{ "id": 352252, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Floyd WYNN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wynn", "decision_date": "2001-04-05", "docket_number": "No. 20,957", "first_page": "381", "last_page": "385", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.M. 381" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "24 P.3d 816" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2001-NMCA-020" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 Kan. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 192700 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/268/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720242 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 F.3d 1102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7415801 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/44/1102-01" ] }, { "cite": "844 S.W.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9995650 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/844/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 Pa.Super. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 901186 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that trial court's conclusion that defendant's testimony was \"self-serving\" no substitute for proof" }, { "page": "1223", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court's conclusion that defendant's testimony was \"self-serving\" no substitute for proof" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/409/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 A.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "holding that jury not permitted to infer from disbelief of defendant's testimony that facts denied by defendant are true" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Conn.App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. App.", "case_ids": [ 1967893 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that jury not permitted to infer from disbelief of defendant's testimony that facts denied by defendant are true" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn-app/14/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-112", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106533 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-066", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217103 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "noting that Jackson requires consideration of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining sufficiency of evidence in criminal ease" }, { "page": "867", "parenthetical": "noting that Jackson requires consideration of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining sufficiency of evidence in criminal ease" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that court conducting sufficiency of the evidence review does not attempt to scrutinize the reasoning process actually used by factfinder" }, { "parenthetical": "noting that court conducting sufficiency of the evidence review does not attempt to scrutinize the reasoning process actually used by factfinder" }, { "parenthetical": "noting that court conducting sufficiency of the evidence review does not attempt to scrutinize the reasoning process actually used by factfinder" }, { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" }, { "page": "1304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322297 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561263 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592839 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding \"unlawful touching\" element of battery established by evidence that defendant fired gun and that bullet perforated victim's necktie, creasing victim's shirt" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ind. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1756045 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding \"unlawful touching\" element of battery established by evidence that defendant fired gun and that bullet perforated victim's necktie, creasing victim's shirt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/233/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723296 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "citing with approval Stokes v. State, 233 Ind. 10, 115 N.E.2d 442 (1953) (holding \"unlawful touching\" element of battery established by evidence that defendant fired gun and that bullet perforated victim's necktie, creasing victim's shirt)" }, { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "citing with approval Stokes v. State, 233 Ind. 10, 115 N.E.2d 442 (1953) (holding \"unlawful touching\" element of battery established by evidence that defendant fired gun and that bullet perforated victim's necktie, creasing victim's shirt)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0437-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 704, "char_count": 11587, "ocr_confidence": 0.695, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7344222028916408e-07, "percentile": 0.7060123968617475 }, "sha256": "ab444c5add43a254d7c944d696308b2bf2b5513093707013ebb1c99f20532a79", "simhash": "1:d45d58629a785f7b", "word_count": 1877 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:26.853949+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge, CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Floyd WYNN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nALARID, Judge.\n{1} Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated battery on a household member. We reverse.\nWhether the State Proved a Touching or Application of Force\n{2} Defendant argues that the State was required to prove that he directly touched the victim\u2019s person or something attached to the victim\u2019s person. New Mexico defines aggravated battery against a household member as \u201cthe unlawful touching or application of force to the person of a household member with intent to injure that person or another.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-3-16(A) (1995) (emphasis added). In our view, the phrase \u201capplication of force\u201d clearly addresses the situation in which the defendant does not touch the victim himself, but instead, sets in motion a series of physical events ultimately resulting in the application of force to the victim. Most obviously, an \u201capplication of force to the person\u201d can occur without a direct touching when a defendant pulls the trigger of a gun, resulting in a violent chemical reaction generating a burst of high pressure gases which propel a bullet against or into the victim\u2019s person. See State v. Ortega, 113 N.M. 437, 440, 827 P.2d 152, 155 (Ct.App. 1992) (citing with approval Stokes v. State, 233 Ind. 10, 115 N.E.2d 442 (1953) (holding \u201cunlawful touching\u201d element of battery established by evidence that defendant fired gun and that bullet perforated victim\u2019s necktie, creasing victim\u2019s shirt)). We enforce a statute according to its plain meaning, unless to do so will lead to absurd or unreasonable results. State v. Wyrostek, 108 N.M. 140, 142, 767 P.2d 379, 381 (Ct.App.1988). Here, there was evidence that Defendant broke the kitchen window of the victim\u2019s apartment while the victim was standing in front of the window and that the victim was cut by a flying shard of glass. Applying the plain meaning of \u201capplication of force,\u201d we hold that Defendant\u2019s act of striking the window with sufficient force to propel the glass inward and against the victim constituted the application of force to the victim within the meaning of Section 30-3-16(A).\nSufficiency of the Evidence that Defendant Intended to Injure the Victim\n{3} Defendant argues that the State did not come forward with sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended either to apply force to the victim or to injure the victim. We agree.\n{4} Aggravated battery is a specific intent crime. State v. Fuentes, 119 N.M. 104, 106, 888 P.2d 986, 988 (Ct.App.1994). Proof that Defendant unreasonably disregarded the victim\u2019s safety is insufficient to establish specific intent to injure. Cf. UJI 14-133 NMRA 2001 (defining criminal negligence). To prove the specific intent required by Section 30-3-16(A), the State was required to prove that in striking the window Defendant subjectively intended the consequences of application of force to the victim and injury to the victim from that application of force. See State v. Brown, 1996 NMSC 073, \u00b6 22, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69 (distinguishing general intent and specific intent crimes).\n{5} In conducting substantial evidence review, we review the record, marshaling all evidence favorable to trial court\u2019s findings. If evidence is in conflict, or credibility is at issue, we accept any interpretation of the evidence that supports the trial court\u2019s findings, provided that such a view of the evidence is not inherently improbable. Crownover v. Natl Farmers Union Prop. & Cos. Co., 100 N.M. 568, 571, 673 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1983). We determine whether the evidence supports any conceivable set of rational deductions and inferences that logically leads to the finding in question. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (noting that court conducting sufficiency of the evidence review does not attempt to scrutinize the reasoning process actually used by factfinder). We must be satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to establish the facts essential to conviction with the level of certainty required by the applicable burden of proof. State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 274, 837 P.2d 862, 867 (1992) (noting that Jackson requires consideration of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining sufficiency of evidence in criminal ease); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal \u00a7 467 (3d. ed.2000) (noting minimal support for proposition that standard for sufficiency of evidence is same in civil and criminal cases and ultimate rejection of this view by Supreme Court in Jackson). To support a conviction under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence must be sufficiently compelling so that a hypothetical reasonable factfinder could have reached \u201ca subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.\u201d See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781.\n{6} Defendant offered the only direct testimony regarding his intent: Defendant denied intending to harm the victim. The trial court was not required to believe Defendant\u2019s testimony that he did not intend to hurt the victim. E.g., State v. Durant, 2000-NMCA-066, \u00b6 15, 129 N.M. 345, 7 P.3d 495. No New Mexico ease has squarely addressed the issue of how the factfinder\u2019s disbelief of a criminal defendant\u2019s testimony is factored into substantial evidence review. In the worker\u2019s compensation context, we have recognized that \u201c[a] finding that the testimony of a witness is not credible does not amount to a finding that the opposite of that witness\u2019s testimony is true.\u201d Varbel v. Sandia Auto Electric, 1999-NMCA-112, \u00b6 21, 128 N.M. 7, 988 P.2d 317. Varbel is consistent with cases from other jurisdictions rejecting the proposition that a factfinder\u2019s disbelief of a criminal defendant\u2019s testimony can substitute for affirmative proof of the state\u2019s case. State v. Coleman, 14 Conn.App. 657, 544 A.2d 194, 202 (1988) (holding that jury not permitted to infer from disbelief of defendant\u2019s testimony that facts denied by defendant are true); Commonwealth v. Scott, 409 Pa.Super. 313, 597 A.2d 1220,1223 (1991) (holding that trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s testimony was \u201cself-serving\u201d no substitute for proof); State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn.1992) (\u201cAlthough the jury is permitted to disbelieve the defendant\u2019s testimony, it may not construct a theory based on no evidence at all.\u201d); United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1114-15 (2d Cir.1995) (observing that normally, discredited testimony is not sufficient to support drawing opposite conclusion). We see no principled basis for not applying Varbel to the testimony of criminal defendants; and, therefore, we hold that the trial court\u2019s rejection of Defendant\u2019s testimony denying the intent to harm the victim did not justify a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the opposite of Defendant\u2019s testimony was true: i.e., that Defendant intended to harm the victim when he struck the window.\n{7} There being no direct testimony supporting the trial court\u2019s finding that Defendant acted with the specific intent to harm the victim, we must determine whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to-support a finding of intent. Durant, 2000-NMCA-066, \u00b6 15, 129 N.M. 345, 7 P.3d 495.\n{8} The victim was the State\u2019s only eyewitness; she testified to the following facts. Defendant is the victim\u2019s ex-husband. They have three children. On July 31, 1998, Defendant repeatedly called the victim at work explaining that he wanted to meet with her and the children so that he could say goodbye. To stop Defendant from calling her at work, the victim promised to bring the children to a park after work. The victim had no intention of keeping the appointment. After work she picked up the children and went home. She left the two older children with Defendant\u2019s sister, Gina, who lived in a neighboring apartment.\n{9} The victim heard a knock on the door. She did not want to talk to Defendant, so to avoid answering the door and revealing her presence, the victim phoned Gina and asked Gina to look out and see who was knocking on the victim\u2019s door. Gina told the victim it was Defendant. Defendant knocked on the bedroom windows. The victim went to the kitchen window, pulled aside the curtains and confronted Defendant, telling him to leave. Defendant told the victim to open the door and let him in. She refused. Defendant gestured with his fist indicating that he was going to break the window. The victim backed away from the window and picked up the phone. She told Defendant that she would call the police if he broke the window. Defendant responded that if the police came, he would die because the police would kill him. The victim was moving back toward the window when Defendant hit the window. The victim was a little over a foot from the window at the moment Defendant struck the window with his fist. She was cut on her face by a shard of glass.\n{10} Defendant climbed through the approximately three-foot by three-foot window. The victim ran outside, calling for Gina. Gina came to the door of her apartment, saw that the victim was bleeding and pushed her into Gina\u2019s apartment. Defendant followed the victim out of her apartment and into Gina\u2019s apartment. Defendant did not threaten or strike the victim; instead, he showed the victim his own wounds and left.\n{11} The victim\u2019s testimony that she was a little over a foot away from the window when Defendant struck the window is the State\u2019s strongest evidence supporting the theory that Defendant intended to harm the victim by causing the glass to cut her. However, the victim also testified that Defendant did not threaten her prior to smashing the window and that after he smashed the window, Defendant did not threaten her or attempt to harm her. The trial court was not entitled to disregard undisputed relevant evidence. State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 521, 817 P.2d 251, 255 (Ct.App.1991). There was no evidence pinning down exactly where Defendant hit the window or where the point of impact was in relationship to the victim\u2019s face. Further, the State failed to provide evidence of the layout of the kitchen. Without such evidence the trial court would not have been able to tell whether the victim moved out of Defendant\u2019s line of sight when she moved away from the window to reach for the telephone. While the victim\u2019s proximity to the window was a significant piece of circumstantial evidence, without further corroborating circumstantial indicia of intent, see State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 996 P.2d 321, 329 (.2000) (listing factors from which premeditation may be inferred, including factors such as nature of weapon used and threats and declarations before and after occurrence), no reasonable factfinder could have concluded that the inference of intent was sufficiently compelling to establish intent to harm beyond a reasonable doubt.\nCONCLUSION\n{12} We reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated battery on a household member. We remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentence dismissing with prejudice the charge of aggravated battery on a household member.\n{13} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge, CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge.", "type": "majority", "author": "ALARID, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Josephine H. Ford, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2001-NMCA-020\n24 P.3d 816\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Floyd WYNN, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 20,957.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 5, 2001.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Josephine H. Ford, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 419, "last_page_order": 423 }