{ "id": 352304, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard CHORNEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chorney", "decision_date": "2001-06-27", "docket_number": "No. 21,769", "first_page": "638", "last_page": "642", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.M. 638" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "29 P.3d 538" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2001-NMCA-050" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 N.M. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715240 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 715", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173472 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "736" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8500657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322255 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" }, { "page": "1151" }, { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "1137-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 352429 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 3", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720274 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the legislature has an obligation to state its intentions as clearly as possible\" in the area of criminal punishment enhancement" }, { "page": "1236", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the legislature has an obligation to state its intentions as clearly as possible\" in the area of criminal punishment enhancement" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "1236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 142282 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "1382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0111-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 700, "char_count": 14496, "ocr_confidence": 0.698, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.953907594520352e-08, "percentile": 0.5369666339620572 }, "sha256": "e6965ccd4e5908412638afe1623e0bf8f61c73f409cb6a16e0d3220d6f0aa44c", "simhash": "1:f58e44766f7754e7", "word_count": 2297 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:26.853949+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER, and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard CHORNEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} Defendant Richard Chorney appeals the use of a habitual offender enhancement to extend his criminal incompetency commitment. We reverse.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Defendant was convicted of shoplifting, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, negligent use of a weapon, and unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon, together with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Shortly after Defendant\u2019s convictions, the State filed a supplemental information charging Defendant as a three-felony habitual offender under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-18-17 (1993). Before sentencing, Defendant was charged separately with new offenses. Before he could be sentenced for the crimes of which he was convicted or tried on the new charges, all criminal proceedings were suspended for a determination of competency pursuant to the Mental Illness and Competency Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 31-9-1 to -1.5 (1988, as amended through 1999).\n{3} The district court determined that Defendant was incompetent to proceed and dangerous. After a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing, the court committed Defendant to the Las Vegas Medical Center for treatment for a term of up to ten years and six months, consisting of eighteen months for the underlying charge of aggravated assault, one year for firearm enhancement, and an eight-year enhancement because Defendant was a habitual offender.\nDISCUSSION\nA. Standard of Review\n{4} Because we interpret the language of Section 31-9-1.5, our review is de novo. State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995). Our task is \u201cto ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature\u201d as to whether the mandatory habitual offender enhancement can be invoked to enhance a Section 31-9-1.5 commitment. State v. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, \u00b6 28, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223. \u201c[C]riminal statutes providing for more [than the basic] punishment should ... be strictly construed.\u201d Id. \u00b6 30.\nB. The Contentions\n{5} Once committed under Section 31-9-1.5(D)(1) of the Act,\nthe defendant shall not be released from that secure facility except pursuant to an order of the district court which committed him or upon expiration of the period of time equal to the maximum sentence to which the defendant would have been subject had the defendant been convicted in a criminal proceeding^]\nSection 31-9-1.5(D)(2).\n{6} Defendant contends Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) subjected him to a \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d of only two and one-half years, that is, the eighteen-month sentence for aggravated assault and the one-year firearm enhancement. He argues that legislative silence on the matter requires that we presume the Legislature did not intend the habitual offender statute to apply to defendants committed under the Act. See Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, \u00b6 31, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (stating that legislative silence in Section 31-18-17 and the DWI statute in question was \u201cthe strongest evidence that the legislature did not intend the habitual offender sentences ... to apply\u201d) (emphasis omitted); Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16, 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991) (stating that \u201cthe legislature has an obligation to state its intentions as clearly as possible\u201d in the area of criminal punishment enhancement); see also State v. Begay, 2001-NMSC-002, \u00b6\u00b6 4-9, 130 N.M. 61, 17 P.3d 434 (stating the Anaya analysis controlled). In addition, Defendant argues that if we find the statutes ambiguous, we must apply the rule of lenity. See id. \u00b6 7.\n{7} Further, quoting from Justice Minzner\u2019s concurrence in State v. Rotherham, 122 N.M. 246, 266, 923 P.2d 1131, 1151, Defendant argues that the Act provisions must be \u201cnarrowly tailored to serve [the Legislature\u2019s] purpose.\u201d Defendant argues that extending the term of incarceration based on prior offenses reflects a penal, pretrial detention goal, amounting to punishment that conflicts with the Act\u2019s purpose of treating a defendant.\n{8} Conversely, the State asks us to decide the issue by looking at the words and meaning of Section 31-9-1.5 in combination with sentencing authority statutes. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 31-18-15 (1999), -16 (1993), -17 (1993). The State relies on the words of Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2): \u201cmaximum sentence to which the defendant would have been subject had the defendant been convicted in a criminal proceeding.\u201d Section 31-18-15(A)(6) establishes the basic sentence of eighteen months imprisonment for fourth degree felonies such as aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-3-2(A) (1963). That sentence shall be increased one year if a firearm is used. See \u00a7 31-18-16(A). If the defendant has been convicted of three prior felonies, the basic eighteen months sentence must be increased by eight years, not to be \u201csuspended or deferred.\u201d Section 31-18-17(D).\n{9} According to the State, when these sentencing statutes are read together, the ordinary meaning of the words and the only reasonable interpretation of the statutes is that a defendant\u2019s \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d in Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) includes a basic sentence and any required enhancements. Looking at the evidence and the sentencing statutes, the district court determined Defendant would have received a maximum sentence to include an eight-year enhancement had he been convicted. Thus, the State concludes, the sentencing statutes are plainly written, and the result in this case was reasonable and legislatively intended.\n{10} The State further points out that the jury determined Defendant committed aggravated assault using a firearm, requiring the court to impose an additional one-year enhancement. Defendant has conceded that the firearm enhancement applies, and attacks only the eight-year enhancement. The State argues that there is no rational basis on which to distinguish between the two enhancements when interpreting the language of Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2).\n{11} The State also argues that no legislative purpose supports exclusion of the habitual offender enhancement from a commitment under the Act. The Act has a legislative purpose to protect an incompetent defendant from indefinite and unjust commitment to a mental health institution without due process of law and to protect society from dangerous criminals. The State asserts the \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d under the Act is one, not of imprisonment, but to provide a proper time period in which to carry out the Act\u2019s unique caretaker status with a definite conclusion of commitment and liberty safeguards. Under the Act, Defendant must be released if he is determined to be competent or no longer dangerous.\nC. The Result\n{12} \u201c \u2018[Djangerous\u2019 [under the Act] means that, if released, the defendant presents a serious threat of inflicting great bodily harm on another or of violating Section 30-9-11 [criminal sexual penetration] or 30-9-13 [criminal sexual contact of a minor].\u201d Section 31-9-1.2(D). The State agrees that \u201cthe legislature has provided for the criminal commitment of only the most serious violent offenders\u201d under Section 31-9-1.5(A). The \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d requirement in Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) addresses the possible dangerousness of an incompetent defendant and provides the outer limits for commitment for the purpose of protecting society. It is based on specific crimes the Legislature believes identify dangerous defendants, namely: \u201ca felony that involves the infliction of great bodily harm on another person; a felony that involves the use of a firearm; aggravated arson ...; criminal sexual penetration ...; or criminal sexual contact of a minor, ... and [entry of] a finding that the defendant remains incompetent to proceed and remains dangerous[.]\u201d Section 31-9-1.5(D).\n{13} A critical inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the Legislature intended the habitual offender enhancement to be employed even where its application bears no reasonable relationship with dangerousness as defined in the Act. We think not. The habitual offender statute has as its primary purpose to deter recidivism. State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 309, 600 P.2d 253, 255 (1979). We have no reason to believe the intent behind the habitual offender statute is to enhance a basic sentence because a felon with prior convictions is dangerous, as that term is defined in the Act.\n{14} A habitual offender enhancement can be based on one or more prior fourth degree felonies involving no dangerous conduct, see, e.g., NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-16-31 (1971) (forgery of a credit card), or can be based on one or more prior murder convictions. Where the sole reason for maximum sentence criminal commitment to a secure and locked facility is the dangerousness of the defendant, it is reasonable to conclude that the \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d under Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) can consist only of basic sentences for the crimes that trigger commitment, and any enhancements of those basic sentences that are expressly based on inherently dangerous criminal conduct as set out in Section 31-9-1.5(D) or defined in Section 31-9-1.2.\n{15} The State argues that because a defendant\u2019s criminal history is important in a treating physician\u2019s determination of dangerousness, \u201cthe same prior criminal history should be similarly important in determining the length of time necessary for appropriate treatment.\u201d Further, the State argues, the fact that a defendant \u201chas committed prior criminal acts certainly indicates a pattern of dangerous behavior deserving of commitment for the longest possible time in order to provide treatment to him and protection to the public.\u201d Thus, the State\u2019s position is that the habitual offender enhancement should be applied in all cases. We see no such legislative intent.\n{16} The eight-year enhancement in this case has a more punitive than treatment purpose. The habitual offender statute is \u201chighly penal in nature,\u201d and its application must be interpreted narrowly. State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. 111, 117, 412 P.2d 405, 408 (1966). The enhancement is not necessarily imposed based on prior dangerous conduct of Defendant, nor is it justified on the basis that it is necessary, no matter what the circumstances of the prior felony or felonies, to protect the public from a dangerous person.\n{17} Whether the criminal commitment is two and one-half years, or ten and one-half years, a defendant must at some time be released from criminal commitment under the Act. Whatever the commitment term, at the end of the term under the Act, the State should evaluate whether to continue the commitment of a dangerous defendant through the civil commitment process pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 43-1-1 to -25 (1976, as amended through 1999). As the State points out, \u201c[a]ny longer confinement for treatment must, therefore, depend upon a civil commitment.\u201d The State should always determine the appropriate placement of a dangerous defendant at the end of a criminal commitment of any length.\n{18} Both the habitual offender statute and the Act are silent as to whether the maximum sentence intended under Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) includes a habitual offender enhancement. We see no clear legislative intent that the habitual offender enhancement be incorporated into the Act\u2019s \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d language. It is reasonable to presume in this case the Legislature did not intend to authorize the imposition of a habitual offender enhancement. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, \u00b6 31, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223; Swafford, 112 N.M. at 16, 810 P.2d at 1236.\n{19} Although \u201cmaximum sentence to which the defendant would have been subject\u201d in Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) seems plain and might be read as the State does in tandem with Sections 31-18-15 through \u2014 17, we nevertheless do not find the language and statute intermixture \u201c \u2018free from all ambiguity and .'.. crystal clear in ... meaning.\u2019 \u201d Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, \u00b6 28, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (quoting State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994)). It is our responsibility to \u201cselect the rationale that most likely accomplishes the legislative purpose \u2014 or best fills a void not addressed by the legislature.\u201d Id. \u00b6 29. We do so without resort to the rule of lenity.\n{20} Imposition of the habitual offender enhancement to commit Defendant beyond his basic sentence and firearm enhancement was not intended by the Legislature and is not within the purpose of the Act. The habitual offender statute cannot be used to compute the maximum sentence under Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2), and Defendant\u2019s eight-year enhancement was improper. Because we reverse based on the foregoing analysis, we need not address any other grounds.\n{21} In deciding competency issues, we should always be mindful of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), in response to which the Act was passed. Rotherham, 122 N.M. at 252-53, 923 P.2d at 1137-38; State v. Gallegos, 111 N.M. 110, 114, 802 P.2d 15, 19 (Ct.App.1990). Jackson forbids the indefinite warehousing of an incompetent defendant. 406 U.S. at 731, 92 S.Ct. 1845. \u201cAt the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.\u201d Id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845. Dangerousness is an element necessary to sustain a commitment of an incompetent person. Id. at 736, 92 S.Ct. 1845. A criminal defendant \u201cwho is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.\u201d Id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845. The Act sets the outer limits of that time period. We think it follows from Jackson that a person such as Defendant in this ease cannot be criminally committed under a sentence enhancement unless the conduct invoking the enhancement is a specific marker of dangerousness as determined and defined by the Legislature.\nCONCLUSION\n{22} We reverse with instruction to the district court to vacate the eight-year enhancement of Defendant\u2019s commitment based on Section 31-18-17.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER, and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Katherine Zinn, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Sheila Lewis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2001-NMCA-050\n29 P.3d 538\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard CHORNEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 21,769.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 27, 2001.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Katherine Zinn, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Sheila Lewis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0638-01", "first_page_order": 676, "last_page_order": 680 }