{ "id": 1217098, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ADAM M., Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Adam M.", "decision_date": "2000-04-20", "docket_number": "No. 20,329", "first_page": "146", "last_page": "150", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.M. 146" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2000-NMCA-049" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2 P.3d 883" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1998-NMCA-139", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827378 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594867 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "stating authority under prior law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731673 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590280 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "stating requirement that court give effect to clear and unambiguous statutory language" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "recognizing that construction of Children's Code requires consideration of its legislative purpose" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-014", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 17246 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598902 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "1391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0133-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 590, "char_count": 13262, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.605443816338481e-07, "percentile": 0.8199113152928993 }, "sha256": "773573a03855cbc270af18aae0813c912f0b68f8a11835e8569983bc5fdbf79d", "simhash": "1:971c363cec0f44d9", "word_count": 2111 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:16.735179+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ALARID and BOSSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ADAM M., Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, J.\n{1} Adam M. (Child) appeals the children\u2019s court\u2019s judgment and disposition in two consolidated delinquency proceedings. At the dispositional hearing, the children\u2019s court ordered Child committed to the custody of Children, Youth, and Family Department (CYFD) for two consecutive two-year commitments. Because the Children\u2019s Code (the Code) does not contemplate consecutive commitments, we reverse and remand.\nFactual and Procedural Background\n{2} The petition in children\u2019s court proceeding JR 97-326-3, filed on June 13, 1997, alleged that Child committed assault with a deadly weapon. The children\u2019s court entered a consent decree on August 6,1997, suspending the proceedings for the lesser period of six months or until CYFD released Child. It ordered Child to sign a probation agreement with CYFD for the suspension period. On November 21, 1997, the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging that Child had violated various provisions of the probation agreement. On December 24, 1997, the children\u2019s court adjudged Child to be a delinquent child. Child entered an amended probation agreement, and the children\u2019s court continued Child\u2019s probation until January 7, 2000. On March 3, 1998, the State filed a second petition to revoke probation, again alleging that Child engaged in various violations of his probation agreement. Child entered a third probation agreement, and the children\u2019s court entered a judgment and disposition suspending a commitment to the custody of CYFD for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years and placing Child on probation for that period.\n{3} On December 18, 1998, the State again filed a petition to revoke probation, asserting that Child raped a minor and thereby violated his probation agreement under which he agreed not to commit any unlawful act. Later that same day, the State filed a separate petition in children\u2019s court proceeding JR 98-501-1 asserting that Child committed criminal sexual penetration and criminal sexual contact with a minor.\n{4} The children\u2019s court accepted Child\u2019s no contest plea in a single document that related to both proceedings, JR 97-326-3 and JR 98-501-3. It held a single dispositional hearing on the two petitions. As its disposition, the children\u2019s court committed Child to the custody of CYFD for a period not to exceed two years in JR 97-326-3 and ordered a separate commitment to the custody of CYFD for a period not to exceed two years in JR 98-501-3. It ordered the two commitments to run consecutively. Child appeals the two commitments.\nAuthority of the Children\u2019s Court to Impose Consecutive Commitments\n{5} The children\u2019s court\u2019s authority to impose a commitment is statutory. See In re Angela R., 105 N.M. 133, 137, 729 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Ct.App.1986) (stating that children\u2019s court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, may only act in manner specifically authorized by statute). Thus, we look to the Code to determine whether the children\u2019s court has the authority to impose consecutive commitments. In doing so, we examine the Code \u201cin its entirety and construe each part to achieve a harmonious result.\u201d State v. Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, \u00b6 15, 124 N.M. 505, 953 P.2d 40. When possible, we give effect to the clear and unambiguous language of the Code. See State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 790, 791 P.2d 64, 65 (1990); Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, \u00b6 15, 124 N.M. 505, 953 P.2d 40.\n{6} Our examination of the Code does not reveal any authority for the children\u2019s court to order consecutive commitments for the same underlying behavior which is the subject of two separate petitions combined for disposition. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-19(B)(2)(a)-(d) (1996) sets out the commitment options of the children\u2019s court for the disposition of an adjudicated delinquent offender. It includes only: (1) a short-term commitment of one year; (2) a long-term commitment of no more than two years; or (3) a commitment to age 21, unless sooner discharged, for a delinquent offender who committed a serious offense specified in the Code or a youthful offender as designated in the Code. The Code authorizes the children\u2019s court to order a disposition of a child found to be delinquent \u201cfor the supervision, care and rehabilitation of the child.\u201d Section 32A-2-19(B).\n{7} The State contends that the children\u2019s court\u2019s authority to impose consecutive commitments extends from the common law which allowed a court the discretion to impose consecutive sentences involving an adult offender. According to the State, we are to construe the Code presuming that the legislature knows the common law and that the legislature intended the Code to be consistent with it. See State v. Gabehart, 114 N.M. 183, 185, 836 P.2d 102, 104 (Ct.App.1992) (stating that repeal of common law is disfavored and found only when legislative intent is evident).\n{8} However, the Code is distinct from the common law which did not make separate provisions for children. Additionally, the Code as written is entirely inconsistent with the judicial discretion under the common law to sentence a criminal offender convicted of multiple crimes to consecutive sentences. Under the Code, when a child is adjudicated a delinquent, the children\u2019s court enters a judgment making \u201ca juvenile disposition.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-18(A) (1996); see also \u00a7 32A-2-19(B). Indeed, the Code uses the word \u201csentence\u201d only when referring to an \u201cadult sentence\u201d which, under the Code, may only be imposed upon a youthful offender or a serious youthful offender, neither of which applies in this instance. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-20CA) (1996) (discussing disposition of a youthful offender); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-3(H) (1996) (defining serious youthful offender); see also \u00a7 32A-2-18(B) (discussing effect of a judgment resulting in an adult sentence for youthful or serious youthful offender). The distinct and deliberate use of these terms in the Code indicates the Code\u2019s intent to treat juvenile offenders differently from adult criminals. See Jonathan M., 109 N.M. at 790, 791 P.2d at 65 (stating requirement that court give effect to clear and unambiguous statutory language). In addition, the Code declares that a purpose of the delinquency act is the removal of children who commit delinquent acts from \u201cthe adult consequences of criminal behavior.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-2(A) (1993).\n{9} To be sure, the Code creates proceedings which, for the purposes of this ease, are significantly different from criminal proceedings. Even though a delinquency petition may state several offenses, as distinguished from a criminal proceeding in which the court sentences the defendant separately for each charge which results in a conviction, the children\u2019s court may order only a single commitment on such petition. See \u00a7 32A-2-19(B). The State so concedes. Also in contrast with a criminal sentence which is set in duration, a long-term commitment to CYFD is indeterminate. See \u00a7 32A-2-19(B)(2)(b) (stating that long-term commitment is for no more than two years); see also State v. Dennis F., 104 N.M. 619, 621, 725 P.2d 595, 597 (Ct.App.1986) (discussing distinction between criminal sentence and commitment under pri- or law). Moreover, after CYFD receives custody of a delinquent child by way of commitment, the child must be released before the commitment expires if the purposes of the commitment are met. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-23(C) (1995); see also Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, \u00b6 4, 124 N.M. 505, 953 P.2d 40. The flexibility in the commitment procedures allows CYFD to accomplish the rehabilitative purposes of the Code. See Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, \u00b6 4, 124 N.M. 505, 953 P.2d 40.\n{10} The Code further addresses the rehabilitative purpose of a long-term commitment by permitting the children\u2019s court to extend its judgment of commitment for additional periods of one year each until the child reaches the age of twenty-one. This extension is authorized upon a finding that it \u201cis necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public interest.\u201d Section 32A-2-23(D). Thus, if CYFD\u2019s rehabilitative effort is incomplete, the Code provides a mechanism to continue the child\u2019s commitment. Importantly, however, the Code does not enable the children\u2019s court to order any greater period than two years for an initial commitment at a dispositional hearing for a delinquent child, regardless of the number of offenses that the child has committed. See \u00a7 32A-2-19(B)(2)(b). In other words, the children\u2019s court must exercise its discretion over a long-term commitment at the end of the commitment, after reviewing a record of the child\u2019s performance while committed, instead of at the beginning when the court has less information before it. The legislature has made this choice. Therefore, given the structure of the Code, with its rehabilitative purpose in delinquency dispositions, and its express manner of addressing delinquent children who are not rehabilitated during a long-term commitment, we do not read Section 32A-2-19 to include unexpressed authority for the children\u2019s court to order consecutive commitments. See Jonathan M., 109 N.M. at 790, 791 P.2d at 65 (recognizing that construction of Children\u2019s Code requires consideration of its legislative purpose); Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, \u00b6 15, 124 N.M. 505, 953 P.2d 40 (stating that the Children\u2019s Code should be read as a whole so that the legislative intent is properly realized).\n{11} In addition, the fact that the State filed two separate petitions, one for probation violation and the other for the substantive offense, does not lead us to the conclusion that the children\u2019s court had authority to order consecutive commitments. The State had the right to file two separate petitions and pursue each to adjudication and disposition. See In re Augustine R., 1998-NMCA-139, \u00b6 7, 126 N.M. 122, 967 P.2d 462. But each petition has the same ultimate dis-positional purpose: care, supervision, and rehabilitation. See \u00a7 32A-2-19. As we have discussed, after the disposition of commitment, the burden of rehabilitation shifts from the children\u2019s court to CYFD with the court having the subsequent opportunity to address commitment at the conclusion of a long-term commitment. Consecutive commitments would give rise to a presumption that CYFD will be unable to accomplish its objectives within the indeterminate commitment period. Thus, consecutive commitments would short-circuit the Code-established procedure and undermine the balance between the children\u2019s court and CYFD that the Code contemplates.\n{12} The State argues that consecutive commitments would not interfere with CYFD\u2019s role. Under the State\u2019s position, if CYFD determined that a delinquent child who had been placed in CYFD\u2019s custody for two consecutive commitments had rehabilitated prior to the completion of the first commitment, CYFD would release the child from the first commitment and the child would not complete serving even the first day of the second commitment. Nothing in the Code even intimates such a procedure. This silence is meaningful to us, indicating that the legislature did not intend such procedure because it did not contemplate consecutive commitments. Moreover, under the Code, the Juvenile Parole Board, not CYFD, decides whether to release a child prior to the completion of a commitment. See \u00a7 32A-2-23(A)(1) (\u201c[T]he juvenile parole board pursuant to the Juvenile Parole Board Act [Chapter 32A, Article 7 NMSA1978] has the exclusive power to parole or release the child.\u201d); Dennis F., 104 N.M. at 621, 725 P.2d at 597 (stating authority under prior law).\n{13} Instead, the Code unambiguously intends a disposition that includes a commitment for no more than an indeterminate period of two years. If separate dis-positional hearings are held on each petition, the Code allows the children\u2019s court to enter a judgment which begins a long-term commitment from the entry of the judgment. See In re Augustine R., 1998-NMCA-139, \u00b6 7, 126 N.M. 122, 967 P.2d 462 (noting that children\u2019s court could properly adjudicate a child delinquent who had previously been adjudicated and committed to CYFD and commit the child to the custody of CYFD for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years). The effect of the second commitment is to extend CYFD\u2019s custody. See id. If, as in this case, a single dispositional hearing is held on more than a single petition, Section 32A-2-19(B) permits only a dispositional judgment which includes a single commitment.\nConclusion\n{14} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Code does not authorize the children\u2019s court to order consecutive commitments from one dispositional hearing, regardless of the number of petitions filed by the State. We therefore reverse and remand to the children\u2019s court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID and BOSSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellee.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Lisabeth L. Occhialino, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2 P.3d 883\n2000-NMCA-049\nSTATE of New Mexico, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ADAM M., Respondent-Appellant.\nNo. 20,329.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 20, 2000.\nCertiorari Denied June 10, 2000.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellee.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Lisabeth L. Occhialino, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0146-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 184 }