{ "id": 183167, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Mark MANN, Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mann", "decision_date": "2002-01-11", "docket_number": "No. 26,582", "first_page": "459", "last_page": "471", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 N.M. 459" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "39 P.3d 124" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2002-NMSC-001" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 U.S. 522", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299581 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 F.3d 1204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "377 Mass. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 334079 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/377/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 F.3d 490", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3694939, 9046263 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/319/0267-01", "/f3d/90/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 F.3d 923", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 268559 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "934" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/143/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304618 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-17", "parenthetical": "reversing a grant of habeas corpus where a juror allegedly applied for a job with the prosecutor's office and holding that due process only requires that the trial court hold a hearing to determine the existence of prejudice" }, { "parenthetical": "reversing a grant of habeas corpus where a juror allegedly applied for a job with the prosecutor's office and holding that due process only requires that the trial court hold a hearing to determine the existence of prejudice" }, { "parenthetical": "reversing a grant of habeas corpus where a juror allegedly applied for a job with the prosecutor's office and holding that due process only requires that the trial court hold a hearing to determine the existence of prejudice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ariz. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 806838 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" }, { "page": "483", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/187/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Wis.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11918387 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/196/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Cal.Rptr. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552-53", "parenthetical": "concluding that an engineer juror's map, drawn based on Ms understanding of the testimony and used during deliberations, did not constitute extraneous evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Cal. App.3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6042728 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding that an engineer juror's map, drawn based on Ms understanding of the testimony and used during deliberations, did not constitute extraneous evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/112/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 P. 1099", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.M. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841207 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/30/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720210 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "733" }, { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "\"The jury was required to evaluate ... conflicting versions of the truth, and it properly used the evidence before it to perform its duty.\"" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "\"The jury is not bound by expert opinion.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "733" }, { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"in evaluating the evidence presented, the jury is given latitude to use its judgment, and although no testimony had been elicited on the exact issue, the background information was all properly before the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "851 S.W.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9996448 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/851/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 S.W.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11958352 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/748/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Neb. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5249886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that the proper approach is to prohibit the use of juror affidavits which seek to impeach verdicts due to a juror's intradeliberational statements based on his or her personal knowledge, when that knowledge is not directly related to the litigation at issue.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/243/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 F.3d 893", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11572162 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894-96" }, { "page": "894-96", "parenthetical": "determining that the Remmer presumption of prejudice survives Phillips and Olano, but.only for jury tampering cases involving bribery or threats" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/192/0893-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-53", "parenthetical": "discussing a claim of juror bias and determining that, absent exceptional circumstances justifying a finding of implied bias, a defendant must demonstrate actual bias" }, { "page": "182-84", "parenthetical": "discussing a claim of juror bias and determining that, absent exceptional circumstances justifying a finding of implied bias, a defendant must demonstrate actual bias" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 F.3d 1190", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11456320 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1199-1200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/208/1190-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Hawai'i 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12259195 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Explicit in our ruling in Larue was a recognition that the foreperson's childhood experience constituted Important biographical information relevant to a challenge for cause.' \" (quoted authority omitted)" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "\"Explicit in our ruling in Larue was a recognition that the foreperson's childhood experience constituted Important biographical information relevant to a challenge for cause.' \" (quoted authority omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/76/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.W.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9937123 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/551/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 P.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1040-42" }, { "page": "1042" }, { "page": "1042" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Haw. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 8831430 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/68/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Nev. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 4798052 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/95/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 P. 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065-67", "parenthetical": "remanding for a new trial when defendant was convicted of \"conniving at the prostitution of his wife\" and juror was familiar with a hotel directly at issue in the case as a house of prostitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Wash. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash.", "case_ids": [ 527869 ], "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "remanding for a new trial when defendant was convicted of \"conniving at the prostitution of his wife\" and juror was familiar with a hotel directly at issue in the case as a house of prostitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash/59/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.Y.S.2d 952", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955-56", "parenthetical": "juror falsely claimed to have visited the scene of the crime and corroborated the state's version of events" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 A.D.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3278566 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "juror falsely claimed to have visited the scene of the crime and corroborated the state's version of events" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/87/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 So.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9566551 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/384/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597103 ], "weight": 17, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "592-94" }, { "page": "254-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 F.3d 236", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 573153 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/53/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580132 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122-24" }, { "page": "47-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 U.S. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3564613 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1892, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "\"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear\"" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/146/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L.Ed. 654", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6237509 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "739-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5326479 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "530-31" }, { "page": "509-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586376 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "365-66" }, { "page": "47-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598923 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 366, 683 P.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App.1983)" }, { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 366, 683 P.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App.1983)" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "750 F.2d 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 628945 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e have distinguished between jury panels tainted by outside influence, such as publicity or direct appeals from third parties, and panels on which one or more of the jurors themselves have violated an instruction of the court.\"" }, { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "\"We are reluctant to adopt a [presumption of prejudice] rule that would unduly bridle the discretion of district judges who, as we are ever mindful, are obviously in a far better position from which to control the flow of trial.\"" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/750/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716984 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "\"It is within a trial court's discretion whether to grant a motion for a new trial based on bailiff misconduct, and we will review that decision only to determine whether the court abused its discretion.\"" }, { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "\"It is within a trial court's discretion whether to grant a motion for a new trial based on bailiff misconduct, and we will review that decision only to determine whether the court abused its discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580243 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "\"The discretion of a trial court is not to be lightly interfered with, and an order denying a motion for a new trial will not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion.\"" }, { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "\"The discretion of a trial court is not to be lightly interfered with, and an order denying a motion for a new trial will not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 P.3d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.M. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217137 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 109" }, { "page": "\u00b6 67" }, { "page": "\u00b6 85" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 39, 42" }, { "page": "\u00b6 102" }, { "page": "\u00b6 42" }, { "page": "\u00b6 88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0600-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1853, "char_count": 48541, "ocr_confidence": 0.678, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.282756051799463e-07, "percentile": 0.6180312056803312 }, "sha256": "5670fa6098498dd040e52fd97769c3168f784b109d7d8b9794510bdb3dd908d1", "simhash": "1:9b6eae2c768651be", "word_count": 7924 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:12:47.108175+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice, GENE E. FRANCHINI, Justice, PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice, and PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Mark MANN, Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSERNA, Chief Justice.\n{1} Defendant William Mark Mann appeals his conviction for intentional child abuse resulting in death. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant\u2019s conviction. State v. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564, cert. granted, 129 N.M. 599, 11 P.3d 563 (2000). Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct during deliberations. We affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction.\nI. Facts and Background\nA. The Trial\n{2} The victim was the six-year-old son of Defendant and Rita Yancher. Yancher had primary custody of the victim, and the victim usually spent every other weekend with Defendant and Patricia St. Jeor Mann, at the time, Defendant\u2019s girlfriend. On August 29, 1996, the victim was present at Defendant\u2019s house. At about 11:00 p.m., Defendant and Yancher argued during a telephone conversation regarding the victim staying with him through Saturday as well as late child support payments. At approximately 1 a.m., on August 30th, St. Jeor awoke and saw Defendant going to the victim\u2019s room to take him to the bathroom. She heard a noise from the victim, followed by a loud crash and a scream. She ran to the bathroom and saw the victim, apparently having a seizure, on the floor with Defendant cushioning his head. St. Jeor called 911 and reported that the victim was injured. She returned to the bathroom and saw the victim on his back with a screwdriver protruding from his chest. St. Jeor testified that the victim was trying to move himself and Defendant was cupping the screwdriver. St. Jeor, a nurse, attempted to attend the victim, but Defendant punched her in the eye, grabbed her by her hair and by the back of the neck and \u201cslammed\u201d her through the door into the opposite wall. She again called 911, telling them that Defendant attacked her.\n{3} Paramedics arrived and saw St Jeor exit the house; she was bleeding from her face and had a swollen eye. A paramedic testified that Defendant growled, refused to let him treat the victim, and told him to leave the house. Upon the arrival of sheriffs deputies, Defendant was separated from the victim, and the victim was taken to the hospital. Medical personnel were unable to revive the child. The paramedics and medical personnel testified that they did not disturb the screwdriver from his chest while performing CPR and other medical treatment.\n{4} The victim\u2019s cause of death was the stab wound in his chest. Almost the entire screwdriver\u2019s blade, approximately four inches, was embedded in his chest; an autopsy revealed that the screwdriver was wedged between the sternum and the second and third ribs. The victim had two wounds in his chest but only one entry wound, indicating that the screwdriver was withdrawn several inches but not fully removed before it was thrust into his chest a second time. A pathologist testified that there was blood in both the right and left chest cavities, indicating that the wounds occurred prior to the victim\u2019s death. The pathologist testified that \u201cthere [were] two trajectories that emanate from one entrance hole, one stab wound with two trajectories.\u201d He concluded that the victim\u2019s wounds were \u201cstabbing paths that were created by a stab into the right chest, a partial withdrawal and then a stab into the left chest.\u201d The pathologist testified that the screwdriver could not simply move over into the left chest because the vertebral column protrudes into the cavity; thus, the screwdriver had to be withdrawn until it was above the range of the column and then reintroduced. He also testified that cardiopulmonary resuscitation compressions to the chest, as well as other medical interventions performed on the victim, could not have caused the second wound path. There were no other injuries on the front of the victim\u2019s head, face, hands, or elbows.\n{5} Defendant was also charged with child abuse for a head injury the victim suffered in 1994. The State\u2019s pathologist testified regarding the victim\u2019s earlier skull fracture. He concluded that the brain injuries he observed were inconsistent with a simple fall from a bar stool as described by Defendant.\n{6} Defendant testified that he got up around 1 a.m. and realized that he had not taken the victim to the bathroom, a routine occurrence. He woke up the victim and walked him into the bathroom. Defendant testified that he was standing in the bathroom doorway when he saw the victim trip on a rug, put out his arms and knock the items on the hamper, and then fall to the floor. Defendant testified that he toned the victim over and saw the screwdriver. Defendant said he grabbed the screwdriver to prevent the victim from pulling it out in order to minimize the injuries. Defendant testified that St. Jeor came back in and that he thought that she would try to move him, so he pushed her from him and told her to get away. He testified that he did not remember hurting her.\n{7} Defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Alan Watts, a physicist, regarding the possibility of the victim impaling himself on the screwdriver consistent with Defendant\u2019s explanation of events. He performed several calculations in the courtroom relating to the angle at which the screwdriver may have landed and the amount of force which the victim\u2019s body would have exerted upon it on impact, as well as videotaped and live demonstrations for the jury. The videotape consisted of Dr. Watts performing experiments in which he dropped a metal rod, which simulated the victim\u2019s body, and a screwdriver onto the concrete floor of his garage. Dr. Watts analogized how a screwdriver might bounce if it hits a solid object with the randomness of throwing dice. Dr. Watts testified that the occurrence of an impalement such as that described by Defendant has \u201ca relatively small overall probability.\u201d He stated that, based on the \u201cprobability aspects of this,\u201d it would be a \u201cfreakish accident.\u201d Dr. Watts said that \u201c[i]t is a probability calculation\u201d and he offered an example for comparison to \u201cMonte Carlo [codes] because basically you roll the dice.\u201d\n{8} The State did not present rebuttal testimony, but instead cross-examined Defendant\u2019s expert. Dr. Watts conceded that he was unable to explain from his calculations how the second wound path occurred, stating that he had \u201cno way of calculating how the second path could have been caused on the basis of physics.\u201d The prosecutor asked if Dr. Watts could calculate \u201cthe probability of [Defendant\u2019s] explanation of the stab wound.\u201d Dr. Watts testified that he did not calculate the probability of impaling oneself on a screwdriver because \u201cthe whole issue that [he] was asked to address was can this happen, and the answer is, yes, it can.\u201d He said that the probability would be \u201cfinite,\u201d but \u201cnever zero.\u201d Dr. Watts testified that if he \u201cwere to run every option possible, [he\u2019d] come to the conclusion that on average you won\u2019t stab yourself by falling on a screwdriver, but there is nevertheless a finite possibility it can happen.\u201d\n{9} A jury convicted Defendant of child abuse resulting in death and second degree murder arising from the death of the victim. The jury also convicted Defendant of aggravated assault of a household member, St. Jeor. The jury deadlocked on the child abuse charge stemming from the victim\u2019s 1994 head injury.\nB. The Jurors\u2019 Statements\n{10} Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was tainted by juror misconduct. Defense counsel interviewed several jurors and was told that Juror 7 presented probability calculations to the other members of the jury regarding the chances of a child and a screwdriver falling in such a manner as to result in impalement. Defendant identified several jurors who he believed had information regarding Juror 7.\n{11} The trial court decided to conduct in camera interviews on the record with members of the jury to determine if an evidentiary hearing was necessary because the trial court was concerned with the jurors\u2019 privacy after videotape of the jury had appeared on television during the trial. The court gave Defendant the opportunity to name the jurors whom the court should question and gave both Defendant and the State the opportunity to posit any additional question to be asked. Defendant did not request that the trial court interview all members of the jury. The Court interviewed Jurors 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10.\n{12} Juror 9 said that Juror 7 wrote \u201csome calculations\u201d on a board in the jury room, and said,\nBut, see, I kind of viewed that more as here is a guy that knows numbers, knows mathematics, who knows probabilities. I viewed it as his life experience. You know, much in the same way that relating back to the \u201994 head injury ... where the one juror ... brought in his life experience. He didn\u2019t bring in something, but in effect he did bring in something. He brought in the fact that he had a kid fall out of a tree and had a bad head injury____ [W]e had nurses in there, and the nurses brought in their life experience____\u201d\n{13} Juror 4 noted that Juror 7 \u201cdidn\u2019t say he did any experiments at home\u201d and that \u201c[h]e didn\u2019t bring papers\u201d into the jury room, but used the easel in the room. Juror 4 recounted that Juror 7 said, \u201c \u2018Let\u2019s take Dr. Watts\u2019 figures.\u2019 And you might fly this by that \u2014 being an engineer and probably halfway [physicist], he said using his figures, it can\u2019t come out the way he said it did.\u201d Juror 10 stated that Juror 7 had some \u201cfigures that he had thought about and it was explaining his point of view on the testimony of Dr. Watts.\u201d Juror 6 stated that \u201cI feel that the particular juror that \u2014 the engineer juror, to me that was just his way of venting his feelings and thoughts and emotions during the deliberation.\u201d\n{14} Juror 7 told the trial court that he did not do any calculations or experiments at home. He contended that he did not dispute or discredit Dr. Watts\u2019 testimony but believed that Dr. Watts\u2019 testimony consisted of \u201cfine calculations and [he] would agree with the calculations.\u201d Juror 7 thought that the testimony did not \u201c[answer] the right question\u201d because he did not accept the \u201clogical tie\u201d between the testimony and Defendant\u2019s story. Juror 7 completed a probability calculation to \u201cverify [his] own gut feeling,\u201d beginning with Dr. Watts\u2019 calculations which were presented during the trial. He stated that he used his \u201cprofessional judgment\u201d and a \u201cfairly simple five-step probability\u201d calculation with five events from Defendant\u2019s description of the event: first, whether \u201cthe screwdriver land[ed] in the correct orientation\u201d or \u201csolid angle\u201d perpendicular to the victim\u2019s falling body; second, whether the screwdriver landed with the blade facing up; third, whether the screwdriver separated itself, as it fell, from other items that had been knocked off the hamper; fourth, where it landed on the floor; and fifth, whether its orientation caused the wound path. He recounted, \u201cI simply multiplied the numbers, one over 10 times one over two times 1 over 100 three times, and the number you get is basically five times ten to minus 8 or in what most of us think about, one in a 20 million chance.\u201d\n{15} The trial court stated,\nI conducted several interviews with the jurors in this case. My concern and purpose for doing that was first of all to find out if there was any juror misconduct requiring possibly a full evidentiary hearing as to the merits of the Defendant\u2019s motion as to whether that misconduct may have influenced the jury to the extent the Defendant might be entitled to a new trial in this case.\nAlso, another reason for my interviews with the jurors were to find in my own mind as to whether anything occurred in the jury room that was such that would require that in the interest of justice that I would have to remedy or should remedy what could be characterized as a manifest miscarriage of justice.\n{16} The trial court expressed\nafter the most serious contemplation, I find that there has not been sufficient evidence before this Court to require either a further inquiry into the jury\u2019s conduct, nor is there such that would require me in my role as a judge to set aside that verdict. I feel I believe in the jury system. I believe that the jury in this ease took the evidence as they saw it in court, made a decision based on their [consciences] and on the evidence presented in court, although some people may feel that they would have come to a different resolution. That is not what our system is about, and for me to place myself in the stead of the jury to overturn that would be, I feel, [betrayal] of everything I believe about our system.\nThe trial court then denied Defendant\u2019s motion. The trial court found that Defendant failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that extraneous information had reached the jury, stating that there was insufficient evidence to require further inquiry into the jury\u2019s conduct or to set aside the verdict. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the issue of juror misconduct, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6 109, 129 N.M. 600,11 P.3d 564.\nII. Discussion\nA. Juror Conduct\n1. Standard of Review\n{17} This Court will not overturn a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion for a new trial unless the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Volpato, 102 N.M. 383, 385, 696 P.2d 471, 473 (1985) (\u201cThe discretion of a trial court is not to be lightly interfered with, and an order denying a motion for a new trial will not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion.\u201d); accord Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 133, 148, 899 P.2d 576, 591 (1995) (\u201cIt is within a trial court\u2019s discretion whether to grant a motion for a new trial based on bailiff misconduct, and we will review that decision only to determine whether the court abused its discretion.\u201d). This Court \u201cwill not disturb the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion for a new trial unless the ruling is arbitrary, capricious or beyond reason.\u201d State v. Litteral, 110 N.M. 138, 144, 793 P.2d 268, 274 (1990). The Court of Appeals correctly emphasized that \u201c[r]eliance upon this standard reflects not only the important policies implicated by motions for new trial, but also the trial court\u2019s unique position in passing upon such questions in the first instance.\u201d Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6 67, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564 (citation omitted). We agree that the trial court is in the best position to make this judgment. United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 338 (5th Cir.1984) (\u201cWe note at the outset that, sitting as we do far from the daily rigors of trial, we are in a particularly inappropriate position from which to judge the effect of a juror\u2019s premature expression of an opinion as to guilt on the minds of the other members of the jury panel. That is precisely why we have traditionally left the manner of handling jury misconduct to the sound discretion of the trial judge.\u201d).\n2. Extraneous Prejudicial Information\n{18} The competency of a juror as a witness is specifically governed by our Rules of Evidence.\nUpon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict ..., a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury\u2019s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror\u2019s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror\u2019s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury\u2019s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.\nRule 11-606(B) NMRA 2001. Thus, a juror may testify on the very limited circumstance of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly before the jury. Otherwise, the rule prohibits a juror from testifying as to any matter or statement made during the course of deliberations or to the juror\u2019s mental processes.\n{19} The party requesting a new trial on the basis that the jury was exposed to extraneous information \u201cmust make a preliminary showing that [he or she] has competent evidence that material extraneous to the trial actually reached the jury.\u201d State v. Sena, 105 N.M. 686, 688, 736 P.2d 491, 493 (1987) (quoting State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 366, 683 P.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App.1983)). Thus, Defendant has the burden to show that the extraneous information actually reached the jury. \u201cThis burden is not discharged merely by allegation; rather, Defendant must make an affirmative showing that some extraneous influence came to bear on the jury\u2019s deliberations.\u201d Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6 85, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564. Rule 11 606(B) tracks the language of the comparable federal rule. See Doe, 101 N.M. at 365, 683 P.2d at 47. \u201cUnauthorized communications to the jury in state courts must be judged by the federal requirements of due process.\u201d State v. Gutierrez, 78 N.M. 529, 531, 433 P.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1967).\n{20} Although several prior New Mexico cases, as well as some cases from other jurisdictions, do not distinguish jury tampering, juror misconduct, and juror bias, we believe it would provide clarification to do so. While there is bound to be overlap between these categories, we find the distinctions useful to place the issue in the present case into proper context. See generally Webster, 750 F.2d at 338 (\u201c[W]e have distinguished between jury panels tainted by outside influence, such as publicity or direct appeals from third parties, and panels on which one or more of the jurors themselves have violated an instruction of the court.\u201d). The essence of cases involving juror tampering, misconduct, or bias is whether the circumstance unfairly affected the jury\u2019s deliberative process and resulted in an unfair jury. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (discussing the claim of prejudice when the trial court allowed alternates to sit in on deliberations, but instructed them not to participate, concluding, \u201c[t]here may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury\u2019s deliberations and thereby its verdict?\u201d (citations omitted)).\n{21} Jury tampering generally refers to private communications between third persons and jurors. The United States Supreme Court has held that private communication, contact, or direct or indirect tampering with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before it, \u201cif not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties\u201d may result in a due process violation. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); see also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892) (\u201cPrivate communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear\u201d). In Mattox, the bailiff remarked to the jury that the defendant had a prior murder charge. 146 U.S. at 142, 13 S.Ct. 50. In Remmer, an unnamed individual remarked to a juror that he could profit from a particular verdict, and the judge, ex parte, requested an investigation. In Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of jury tampering when an individual approached a \u201cjuror and told her \u2018to make a wise decision,\u2019 \u201d and relied upon Remmer. 78 N.M. at 530-31, 433 P.2d at 509-10. The Court of Appeals relied upon Gutierrez in another jury tampering case in which an \u201cinformant\u201d told a juror about \u201ca witness who had identified [the respondent] in court only after an initial hesitation.\u201d Doe, 101 N.M. at 365-66, 683 P.2d at 47-48.\n{22} Juror misconduct, on the other hand, includes activity by members of the jury which is inconsistent with the instructions by the court. See Sena, 105 N.M. at 688, 736 P.2d at 493 (rejecting the defendant\u2019s argument that the defendant\u2019s sister saw a juror sleeping during the trial and a juror\u2019s remark that he knew the defendant was guilty but not based on evidence presented at trial constituted juror misconduct and supported the defendant\u2019s claim that extraneous material reached the jury). Juror misconduct would also include members of the jury making an unauthorized visit to the scene of the crime, or referring to material, such as a dictionary, not in evidence and against the instructions of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 122-24, 692 P.2d 45, 47-49 (Ct.App.1984) (concluding that, where the judge instructed the jury that it was not allowed to have a dictionary and a juror later copied a dictionary definition and showed it to the jury, an improper communication occurred but that the presumption of prejudice was rebutted); United States v. Harber, 53 F.3d 236, 241 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that, when a copy of the case agent\u2019s report, not admitted into evidence, was in the jury room during deliberations, it resulted in inherent prejudice where it was read and relied upon by the jury).\n{23} In State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 762 P.2d 250 (1988), this Court addressed whether juror remarks constituted extraneous information that prejudiced the defendant. In Sacoman, the defendant\u2019s work as a busboy was relevant to his alibi; he claimed that he had not punched his time card but had been paid as if he had finished work at the end of his shift. Id. at 589, 762 P.2d at 251. One juror described his own personal experience as a busboy, \u201crelating that on many occasions when he wanted to take off work early he would work extra hard ... then leave without punching out.\u201d Id. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252. Another juror fabricated a story about employment procedures, claiming that a payroll clerk told the juror that if an employee did not clock out, the clerk assumed that the employee worked the full time. Id. The Sacoman Court summarily concluded that \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s authorities convince us that he is correct in asserting that the juror communications at issue in this case constituted extraneous information.\u201d Id. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253.\n{24} The Court, in Sacoman, expressed a rather broad introductory statement: \u201c[c]ommunication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others involves extraneous information.\u201d Id. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252. Defendant relies upon this statement as this Court\u2019s definition of extraneous information. As discussed further below, this would be a sweeping and far-reaching rule if actually applied. We do not believe this to be a particularly helpful test in extraneous information cases. Further, a careful review of the authority on which Sacoman based its determination leads us to the conclusion that this aspect of the case was questionable. Sacoman\u2019s out-of-state authority in which jurors had specific knowledge of extrajudicial facts directly related to the litigation before them was inapplicable to the facts in Sacoman and is inapplicable in the present case. See State v. Wisham, 384 So.2d 385, 387 (La.1980) (concluding that the defendant\u2019s right to an impartial jury was violated when jurors saw the defendant\u2019s alibi witness arrested for perjury); People v. Huntley, 87 A.D.2d 488, 452 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955-56 (1982) (juror falsely claimed to have visited the scene of the crime and corroborated the state\u2019s version of events); State v. Lorenzy, 59 Wash. 308, 109 P. 1064, 1065-67 (1910) (remanding for a new trial when defendant was convicted of \u201cconniving at the prostitution of his wife\u201d and juror was familiar with a hotel directly at issue in the case as a house of prostitution). Of particular note, Sacoman relied heavily on State v. Thacker, 95 Nev. 500, 596 P.2d 508, 509 (1979) (per curiam), a larceny case involving two calves, and characterized a juror \u201cas the foreman of a cattle ranch ... who made estimates regarding the weight of the cattle that contradicted the theory of defense\u201d Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253. However, the Sacoman Court failed to recognize that, in Thacker, the juror\u2019s ranch was the same ranch where the calves at issue were located. Thacker, 596 P.2d at 509. Unlike those cases, the jurors in Sacoman and the present case did not have knowledge of extraneous facts directly related to the specific ease. The Sacoman juror with busboy experience did not inform the jury as to procedures used at the defendant\u2019s place of employment; he simply related his own work experiences in that particular field. Id. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252. Similarly, the juror who related a false story concocted a description of a different workplace, not the defendant\u2019s. Id.\n{25} Sacoman also relied on cases which involve juror bias, State v. Larue, 68 Haw. 575, 722 P.2d 1039 (1986) and Rogers v. State, 551 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), in which jurors related personal experiences similar to the victims in the respective cases. Although juror bias may involve juror misconduct, we consider these cases to be clearly distinguishable from Sacoman and the present case as well. Larue involved a juror who related to the jury an experience similar to the victims in the case before her, of sexual abuse at a young age, to support the victims\u2019 ability to recall the event despite their age. Larue, 722 P.2d at 1040-42. The Supreme Court of Hawaii based its conclusion that this constituted extraneous prejudicial information on the fact that the juror should have been excluded for cause during voir dire. Id. at 1042; see State v. Furutani, 76 Hawai'i 172, 873 P.2d 51, 61 (1994) (\u201cExplicit in our ruling in Larue was a recognition that the foreperson\u2019s childhood experience constituted Important biographical information relevant to a challenge for cause.\u2019 \u201d (quoted authority omitted)). In other words, Larue addressed juror bias. If a juror is biased, then the defendant, by definition, suffers prejudice. One juror\u2019s bias, even if it does not influence other jurors, jeopardizes the defendant\u2019s right to an impartial jury. See United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that a juror\u2019s statement that the juror knew of the defendant\u2019s reputation in the community as a drug dealer constituted extraneous material; noting that the statement raised questions regarding the truthfulness of the juror during voir dire and of bias against the defendant).\n{26} The relationship between voir dire and juror bias demonstrates the distinctions between the juror\u2019s actions in Larue and the present case. During voir dire, the parties and the court in Larue questioned venire members regarding sexual abuse. Larue, 722 P.2d at 1041 \u2014 42. The juror in question did not disclose that she had been sexually assaulted at age three. Id. The juror did not necessarily commit misconduct because she apparently did not attempt to deceive the parties during voir dire, but instead simply failed to understand the significance of the events in her past to the case before her. Id. Had she properly disclosed her history, the defendant could have successfully challenged her for cause. Id. at 1042. In other words, it is more generally accepted that a juror who has experienced a traumatic event similar to a victim in a criminal case is likely to be unable to be fair and impartial in deciding the defendant\u2019s guilt. Sacoman does not discuss whether the juror\u2019s experience as a busboy was a fact disclosed during voir dire. Had the defendant raised this issue, it most likely would not have resulted in an excusal for cause because a juror\u2019s work experience in this context, although similar to an issue at trial, is not considered to affect the ability of that juror to be fair and unbiased. See generally State v. Sanchez, 120 N.M. 247, 251-53, 901 P.2d 178, 182-84 (1995) (discussing a claim of juror bias and determining that, absent exceptional circumstances justifying a finding of implied bias, a defendant must demonstrate actual bias). In the present ease, this reasoning is even more clear. The fact that Juror 7 had the educational and professional ability to understand and perform calculations such as those conducted by Defendant\u2019s expert would clearly not provide a basis for Juror 7\u2019s excusal for cause.\n{27} We emphasize that the underlying issue in cases involving extraneous information is a defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial jury. Jury tampering and juror bias present the clearest examples of potentially improper influences upon a jury, while the notion of juror misconduct creates a more difficult extension of the issue. See United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894-96 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cJury tampering is a much moi\u2019e serious intrusion into the jury\u2019s processes [than juror misconduct] and poses an inherently greater risk to the integrity of the verdict.\u201d). Although some forms of misconduct, such as a juror making an unauthorized visit to the scene of a crime, may infringe on a defendant\u2019s right to a fair jury, we are cautious and reluctant to apply this reasoning to actions approaching juror deliberations. Sacoman appears to have imprudently extended the reasoning of jury tampering or bias cases to a situation in which a juror drew on his past experiences in order to deliberate on the case before him. Although Juror 7\u2019s conduct arguably could be labeled juror misconduct if we applied the broad introductory statement of Sacoman that communication of specific knowledge from one juror to the jury involves extraneous information, we take this opportunity to clarify that jurors may properly rely on their background, including professional and educational experience, in order to inform their deliberations. See Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811, 503 N.W.2d 173, 186 (1993) (\u201c[W]e feel that the proper approach is to prohibit the use of juror affidavits which seek to impeach verdicts due to a juror\u2019s intradeliberational statements based on his or her personal knowledge, when that knowledge is not directly related to the litigation at issue.\u201d). \u201cJurors are generally knowledgeable in many areas, and they are entitled to use their common or acquired sense in arriving at a verdict, so long as the knowledge is not imparted to them outside the judicial proceeding in which they sit as jurors. The use of their extrinsic knowledge in the deliberative process does not fall into the category of extrinsic influence.\u201d State v. Anderson, 748 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985), overruled m other grounds by State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn.1993). We believe this holding is more consistent with the policy articulated in Rule 11-606(B) that a juror may not testify concerning his or her mental processes or the \u201ceffect of anything upon that or any other juror\u2019s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict.\u201d Rather, a juror may only \u201ctestify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury\u2019s attention.\u201d Rule 11-606(B).\n3. Juror 7\u2019s Conduct\n{28} As discussed below, we conclude that Juror 7\u2019s statements constituted proper deliberations based upon his professional and educational experience. Defendant argues that Juror 7 injected new evidentiary facts which contradicted defense testimony rather than expressing opinions, views or beliefs about the evidence. We disagree. Defendant concedes that Juror 7 began with Dr. Watts\u2019 testimony, but he asserts that Juror 7 \u201cadded his own testimony of probability and physics.\u201d See Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6\u00b6 39, 42, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564 (Apodaca, J., dissenting in part) (characterizing the remarks as a \u201cdissertation\u201d). Juror 7, albeit with greater understanding than the average person, was engaging in deliberation of the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 732, 819 P.2d 673, 682 (1991).\n{29} In order to provide expert testimony supporting Defendant\u2019s version of events, Dr. Watts described basic physics principles, completed extensive calculations, and performed both in-court and videotaped demonstrations with a screwdriver and other materials. Dr. Watts testified that the occurrence of an accidental impalement consistent with Defendant\u2019s theory has \u201ca relatively small overall probability.\u201d Dr. Watts testified that, based on the \u201cprobability aspects\u201d of this scenario, the victim\u2019s accidental impalement would be a \u201cfreakish accident.\u201d On cross-examination, Dr. Watts testified that he did not calculate the actual probability of impaling oneself on a screwdriver because the specific issue Defendant wished for him to address was whether the scenario could possibly happen. However, Dr. Watts did give his expert opinion regarding the probability of such an accidental impalement as \u201cfinite,\u201d but \u201cnever zero.\u201d Dr. Watts testified that if he \u201cwere to run every option possible, [he\u2019d] come to the conclusion that on average you won\u2019t stab yourself by falling on a screwdriver, but there is nevertheless a finite possibility it can happen.\u201d Dr. Watts analogized how a screwdriver might bounce into position to the randomness of throwing dice; he compared the probability calculation to \u201cMonte Carlo codes\u201d which are \u201cnamed after the gambling place.\u201d Defendant himself placed probability calculations regarding his accidental impalement theory in evidence before the jury.\n{30} Juror 7 articulated his own thought process as to what this \u201cfinite\u201d probability calculation would be, based on the evidence presented in court and based on Dr. Watts\u2019 testimony. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6 102, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564 (concluding that \u201cJuror No. 7\u2019s expression of his \u2018professional opinion\u2019 appears to have been nothing more than the expression of his subjective take on the evidence in record\u201d). Juror 7\u2019s deliberations properly took their content from the evidence and testimony presented at trial. His calculation, as well as several other jurors\u2019 calculations, expressed the probability, introduced into evidence by Defendant, as one in several million. The jury\u2019s deliberation was an attempt to review and evaluate Defendant\u2019s expert testimony. Juror 9 rejected the conclusion of Defendant\u2019s expert, and decided that \u201cNot in a zillion billion years did that happen.\u201d Juror 4 estimated the probability of Defendant\u2019s accident occurring as \u201cone in 10 million.\u201d Defendant concedes that this type of opinion is proper. See Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6 42, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564 (Apodoca, dissenting in part) (asserting that Juror 7 \u201ccould have stated that, based on his experience, Defendant\u2019s theory was virtually impossible\u201d). Juror 7, because of his life experience, occupation, and education, verbalized a similar opinion as other jurors based on evidence and testimony presented at trial in a more complex manner, explaining the basis behind the conclusion that Defendant finds permissible. Concluding that Defendant\u2019s theory has a less than one in twenty million chance, rather than Dr. Watts\u2019 characterization of a \u201cfreak accident,\u201d is not a new evidentiary fact. The jury, including Juror 7, carefully considered Defendant\u2019s theory but was ultimately persuaded that the State demonstrated that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, the jury performed its duty. See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (\u201cThe jury was required to evaluate ... conflicting versions of the truth, and it properly used the evidence before it to perform its duty.\u201d). Defendant wishes to be allowed, and in fact, was properly allowed, to present expert physics testimony regarding the ultimate conclusion of the probability of impalement to the jury (possible but extremely unlikely), but now strenuously objects to the jury actually deliberating on this very issue. It would be inordinately bad policy to single out a juror who thoughtfully and conscientiously engaged in deliberation and presented Ms conclusion to the jury because he was able to express exactly why he came to that conclusion based on the evidence at trial, rather than more simply state the theory as one in a million.\n{81} In Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731, 819 P.2d at 681, tMs Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the jury\u2019s experiment, in wMch they removed a gun from its holster to compare the noise with a noise on an audiotape, created new or extrinsic evidence, and concluded that the jury\u2019s experimentation with properly admitted evidence in a manner not discussed at trial did not constitute \u201cevidence not properly admitted or experimentation based on facts or evidence not properly before the jury.\u201d Similarly, Juror 7\u2019s calculations were based on testimony and evidence properly admitted at trial. Defendant emphasizes that Juror 7\u2019s calculations contradicted those of Ms expert. We reject tMs argument. First, Juror 7 said that he in fact agreed with Dr. Watts\u2019 calculations. Secondly, as Defendant concedes, the jury is free to reject expert testimony. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (\u201cThe jury is not bound by expert opinion.\u201d). \u201cAlthough potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the record for the jury, the jury must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate.\u201d Id. (citations omitted).\n{32} \u201cIn deciding every case, jurors must necessarily take into consideration their knowledge and impressions founded upon experience in their everyday walks of life, and the fact that these things affect them in reaching their verdict cannot be reversible error, because, indeed, jurors without possessing such knowledge and impressions could not be had.\u201d State v. Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 37, 226 P. 1099, 1100 (1924). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial under New Mexico precedent. Cases from other jurisdictions also support tMs conclusion. See, e.g., Wagner v. Doulton, 112 Cal. App.3d 945, 169 Cal.Rptr. 550, 552-53 (1980) (concluding that an engineer juror\u2019s map, drawn based on Ms understanding of the testimony and used during deliberations, did not constitute extraneous evidence); State v. Heitkemper, 196 Wis.2d 218, 538 N.W.2d 561, 563-64 (App.1995) (concluding that a pharmacist juror\u2019s remark that he disbelieved a witness regarding drugs she ingested because the quantities should have knocked her out did not constitute extraneous information). \u201cA juror\u2019s common sense and experience, including expertise in particular subjects, is not extrinsic information warranting relief if used during deliberations.\u201d State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 926 P.2d 468, 483 (1996) (en banc) (holding that a m\u00e9chame juror\u2019s statement that he did not believe the defendant\u2019s claim that his truck overheated based on his expertise did not constitute extraneous information).\n{33} Remarks made by the jurors in the present case illustrate the problematic application of a broad definition that communication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others constitutes extraneous prejudicial information. Juror 9 described how another juror discussed that juror\u2019s experience with his own child falling from a tree and how that experience related to Ms understanding of the child abuse charge stemming from the victim\u2019s 1994 head injury. Both Juror 9 and Juror 7 mentioned that two jurors who were nurses discussed their opinion regarding the expert medical testimony, based on their educational and professional experience. Finally, Juror 7 described another juror recounting a previous experience in which the juror fell straight forward and sustained an injury to her chin. All of this information was not subject to cross-examination regarding the similarity or dissimilarity to the charges in the present case; it could be considered extraneous under tMs definition. The examples from the present case illustrate the difficulties inherent in attempting to distinguish extraneous information from permissible deliberation based on life experience. This highlights the importance of allowing our jury system to function without improper interference, and the critical need for tMs Court to protect open, full, and complete deliberations among members of the jury.\n{34} Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals opinion will result in the \u201cdumbing down\u201d of juries because attorneys will remove individuals such as Juror 7. We disagree. We do not believe that because an individual has particular professional experience or is well-educated one can assume that he or she is biased in favor of any particular party. As discussed above, venire members who express experiences which would affect their ability to be unbiased can be dismissed through cause challenges during voir dire. If either party wishes to remove a member of the venire because of that individual\u2019s life experience, or educational or professional background, as a matter of strategy, the party will have to do so with a peremptory challenge. These factors, without more as determined by the trial court, will not provide a basis for challenging such individuals for cause and will not subject a jury verdict to attack. Accepting Defendant\u2019s argument that an articulate juror who expresses and explains his or her reasoning based on properly admitted evidence results in extraneous information prejudicing the jury would, we believe, surely result in a chilling effect on jury deliberations. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, \u00b6 88, 129 N.M. 600, 11 P.3d 564 (\u201cThe analysis we apply today has evolved expressly to safeguard the secrecy of jury deliberations from unwarranted invasion.\u201d).\n{35} Juror 7 discussed evidence and testimony properly admitted at trial and performed calculations similar to those of Defendant\u2019s expert. See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (concluding that \u201cin evaluating the evidence presented, the jury is given latitude to use its judgment, and although no testimony had been elicited on the exact issue, the background information was all properly before the jury\u201d). We conclude that the trial court correctly found that Juror 7 did not bring extraneous prejudicial information to the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Because Defendant did not meet his burden by showing that extraneous information reached the jury, we need not address the issue of prejudice.\n{36} However, we do note that it appears that the United States Supreme Court has distanced itself from the Remmer presumption of prejudice upon which New Mexico courts have relied. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 739-40, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 214-17, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (reversing a grant of habeas corpus where a juror allegedly applied for a job with the prosecutor\u2019s office and holding that due process only requires that the trial court hold a hearing to determine the existence of prejudice). This development has also been recognized by other courts. See United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir.1998) (\u201cWe agree that the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano. Accordingly, the trial court must first assess the severity of the suspected intrusion; only when the court determines that prejudice is likely should the government be required to prove its absence.\u201d); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C.Cir.1996) (rejecting Remmer\u2019s automatic presumption, relying on Olano, and concluding that the trial court should \u201cinquire whether any particular intrusion showed enough of a \u2018likelihood of prejudice\u2019 to justify assigning the government a burden of proving harmlessness\u201d); Webster, 750 F.2d at 338 (\u201cWe are reluctant to adopt a [presumption of prejudice] rule that would unduly bridle the discretion of district judges who, as we are ever mindful, are obviously in a far better position from which to control the flow of trial.\u201d). But see Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 894-96 (determining that the Remmer presumption of prejudice survives Phillips and Olano, but.only for jury tampering cases involving bribery or threats). For purposes of this case, it is unnecessary to reconcile existing New Mexico precedent with this more recent articulation by the Supreme Court.\n{37} As a final matter, Defendant argues that his right of confrontation was violated and makes an unsupported argument regarding his right to be present while the trial court questioned the jurors. Because, as we explained above, we conclude that no extrinsic evidence was before the jury, Defendant was not deprived of his right of confrontation. The trial court\u2019s in camera interviews were within its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519 (1979) (\u201c[Permitting unbridled interviews of jurors could lead to harassment of jurors, exploitation of jurors\u2019 thought processes, and diminished confidence in jury verdicts. A rule requiring post-verdict interviews to be supervised and directed by the judge also prevents the interrogation from exceeding its proper scope.\u201d (citations omitted)); United States v. DiSalvo, 84 F.3d 1204, 1223 n. 18 (3d Cir.1994) (concluding that the trial court did not err by interviewing some members of the jury in camera in response to a claim of juror misconduct); Webster, 750 F.2d at 339 (\u201cWhether we consider the presence of counsel bottomed on the need to rebut a presumption of prejudice or as emanating from the defendant\u2019s general right to be present at all stages of the trial, our inquiry is the same: were appellants prejudiced by the in camera nature of the juror interviews? A review of the transcript of the juror interviews belies any claim that appellants were prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow them to participate.\u201d) (citations omitted). Although Defendant clearly requested that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing, Defendant does not indicate how he preserved his right to be present at the interview for appellate review; Defendant does not assert that he requested to be present while the trial court questioned the jurors. The United States Supreme Court provides guidance: \u2018We hold that failure by a criminal defendant to invoke his [or her] right to be present under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 at a conference which he [or she] knows is taking place between the judge and a juror in chambers constitutes a valid waiver of that right.\u201d United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). Our rule regarding a defendant\u2019s right to be present is similar to the federal rule. See Rule 5-612 NMRA 2001 committee commentary (stating that \u201cthis rule is almost identical to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure\u201d). Thus, Defendant\u2019s failure to invoke any right to be present when the trial court announced that it was going to interview the jurors in camera constituted a valid waiver of that right.\nIII. Conclusion\n{38} Defendant failed to demonstrate that extrinsic information actually reached the jury. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. The trial court acted within its discretion with respect to Defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. A juror may properly rely on his or her education, experience and common sense during deliberations; thorough discussion, informed by expertise and based on evidence at trial, does not constitute extraneous prejudicial information. Under Rule 11-606(B), such information concerning the juror\u2019s mental processes is not properly the subject of juror testimony. Thus, we affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction.\n{39} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice, GENE E. FRANCHINI, Justice, PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice, and PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice.\n. Defendant does not argue that the New Mexico Constitution provides greater protection, and we do not address this question.\n. Unlike the juror with busboy experience, the Sacoman juror who related a false story could more accurately be described as a potentially biased juror. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 592-94, 762 P.2d at 254-56.", "type": "majority", "author": "SERNA, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Billy R. Blackburn, John R. Robbenhaar, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.", "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Arthur W. Pepin, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2002-NMSC-001\n39 P.3d 124\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Mark MANN, Defendant-Petitioner.\nNo. 26,582.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJan. 11, 2002.\nBilly R. Blackburn, John R. Robbenhaar, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Arthur W. Pepin, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0459-01", "first_page_order": 493, "last_page_order": 505 }