": "Nos. 19,918, 19,919, 19,921", "first_page": "601", "last_page": "610", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "128 N.M. 601" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "995 P.2d 1043" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2000-NMCA-011" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 N.M. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584546 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715044 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "reversing this Court's denial of compensation and citing Moer for the proposition that the employee's injury arose out of his employment because his employer derived intangible benefit from the activity the employee was engaged in when injured" }, { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "reversing this Court's denial of compensation and citing Moer for the proposition that the employee's injury arose out of his employment because his employer derived intangible benefit from the activity the employee was engaged in when injured" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723247 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708550 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" }, { "page": "1129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 991", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11026867 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/494/0991-01" ] }, { "cite": "870 P.2d 624", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10357344 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/870/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 A.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7863780 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/664/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.W.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Mich.App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 486033 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/224/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725484 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" }, { "page": "1040" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555198 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" }, { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555138 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597094 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 A.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11906722 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360-61" }, { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a traveling employee is injured while engaging in a reasonable and foreseeable activity that is reasonably related to or incidental to his or her employment, the injury arises in the course of employment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/699/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1132-33" }, { "page": "1132" }, { "page": "1133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill.Dec. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill.App.3d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208054 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Or.App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 4432614 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "injuries suffered during basketball game covered" }, { "page": "831-32", "parenthetical": "injuries suffered during basketball game covered" }, { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/123/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "injuries from an all-terrain vehicle accident covered" }, { "page": "921" }, { "page": "921" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill.Dec. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "injuries from an all-terrain vehicle accident covered" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill.App.3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352870 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "injuries from an all-terrain vehicle accident covered" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ark.App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142137 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "extending coverage to woman injured by intoxicated stranger while returning to her motel room from motel's bar" }, { "page": "848-49", "parenthetical": "extending coverage to woman injured by intoxicated stranger while returning to her motel room from motel's bar" }, { "page": "848" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/12/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 A.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "921" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.H. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4413693 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/129/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 A.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "quoting Whittemore v. Sullivan County Homemaker's Aid Serv., 129 N.H. 432, 529 A.2d 919, 921 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.H. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 2290819 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Whittemore v. Sullivan County Homemaker's Aid Serv., 129 N.H. 432, 529 A.2d 919, 921 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/140/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11062372 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/427/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 A.2d 1342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7881346 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1343" }, { "page": "1344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/642/1342-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ga.App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 739807 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/127/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ga. App. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 260415 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing and quoting McDonald v. State Highway Dep't., 127 Ga.App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919, 922-23 (1972)" }, { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "citing and quoting McDonald v. State Highway Dep't., 127 Ga.App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919, 922-23 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/237/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.W.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10679051 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "135, 138", "parenthetical": "reversing denial of compensation to claimant who was accidentally shot by intoxicated fellow employee \"attempt[ing] to generate some excitement\" because claimant's trip to the bar \"for recreational purposes was a reasonable activity and therefore incident to the employment relationship\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/306/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872687 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480-81" }, { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2869563 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2865581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725451 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239-40" }, { "page": "382-83" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Or.App. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 76770 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting Oregon's longstanding recognition of exceptions to going-and-coming rule without reference to passage in 1995 of Or. Rev.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 656-012(3) (Supp.1998) abrogating liberal construction of Oregon's workers' compensation statute" }, { "page": "356", "parenthetical": "noting Oregon's longstanding recognition of exceptions to going-and-coming rule without reference to passage in 1995 of Or. Rev.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 656-012(3) (Supp.1998) abrogating liberal construction of Oregon's workers' compensation statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/160/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "1145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715059 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580025 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" }, { "page": "1380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-072", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142259 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0605-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1378, "char_count": 29429, "ocr_confidence": 0.713, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6384003946753257e-07, "percentile": 0.6906620810711358 }, "sha256": "5feb724e50027fdc5dedc5747b05bcbfdb3711e0a7ea7693135ad3ac0a01e547", "simhash": "1:c4578cc835fa2993", "word_count": 4756 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:01:18.689942+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOSSON and ARMIJO, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Nancy RAMIREZ, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jose Ramirez, Deceased, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. DAWSON PRODUCTION PARTNERS, INC., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Gabriel Alvarez, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. and Jesus Cervantes, Worker-Appellant, v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} This case requires us to examine the scope of workers\u2019 compensation coverage for workers whose work takes them away from home and who are injured while away from home for their employment. We address appeals from a consolidated case before the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration in which three oil field workers injured in an automobile accident between their work site and their homes sought workers\u2019 compensation benefits for their injuries. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge (WCJ) applied the \u201ctraveling employee exception\u201d to the \u201cgoing and coming rule\u201d in awarding benefits to two of the workers but denying benefits to the third. The WCJ ordered that the compensation awards to the two workers be reduced by 30% and 15%, respectively, based on the workers\u2019 violations of certain company safety policies and statutory regulations. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.\nFACTS\n{2} On August 4, 1997, Jose Ramirez, Gabriel Alvarez, and Jesus Cervantes were working as roustabouts, or roughnecks, for Dawson Production Partners, Inc. (Dawson), which operates an oil field well-servicing business. Ramirez, Alvarez, and Cervantes were part of a \u201cpulling unit\u201d crew, the pulling unit being the mobile rig assembly. Dawson\u2019s pulling unit crews consisted of two floor hands, a derrick man, and a rig operator, who oversaw the work of the other crew members. Two such crews, including the one to which Ramirez, Alvarez, and Cervantes were assigned, were working in Men-tone, Texas, on a \u201cfishing\u201d operation; that is, they were working to try to retrieve tubing and wire that were stuck in a drill hole. Mentone, Texas, is approximately ninety miles from Hobbs, New Mexico, where the workers\u2019 lived and where Dawson maintained its home office.\n{3} When Dawson began the fishing operation in Mentone in March 1997, it expected the job to take approximately two weeks. Dawson provided crew members $50 per day, with which they could pay for lodging and meals in the nearby towns of Kermit or Pecos, Texas, and $6.50 per day for travel, including the day of the car accident, for the approximately one-half hour trip each way between the workers\u2019 lodgings and the oil field. Everyone understood the purpose of the per diem money; most used it to stay at a motel in Pecos. But workers were not directed specifically on how they were to spend the money, and they received the money even if they did not stay in Pecos on work nights. Dawson also initially provided transportation between Mentone and Hobbs on the workers\u2019 days off.\n{4} The job took much longer than originally expected, and safety became a concern as the two crews worked around the clock with little time off. Sometime before July 1, 1997, Lilo Quiroz, one of the rig operators at Mentone, and Lonnie Stuward, Dawson\u2019s Operations Manager in Hobbs, agreed that crews in Mentone should have an extra member in order for crew members to establish a rotating schedule of regular days off. The idea was that workers would be more well rested and therefore safer as a result of having regularly scheduled days off. In exchange for the extra crew member, however, workers would have to provide their own transportation between Mentone and Hobbs.\n{5} On August 4, 1997, Ramirez, Alvarez, and Cervantes finished their shift on the pulling unit crew at 5:00 p.m. MDT. Their supervisor, Lilo Quiroz, drove them from the rig site to Mentone, where the three got into a pickup truck Ramirez had borrowed from his cousin. They set out for Hobbs, stopping for a six pack of beer along the way. Five miles north of Kermit, Texas, the truck\u2019s left rear tire blew while the truck was traveling at over eighty miles per hour. Ramirez, the driver, lost control of the truck. It swerved and skidded and rolled at least three times before coming to rest on the side of the road. All three workers were ejected from the truck and seriously injured. Ramirez died as a result of his injuries. None of the three was wearing a seat belt, although the seat belt where Alvarez was sitting was broken. All had drunk beer, but none had a significant blood-alcohol concentration. The WCJ found the levels of blood alcohol to be \u201cvery low.\u201d\n{6} After a hearing, the WCJ awarded benefits to Ramirez\u2019 estate and to Alvarez, based on the conclusion that Ramirez and Alvarez, as traveling employees, were injured within the course and scope of their employment while traveling to Hobbs. She denied benefits to Cervantes, however, because she concluded he was outside the scope of his employment.\nDISCUSSION\n{7} Under New Mexico\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 1999) (the Act), workers injured while traveling between home and work are generally not eligible for compensation. See \u00a7 52-1-19 (excluding from compensation \u201cinjuries to any worker occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties\u201d). In this respect, the Act codifies what is commonly known in workers\u2019 compensation law as the \u201cgoing-and-coming rule.\u201d See Espinosa v. Albuquerque. Publ\u2019g Co., 1997-NMCA-072, \u00b6 8, 123 N.M. 605, 943 P.2d 1058. \u201cThis rule arises from the recognition that, \u2018while admittedly the employment is the cause of the workman\u2019s journey between his home and the factory, it is generally taken for granted that workmen\u2019s compensation was not intended to protect him against all the perils of that journey.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 15.11 (1996)). The going-and-coming rule is subject to a number of exceptions, though, as we have recognized on several occasions. See Espinosa, 1997-NMCA-072, \u00b6 8, 123 N.M. 605, 943 P.2d 1058 (\u201cOff-premises injuries sustained while going to or from work are not covered under the [Act] unless they fit within one of several specific exceptions to the going-and-coming rule.\u201d); see also Barton v. Las Cositas, 102 N.M. 312, 315, 694 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Ct.App.1984) (\u201cIf the employee\u2019s work creates the necessity for the travel, then any injury during travel (except for that governed by the \u2018going and coming rule\u2019) is compensable.\u201d). One of those exceptions \u2014 the \u201ctraveling-employee\u201d exception\u2014 is at issue in this ease.\n{8} Before discussing the traveling-employee rule in detail, however, we think it necessary to address Dawson\u2019s argument that our Legislature\u2019s rejection of the rule of liberal construction of the Act in favor of workers precludes us from adopting the traveling-employee rule in this case. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-5-1 (1989) (\u201cIt is the specific intent of the legislature that benefit claims eases be decided on their merits and that the common law rule of \u2018liberal construction\u2019 based on the supposed \u2018remedial\u2019 basis of workers\u2019 benefits legislation shall not apply in these eases.\u201d). We do not agree with Dawson\u2019s contention. Liberal construction was \u201cbut one of many tools employed by our appellate courts in construing workers\u2019 compensation legislation. Liberal construction has historically been tempered by attention to legislative intent and balanced against sound reason and policy. Fundamental fairness to both the workers and employers has long been a guideline.\u201d Garcia v. Mt. Taylor Millwork, Inc., 111 N.M. 17, 19, 801 P.2d 87, 89 (Ct.App.1989) (citation omitted). \u201cSection 52-5-1 [simply] calls for a balanced and evenhanded construction of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d Gomez v. B.E. Harvey Gin Corp., 110 N.M. 100, 102, 792 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1990).\n{9} As our discussion below indicates, the traveling-employee rule recognizes that the conditions faced by employees working \u201con the road,\u201d away from home and away from their employer\u2019s home office, are sufficiently different from the conditions faced by employees merely going to or from their local place of employment on a daily basis to warrant a distinct rule. We need not construe the Act liberally to apply a rule appropriate to the circumstances in which Dawson and its employees working at Mentone found themselves at the time of the accident. Instead, evenhanded construction of the Act requires us to recognize the conditions traveling employees face. Cf. Iliaifar v. SAIF Corp., 160 Or.App. 116, 981 P.2d 353, 356 (1999) (noting Oregon\u2019s longstanding recognition of exceptions to going-and-coming rule without reference to passage in 1995 of Or. Rev.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 656-012(3) (Supp.1998) abrogating liberal construction of Oregon\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation statute).\n{10} Dawson also argues that we have already rejected the traveling-employee exception with our decision in Arias v. AAA Landscaping, 115 N.M. 239, 849 P.2d 382 (Ct.App.1993), implicitly acknowledging our ability to adopt the traveling-employee exception despite the Legislature\u2019s direction that courts not construe the Act liberally. We concede that the facts in Arias bear some similarity to the facts in this case. See id. at 239-40, 849 P.2d at 382-83. However, in Arias we were concerned with three distinct exceptions to the going-and-coming rule: the \u201cemployer\u2019s conveyance exception,\u201d see id. at 240, 849 P.2d at 383 (citing 1 Arthur Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 17.00 (1992)); the \u201cspecial errand exception,\u201d see id. (citing Edens v. New Mexico Health & Soc. Servs. Dep\u2019t, 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65 (1976); Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 90 N.M. 707, 568 P.2d 233 (Ct. App.1977)); and the \u201cdual purpose exception,\u201d see id. at 241, 849 P.2d at 384 (citing and quoting Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 92, 227 P.2d 365, 372 (1950)); cf. Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477, 480-81, 565 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Ct.App.1977) (discussing development of dual-purpose doctrine in New Mexico). Anas does not discuss the traveling-employee exception at all, and we adhere to the rale that cases are not authority for propositions they do not consider. See Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co., 115 N.M. 622, 627, 857 P.2d 22, 27 (1993). We therefore turn to the traveling-employee exception and its applicability in this case.\nThe Traveling-Employee Exception\n{11} \u201cThe general rule is that an employee whose work entails travel away from the employer\u2019s premises is, in most circumstances, under continuous workers\u2019 compensation coverage from the time he leaves home until he returns.\u201d Voight v. Rettinger Transp., Inc., 306 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn.1981); see also 2 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 25.01 (1999). Stated otherwise,\nAn employee who is taken away from home by his or her employment and who of necessity must eat and sleep away from home in order to further the employer\u2019s business may be considered to be in the continuous employment of the employer, day and night. In such a case, \u201c \u2018[i]t can not [sic] be said that the employment is broken by mere intervals of leisure such as those taken for a meal.\u2019 \u201d\nBoyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fonville, 237 Ga. App. 721, 516 S.E.2d 573, 574 (1999) (citing and quoting McDonald v. State Highway Dep\u2019t., 127 Ga.App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919, 922-23 (1972)) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). A traveling employee is not simply one who must travel significant distances to and from his job, however. \u201cTraveling employees are employees for whom travel is an integral part of their jobs, such as those who travel to different locations to perform their duties, as differentiated from employees who commute daily from home to a single workplace.\u201d Boyce v. Potter, 642 A.2d 1342, 1343 (Me.1994).\n{12} \u201cThe rationale behind the traveling employee rule is that an employee who is required to travel away from home is furthering the business of his employer as he eats, sleeps, and performs other acts necessary to his health and comfort during his travels.\u201d Olinger Constr. Co. v. Mosbey, 427 N.E.2d 910, 915 (Ind.Ct.App.1981). In addition, \u201c[w]here the employment requires travel, the employee is consequently exposed to hazards [he or] she would otherwise have the option of avoiding. Thus the hazards of the route become the hazards of the employment.\u201d Appeal of Griffin, 140 N.H. 650, 671 A.2d 541, 544 (1996) (quoting Whittemore v. Sullivan County Homemaker\u2019s Aid Serv., 129 N.H. 432, 529 A.2d 919, 921 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). But,\n[i]t is not merely travel on a highway that creates a risk of compensable injury; if that were so, every ordinary commuter would be covered under the Act. Rather, it is the job\u2019s requirement of travel and the employer\u2019s authority and control in assigning its employees to different work sites that increase the normal risk and render compensable ... injuries] suffered during such travel.\nBoyce, 642 A.2d at 1344. In this respect, traveling employees have been regarded as having a \u201csui generis status since their work necessarily requires that they be away from home.\u201d Voight, 306 N.W.2d at 138.\n{13} We note that some jurisdictions have extended coverage to injuries a traveling employee suffers during \u201cleisure\u201d activities, other than eating or sleeping, while away from home. See, e.g., Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Health v. Huntley, 12 Ark.App. 287, 675 S.W.2d 845, 848-49 (1984) (extending coverage to woman injured by intoxicated stranger while returning to her motel room from motel\u2019s bar); Bagcraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 302 Ill.App.3d 334, 235 Ill.Dec. 736, 705 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1998) (injuries from an all-terrain vehicle accident covered); Proctor v. SAIF Corp., 123 Or.App. 326, 860 P.2d 828, 831-32 (1993) (injuries suffered during basketball game covered). The reason for extending coverage to some injuries incurred during recreational activities is that employers should expect their traveling employees to engage in some sort of recreation while on the road. See Bagcraft Corp., 235 Ill.Dec. 736, 705 N.E.2d at 921. Moreover, given the rationale behind the exception, it would make little sense to provide coverage for traveling employees only while they are actually performing the duties of their jobs. See id. Thus, \u201c[a] traveling employee may satisfy a physical need for recreation even if the job does not cause stress, and even if the employee chooses an activity that is not related to work. As the cases show, most traveling employees relax through activities that have little relationship to work.\u201d Proctor, 860 P.2d at 831.\n{14} Coverage for traveling employees injured while away from home is not limitless, however. While a traveling employee is considered to be acting within the scope of his or her employment while on the road, one seeking compensation for an injury must still demonstrate that the injury \u201carose out of and in the course of employment.\u201d See Jensen v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 305 Ill.App.3d 274, 238 Ill.Dec. 468, 711 N.E.2d 1129, 1132-33 (1999); see also Kolson v. District of Columbia Dep\u2019t of Employment Servs., 699 A.2d 357, 360-61 (D.C.1997); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-l-28(A)(l). The phrase \u201cin the course of,\u201d we have previously noted, \u201crefers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred.\u201d Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Prods. Co., 107 N.M. 26, 29, 751 P.2d 710, 713 (Ct.App.1988). In contrast, \u201c[a]n injury arises out of the employment when it is \u2018caused by a risk to which the worker is subjected in the employment.\u2019 \u201d Sena v. Continental Cas. Co., 97 N.M. 753, 755, 643 P.2d 622, 624 (Ct.App.1982) (quoting Losinski v. Drs. Corcoran, Barkoff & Stagnone, P.A., 97 N.M. 79, 80, 636 P.2d 898, 899 (Ct.App.1981)). \u201cFor an injury to \u2018arise out of the employment, there must be a showing that the injury was caused by a risk to which the plaintiff is subjected by reason of his employment.\u201d Gutierrez, 107 N.M. at 29, 751 P.2d at 713. \u201cTypically, an injury \u2018arises out of a claimant\u2019s employment if, at the time of the occurrence, the claimant was performing acts the employer instructed the claimant to perform, acts incidental to the claimant\u2019s assigned duties, or acts which the claimant had a common law or statutory duty to perform.\u201d Jensen, 238 Ill.Dec. 468, 711 N.E.2d at 1132. Determining whether a worker\u2019s injury arose out of his employment is a question of fact. See Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge, 115 N.M. 335, 337, 850 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Ct.App.1993). \u201cHowever, where the historical facts of the case are undisputed, as in this case, the question of whether the accident arose out of the employment is a question of law.\u201d Id.\n{15} Several jurisdictions have held that the requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of employment are met if the traveling employee was injured while engaging in an activity that was both reasonable and foreseeable. See Huntley, 675 S.W.2d at 848; Bagcraft, 235 Ill.Dec. 736, 705 N.E.2d at 921; Voight, 306 N.W.2d at 138. Other jurisdictions have held that a traveling employee is covered unless he was injured during a distinct departure from his employment for a personal errand. See Eversman v. Concrete Cutting & Breaking, 224 Mich.App. 221, 568 N.W.2d 387, 389 (1997); see also Evans v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Hotwork, Inc.), 664 A.2d 216, 219 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (allowing employer to rebut presumption that traveling employee was furthering employer\u2019s business by proving \u201cthat the claimant\u2019s actions were so foreign to and removed from his usual employment as to constitute an abandonment thereof\u2019). These tests are fine, as far as they go. But they can put an undue burden on employers. Cf. Voight, 306 N.W.2d at 135, 138 (reversing denial of compensation to claimant who was accidentally shot by intoxicated fellow employee \u201cattempt[ing] to generate some excitement\u201d because claimant\u2019s trip to the bar \u201cfor recreational purposes was a reasonable activity and therefore incident to the employment relationship\u201d).\n{16} At least one of the jurisdictions that employs the reasonable-and-foreseeable test has sought to limit the test\u2019s reach by imposing an additional requirement for compensation. The Illinois Appellate Court recently held that an injury incurred in an otherwise reasonable and foreseeable recreational activity will not be compensable if the activity was conducted in an unreasonable or unforeseeable manner. See Jensen, 238 Ill.Dec. 468, 711 N.E.2d at 1133. We agree that this should be part of the analysis. We also join those jurisdictions that hold that the activity giving rise to the injury must confer some benefit on the employer; that it must be reasonably related or incidental to employment. See Benson v. Colorado Compensation Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 624, 627 (Colo.Ct.App.1994) (holding that the traveling-employee exception applies, in part, \u201cwhen the travel confers a benefit on the employer beyond the sole fact of the employee\u2019s arrival at work\u201d); Kolson, 699 A.2d at 361 (\u201c[W]hen a traveling employee is injured while engaging in a reasonable and foreseeable activity that is reasonably related to or incidental to his or her employment, the injury arises in the course of employment.\u201d); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Morgan, 494 N.E.2d 991, 994 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (\u201cActivities which advance, either directly or indirectly, an employer\u2019s interests or are for the mutual benefit of the employer and employee may be incidental to and arise in the course of employment.\u201d). This is consistent with our position in earlier cases \u201cthat an injury occurs in the course of employment when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of employment or doing something incidental to it.\u201d Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 106 N.M. 594, 597, 746 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Ct.App.1987); accord Garcia v. Homestake Mining Co., 113 N.M. 508, 511, 828 P.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App. 1992); cf. Evans v. Valley Diesel, 111 N.M. 556, 559, 807 P.2d 740, 743 (1991) (reversing this Court\u2019s denial of compensation and citing Moer for the proposition that the employee\u2019s injury arose out of his employment because his employer derived intangible benefit from the activity the employee was engaged in when injured).\n{17} In sum, we hold that one whose work not only requires him to travel but for whom travel is an integral part of his employment is within the scope of employment continuously while traveling, and may therefore be eligible for workers\u2019 compensation benefits as a traveling employee for injuries he sustains while away from home. The injury must, however, arise out of and in the course of employment, which means that it must occur during the commission of an activity that is reasonable and foreseeable both as to its nature and manner of commission, and must be of some benefit to the employer. The benefit to the employer need not be pecuniary, and may be as intangible as a well-fed and well-rested employee.\n{18} In this case, the WCJ applied the correct test in deciding whether to award benefits to Ramirez, Alvarez, and Cervantes. The WCJ found that the trip by Ramirez arose out of and in the course of his employment because the primary purposes of the trip were (1) to transport Alvarez to Hobbs so that Alvarez could begin his scheduled days off; and (2) to transport dirty uniforms, in part at the request of his supervisor, Lilo Quiroz, for laundering at the Hobbs yard the next day. These were both reasonable and foreseeable, and they benefitted Dawson by helping to ensure that Alvarez would be rested when he returned to work and that those whose uniforms Ramirez was transporting for laundering would have uniforms that met industry standards for safety. Thus, the WCJ properly awarded compensation to Ramirez\u2019 estate.\n{19} About the awarding of benefits to Alvarez, little needs to be said. He was returning to Hobbs to begin his days off, as would be expected. The benefit to Dawson is exactly what was contemplated by the 1997 agreement: having a well-rested employee. And Alvarez arranged for a ride in a co-worker\u2019s vehicle, as was necessary under the 1997 agreement. We note, as did the WCJ, that the 1997 agreement between Lilo Quiroz and Lonnie Steward conferred an incidental benefit on Dawson, saving it the expense of using one of its vehicles to transport workers back and forth from Hobbs to Mentone. The WCJ properly awarded compensation to Alvarez.\n{20} The WCJ concluded Cervantes\u2019 injuries were not compensable because they did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Although Cervantes was also taking his uniforms to Hobbs for cleaning, it was not necessary for him to accompany Ramirez and Alvarez, insofar as they were making the trip and transporting uniforms anyway. Regarding the other reason Cervantes offered for going along on the trip\u2014to keep Ramirez company on the return trip the following morning\u2014the WCJ concluded that conferred no benefit on Dawson and that Cervantes was therefore not entitled to compensation benefits. We agree. Traveling back and forth from Mentone to Hobbs too frequently would have exposed workers to the very safety risk Dawson sought to remedy by encouraging workers to stay in the Mentone area\u2014insufficient rest. We therefore hold that the WCJ properly denied benefits to Cervantes.\nThe WCJ\u2019s Reduction of Workers\u2019 Benefits\n{21} As we noted at the outset, despite awarding compensation benefits to Ramirez and Alvarez, the WCJ concluded that their compensation awards should be reduced because both had consumed alcohol during the drive and neither was wearing a seat belt. Specifically, the WCJ ordered a 10% reduction in benefits for both Ramirez and Alvarez for consuming alcohol during the drive, and ordered an additional 10% reduction in Ramirez\u2019 benefits for failing to wear a seat belt, but only an additional 5% reduction in Alvarez\u2019 benefits for failing to wear a seat belt, because the seat belt where he was sitting was inoperative. Finally, the WCJ ordered that Ramirez\u2019 benefits be further reduced by 10% because he was speeding at the time of the accident.\n{22} The Act does provide for a reduction- in compensation to an injured worker under certain circumstances:\nIn case an injury to, or death of, a worker results from his failure to observe statutory regulations appertaining to the safe conduct of his employment or from his failure to use a safety device provided by his employer, then the compensation otherwise payable under the ..'. Act ... shall be reduced ten percent.\nSection 52-l-10(A). By the terms of the statute, in order for a reduction to be appropriate the employee\u2019s statutory violation or failure to use a safety device must have caused his injury. \u201cIn the absence of a showing of causation, no issue of entitlement to the penalty is raised.\u201d Boughton v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 99 N.M. 723, 726, 663 P.2d 382, 385 (Ct.App.1983).\n{23} With respect to Ramirez\u2019 and Alvarez\u2019 consumption of alcohol and failure to wear seat belts, the record is devoid of evidence that those factors caused their injuries. In fact, the WCJ specifically found that \u201cMr. Ramirez\u2019s consumption of alcohol did not contribute to the accident in which he was injured\u201d; that the accident due to a blown tire might well have occurred even if the workers had not had any alcohol to drink. On the use of seat belts, Dawson does not point to any evidence, nor have we found any, to indicate that the workers\u2019 failure in this regard caused their injuries. Instead, Dawson argues that \u201cas a matter of common sense\u201d the workers were ejected from the vehicle because they were not wearing seat belts, which \u201ctends to lead to enhanced injuries.\u201d Dawson also argues that the WCJ made an \u201cimplicit finding\u201d that Ramirez\u2019 and Alvarez\u2019 failure to wear seat belts was a cause of their injuries. Of course, an implicit finding of causation is not a showing of causation. Dawson simply failed to present any evidence showing enhanced injury due to nonuse of seat belts, and we reject Dawson\u2019s invitation to speculate to that effect.\n{24} The WCJ reduced Ramirez\u2019 and Alvarez\u2019 compensation awards nonetheless based on the finding that their consumption of alcohol and their failure to wear seat belts were in violation of Dawson\u2019s safety policies. But Section 52-l-10(A) does not provide for a reduction in benefits when an employee simply violates company policies in the absence of evidence that the violation caused the injury, which Dawson did not produce. The WCJ was therefore incorrect in reducing Ramirez\u2019 and Alvarez\u2019 compensation awards on that basis. We reverse two of the 10% reductions for Ramirez. We also reverse the 15% reduction for Alvarez and note that, not only does Section 52-l-10(A) not provide for a 5% reduction in benefits, we also think it improper to penalize a worker for violating a regulation or failing to use a safety device (the non-operational seat beat) when the violation or failure was beyond his control.\n{25} In contrast, the WCJ found, based on the opinions of the officer who investigated the accident, that excessive speed was one of the causes of the accident. Por a traveling employee who is driving while in the course and scope of his employment, observing the posted speed limit is a \u201cstatutory regulation}] appertaining to the safe conduct of his employment.\u201d Section 52-l-10(A). Thus, in light of the WCJ\u2019s findings that speeding was a contributing cause of the accident (and therefore the injuries), it was proper to reduce Ramirez\u2019 compensation award by 10%. As a mere passenger, Alvarez is not affected by this ruling. Because of our disposition of the other two reductions to Ramirez\u2019 compensation award, we need not decide whether Section 52-1-10(A) authorizes multiple 10% reductions in a single accident for each safety violation or failure to use a safety device.\nCONCLUSION\n{26} We affirm the award of compensation to Ramirez and Alvarez based on the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that the two were traveling-employees injured in the course and scope of their employment. We reverse the WCJ\u2019s order of a 15% reduction in Alvarez\u2019 compensation award for the reasons discussed above, and hold that Alvarez is not subject to any reduction. We likewise reverse the WCJ\u2019s order of a reduction in Ramirez\u2019 compensation award, except the 10% reduction based on the findings related to his driving in excess of the posted speed limit. We affirm the denial of benefits to Cervantes. We remand for the entry of a new order consistent with this opinion.\n{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBOSSON and ARMIJO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy J. Cusack, Cusack, Jaramillo, Romero & Assoc., P.C., Roswell, for WorkerAppellee/Cr oss-Appellant Ramirez.", "Royce E. Hoskins, Trenchard & Hoskins, L.L.P., Roswell, for Worker-Appellee/CrossAppellant Alvarez and Worker-Appellant Cervantes.", "Thomas D. Haines, Jr., Rebecca A. Zuschlag, Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley, L.L.P., Roswell, for Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2000-NMCA-011\n995 P.2d 1043\nNancy RAMIREZ, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jose Ramirez, Deceased, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. DAWSON PRODUCTION PARTNERS, INC., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Gabriel Alvarez, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. and Jesus Cervantes, Worker-Appellant, v. Dawson Production Partners, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees.\nNos. 19,918, 19,919, 19,921.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 11, 2000.\nTimothy J. Cusack, Cusack, Jaramillo, Romero & Assoc., P.C., Roswell, for WorkerAppellee/Cr oss-Appellant Ramirez.\nRoyce E. Hoskins, Trenchard & Hoskins, L.L.P., Roswell, for Worker-Appellee/CrossAppellant Alvarez and Worker-Appellant Cervantes.\nThomas D. Haines, Jr., Rebecca A. Zuschlag, Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley, L.L.P., Roswell, for Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees." }, "file_name": "0601-01", "first_page_order": 639, "last_page_order": 648 }