{ "id": 1217186, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. SANDERS a/k/a Eddie Sanders, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sanders", "decision_date": "2000-10-19", "docket_number": "No. 25,569", "first_page": "728", "last_page": "736", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.M. 728" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "13 P.3d 460" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2000-NMSC-032" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "397 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058257 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-075", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834206 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580083 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" }, { "page": "1389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41-42" }, { "page": "990-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 U.S. 315", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8889 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/360/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6213196 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959), for the proposition that as interrogators have turned to psychological persuasion, \"courts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the Voluntariness' calculus.\"" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 A.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "\"Admittedly, some courts have found confessions involuntary in cases where state agents said they would not protect the defendant from a credible threat of imminent harm from a third person unless the defendant confessed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.H. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 2294696 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Admittedly, some courts have found confessions involuntary in cases where state agents said they would not protect the defendant from a credible threat of imminent harm from a third person unless the defendant confessed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/138/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 944", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11837518 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/695/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "994 F.Supp. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 214089 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/994/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 F.3d 1087", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7636765 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/76/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 U.S. 560", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164736 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562-63" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/356/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.M. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2831632 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "960" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 P. 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 2, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.M. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4735823 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/25/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 F.2d 1060", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 841068 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/586/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 F.2d 773", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1298389 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/633/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 F.2d 1363", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1778287 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/847/1363-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 F.3d 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10503198 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/24/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 F.2d 16", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2028930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/377/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "796 F.2d 598", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1620188 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/796/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "852 F.2d 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10546661 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/852/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "918 F.2d 236", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532706 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/918/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "709 A.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11836819, 507799 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883", "parenthetical": "\"The United States Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the quoted passage from Bram is not the correct standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession, instead the totality of the circumstances determine voluntariness.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/709/0879-01", "/pa/551/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 Pa. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 507799 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The United States Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the quoted passage from Bram is not the correct standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession, instead the totality of the circumstances determine voluntariness.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/551/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "942 P.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the test from Bram \"is not the correct test of voluntariness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Wash.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 331071 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing that the test from Bram \"is not the correct test of voluntariness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/133/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6141481 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1897, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/168/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571165 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" }, { "page": "801" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "801" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558825 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "adopting Colorado v. Connelly and holding the \"totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching\"" }, { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "adopting Colorado v. Connelly and holding the \"totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 568", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785545 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 F.2d 1530", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1310605 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/838/1530-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-048", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827394 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 28-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 279", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11318776 ], "weight": 17, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "reaffirming the \"totality of the circumstances\" as the proper inquiry" }, { "parenthetical": "reaffirming the \"totality of the circumstances\" as the proper inquiry" }, { "parenthetical": "reaffirming the \"totality of the circumstances\" as the proper inquiry" }, { "page": "285" }, { "parenthetical": "recognizing that the test from Bram \"is not the correct test of voluntariness\"" }, { "page": "282" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 U.S. 278", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3929326 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment" }, { "parenthetical": "seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment" }, { "parenthetical": "seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/297/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 17186 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1320, "char_count": 30345, "ocr_confidence": 0.714, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.532508199301246e-08, "percentile": 0.4474938500275499 }, "sha256": "35f087c05bdca000a312e3aa59b367f6b06859ea3419ef9976ea0a0651937275", "simhash": "1:b3e46f006e408a87", "word_count": 4927 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:16.735179+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MINZNER, C.J., FRANCHINI, SERNA, and MAES, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. SANDERS a/k/a Eddie Sanders, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBACA, Justice.\n{1} Defendant, Richard Eddie Sanders, was convicted of willful and deliberate first degree murder contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-2-l(A)(l) (1994) and numerous other crimes stemming from his involvement in a drug trafficking ring that operated in southern New Mexico. Sanders\u2019 sentence to life imprisonment vests this Court with jurisdiction. See N.M. Const, art. VI, \u00a7 2 (as amended 1965); see also Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA 2000. Sanders appeals his conviction on three grounds. He alleges that the district court: (1) improperly admitted his confession in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against coerced confessions; (2) committed reversible error by improperly rejecting his proffered jury instructions regarding the voluntariness of his confession; and (3) improperly denied his motion to monitor the jury culling process. Finding no error in the rulings of the trial court, we affirm Sanders\u2019 convictions.\nI.\n{2} Sanders\u2019 conviction resulted from a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) probe into a suspected drug organization operating in southern New Mexico. In conjunction with its drug investigation, the FBI was also investigating the disappearance of Darrett McCauley, a purported member of the drug organization. During the course of their investigation, the FBI learned of a threat on Sanders\u2019 life and that members of the drug organization considered him a \u201cloose end that had to be taken care of.\u201d The FBI has a policy of alerting intended victims of threats on their lives which they have learned of during the course of an investigation. Accordingly, two agents, Mr. Colbridge and Mr. Pittman, visited Sanders\u2019 father\u2019s feed store in Alamogordo on July 27, 1994, in an attempt to contact Sanders. Because Sanders was not available, the agents spoke with his father, advised him of the threat, and left a contact number for Sanders to reach them. The next day, Sanders called the FBI and left a cellular telephone number where he could be reached. FBI Special Agent Pittman returned Sanders\u2019 call. Statements made during this initial conversation between Special Agent Pittman and Sanders provide the basis for Sanders\u2019 Due Process challenge. The conversation occurred as follows:\nSA Pittman: Well, we, we ... ah ... talked to your father, Jim?\nEddie Sanders: Yeah.\nSA Pittman: Yesterday, um ... we ... like we told him ... we needed to contact you and advise you that ... ah ...\nEddie Sanders: I\u2019ve got problems.\nSA Pittman: Well, not that you\u2019ve got problems that ... ah ... during the investigation of our we\u2019ve recently received information ... ah ... that your life might be in danger.\nEddie Sanders: Okay, would it help you all in the investigation if I cooperated any at all?\nSA Pittman: It\u2019s ... it certainly would and ... and may in fact help yourself.\nEddie Sanders: Well, I\u2019m ready.\nSA Pittman: Okay, you need to understand that I can\u2019t promise you anything.\nEddie Sanders: Yeah, I realize that.\nSA Pittman: But what I can do is I can ... um ... communicate to the U.S. Attorney with whom I, I work on a daily basis about your cooperation.\nEddie Sanders: Okay.\nSA Pittman: Okay, now ... um ... when would you like to get together?\nEddie Sanders: Ah ... what would be convenient for you all cause I really kind of hate to get back in Alamogordo for a little while because I\u2019ve got some other problems there.\nSA Pittman: Okay.\nEddie Sanders: My girlfriend got beat up a couple of nights ago and raped and that\u2019s one of the reasons that we\u2019re out of town.\n(Agent Pittman and Sanders then arranged a tentative time to meet in Las Cruces.).\nEddie Sanders: I should get over there ... ah ... I just call you sometime in the morning and let you know where I\u2019m at and everything.\nSA Pittman: Okay.\nEddie Sanders: Cause ... ah ... I\u2019d like for you all to go ahead and keep track of me.\nSA Pittman: Okay.\nEddie Sanders: You know ... cause ... ah.... I don\u2019t know what the investigation is about but I have a sneaking suspicion about how it\u2019s originated.\nSA Pittman: Okay.\nEddie Sanders: And ... ah ... I\u2019ve.\nSA Pittman: Now if we ... I\u2019m gonna be frank with you Eddie, if we get together I don\u2019t, I don\u2019t wanna dance around. I want, I would like to get to the point and get to the bottom of this.\nEddie Sanders: Me too. No problem at all.\nSA Pittman: Okay.\nEddie Sanders: Ah, you know I\u2019ve been ... this has been kind of in the back of my head, bugging me for probably a year.\nSA Pittman: Okay.\n(Conversation ends with confirmation that Defendant should call in the morning to arrange meeting with Special Agent Pittman.).\n{3} Following this conversation, Sanders met Special Agent Pittman and Agent Col-bridge at a Super 8 Motel in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Sanders was driven to the Super 8 by his girlfriend and his father. During this meeting, Sanders gave what was to be the first of a number of detailed confessions in which he described the killing of Darrett McCauley and provided information that led to the discovery of McCauley\u2019s remains in the forest of Catron County. At the conclusion of the initial interview on July 28, 1994, Sanders signed an FBI Advice of Rights interrogation form which contained his rights under Miranda and the following statements: \u201cI understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.\u201d He again signed advice of rights forms when he met with the FBI on August 9, 1994, and August 15,1994.\n{4} Sanders was subsequently charged with the murder of Darrett McCauley. Sanders filed a motion to suppress the contents of his confession, alleging that it was coerced by Special Agent Pittman\u2019s indication that he would communicate his cooperation to the United States Attorney\u2019s office. Sanders also maintained that the FBI coerced his confession by informing him of the threat on his life. The district court conducted a suppression hearing at which Sanders and the FBI agents testified. In addition to the transcript of the conversation, the trial court also considered a number of other relevant factors. The trial court detailed those findings of fact after the suppression hearing: (1) Defendant, an adult male bom March 1953, completed high school and reads and understands the English language; (2) Defendant was having some \u201cproblems\u201d in 1994 which included the suspicious destruction of both his truck and home and the rape of his girlfriend; (3) In May of 1994, Defendant sought treatment for depression, was prescribed Prozac, but was not taking his medication at the time of his confession; (4) In May of 1994, while fighting forest fires, Defendant became seriously depressed and started using marijuana, but during a subsequent fire in June of 1994, he worked hard for 20 days without incident; (5) On the day of his confession, Defendant appeared in good health and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. After reviewing all of the relevant factors, the district judge ruled, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Sanders\u2019 statement was \u201ccompletely voluntary.\u201d Sanders seeks review of this conclusion. He also alleges that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to give his proffered jury instructions with regard to the voluntariness of his confession. Finally, he asserts that he should have been allowed to participate in the jury qualification or culling process.\nII.\n{5} Sanders was not in custody and was free to leave when he gave his initial confession and therefore he does not assert that his confession was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Instead, Sanders asserts that his confession was improperly induced by police coercion and that the use of the confession at trial was in contradiction of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, \u00b6 31, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (detailing the analytical distinction between a Miranda analysis and a voluntariness analysis); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).\n{6} We review the voluntariness of a defendant\u2019s confession based on the totality of the circumstances. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (reaffirming the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d as the proper inquiry); Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, \u00b6 26, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660. \u201cVoluntariness means \u2018freedom from official coercion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (quoting Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir.1988)). However, not all confessions obtained by police violate the Due Process Clause. \u201cThe police may be midwife to a declaration naturally born of remorse, or relief, or desperation, or calculation.\u201d Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). Therefore, it is the duty of this Court to determine whether Sanders\u2019 \u201cwill has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired\u201d in such a way as to render his confession the product of official coercion. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6 20, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (quoting Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602), 81 S.Ct. 1860. \u201c[W]e review the entire record and the circumstances under which the statement or confession was made in order to make an independent determination of whether a defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary.\u201d State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 298, 901 P.2d 708, 716 (1995).\n{7} Sanders finds support for his contention that his confession was coerced in State v. Aguirre: \u201cFor a confession to be voluntary, it must not have been extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exercise of any improper influence.\u201d 91 N.M. 672, 675, 579 P.2d 798, 801 (Ct.App.1978). Sanders contends that the language \u201chowever slight\u201d means that the FBI\u2019s warning him about the threat on his life and offering to speak to the United States\u2019s Attorney on his behalf were improper inducements. However, the Court of Appeals, in Aguirre, analyzed the police officer\u2019s promise not to prosecute on other charges in the context of the totality of the circumstances. The Court in Aguirre expressly states, \u201c[the] promise was no more than an additional factor for the trial court to consider, as a part of the totality of the circumstances, in deciding whether the confession was voluntary.\u201d 91 N.M. at 675, 579 P.2d at 801. Therefore, contrary to creating a per se rule as advanced by Sanders, the existence of promises or threats of violence is but one factor to be considered in analyzing the totality of the circumstances.\n{8} Additionally, the expansive language relied on by Sanders from Aguirre originated in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). The United States Supreme Court has expressly departed from the standard set forth in Bram, stating, \u201cit is clear that this passage from Bram, ... under current precedent does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession----\u201d Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285, 111 S.Ct. 1246; see also State v. Broadaway, 133 Wash.2d 118, 942 P.2d 363, 371 (1997) (recognizing that the test from Bram \u201cis not the correct test of voluntariness\u201d); Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 709 A.2d 879, 883 (1998) (\u201cThe United States Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the quoted passage from Bram is not the correct standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession, instead the totality of the circumstances determine voluntariness.\u201d). Moreover, other pre-Fulminante cases citing this broad language from Bram have generally applied it in the context of the totality of circumstances, as the Court of Appeals did in Aguirre. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 242 (1st Cir.1990) (recognizing that although Bram has not been overruled, it has been modified; any threats or promises are reviewed as part of the totality of the circumstances); United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir.1988) (\u201c[Bram] does not establish a per se rule; a review of the totality of the circumstances is still required[.]\u201d); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 608 (3rd.Cir.1986) (stating that the Bram test \u201chas not been interpreted as a per se proscription against promises made during interrogation\u201d); United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d. Cir.1967) (relying upon totality of the circumstances and observing that the Bram \u201clanguage has never been applied with the wooden literalness urged upon us by appellant.\u201d).\n{9} Therefore, Sanders\u2019 reliance on Aguirre for proposition that \u201cany sort of threats or violence\u201d or \u201cany direct or implied promises, however slight\u201d operates to render a confession involuntary is not a proper articulation of the applicable law. 91 N.M. at 675, 579 P.2d at 801. Because Sanders asserts that both a promise and a threat of violence induced his confession, for clarity of analysis, we will discuss each factor independently and then evaluate the totality of the circumstances.\nA.\n{10} Sanders claims that Special Agent Pittman\u2019s promise to inform the United States Attorney about his cooperation with the FBI investigation was sufficient to induce his confession. However, numerous courts have held that merely promising to bring a defendant\u2019s cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor is not objectionable. See United States v. Lewis, 24 F.3d 79, 82 (10th Cir.1994) (\u201cThat type of limited assurance [informing U.S. Attorney of cooperation] does not taint ensuing statements as involuntary.\u201d); United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.1988) (\u201cAn interrogating agent\u2019s promise to inform the government prosecutor about a suspect\u2019s cooperation does not render a subsequent statement involuntary, even when it is accompanied by a promise to recommend leniency or by speculation that cooperation will have a positive effect.\u201d); United States v. Brandon, 633 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir.1980) (\u201cWe reject the defendant\u2019s contention that the agents\u2019 promise to bring the fact of Bracelin\u2019s cooperation to the attention of the United States Attorney and to recommend leniency, and Bracelin\u2019s expectation of it, constituted coercion.\u201d); United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1978) (\u201cNeither is a statement that the accused\u2019s cooperation will be made known to the court a sufficient inducement so as to render a subsequent incriminating statement involuntary.\u201d); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure \u00a7 6.2(c), at 454 (1999) (\u201cMerely promising to bring defendant\u2019s cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor is not objectionable, nor is a promise that if defendant confessed the prosecutor would discuss leniency.\u201d) (footnote and emphasis omitted). Based on this reasoning, we hold that the mere offer to communicate a defendant\u2019s cooperation to the prosecutor, absent other coercive conduct, is not objectionable.\nB.\n{11} Sanders also asserts that the threat on his life induced his confession. However, the FBI did not originate the threat, but merely communicated it to Sanders. Accordingly, we must consider whether the mere communication of a threat made by a third person can constitute sufficient state coercion to render the resulting confession involuntary.\n{12} Sanders relies on State v. Foster, 25 N.M. 361, 183 P. 397 (1919), and State v. Benavidez, 87 N.M. 223, 531 P.2d 957 (Ct.App.1975), for the proposition that the threat need not originate with the state actor. Neither Foster nor Benavidez can be read to support Sanders\u2019 contention. Neither Foster nor Benavidez concerned threats made by third persons and whether those threats could constitute police coercion. Instead, the issue in both Foster and Benavidez was whether the individual making a promise of leniency appeared to have the authority to make that promise, and whether the promise expressed by that person could constitute sufficient coercion to render the confession involuntary. See Foster, 25 N.M. at 364, 183 P. at 398; Benavidez, 87 N.M. at 226, 531 P.2d at 960. Both Foster and Benavidez dealt with promises of leniency, not threats, made by third parties. Id. As such, we conclude that neither Foster nor Benavidez support Sanders\u2019 claim.\n{13} Despite Sanders\u2019 misguided citations to Foster and Benavidez, we have found some support for his contention in Federal jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court indirectly addressed the issue of whether the threat need originate with government officials in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958). In Payne, the defendant was suspected in the brutal killing of a local businessman. 356 U.S. at 562-63, 78 S.Ct. 844. The defendant was arrested without a warrant and in addition to numerous other improprieties, he was also told by the chief of police that there was an angry mob outside waiting for him. The Supreme Court found the communication of the mob threat particularly relevant, stating: \u201cIt seems obvious from the totality of this course of conduct, and particularly the culminating threat of mob violence, that the confession was coerced and did not constitute an \u2018expression of free choice.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 567, 78 S.Ct. 844 (footnote and quoted authority omitted). Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the communication of that threat, combined with the other circumstances, was sufficient to hold the confession involuntary.\n{14} The United States Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of whether the threats of violence need to originate from the government officials in Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). In Fulminante the defendant was incarcerated in a federal prison in New York. Id. at 282, 111 S.Ct. 1246. During his incarceration, he was receiving \u201ctough treatment and whatnot\u201d from the other inmates because of a rumor that he had killed his stepdaughter in Arizona. Id. at 283, 111 S.Ct. 1246. Another inmate and a paid informer for the FBI, offered protection from the other inmates if Fulminante told him about the murder in Arizona. Fulminante confessed, and that confession was used against him at his trial in Arizona for the murder of his stepdaughter. Id. at 284, 111 S.Ct. 1246. In ruling that the confession was involuntary, the United States Supreme Court stated, \u201cOur eases have made clear that a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient.\u201d Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court found that the \u201ccredible threat\u201d from the prison population, when combined with the offer of protection, was sufficient to overbear Fulminante\u2019s will and render his confession the product of official coercion. See id. Therefore, in Fulminante the United States Supreme Court found the confession coerced even where the state did not originate the threat, but merely capitalized on it to induce Fulminante\u2019s confession.\n{15} Other courts have followed Fulminante\u2019s pronouncement that the communication of a credible threat is sufficient to operate as official coercion. See United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1101 (10th Cir.1996) (finding a \u201ccredible threat\u201d of violence from drug organization); United States v. Heatley, 994 F.Supp. 477, 483 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (recognizing that \u201ca confession induced by a credible threat of physical violence to the suspect, combined with a government promise of protection conditioned upon the suspect\u2019s confession, can be considered involuntary\u201d); Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944, 948 (Ind.Sup.Ct.1998) (\u201cIt was irrelevant whether the threat came from a government agent or a third party\u201d but deciding that confession was not coerced); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 645 A.2d 82, 86 (1994) (\u201cAdmittedly, some courts have found confessions involuntary in cases where state agents said they would not protect the defendant from a credible threat of imminent harm from a third person unless the defendant confessed.\u201d).\n{16} Based on this precedent, we conclude that a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent, and we follow the United States Supreme Court\u2019s determination that a credible threat of physical violence from a third party may be sufficient to render a confession involuntary. However, we hold that the communication of a credible threat of violence to a defendant is but one factor to be considered when conducting an examination into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.\nC.\n{17} In this case, based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Special Agent Pittman communicated a credible threat to Sanders of violence from the drug organization. However, where the FBI made no offer of protection in exchange for Sanders\u2019 cooperation and all of the other circumstances support the voluntariness of the confession, we hold that Sanders\u2019 confession was voluntary and properly admitted by the district court.\n{18} There is nothing in the record which indicates that Sanders did not fully understand what he was doing when he gave his confession. He is a middle-aged individual with a high school education. There is nothing in the record to suggest that his mental faculties were in any way impaired on the day he gave his confession. Sanders makes no showing that his depression rose to a debilitating level, such that he was unable to make an informed, knowing decision. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959), for the proposition that as interrogators have turned to psychological persuasion, \u201ccourts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the Voluntariness\u2019 calculus.\u201d). Although Sanders may have been depressed, this did not inhibit his ability to carry on with day-to-day activities or to hold down employment, as evidenced by his ability to fight the fire in June with no problems.\n{19} We also can find no wrongdoing in the conduct of the FBI agents in this case. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that \u201ccoercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not Voluntary\u2019 \u201d); see also State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 299, 901 P.2d 708, 717 (1995) (adopting Colorado v. Connelly and holding the \u201ctotality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching\u201d). Special Agent Pittman clearly identified himself as a law enforcement officer both during his initial visit to the feed store and in all subsequent conversations with Sanders. Therefore, Special Agent Pittman\u2019s status and role were clearly known to Sanders. There is no allegation that the agents invented the threat on Sanders\u2019 life as a pretext for communication or otherwise used trickery or deceit. Special Agent Pittman did not make an offer of protection contingent on Sanders\u2019 confession. There was no quid pro quo in this case.\n{20} We also find no wrongdoing on the part of the agents in offering to inform the U.S. Attorney of Sanders\u2019 cooperation. This is especially true considering that Special Agent Pittman clearly communicated to Sanders that he was unable to make any promises to Sanders, and Sanders responded that he \u201crealized that.\u201d\n{21} We find it significant that Sanders initiated the telephone conversation to which he now objects. He was under no obligation to return Special Agent Pittman\u2019s call, and he was free to terminate the conversation at any time. Furthermore, it is significant that during the initial conversation, it was Sanders who volunteered his cooperation by stating, \u201cOkay, would it help you all in the investigation if I cooperated any at all?\u201d Sanders was not taken into custody and the interview took place at a neutral location. Sanders was under no obligation to meet the officers at the Super 8 Motel. He was not picked up by the officers but was driven there by his father and girlfriend. See e.g. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6\u00b6 28-32, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847, (discussing coercive effect of atmosphere of the interview). There is also no allegation that Sanders was mistreated in any way.\n{22} It is impossible for this Court to fully understand what convinced Sanders to cooperate with the FBI, but based on a totality of the circumstances, we do not believe that the officers coerced Sanders\u2019 confession. In this case, it appeal\u2019s that Sanders was motivated to cooperate for reasons that had nothing to do with any improper police conduct. Sanders stated during the initial conversation with Agent Pittman that, \u201cthis has been in the back of my head, bugging me for probably a year.\u201d After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Sanders\u2019 confession was voluntary and properly admitted in the district court.\nIII.\n{23} Sanders claims that the district court\u2019s failure to submit his proffered instructions regarding the voluntariness of his confession constitutes reversible error. However, we believe that the jury was properly instructed on the voluntariness of Sanders\u2019 confession. The jury was instructed regarding the admission of a confession according to UJI 14-5040 NMRA 2000:\nEvidence has been admitted concerning a statement allegedly made by Richard Sanders. Before you consider any such statement for any purpose, you must determine that the statement was given voluntarily. In determining whether a statement was voluntarily given, you should consider if it was freely made and not induced by promise or threat.\nAt Sanders\u2019 request, the jury also received an instruction that defined both \u201cpromise\u201d and \u201cthreat.\u201d The instructions given in this case were not erroneous, vague, nor contradictory. See State v. Parish, 118 N.M. 39, 41-42, 878 P.2d 988, 990-91 (1994). The four other instructions proffered by Sanders regarding the voluntariness of the confession were cumulative and would have given undue emphasis to the Defendant\u2019s theory of the case. See State v. Sparks, 102 N.M. 317, 324, 694 P.2d 1382, 1389 (Ct.App.1985). We hold that the jury was properly instructed in this case.\nIV.\n{24} Sanders alleges the trial court erred by denying his motion to monitor the jury culling process. The culling process is the stage in which the judge or designee disqualifies or exempts prospective jurors pursuant to the statutory exemptions contained in NMSA 1978, \u00a7 38-5-1 (1991) and NMSA 1978, \u00a7 38-5-ll(B) (1991). A defendant\u2019s right to be present during this process was recently addressed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Huff, 1998-NMCA-075, 125 N.M. 254, 960 P.2d 342. We are persuaded by the Court of Appeals\u2019 reasoning in Huff:\nDefendant\u2019s presence would not impact the process. Defendant has no statutory authority to participate in this process, and, unlike the process of challenging potential jurors where Defendant may be able to discern some bias or prejudice, defendant can provide no special insight into the removal of jurors from the pool who are disqualified or excused on statutory grounds. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 38-5-1 (1991).\nId. at \u00b6 31; see also \u00a7 38-5-ll(B) (setting forth the statutory exemptions available for prospective jurors.). The reasoning in Huff is particularly convincing when viewed with Section 38-5-11(C), which allows the inspection and copying of both the certified list and the questionnaires of the panel members. See \u00a7 38-5-ll(C) (\u201cThe certified list of jurors and the questionnaires obtained from jurors shall be made available for inspection and copying by any party to any pending proceeding or their attorney or to any person having good cause for access to the list and the questionnaires.\u201d). Access to these records coupled with the ability to voir dire the potential jury members for his trial on the information contained therein is all that is statutorily required and all that we think is appropriate.\nV.\n{25} We hold that the district judge properly denied the motion to suppress Sanders\u2019 confession and the motion to monitor the jury culling process. We also hold that the jury was properly instructed on the voluntariness of Sanders\u2019 confession. Therefore, we affirm.\n{26} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMINZNER, C.J., FRANCHINI, SERNA, and MAES, JJ., concur.\n. Sanders was also convicted of the following: conspiracy to commit first degree murder contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-28-2 (1979) and Section 30-2-1; false imprisonment contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-4-3 (1963); conspiracy to commit false imprisonment contrary to Section 30-28-2 and Section 30-4-3; and accessory to aggravated battery contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-3-5(0 (1969) and NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-1-13 (1972).\n. Aguirre cites to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), which in turn cites to Bram.\n. The United States Supreme Court described the defendant and the circumstances of his confession as \"a mentally dull 19-year-old youth [who], (1) was arrested without a warrant, (2) was denied a hearing before a magistrate at which he would have been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel, as required by Arkansas statutes, (3) was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel, (4) was held incommunicado for three days, without counsel, advisor or friend. and though members of his family tried to see him they were turned away, and he was refused permission to make even one telephone call, (5) was denied food for long periods, and, finally, (6) was told by the chief of police \u2018that there would be 30 or 40 people there in a few minutes that wanted to get him,' which statement created such fear in petitioner as immediately produced the \u2018confession.\u2019 \u201d Payne, 356 U.S. at 567, 78 S.Ct. 844.", "type": "majority", "author": "BACA, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Systems of Las Cruces, P.A., Anthony F. Avallone, Radium Springs, NM, for Appellant.", "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "13 P.3d 460\n2000-NMSC-032\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. SANDERS a/k/a Eddie Sanders, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 25,569.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nOct. 19, 2000.\nLaw Systems of Las Cruces, P.A., Anthony F. Avallone, Radium Springs, NM, for Appellant.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0728-01", "first_page_order": 762, "last_page_order": 770 }