{ "id": 260728, "name": "In the Matter of CHRISTOBAL V., a Child, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Christobal V.", "decision_date": "2002-05-30", "docket_number": "No. 21,795", "first_page": "474", "last_page": "479", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 N.M. 474" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "50 P.3d 569" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2002-NMCA-077" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 N.M. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584634 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552576 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715228 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356-57" }, { "page": "1362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566481 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-114", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834168 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563540 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "1053" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "1309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "1076" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322323 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708048 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "808" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352591 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-089", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217158 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b67" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827335 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575618 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577342 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573181 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0578-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 751, "char_count": 15337, "ocr_confidence": 0.687, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0944325908161151e-07, "percentile": 0.5664897837673162 }, "sha256": "1722cda0165ed64c448d03ff812d53e430ccb6f46ebd51c2a303e80cdea1fe2a", "simhash": "1:d70c3c3af67cf1d2", "word_count": 2540 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:52.963241+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Judge, and A. JOSEPH ALARID, Judge." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of CHRISTOBAL V., a Child, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCASTILLO, Judge.\n{1} In this case we are asked to review the effect of Rule 10-230.1(B) NMRA 2002 on an order entered 132 days after the filing of a motion to reconsider a child\u2019s disposition under the Children\u2019s Code. Christobal V. (Child) was originally sentenced to the custody of the New Mexico Youth Authority (Authority) for a two-year commitment. Child timely filed a motion to reconsider. The matter was set for hearing 132 days after the motion was filed. At the hearing, the State moved to dismiss the motion to reconsider arguing that Rule 10 230.1(B) requires such motions to be determined within ninety days from date of filing or they are deemed denied by operation of law. The children\u2019s court reconsidered the motion notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 10-230.1(B) and reduced the Child\u2019s sentence to one year. We reverse.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Child entered into a plea agreement wherein he pled no contest to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and was to be sentenced as a juvenile. There was no agreement as to disposition. The children\u2019s court filed a judgment and disposition sentencing Child to the custody of the Authority for a period not to exceed two years. On May 17, 2000, Child timely filed a motion to reconsider his disposition. Over a month later, Child filed a request for motion setting. Child did not submit an order setting a hearing on the motion together with the motion as provided by Rule 10-230.1(B). Notice of the hearing date was mailed to counsel on September 12, 2000, 118 days after the motion was filed. The hearing on Child\u2019s motion to reconsider was held on September 21, 2000, 132 days after the motion was filed.\n{3} At the motion hearing, pursuant to Rule 10-230.1(B), the State moved to dismiss Child\u2019s motion to reconsider on the grounds that the ninety-day period allowed for determination of this type of motion had expired. Based on its belief that the motion could be revived, the children\u2019s court denied the State\u2019s motion to dismiss and reduced Child\u2019s commitment from two years to one. All judicial action on the motion was taken more than ninety days after the motion was filed. The State appeals the order denying its motion to dismiss and entry of judgment reducing Child\u2019s commitment.\nDISCUSSION\n{4} Rule 10-230.1(B) states as follows:\nReduction of term of commitment. A motion to modify or reconsider the judgment or disposition may be filed by the respondent within thirty (30) days after the judgment is filed. A form of order setting a hearing on the motion shall be submitted with the motion. The court shall determine the motion within ninety (90) days after the date it is filed or the motion is deemed denied.\nThe State argues that the plain language of Rule 10-230.1(B) requires the children\u2019s court to rule on a motion to reconsider within ninety days from the date the motion is filed, or the motion is deemed denied by operation of law. We agree that the language is clear, its import unambiguous. The Rule gives the children\u2019s court ninety days to decide the motion and no more. The Rule has been approved by our Supreme Court. It would take a compelling argument for us to undertake a different interpretation of Rule 10-230.1.\n{5} Child urges affirmance based on four arguments. Relying on NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-2-23(G) (1995) and State v. Aguilar, 95 N.M. 578, 579, 624 P.2d 520, 521 (1981), Child first argues that the State has no right to appeal this decision. Secondly, Child claims that because the children\u2019s court invited the reconsideration, the children\u2019s court had the discretion to extend the ninety days in order to receive information necessary to make a determination. Child also contends that his due process rights would have been denied had the motion not been heard. Lastly, Child asserts that Rule 10-230.1(B) conflicts with the inherent purpose of Section 32A-2-23 of the Children\u2019s Code and therefore the statute, which does not set a time limit for determination of reconsideration motions, should control. We disagree with Child and reverse.\n{6} Before we discuss the arguments, we address Child\u2019s representation that the children\u2019s court initiated the reconsideration by inviting the motion and continued taking action by consistently apprising counsel that certain documents were needed in order to thoroughly and properly review Child\u2019s motion. The record does not support this description of events but, instead, discloses the following. After the children\u2019s court sentenced Child, Child\u2019s attorney asked the court, \u201cMay I be allowed to present for reconsideration?\u201d The children\u2019s court responded, \u201cSure.\u201d This exchange does not support Child\u2019s conclusion that the children\u2019s court invited the reconsideration. Furthermore, the children\u2019s court made no notations on the judgment and disposition that the sentence would be reconsidered.\n{7} Additionally, the alleged invitation to reconsider was not mentioned at any time during the hearing on the motion to reconsider. Child argued that the children\u2019s court had the discretion to rule on the motion and pointed to scheduling problems based on conversations with the children\u2019s court secretary that the children\u2019s court \u201cwanted to know what was new\u201d and \u201cwhether or not to schedule it.\u201d At the hearing on the motion, the children\u2019s court made no reference to problems with information gathering. On the contrary, the children\u2019s court alluded to scheduling problems by commenting that it was \u201cnot sure why we are setting these past ninety days.\u201d The children\u2019s court ruled that the late setting was not the fault of Child and concluded that \u201cif the rule provides that I am deemed to deny it (the motion), then I will. revive it.\u201d This record demonstrates that the children\u2019s court neither initiated nor invited the motion nor requested specific information before scheduling the hearing. We clarify this issue now because Child relies on a mistaken characterization of the record as the basis for two of his arguments. We now turn to Child\u2019s four points.\nRIGHT TO APPEAL\n{8} Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution as amended in 1965 provides that \u201can aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal.\u201d An \u201caggrieved party\u201d means a party whose interests are adversely affected. State v. Castillo, 94 N.M. 352, 354, 610 P.2d 756, 758 (Ct.App.1980). The State is aggrieved by a disposition contrary to law and may properly challenge such a disposition on appeal. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-17 (1999); State v. Santillanes, 96 N.M. 482, 486, 632 P.2d 359, 363 (Ct.App.1980), aff'd in part & rev\u2019d in part on other grounds by, 96 N.M. 477, 478, 632 P.2d 354, 355 (1981); State v. Doe, 95 N.M. 90, 92, 619 P.2d 194, 196 (Ct.App.1980). Consequently, this appeal is properly before this Court.\nCOURT\u2019S DISCRETION TO EXTEND TIME TO HEAR MOTION\n{9} Child acknowledges that the interpretation and application of the law by the children\u2019s court are subject to de novo review. We agree. State v. Brown, 1999-NMSC-004, \u00b6 8, 126 N.M. 642, 974 P.2d 136; State v. Muniz, 2000-NMCA-089, \u00b67, 129 N.M. 649, 11 P.3d 613.\n{10} Child argues that the children\u2019s court has discretion to extend time limitations for good cause shown, citing In re Ruben D., 2001-NMCA-006, \u00b6 23, 130 N.M. 110, 18 P.3d 1063. According to Child, there was good cause because the children\u2019s court invited the reconsideration and was waiting to receive the necessary documents for Child\u2019s disposition. Child\u2019s argument fails for two reasons. First, we find Child\u2019s reliance on In re Ruben D. to be misplaced. In that ease, although the original hearing was scheduled before child\u2019s commitment expired, the order was not entered until after expiration of the original commitment. This Court affirmed because the child had asked for an extension of time, which we considered good cause. In the case before us, however, no continuance was requested and no motion to enlarge time was ever filed. Rule 10-106 NMRA 2002. Further, the children\u2019s court did not invite the reconsideration and the record contains no references to the need for a letter and information on the pre-disposition recommendations.\nCHILD\u2019S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS\n{11} Child relies on Hayes v. State, 106 N.M. 806, 808, 751 P.2d 186, 188 (1988), arguing that his due process rights would have been denied if his motion had not been heard. In Hayes, the trial court initiated the idea of reconsideration and assured Hayes that his motion for reconsideration would be heard. The record in this case reveals that Child initiated the request to file a motion to reconsider and that unlike Hayes, the children\u2019s court did nothing to create any expectation that his sentence would be modified in the future. Child\u2019s argument fails because there are no facts in the record to support a violation of due process.\nPROVISIONS OF RULE AND STATUTE\n{12} In his last argument, Child argues that Section 32A-2-23(G) of the Children\u2019s Code conflicts with Rule 10-230.1(B), and the conflict should be reconciled in favor of Child. Child refers to language in the Children\u2019s Code which directs the Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure \u201cnot in conflict with the Children\u2019s Code.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-5(B) (1993). We review the construction of children\u2019s court rules de novo. Muniz, 2000-NMCA-089, \u00b6 7, 129 N.M. 649, 11 P.3d 613; State v. Carlos A., 1996\u2014 NMCA-082, \u00b6 6, 122 N.M. 241, 923 P.2d 608. Section 32A-2-23(G) reads as follows:\nA child may make a motion to modify a children\u2019s court or adult disposition within thirty days of the judge\u2019s decision. If the court is of the opinion that the matter should be reviewed, it may, upon notice to all necessary parties, proceed to a hearing in the manner provided for hearings on petitions alleging delinquency.\nChild emphasizes that this statute does not impose any time limitation for the determination of a motion to reconsider a child\u2019s sentence while Rule 10-230.1(B) sets a ninety-day limit. Child maintains that the legislature never intended to place such strict limitations on the court\u2019s authority to hear the motion. Thus, Child concludes that because the rule conflicts with the statute, the statute controls and prohibits the imposition of a deadline for the determination of motions.\n{13} While we agree that Section 32A-2-23(G) does not impose any time limitations regarding the disposition of motions, we do not agree that the language of the statute prohibits a rule imposing such a deadline. Generally, any conflict between rules of procedure of the Supreme Court and statutes that relate to procedure must be resolved in favor of the rules. Maestas v. Allen, 97 N.M. 230, 231, 638 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1982). To the extent that procedural rules of the children\u2019s court conflict with statutory provisions, the rules usually control. Smith v. Martinez, 96 N.M. 440, 441, 631 P.2d 1308, 1309 (1981). In re Paul T., 118 N.M. 538, 540, 882 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Ct.App.1994).\n{14} Child also relies on In re Zac McV., 1998-NMCA-114, \u00b6 16, 125 N.M. 583, 964 P.2d 144 for the proposition that Section 32A-2-23(G) provides the children\u2019s court with the authority to hear modification motions for \u201csuch further time as may be necessary to enable the court to rule on a motion.\u201d Because Rule 10-230.1(B) would limit the time allowed to hear the motion, Child concludes that under In re Zac McV. the rule conflicts with the statute. Child misreads our holding. In In re Zac McV., this Court differentiated between Section 32A-2-23(G), which pertains to child-initiated motions for reconsideration, and Section 32A-2-23(F), which pertains to court-invited motions for reconsideration. The holding of In re Zac McV. was based on a court-initiated motion. Rule 10-230.1(B) clearly applies to child-initiated motions, as it specifically refers to those motions \u201cfiled by the respondent,\u201d who is the juvenile in these cases. We see no conflict.\n{15} Lastly, Child relies on certain language in the Children\u2019s Code and in the children\u2019s court rules to argue that there is conflict and the statute should prevail. Whether a rule has the force of a law depends on whether the rule is promulgated in accordance with the statutory mandate to carry out and effectuate the purpose of the applicable statute. See Las Cruces v. Pub. Employee Labor Relations Bd., 121 N.M. 688, 690, 917 P.2d 451, 453 (1996); State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 356-57, 871 P.2d 1352, 1362-63 (1994). When a rule is not in conflict with legislative policy, the rule has the force of law. Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 111 N.M. 154, 156, 803 P.2d 243, 245 (1990). We recognize that the legislative purpose of the Children\u2019s Code is \u201cto provide judicial and other procedures through which the provisions of the Children\u2019s Code are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-3(B) (1999). Children\u2019s court rules \u201care intended to provide for the just determination of children\u2019s court proceedings. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay and to assure the recognition and enforcement of constitutional and other rights.\u201d Rule 10-101(B) NMRA 2002. The purposes of the Children\u2019s Code and the children\u2019s court rules are similar and we see nothing to prevent the application of Rule 10-230.1(B) ninety-day limit for determining a child-initiated motion to reconsider filed pursuant to Section 32A-2-23(G).\n{16} Child also acknowledges that both this Court and the Supreme Court have held thirty- and ninety-day jurisdictional time limits to be reasonable. See State v. Trujillo, 117 N.M. 769, 771, 877 P.2d 575, 577 (1994); Hayes, 106 N.M. at 808, 751 P.2d at 188 (stating that as a matter of law a motion is denied if the court does not enter a final ruling on it within a reasonable time frame of ninety days); Chavez-Rey v. Miller, 99 N.M. 377, 380, 658 P.2d 452, 455 (Ct.App.1982) (holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law). Child argues that his case can be distinguished because the trial court took action between the time of filing the motion and the hearing date. As stated above, the record shows otherwise.\nCONCLUSION\n{17} We hold that Rule 10-230.1(B) applies to child-initiated motions to reconsider authorized by Section 32A-2-23(G). Therefore, absent time enlargements allowed by Rule 10-106, the children\u2019s court must determine any child-initiated motion to reconsider within ninety days after the motion is filed, or such motion is deemed denied. Accordingly, the order of the children\u2019s court dated September 25, 2000, is reversed and the judgment and disposition entered on April 18, 2000, is reinstated.\n{18} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Judge, and A. JOSEPH ALARID, Judge.", "type": "majority", "author": "CASTILLO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.", "Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2002-NMCA-077\n50 P.3d 569\nIn the Matter of CHRISTOBAL V., a Child, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 21,795.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMay 30, 2002.\nCertiorari denied, No. 25,570, July 15, 2002.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.\nPhyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0474-01", "first_page_order": 506, "last_page_order": 511 }