{ "id": 1217102, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anna TORRES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Torres", "decision_date": "2000-03-10", "docket_number": "No. 20,154", "first_page": "51", "last_page": "55", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.M. 51" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2000-NMCA-038" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1 P.3d 433" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "118 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563429 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142280 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2", "parenthetical": "\"Where testimony is conflicting, such conflict raises questions of fact for a jury to decide.\"" }, { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "\"Where testimony is conflicting, such conflict raises questions of fact for a jury to decide.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563621 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765-66" }, { "page": "759-60" }, { "page": "766" }, { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-087", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834309 ], "weight": 18, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b65-6" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6-9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0656-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 596, "char_count": 10798, "ocr_confidence": 0.718, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.123532716690216e-08, "percentile": 0.4682309663613593 }, "sha256": "6b90c3767aa7117e0a187f31c317282e9f6154979fd13d4881b90fb4a60d0d35", "simhash": "1:5855d9efb28e1f69", "word_count": 1773 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:16.735179+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WECHSLER and BUSTAMANTE, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anna TORRES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nKENNEDY, Judge.\n{1} Defendant appeals her conviction for \u201cknowingly issuing or transferring a forged writing with intent to injure or defraud\u201d in violation of NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-16-10(B) (1963), claiming an insufficiency of evidence to support her conviction. Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence that she issued or transferred documents with the intent to injure or defraud. We disagree. She further asserts the documents she is convicted of passing do not \u201cpurport to have legal efficacy\u201d as required by the statute. This latter question is not a question of sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of law. See State v. Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, \u00b6\u00b65-6, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820. The documents passed by Defendant satisfy the statute under that standard. We accordingly affirm her conviction. Recognizing a need to clarify the view concerning the \u201clegal efficacy\u201d of forged documents as a matter of law, we issue this formal opinion.\nFACTS\n{2} Mr. and Mrs. Arrevolos hired Defendant to help process immigration applications with the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for their son, who was illegally residing in the United States. Defendant accepted a payment of $280 to perform the work. Defendant told the Arrevoloses INS would take about two months to process the documents. About a month later, the Arrevoloses returned to Defendant, who told them the documents would arrive at their house and not to ask her about it anymore. About three weeks later, the Arrevoloses went back to Defendant and asked Defendant to return their money and the documents. Defendant said the papers were at the bank and she would have them the following day.\n{3} A couple of days later, Defendant returned the documents she had been given and gave the Arrevoloses a partially completed INS application. She also produced two additional documents and gave them to the Arrevolos: one was a receipt for money purporting to show she had paid INS a $70 processing fee for the documents and the other was a return receipt from the United States Postal Service (USPS) indicating INS had received the documents. Both documents were signed by Joseph Vigil, an alleged employee of INS, as the recipient of the respective items.\n{4} The State presented evidence that the USPS return receipt had originally been attached to a letter sent to Joseph Vigil by a nursing home where Defendant worked. Mr. Vigil was in Clayton, New Mexico, at the time he allegedly signed the return receipt and was not an employee of INS. The State\u2019s handwriting expert identified some of the handwriting on the return receipt as definitely belonging to Defendant, and some of the handwriting as probably belonging to Defendant. The State\u2019s expert also testified that the cash receipt was written by Defendant and showed evidence of alteration, erasure, and the use of correction tape. The State\u2019s expert did not issue a conclusive opinion about the validity of the money receipt.\n{5} According to Defendant she returned the papers to the Arrevolos without accepting any money and told them she could not help them when they could not produce the documentation she needed to complete her work. She does not attempt to explain how the Arrevolos came to possess two documents that bear her handwriting and indicate transactions between her and INS. Defendant argues the two documents she provided the Arrevolos were not \u201cof legal efficacy\u201d as required by .the forgery statute and urges we vacate her conviction.\nDISCUSSION\nStandard of Review\n{6} Defendant posits there was insufficient evidence in her trial for the jury to convict her of forgery. In reviewing her claim, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See State v. Apodaca, 118 N.M. 762, 765-66, 887 P.2d 756, 759-60 (1994). We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See State v. Lankford, 92 N.M. 1, 2, 582 P.2d 378, 379 (1978) (\u201cWhere testimony is conflicting, such conflict raises questions of fact for a jury to decide.\u201d). We resolve conflicting evidence and indulge all inferences in favor of the jury\u2019s decision. See Apodaca, 118 N.M. at 766, 887 P.2d at 760.\n{7} Whether the forged documents in this ease \u201cpurport to have legal efficacy\u201d is a question of law. See Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, \u00b6\u00b6 6-9, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820; see also UJI 14-1643 NMRA 2000 committee commentary. We review questions of law de novo. See Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, \u00b6 6, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820.\nLegal Efficacy\n{8} Section 30-16-10 defines the elements of forgery as follows:\nForgery consists of:\nA. falsely making or altering any signature to, or any part of, any writing purporting to have any legal efficacy with intent to injure or defraud; or\nB. knowingly issuing or transferring a forged writing with intent to injure or defraud.\nDefendant sets forth a number of arguments asserting that the receipts in question do not possess legal efficacy as required by statute. Defendant\u2019s narrow reliance on Wasson is misplaced. Defendant urges that our interpretation of a document having legal efficacy be limited to \u201c \u2018an instrument which upon its face could be made the foundation of liability5 and \u2018an instrument good and valid for the purpose for which it was created.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u00b6 7 (quoting State v. Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, \u00b6 14, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098). We disagree.\n{9} The statute does not require the document to be a facially valid document of the sort it purports to be. First, Wasson directs us in our interpretation of the forgery statute by explaining that \u201c[t]he language of penal statutes should be given a reasonable or common sense construction consonant with the objects of the legislation, and the evils sought to be overcome should be given special attention.\u201d M 16 (quoting State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 243, 880 P.2d 845, 854 (1994)). Next, Wasson defines \u201clegal efficacy\u201d in much broader terms than the Defendant uses, explaining that \u201cthe statute applies to any writing which purports to have legal efficacy.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9 \u201cIn New Mexico ... forgery is complete when the false instrument is issued or transferred with the requisite intent, regardless of its acceptance, or whether further steps are taken by the recipient to verify the writing.\u201d Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, \u00b6 16, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098. \u201c[FJorgeries often involve documents relied upon to establish financial obligations and entitlements in the conduct of private business, [but] ... also may involve \u2018any document required by law to be filed or recorded or necessary or convenient to the discharge of a public official\u2019s duties.\u2019 \u201d Wosson, 1998-NMCA-087, \u00b6 7, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820 (citation omitted) (quoting 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law \u00a7 491, at 94 (15th ed.1996)). \u201cIt is sufficient ... to constitute a forgery if there is a reasonable possibility that the false writing or instrument may operate to cause injury, although no actual injury therefrom is necessary.\u201d 36 Am.Jur.2d Forgery \u00a7 24 (1968) (footnote omitted).\n{10} Based on New Mexico precedent, the proper basis for analyzing whether forgery has occurred is the actual role the document plays in the fraudulent transaction between victim and defendant. The INS receipt purports to have legal efficacy because on its face it would appear to put the onus on INS to act in some way \u2014 to process a completed form or explain why, having received documents upon which it should act, it has or has not done so. Moreover, it appears to be a \u201cdocument required by law to be recorded or necessary or convenient to the discharge of a public official\u2019s duties.\u201d Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, \u00b6 7, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820. Likewise, the USPS receipt would seem to appear on its face \u201cgood and valid for the purpose for which it was created,\u201d and would, \u201cif genuine, ... apparently operate to the legal prejudice of the [USPS].\u201d Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, \u00b614, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098. Defendant\u2019s argument centers on the misplaced idea that the documents do not actually possess legal efficacy. By so insisting the Defendant ignores the work of this Court in Wasson, where we point out \u201cthe statute plainly is not limited to writings which actually have legal efficacy. Rather, the statute applies to any writing which purports to have legal efficacy.\u201d Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, \u00b6 9, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820. Ballantine\u2019s Law Dictionary 1029 (3d ed.1969) defines \u201cpurport\u201d as \u201c[t]he apparent, but not necessarily the legal, import of the instrument.\u201d\nSufficiency of the Evidence\n{11} The jury found Defendant defrauded the Arrevoloses by taking money for work she did not perform. She gave two receipts to the Arrevoloses to prove she had worked and to justify keeping their money. The fraud began when Defendant took money for work she either intended not to perform or just did not perform. It was consummated when she intentionally and fraudulently tried to retain the money. The Arrevoloses relied upon Defendant\u2019s representation that she would perform work and, because of Defendant\u2019s representation, paid her money.\n{12} When the deal fell through, Defendant could easily have returned the papers and the money. She did not. She waited a few days and then returned the partially completed paperwork and two receipts to her victims. On their face, the receipts said two things: (1) INS had received both documents and money from Defendant which she sent on behalf of the Arrevoloses; and (2) Defendant had done at least some work for which she had been contracted.\n{13} That Defendant had in fact done no work is evidence of her intent to use the documents to defraud the Arrevoloses. The fraudulent representation that Defendant would work for her pay was made by Defendant and relied on by the Arrevoloses at the inception of the contract. Whether the Arrevoloses actually relied on the receipts is immaterial. Defendant intended that the documents establish her right to money to which she was not entitled. The receipts are forged documents of \u201clegal efficacy\u201d provided by Defendant in furtherance of her intent and scheme to defraud the Arrevoloses of their money.\nCONCLUSION\n{14} The issue of whether the real crime was forgery or misdemeanor fraud is moot. Defendant\u2019s conviction for forgery is affirmed.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWECHSLER and BUSTAMANTE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "KENNEDY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for appellee.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Donna M. Bevacqua, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "1 P.3d 433\n2000-NMCA-038\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anna TORRES, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 20,154.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 10, 2000.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 26,261, May 1, 2000.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for appellee.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Donna M. Bevacqua, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for appellant." }, "file_name": "0051-01", "first_page_order": 85, "last_page_order": 89 }