{
  "id": 352299,
  "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. James SUNDEEN, Defendant-Respondent",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sundeen",
  "decision_date": "2001-01-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 26,034",
  "first_page": "83",
  "last_page": "84",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "130 N.M. 83"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "17 P.3d 1019"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "2001-NMSC-006"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M.",
    "id": 8835,
    "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "387 N.W.2d 315",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        10654022
      ],
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "319",
          "parenthetical": "explaining that as between the general definition of a \"felony\" and the definition of \"felony\" provided in the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, the latter controls in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a felon"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nw2d/387/0315-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 323,
    "char_count": 6365,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.709,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.364012536165934e-08,
      "percentile": 0.2739584431370323
    },
    "sha256": "298d5be982471d0f34e769e637c51f5f1f8f74eca8bb99b5f112c1477a3aa009",
    "simhash": "1:261d4711d459ae31",
    "word_count": 1031
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:26.853949+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "SERNA, C.J., BACA, FRANCHINI, MINZNER, and MAES, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. James SUNDEEN, Defendant-Respondent."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nPER CURIAM\n{1} The State appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss an indictment. State v. Sundeen, No. 20,245, slip. op. (NMCA Oct. 20, 1999). We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and adopt the text of that decision, which reads as follows:\nDefendant was charged with violating NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-16 (1987), which makes it unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment arguing that he was not a felon in any sense of the word or for any purpose. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion, but granted his application for interlocutory appeal to resolve the question whether Defendant could be considered a felon for purposes of Section 30-7-16 when he was previously convicted in Colorado of two crimes classified by Colorado as misdemeanors, when the punishment for one of these misdemeanors may include imprisonment for one year, and when Defendant was sentenced to eighteen months of probation and a sixty-day suspended jail sentence. We conclude that Defendant should not be considered a felon under Section 30-7-16, and that the indictment against him should be dismissed.\nDefendant was convicted of a crime classified by Colorado as a misdemeanor, but for which Colorado authorized a penalty of one-year imprisonment. See Colo.Rev. Stat. \u00a7 18-1-106(1) (1998) (authorizing a maximum of twelve-months imprisonment for class two misdemeanor); Colo Rev. Stat. \u00a7 18-3-303 (1998) (defining false imprisonment as a class 2 misdemeanor). The question before us is whether Defendant\u2019s conviction of Colorado\u2019s crime of false imprisonment is a felony for purposes of New Mexico\u2019s statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. The statute itself defines \u201cfelon\u201d as a person \u201cconvicted ... [by a state court] to a sentence of death or one or more years imprisonment.\u201d Section 30-7-16(0(2). Defendant and the State dispute whether this definition requires conviction of a crime for which a sentence of one or more years imprisonment is authorized or whether this definition requires both conviction and sentence to one or more years imprisonment.\nThe State urges us to read the language of Section 30-7-16(0(2) as though it mirrored the general definition of a felony. According to the Criminal Code, \u201c[a] crime is a felony ... if upon conviction thereof a sentence of death or of imprisonment for a term of one year or more is authorized.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-l-6(A) (1963). If we were to read the statute this way, Defendant\u2019s indictment would stand because a defendant convicted of false imprisonment in Colorado, as was Defendant in this case, may be sentenced to one-year imprisonment. See Colo.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 18-1-106(1); Colo Rev. Stat. \u00a7 18-3-303. This would be the outcome even though Defendant was only sentenced to a sixty-day suspended jail sentence in Colorado.\nWe decline to interpret the language of Section 30-7-16(0(2) as though it were the same as the general definition of \u201cfelony.\u201d When the Legislature has gone to the trouble of providing a specific definition within the section establishing a crime, we understand the Legislature to mean that the specific definition controls for purposes of that crime. See Saadiq v. Iowa, 387 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Iowa 1986) (explaining that as between the general definition of a \u201cfelony\u201d and the definition of \u201cfelony\u201d provided in the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, the latter controls in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a felon). Therefore, we conclude that a felon for purposes of this crime is one who is convicted to a sentence of one or more years imprisonment. See \u00a7 30-7-16(0(2).\nWe also conclude that the plain language of this definition requires the State to prove that Defendant was convicted and sentenced to a year or more imprisonment for the underlying offense in order to convict Defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm. The language \u201cconvicted to a sentence of\u2019 requires us to look at the sentence imposed, not the maximum sentence authorized by statute. Had the Legislature intended the maximum sentence authorized to apply in this type of case, it could have employed more specific language, as it did in the general criminal definition of a felony. See \u00a7 30-l-6(A) (defining \u201cfelony\u201d as a crime for which \u201ca sentence of death or of imprisonment for a term of one year or more is authorized \u201d) (emphasis added). We presume the Legislature understood and intended the difference between the language of each of these sections.\nOur conclusion that the language of Section 30-7-16(C)(2) requires the imposition of a sentence of one or more years, and not just the authority to impose such a sentence, is bolstered by the Supreme Court\u2019s recent change in the uniform jury instruction, which now requires proof that a defendant was actually sentenced to prison for a year or more. Compare UJI 14-701 NMRA 1999 (\u201cThe defendant ... was convicted and sentenced to one or more years imprisonment.\u201d) with UJI 14-701 NMRA 1998 (\u201cThe defendant was previously convicted of the crime of____\u201d). Although a change in an instruction would normally indicate a change in the law, that is not true in this case. Here, the Legislature did not amend the statute in 1998 or 1999. Therefore, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision to amend the instruction must reflect its belief that the new instruction more accurately reflects the Legislature\u2019s intention in enacting the statute.\nBecause we conclude that Section 30-7-16(0(2) requires Defendant to have been convicted and sentenced to a year or more imprisonment, and because Defendant was only sentenced to eighteen months probation and a sixty-day suspended sentence, Defendant cannot be considered a felon under the statute. Therefore, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the indictment.\n{2} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nSERNA, C.J., BACA, FRANCHINI, MINZNER, and MAES, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Patricia Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.",
      "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Nancy M. Hewitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "2001-NMSC-006\n17 P.3d 1019\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. James SUNDEEN, Defendant-Respondent.\nNo. 26,034.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJan. 30, 2001.\nPatricia Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Nancy M. Hewitt, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0083-01",
  "first_page_order": 121,
  "last_page_order": 122
}