{
  "id": 260753,
  "name": "John P. ARMIJO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Armijo v. State, Taxation & Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Division",
  "decision_date": "2001-02-02",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "WE CONCUR: A. JOSEPH ALARID and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judges."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "John P. ARMIJO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nPICKARD, Judge.\n{1} Petitioner-Appellant (Driver) appeals from the revocation of his driving privileges for a period of ten years pursuant to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-5-5(D) (1999). The issue on appeal is whether the Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) erred in applying Section 66-5-5(D) against Driver, given the form of the negotiated plea agreement. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE\n{2} Driver has been convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) on three separate occasions. The third conviction, the subject of this appeal, was pursuant to a plea and disposition agreement by which Driver pleaded guilty to DWI, \u201cfirst offense pursuant to Section 66-8-102 ... for all lawful purposes.\u201d The metropolitan court accepted the plea and entered the judgment and sentence convicting Driver of DWI, \u201c1st offense,\u201d on February 23,1998.\n{3} Thereafter, based on the existence of the three DWI convictions, MVD revoked Driver\u2019s license to drive. Driver challenged the revocation, and the MVD Director sustained the revocation, pursuant to Section 66-5-5(D).\n{4} Driver then petitioned the district court for review of MVD\u2019s decision. The district court concluded that Driver had been convicted of DWI three times within a ten-year period, as contemplated by Section 66-5-5(D), and therefore affirmed. In so ruling, the district court specifically determined that the \u201cfirst offense\u201d designation appearing in the plea agreement and in the metropolitan court\u2019s judgment and sentence did not preclude MVD from revoking Driver\u2019s license, because the application of Section 66-5-5(D) depends upon the number of convictions, rather than their sequence or status, and because no intent to preserve Driver\u2019s driving privileges is evinced by the relevant documents. This appeal followed.\nDISCUSSION\n{5} Driver argues that the \u201cfirst offense ... for all lawful purposes\u201d designation appearing in the plea agreement and the judgment and sentence should preclude MVD from revoking his license pursuant to Section 66-5-5(D), as a matter of due process. The issue presents a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Gaede, 2000-NMCA-004, \u00b6 7, 128 N.M. 559, 994 P.2d 1177. In determining whether Driver\u2019s due process rights have been violated, we conduct an independent review of the record and the applicable law. See id.\n{6} This Court has addressed similar circumstances in two recent cases. In Collyer v. State Taxation & Revenue Department, 1996-NMCA-029, 121 N.M. 477, 913 P.2d 665, Collyer challenged the revocation of his license pursuant to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-5-29(A)(3) (1993), which provides for the mandatory revocation of the license of any \u201csubsequent offender\u201d under the Motor Vehicle Code. Because Collyer\u2019s second conviction was entered pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the conviction was adjudicated as a \u201cfirst offense\u201d for the acknowledged purpose of preserving Collyer\u2019s driving privileges, this Court held that MVD\u2019s revocation of Collyer\u2019s license was in disregard of the terms of the judgment and sentence, and therefore reversed. See Collyer, 1996-NMCA-029, \u00b6\u00b6 4-7, 121 N.M. 477, 913 P.2d 665. Importantly, in Collyer, the only source of statutory authority for a license revocation of a person twice convicted of DWI was Section 66-5-29(A)(3). We also held that the district attorney had the authority to bind MVD by the plea agreement, pursuant to which the State expressly agreed not to revoke Collyer\u2019s license. See Collyer, 1996-NMCA-029, \u00b6\u00b6 8-12, 121 N.M. 477, 913 P.2d 665.\n{7} In the case of Gaede, 2000-NMCA-004, 128 N.M. 559, 994 P.2d 1177, the defendant challenged his sentencing as a fourth-time DWI offender pursuant to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-8-102(G) (1997). He asserted with regard to his first conviction that the sentencing judge had promised that the offense would be eliminated from his record if he complied with the terms of the sentence. See Gaede, 2000-NMCA-004, \u00b64, 128 N.M. 559, 994 P.2d 1177. Further, Gaede pointed to the terms of the subsequent convictions, which were designated \u201cfirst,\u201d \u201csecond,\u201d and \u201cthird\u201d offenses, in support of his argument that he could not be treated as a fourth offender. See id. \u00b6 9. The district court rejected these arguments, and this Court affirmed. With regard to the first conviction, we explained that the district court was entitled to give as little weight to Gaede\u2019s assertions regarding the alleged \u201cpromise\u201d as it saw fit. See id. More importantly, with regard to the \u201cfirst,\u201d \u201csecond,\u201d and \u201cthird\u201d offense designations, we explained that all three prior convictions constituted valid adjudications of guilt, such that the \u201cfourth-offender\u201d requirement of Section 66-8-102(G) was met notwithstanding the numerical references. See Gaede, 2000-NMCA-004, \u00b6 11, 128 N.M. 559, 994 P.2d 1177.\n{8} Applying these authorities to the instant case, we uphold the revocation of Driver\u2019s license. The statutory provision applied against Driver, Section 66 \u2014 5\u20145(D), merely requires a showing of three convictions within a ten-year period. Section 66-5-5(D) states: \u201cPersons not to be licensed. The division shall not issue a driver\u2019s license ... to any person ... who, within any ten-year period, is three times convicted of [DWI].\u201d Further, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-5-24(A) (1978) authorizes the division to cancel the license of a person not entitled to issuance thereof. Thus, as in Gaede, and unlike Collyer, the pertinent statute\u2019s application depends exclusively on the number of convictions, rather than the order in which they might have occurred. Nor does the portion of the plea agreement providing for treatment of the conviction as a first offense \u201cfor all lawful purposes\u201d preclude MVD from applying Section 66-5-5(D) in this case. Treatment of Driver\u2019s latest conviction as a first offense \u201cfor all lawful purposes\u201d does not eliminate the other convictions from Driver\u2019s record. We further note that the judgment entered against Driver is to be analogized to the judgment at issue in Gaede, and distinguished from Collyer, by the absence of any explicit agreement or acknowledgment that the judgment was intended to have the specific effect of preserving Driver\u2019s license to drive. See Gaede, 2000-NMCA-004, \u00b6\u00b6 17-18, 128 N.M. 559, 994 P.2d 1177. Based on these considerations, we hold that MVD was within its authority to revoke Driver\u2019s license.\n{9} Driver argues at length that the State\u2019s plea bargaining strategy created a belief in his mind that he would only be sentenced pursuant to Section 66-8-102, and that this expectation should be satisfied in the interest of preserving the integrity of the plea bargaining system. We find these arguments to be unpersuasive. Although we acknowledge the importance of plea bargaining to our system of criminal justice and recognize the need to ensure its fair administration, these considerations do not imply that the State is under an obligation to satisfy subjective and erroneous assumptions. MVD points out that drivers who wish to insure that their pleas do not result in adverse action pursuant to Section 66-5-5(D) need to make sure provisions to that effect are contained in the plea agreements and judgments as they were in Collyer in order to reap the benefits of the portion of the Collyer opinion dealing with the district attorney binding MVD.\nCONCLUSION\n{10} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the agreement to characterize Driver\u2019s latest conviction as a \u201cfirst offense\u201d did not preclude MVD\u2019s enforcement of Section 66-5-5(D) in this case. We therefore affirm.\n{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: A. JOSEPH ALARID and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judges.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PICKARD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Anthony James Ayala, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.",
      "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Julia Belles, Special Ass\u2019t Attorney General, Taxation and Revenue Department, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "2002-NMCA-065\n49 P.3d 77\nJohn P. ARMIJO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 21,585.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 2, 2001.\nCertiorari Granted July 27, 2001.\nCertiorari Quashed, No. 26,800, Jan. 11, 2002.\nAnthony James Ayala, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Julia Belles, Special Ass\u2019t Attorney General, Taxation and Revenue Department, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0398-01",
  "first_page_order": 430,
  "last_page_order": 432
}