{
  "id": 106568,
  "name": "Bunny FOGLEMAN, Worker-Appellant, v. DUKE CITY AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, and the Dodson Group, Employer-Insurer-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fogleman v. Duke City Automotive Services",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Bunny FOGLEMAN, Worker-Appellant, v. DUKE CITY AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, and the Dodson Group, Employer-Insurer-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nALARID, Judge.\n{1} This case presents an issue of first impression: whether a wheelchair-accessible van is an \u201cartificial member\u201d within the meaning of our workers\u2019 compensation statutes. In the present ease, the workers\u2019 compensation judge (WCJ) determined that such a van is not an artificial member. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Worker was injured in 1982 in a work-related automobile accident that left Worker paralyzed in both legs and both arms. Employer furnished Worker with a modified van. In August 1998, Worker filed a workers\u2019 compensation complaint alleging that she was \u201cin need of a new vehicle to transport her to and from places as her old vehicle [was] breaking down.\u201d Employer answered, denying any responsibility for providing a replacement vehicle. Employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that a specially-equipped van was not a \u201cmedical expense.\u201d Worker filed a response and counter motion for summary judgment, pointing out that she was not seeking the van as a medical expense, but rather, as an \u201cartificial member\u201d under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1 \u2014 49(0) (1937; as amended through 1977). The parties subsequently stipulated that the WCJ should treat the pending cross-motions for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In a February 23, 1999 order, the WCJ ruled that a van modified to accept Worker\u2019s wheelchair was not an artificial member. The WCJ ruled that the Employer\u2019s responsibility is \u201climited to the modification of the van to make the van useable by the injured Worker.\u201d Worker appeals.\nDISCUSSION\n{3} New Mexico enacted its first workers\u2019 compensation law in 1917. See 1917 N.M.Laws, ch. 83. In 1937, the Legislature added the following provision to the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act:\nIn all cases where the injury is such as to permit the use of artificial members (including teeth and eyes) the employer shall furnish such artificial members.\n1937 N.M.Laws, ch. 92, \u00a7 10. This provision has been retained throughout subsequent revisions of the Act.\n{4} The parties agree that this case is governed by the law in effect at the time of Worker\u2019s injury. Except for the substitution in the current version of \u201cshall pay for\u201d for \u201cshall furnish,\u201d the two versions are identical. Compare NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-l-49(H) (1990) ivith NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-49(0 (1977). Because we are deciding the present case under the law in effect in 1982, we have liberally construed the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in favor of Worker, as required by law in effect at the time of Worker\u2019s injury. See Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 106 N.M. 594, 596, 746 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct.App.1987). But see Herrera v. Quality Imports, 1999-NMCA-140, \u00b6 9, 128 N.M. 300, 992 P.2d 313 (pursuant to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-5-1 (1991) Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is not to be construed liberally in favor of either Worker or Employer).\n{5} Worker argues that \u201c[a]n injured worker who has lost the use of his or her legs should be provided with an \u2018artificial member\u2019 to replace the loss of function of the worker\u2019s arms and legs, to the extent our technology allows us to create a replacement or substitute.\u201d Worker cites to workers\u2019 compensation cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have upheld the award of a specially-equipped vehicle to an injured worker. See, e.g., Terry Grantham Co. v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 154 Ariz. 180, 741 P.2d 313 (Ct.App.1987) (holding that specially-equipped van constitutes \u201cother apparatus\u201d for purposes of workers\u2019 compensation benefits). However, in our view, these cases are distinguishable in that the statutes in question in these cases from other jurisdictions were written in broader terms than our statute. For example, the Arizona statute at issue in Grantham, Ariz.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 23-1062(A), provided that \u201cevery injured employee shall receive medical, surgical and hospital benefits or other treatment, nursing, medicine, surgical supplies, crutches and other apparatus, including artificial members, reasonably required at the time of the injury, and during the period of disability.\u201d Similarly, in Wilmers v. Gateway Transp. Co., 227 Mich.App. 339, 575 N.W.2d 796 (1998), the relevant statute, Mich.Comp.Laws \u00a7 418.315(1), provided that \u201c[t]he employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury.\u201d Brawn v. Gloria\u2019s Country Inn, 698 A.2d 1067 (Me.1997) involved a statute, Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 39-A, \u00a7 206(8), that extended benefits to \u201cother physical aids made necessary by the injury.\u201d\n{6} In our view, our Legislature\u2019s reference to teeth and eyes suggests that the Legislature intended \u201cartificial member\u201d to refer to prosthetic devices that are attached to, or used in immediate proximity to, the injured worker\u2019s body. We believe that it would distort the words employed by the Legislature to construe \u201cartificial member\u201d to include the entire cost of a wheelchair-accessible vehicle. We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the term \u201cartificial member,\u201d as used in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, does not include the entire cost of the wheelchair-accessible van as claimed by Worker. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration.\n{7} IT IS SO ORDERED.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ALARID, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rod Dunn, Dunn Law Offices, Rio Rancho, for Appellant.",
      "Timothy L. Fields, Wade L. Woodard, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "2000-NMCA-039\n999 P.2d 1072\nBunny FOGLEMAN, Worker-Appellant, v. DUKE CITY AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, and the Dodson Group, Employer-Insurer-Appellees.\nNo. 20,219.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 14, 2000.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 26,271, May 2, 2000.\nRod Dunn, Dunn Law Offices, Rio Rancho, for Appellant.\nTimothy L. Fields, Wade L. Woodard, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, for Appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0840-01",
  "first_page_order": 878,
  "last_page_order": 880
}