{ "id": 352321, "name": "James W. OTTINO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dana D. OTTINO, Respondent-Appellant; Amanda J. Ottino and Dana D. Winters (formerly Ottino), Petitioners-Appellants, v. James W. Ottino, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Ottino v. Ottino", "decision_date": "2000-04-28", "docket_number": "No. 20,153", "first_page": "168", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.M. 168" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "21 P.3d 37" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2001-NMCA-012" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 N.M. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "953 P.2d 1089", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.M. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 18707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ariz. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1544616 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" }, { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/167/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "Montgomery, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "Montgomery, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582944 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "holding district court not bound by parties' marriage settlement agreement" }, { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "holding district court not bound by parties' marriage settlement agreement" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731550 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" }, { "page": "1003" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586467 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "\"A separation agreement is binding on the parties, but is subject to such action as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 P.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "looking to intent of parties and court to determine whether parties' marriage settlement agreement merged with court's divorce decree" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Wash.App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 460599 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "looking to intent of parties and court to determine whether parties' marriage settlement agreement merged with court's divorce decree" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/24/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590293 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "Montgomery, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "Montgomery, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557137 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "\"Although the cause of action may be merged into the judgment, the debt may be earned forward to prevent the destruction of contract rights.\"" }, { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "\"Although the cause of action may be merged into the judgment, the debt may be earned forward to prevent the destruction of contract rights.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 N.M. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1581983 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/54/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.W.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11686405 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/585/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 F.2d 987", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3672717 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "991" }, { "page": "991", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/151/0987-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2822217 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "noting \"a long recognized rule\" that marriage settlement agreements \"are highly favored in the law\"" }, { "page": "793", "parenthetical": "noting \"a long recognized rule\" that marriage settlement agreements \"are highly favored in the law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727713 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "\"[A] voluntary property settlement between divorcing spouses, dividing their community property as they see fit, is sacrosanct[.]\"" }, { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "\"[A] voluntary property settlement between divorcing spouses, dividing their community property as they see fit, is sacrosanct[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720276 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "1329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5338119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "addressing appeal of actions in divorce decree joined with \"three additional counts sounding in tort\"" }, { "page": "994", "parenthetical": "addressing appeal of actions in divorce decree joined with \"three additional counts sounding in tort\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N.M. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 142260 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597228 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M, 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588679 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500", "parenthetical": "recognizing rule that a statute is not to be construed in such a manner that renders it unconstitutional" }, { "page": "1131", "parenthetical": "recognizing rule that a statute is not to be construed in such a manner that renders it unconstitutional" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5360404 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5326129 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103-04", "parenthetical": "reinforcing holding of Fellows v. Shultz, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141 (1970), that legislature's attempt to remove proceeding from jurisdiction of administrative agency to that of district courts violated separation of powers doctrine" }, { "page": "501-02", "parenthetical": "reinforcing holding of Fellows v. Shultz, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141 (1970), that legislature's attempt to remove proceeding from jurisdiction of administrative agency to that of district courts violated separation of powers doctrine" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "recognizing certain statutory \"interference in the original jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction is constitutionally impermissible\"" }, { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "recognizing certain statutory \"interference in the original jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction is constitutionally impermissible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 N.M. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571415 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "933" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[Such argument] would make jurisdiction turn on the underlying validity vel non of a claim-the very question to be determined by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/41/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590285 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 399, 69 P.2d 931, 933 (1937)" }, { "page": "1254", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 399, 69 P.2d 931, 933 (1937)" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "1254", "parenthetical": "questioning whether distinction between court's subject matter jurisdiction and its authority to decide a matter before it \"serves any useful purpose\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5367830 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827361 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594909 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2740534 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322250 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568816 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" }, { "page": "710" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Whether an agreement to support can be enforced under a contractual theory is not an issue here.... \"" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "710", "parenthetical": "'We do not believe, however, that the subject matter jurisdiction of the court can be extended by agreement of the parties.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568807 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" }, { "page": "1174" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "1174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 N.M. 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 834236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559026 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "84" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "84" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588659 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "783" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "783" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "783", "parenthetical": "reversing trial court's \"ordering the parties jointly responsible for the post-minority education of their child\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1158, "char_count": 23516, "ocr_confidence": 0.704, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0062843156227626e-07, "percentile": 0.743668839380211 }, "sha256": "87fba770c5eb70d103b363b56f7bdbcaeb17981bd6681ce075b3e0722eca0a5c", "simhash": "1:9b4b4d6afa1b9726", "word_count": 3789 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:26.853949+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Judge, MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge." ], "parties": [ "James W. OTTINO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dana D. OTTINO, Respondent-Appellant. Amanda J. Ottino and Dana D. Winters (formerly Ottino), Petitioners-Appellants, v. James W. Ottino, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nARMIJO, Judge.\n{1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine the district court's authority, when sitting as a family court, to enforce that portion of a marriage settlement agreement which provides for post-minority child support of an emancipated child. This appeal implicates two questions. The central question concerns the effect NMSA 1978, \u00a7 40-4-7 (1901, as amended through 1993) has on the district court's original jurisdiction. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the parties\u2019 agreement to provide for post-minority support is enforceable. We reverse and remand the decision of the district court, concluding that it can enforce the contested provision in contract.\nFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n{2} James Ottino and Dana Ottino (now Dana Winters) married in July 1984. At the time of their wedding, Dana\u2019s daughter, Amanda, was five years of age. In 1987, James adopted Amanda, assuming parental rights and obligations as to her support. In 1990, James petitioned for divorce, and he and Dana shortly thereafter entered into a \u201cStipulation and Property Settlement Agreement,\u201d or marriage settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA provided for the distribution of community assets, as well as for James\u2019 payments for Dana\u2019s and Amanda\u2019s support. The MSA also provided that Dana and James would split equally the costs of Amanda\u2019s college education:\n7. Petitioner [James] is deemed to be contractually bound to assist with the college education of AMANDA J. OTTINO. The term \u201cassist\u201d contemplates that he will be obligated to pay an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the cost of education of said child as an in[-]state resident in a New Mexico public college or university. The obligation for such assistance shall terminate at the bachelors [sic] degree level.\n{3} Amanda graduated high school in 1997 and attended her first year of college at New Mexico Junior College, as an in-state resident, during the 1997-1998 academic year. James since refused to pay any amount to offset the costs of Amanda\u2019s college education.\n{4} In 1998, Dana and Amanda filed suit in the District Court of Lea County, seeking to enforce what they claim to be James\u2019 contractual obligation to pay half of Amanda\u2019s education-related expenses. James moved the district court to dismiss the action, however, arguing that jurisdiction over the matter \u201crests exclusively within the subject matter, [sic] jurisdiction and venue to the Second Judicial District.\u201d That court granted James\u2019 motion. Dana and Amanda did not appeal this ruling; instead, they filed a new action in the District Court for the Second Judicial District. Dana sued on her own behalf, as a party to the contract; Amanda sued as a third-party beneficiary of the contract. Here, too, James challenged the jurisdiction of the court, arguing that the Second District had no jurisdiction to enforce a divorce decree that provided post-minority support, that is, support to be paid on Amanda\u2019s behalf subsequent to her emancipation at eighteen years of age. James prevailed; Dana and Amanda now appeal from the second dismissal of their action against James.\nDISCUSSION\n{5} Under the relevant statute in effect at the time of the entry of the divorce decree between James and Dana, the district court could, as a general matter, only order child support attendant to a divorce decree \u201cso long as the children remain[ed] minors.\u201d Section 40-4-7(F) (1993); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 100 N.M. 102, 104, 666 P.2d 781, 783 (1983). However, in addition to its statutory authority, the district court possesses the separate and constitutionally vested authority to enforce contracts. See Marchman v. NCNB Texas Nat\u2019l Bank, 120 N.M. 74, 84, 898 P.2d 709, 719 (1995). The litigants\u2019 dispute, then, presents two issues pertaining to the district court\u2019s authority to enforce the provision at issue in this appeal. First, does Section 40-4-7 preclude the court from enforcing a contract between the parents as to the provision of post-minority child support? Second, has the underlying agreement so merged with the final divorce decree that the contractual nature of the post-minority support provision of the MSA has lost legal viability separate from the court\u2019s order? We discuss each question in turn.\n1. Section 40-4r-7 and the District Court\u2019s Jurisdiction\n{6} Whether the district court is possessed of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a question of law that we review de novo. See Harrell v. Hayes, 1998 NMCA122, \u00b6 11, 125 N.M. 814, 965 P.2d 933. Our district courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See Sanchez v. Attorney Gen., 93 N.M. 210, 214, 598 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Ct.App. 1979). As such, they enjoy the \u201cpresumption of jurisdiction, in the absence of proof to the contrary.\u201d Marchman, 120 N.M. at 84, 898 P.2d at 719.\n{7} Our Constitution vests adjudicative powers in the district court. It provides \u201c[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted in this constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law.\u201d N.M. Const, art. VI, \u00a7 13. Thus, the district court is possessed of two forms of jurisdiction: original and statutory. The parties rest their arguments on the distinction between these two bases of jurisdiction.\n{8} For example, Dana and Amanda emphasize the contractual basis of their claim for post-minority support; that is, they seek to invoke the district court\u2019s original jurisdiction to enforce the contested provision on a contract theory. See Marchman, 120 N.M. at 84, 898 P.2d at 719; Sanchez, 93 N.M. at 214, 598 P.2d at 1174 (\u201cThe \u2018original jurisdiction\u2019 of N.M. Const., art. VI, \u00a7 13, that is, the general jurisdiction of the district courts, covers those matters known \u2018to the common law and equity practice of England prior to 1776.\u2019 \u201d (citation omitted.))\n{9} James, on the other hand, asserts the statutory nature of the court\u2019s independent authority to order child support, an authority that, as we have noted, was valid under the statute\u2019s former wording only until a child reached majority. See \u00a7 40-4-7(F); see also Christiansen, 100 N.M. at 104, 666 P.2d at 783. He argues that given the statutory limitation on the district court\u2019s power to order child support incident to a divorce, a court is also without power to enforce any contractual agreement for post-minority support. In so arguing, he primarily relies upon Spingola v. Spingola, 93 N.M. 598, 600, 603 P.2d 708, 710 (1979). We are not persuaded by James\u2019 reasoning.\n{10} In Spingola, our Supreme Court held that the district court is without jurisdiction to order, of its own authority, post-minority child support. In so holding, however, it expressly refrained from deciding the question now before this Court. See id. (\u201cWhether an agreement to support can be enforced under a contractual theory is not an issue here.... \u201d). Accordingly, it is not binding precedent in the present case. See Bogle Farms, Inc. v. Baca, 1996 NMSC 051, \u00b6\u00b6 19-20, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184; Zarges v. Zarges, 79 N.M. 494, 496, 445 P.2d 97, 99 (1968).\n{11} Nor are other opinions binding which merely reinforce the Court\u2019s basic holding in Spingola; that is, that the district court cannot order, of its ovm authority, the parties to provide post-minority child support. See, e.g., Christiansen, 100 N.M. at 104, 666 P.2d at 783 (reversing trial court\u2019s \u201cordering the parties jointly responsible for the post-minority education of their child\u201d); Dillard v. Dillardi 104 N.M. 763, 766, 727 P.2d 71, 74 (Ct.App.1986) (reversing trial court\u2019s \u201cestablishing a trust which provided for the parties\u2019 children\u2019s post-minority education\u201d). These cases did not address the court\u2019s authority to enforce contracts for post-minority child support; they involved the district court\u2019s imposition of such obligations. Indeed, this Court has enforced marriage settlement agreements, although not those dealing with post-minority child support, under a contract theory. See Herrera v. Herrera, 1999-NMCA-034, \u00b6 9, 126 N.M. 705, 974 P.2d 675. We see no reason why a contract, if valid, for post-minority support cannot be similarly enforced.\n{12} Nonetheless, James would have us emphasize the Court\u2019s comment in Spingola that parties cannot, by agreement, extend the district court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction. See Spingola, 93 N.M. at 600, 603 P.2d at 710 (\u2018We do not believe, however, that the subject matter jurisdiction of the court can be extended by agreement of the parties.\u201d). Of course, there can be no dispute regarding that basic observation of black-letter law. See State ex rel. Overton v. New Mexico State Tax Comm\u2019n, 81 N.M. 28, 31, 462 P.2d 613, 616 (1969). However, such argument turns the question now before us on its head.\n{13} The question in this ease is not whether the parties can extend the court\u2019s jurisdiction by agreement, but whether the court has jurisdiction over an agreement of the parties, ancillary to a final divorce decree. In effect, James is arguing that the district court has no jurisdiction because there is no contract; however, whether or not an enforceable contract exists is the precise question presented to the district court. In an analogous context, Justice Montgomery once observed:\nThis Court has repeatedly noted that the jurisdiction of a district court does not depend on how the court decides a contested issue submitted to it; the test \u201cis whether or not it had power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion ... was right or wrong.\u201d\nSundance Mechanical & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 109 N.M. 683, 687, 789 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1990) (quoting State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 399, 69 P.2d 931, 933 (1937)). In other words, James\u2019 argument goes more to the merits of Dana\u2019s and Amanda\u2019s claim than it does to the district court\u2019s jurisdiction. See id. (\u201c[Such argument] would make jurisdiction turn on the underlying validity vel non of a claim-the very question to be determined by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.\u201d).\n{14} Accordingly, we hold that the district court has the power, arising from its original jurisdiction over matters sounding in contract, to enforce valid agreements for post-minority support. As we have already noted, the district court\u2019s original jurisdiction arises from our state\u2019s constitution. See N.M. Const, art. VI, \u00a7 13. Therefore, absent a constitutional amendment, the court\u2019s jurisdiction cannot be limited by the Legislature\u2019s enactment of a statute. See N.M. Const, art. III, \u00a7 1; In re Guardianship of Arnall, 94 N.M. 306, 308, 610 P.2d 193, 195 (1980) (recognizing certain statutory \u201cinterference in the original jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction is constitutionally impermissible\u201d); cf. City of Hobbs v. State ex rel. Reynolds, 82 N.M. 102, 103-04, 476 P.2d 500, 501-02 (1970) (reinforcing holding of Fellows v. Shultz, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141 (1970), that legislature\u2019s attempt to remove proceeding from jurisdiction of administrative agency to that of district courts violated separation of powers doctrine). In this light, the statutory jurisdiction vested in our district courts for the purposes of crafting and entering orders of support upon divorce ought not to be viewed as a limitation upon the courts\u2019 original jurisdiction, but as an augment to it. See State v. Segotta, 100 N.M, 498, 500, 672 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1983) (recognizing rule that a statute is not to be construed in such a manner that renders it unconstitutional); State v. Jim, 107 N.M. 779, 783, 765 P.2d 195, 199 (Ct.App.1988) (same).\n{15} Contrary to James\u2019 arguments, our ease law identifies no reason why these separate bases of the district court\u2019s jurisdiction-original versus statutory-must operate each to the exclusion of the other. Cf. Sundance Mechanical, 109 N.M. at 687, 789 P.2d at 1254 (questioning whether distinction between court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction and its authority to decide a matter before it \u201cserves any useful purpose\u201d). For example, in Cohn v. Cohn, 1997 NMCA 011, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 8, 123 N.M. 85, 934 P.2d 279, this Court recognized a parent\u2019s common law duty to provide post-minority support to his severely disabled child. In so deciding, we implicitly recognized that the district court\u2019s independent bases of jurisdiction were not each exclusive of the other. Several other opinions provide examples of the district court\u2019s adjudicating cases in concurrent reliance upon separate bases of its jurisdiction. See Dunne v. Dunne, 83 N.M. 377, 377, 492 P.2d 994, 994 (1972) (addressing appeal of actions in divorce decree joined with \u201cthree additional counts sounding in tort\u201d); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 181, 812 P.2d 1320, 1329 (Ct.App.1991) (Donnelly & Chavez, JJ., specially concurring) (recognizing ability of spouse to join common law tort claim to divorce action); cf. Herrera, 126 N.M. 705, 974 P.2d 675, 1999 NMCA 034, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 13-17 (enforcing as contract, without discussing issues here presented, marriage settlement agreement).\n{16} We therefore conclude that any binding agreements made by a divorcing couple, which include terms in excess of what the court could order on its own, are enforceable in contract. Cf. Ruggles v. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 52, 70, 860 P.2d 182, 200 (1993) (\u201c[A] voluntary property settlement between divorcing spouses, dividing their community property as they see fit, is sacrosanct[.]\u201d); Unser v. Unser, 86 N.M. 648, 651, 526 P.2d 790, 793 (1974) (noting \u201ca long recognized rule\u201d that marriage settlement agreements \u201care highly favored in the law\u201d); Herrera, 126 N.M. 705, 974 P.2d 675, 1999 NMCA 034, \u00b6 18 (holding parties to bargained-for, yet unequal property division, where complaining party could prove no fraud or similar ground in equity to justify undoing agreement). In the present case, however, we must also decide whether any agreement of the parties, as to post-minority child support, survived the district court\u2019s entry of its final divorce decree.\n2. Merger of the Agreement and the Divorce Decree\n{17} James argues that no matter the district court\u2019s constitutional authority to enforce contracts, there is no contract to enforce because his and Dana\u2019s original agreement merged with the court\u2019s final divorce decree, and the legal vitality of any contract contained in the MSA was thereby destroyed. We are not persuaded by James\u2019 argument.\n{18} Merger is an equitable doctrine, premised upon the principles of res judicata. See Letcher County, Ky. v. DeFoe, 151 F.2d 987, 991 (6th Cir.1945) (\u201c[The doctrine of merger] is related to the principle of res judicata which precludes the relitigation of the same cause of action.\u201d); see also Risse v. Meeks, 585 N.W.2d 875, 880 (S.D.1998) (Konenkamp, J., concurring) (noting \u201cdoctrine of merger [is] inextricably related to principle of res judicata\u201d).\n{19} Generally, once an agreement between divorcing parties has been adopted and incorporated into the final divorce decree, the underlying agreement is deemed to have merged with the decree, extinguishing any independent right one of the parties might assert in contract. See Scanlon, 60 N.M. at 54, 287 P.2d at 246. However, this is not a rule to be blindly applied; as our Supreme Court has noted, \u201c[t]he doctrine of merger ... will not be carried any further than the ends of justice require.\u201d Tindall v. Bryan, 54 N.M. 114, 117, 215 P.2d 355, 357 (1950); see also Letcher County, Ky. v. DeFoe, 151 F.2d at 991 (same); Ruidoso State Bank v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 288, 290, 587 P.2d 435, 437 (1978) (\u201cAlthough the cause of action may be merged into the judgment, the debt may be earned forward to prevent the destruction of contract rights.\u201d); cf. Ballengee v. New Mexico Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 109 N.M. 423, 427, 786 P.2d 37, 41 (1990) (Montgomery, J., specially concurring) (\u2018\u201cEquity regards that as done which ought to be done.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence \u00a7 363 (5th ed.1941)). In the present ease, we conclude that the agreement between James and Dana as to Amanda\u2019s college education was not rendered unenforceable by its inclusion in the final divorce decree. We explain further.\n{20} First, to hold otherwise would be to violate James\u2019 and Amanda\u2019s clear intention in making the original agreement. See In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wash.App. 292, 600 P.2d 690, 694 (1979) (looking to intent of parties and court to determine whether parties\u2019 marriage settlement agreement merged with court\u2019s divorce decree); cf. Wolcott v. Wolcott, 101 N.M. 665, 669, 687 P.2d 100, 104 (Ct.App.1984) (resolving ambiguity regarding scope to which court\u2019s orders merged by inquiry into court\u2019s intent). In this regard, we note the parties\u2019 choice of language: \u201cPetitioner [James] is deemed to be contractually bound to assist with the college education of AMANDA J. OTTINO.\u201d This is the only provision in the MSA that the parties based explicitly upon a contract theory and indicates their clear intent to separate the incurred obligation from the rest of the court\u2019s order. While the court was without power to order post-minority support of its own authority, the intent demonstrated by the parties\u2019 choice of language is all the clearer with respect to the contractual obligation.\n{21} Second, to hold otherwise would exceed the purpose for merging marriage settlement agreements with divorce decrees generally. As noted above, the doctrine of merger is premised upon the doctrine of res judicata. That is, its purpose is to prevent the relitigation of decided issues. Such concern is not implicated in the present case. Moreover, we recognize that settlement agreements are typically merged with divorce decrees in order to bring the court\u2019s contempt powers to bear on defiant former spouses. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 114 N.M. 378, 386, 838 P.2d 995, 1003 (Ct.App.1992). Application of the merger doctrine in the present case would accomplish exactly the opposite result.\n{22} Finally, we emphasize that where application of the doctrine would operate to prevent the enforcement of a valid and recognized right, it need not be applied. See Tindall, 54 N.M. at 117, 215 P.2d at 357; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 26(l)(c) (1982) (recognizing exception to doctrine in instances where limitations upon court\u2019s jurisdiction would limit litigant\u2019s available relief). Here, to deem the contested post-minority child support agreement merged with the divorce decree would deprive the district court of jurisdiction over a separate and otherwise enforceable contract action. This would work undue prejudice against Dana and Amanda and would allow James to escape his obligation of his bargain.\n{23} Our holding today does not conflict with our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Scanlon. Therein, a former husband attempted to thwart his former wife\u2019s attempt to seek an increase in alimony payments by asserting a term in their marriage settlement agreement which provided that no term thereof could be modified without both parties\u2019 consent. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the underlying agreement had wholly merged with the district court\u2019s final divorce decree.\n{24} We distinguish Scanlon from the facts at bar. First, the Court announced no sweeping rule in that ease, concluding only \u201c[i]n the case at bar\u201d that the agreement had merged with the divorce decree. Id., 60 N.M. at 54, 287 P.2d at 246.\n{25} Second, and more importantly, we note that the Court\u2019s action was motivated primarily by the former husband\u2019s attempt \u201cto control the discretion of the district court of New Mexico.\u201d Id. at 49, 287 P.2d at 242. Compare Ferret v. Ferret, 55 N.M. 565, 574, 237 P.2d 594, 599 (1951) (holding district court not bound by parties\u2019 marriage settlement agreement), with Wolcott, 101 N.M. at 669, 687 P.2d at 104 (\u201cA separation agreement is binding on the parties, but is subject to such action as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate.\u201d). Our ruling today is motivated by a similar concern: We will not endorse by affirmance James\u2019 attempt to limit the district court\u2019s exercise of its original jurisdiction over matters sounding in contract by an overly mechanistic construction of jurisdiction, doctrine, and statute. See Ferret, 55 N.M. at 574, 237 P.2d at 599 (\u201cHence, the district court could not be denied its statutory powers in relation thereto.\u201d); cf. Lowe v. Bloom, 110 N.M. 555, 559, 798 P.2d 156, 160 (1990) (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (discussing jurisdiction as an \u201cintensely practical concept\u201d), cited favorably in Govich v. North Am. Sys., Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 230, 814 P.2d 94, 98 (1991); The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1033, (K.B. 1610) (\u201cJurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta, cum necessitate juris dicendi,\u201d which translates as: \u201cJurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.\u201d).\n{26} Our holding today is consistent not only with the approach adopted by a majority of other jurisdictions with statutes similar to ours, see, e.g., Solomon v. Findley, 167 Ariz. 409, 808 P.2d 294, 297 n. 2 (1991) (en banc), but is also consistent with our Legislature\u2019s recent amendment to Section 40-4-7(C) (providing by 1997 amendment that \u201c[t]he court may order and enforce the payment of support for the maintenance and education after high school of emancipated children of the marriage pursuant to a written agreement between the parties\u201d). We reference the amended version of Section 40-4-7, a provision that was not in effect at the time Dana\u2019s and Amanda\u2019s claim arose, as a persuasive expression of public policy. See Weidler v. Big J. Enters., Inc., 1998-NMCA-021, \u00b6 18, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 (\u201cOne source we look to for statements of public policy is legislation.\u201d).\nREMAINING ISSUE\n{27} James argues, as an alternative basis for affirming the district court\u2019s dismissal of this action, that we should hold that even if jurisdiction was proper to the district court over the agreement for post-minority support, there was no meeting of the minds such that the provision could be enforced. The district court, however, never reached the merits of the agreement between the parties, and we will not usurp the prerogative of the district court in this regard. We, accordingly, express no opinion as to the validity of the parties\u2019 agreement, remanding this question to the district court.\nCONCLUSION\n{28} For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the decision of the district court, remanding the matter for its full consideration of the merits.\n{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Judge, MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n. We are bound to apply the statute in effect at the time of the divorce, see Scanlon v. Scanlon, 60 N.M. 43, 49, 287 P.2d 238, 242 (1955), even though it was amended in 1997 to allow district courts to \"order and enforce the payment of support for the maintenance and education after high school of emancipated children of the marriage pursuant to a written agreement of the parties,\u201d Section 40-40-7(C) (1997).", "type": "majority", "author": "ARMIJO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven L. Tucker, Tucker Law Firm, P.C., Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants.", "Stephen J. Rhoades, Thompson, Kushner & Rhoades Lip, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2001-NMCA-012\n21 P.3d 37\nJames W. OTTINO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dana D. OTTINO, Respondent-Appellant. Amanda J. Ottino and Dana D. Winters (formerly Ottino), Petitioners-Appellants, v. James W. Ottino, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 20,153.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 28, 2000.\nCertiorari Granted, No. 26,827, March 23, 2001.\nSteven L. Tucker, Tucker Law Firm, P.C., Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants.\nStephen J. Rhoades, Thompson, Kushner & Rhoades Lip, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0168-01", "first_page_order": 206, "last_page_order": 212 }