{ "id": 15809, "name": "Jay Courtney FIKES, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter T. FURST, Ph.D., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Fikes v. Furst", "decision_date": "2002-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 20,717", "first_page": "146", "last_page": "158", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 N.M. 146" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "61 P.3d 855" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2003-NMCA-006" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 N.M. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580048 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" }, { "page": "1356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582545 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ohio St.3d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1737289 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/72/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10998206 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/587/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "holding statement that plaintiff was anti-Semitic not actionable" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ohio App.3d 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1791339 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding statement that plaintiff was anti-Semitic not actionable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/110/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 A.2d 972", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 712162, 712155 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980-81", "parenthetical": "concluding statement that plaintiff hated Jews not actionable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/136/0515-01", "/nj/136/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.J. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 712155 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding statement that plaintiff hated Jews not actionable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/136/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 F.Supp. 1218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7847047 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/874/1218-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" }, { "page": "1236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "calling someone a \"lousy agent\" commonly is non-libelous name-calling" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill.App.3d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2523132 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "calling someone a \"lousy agent\" commonly is non-libelous name-calling" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-107", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834255 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212323 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582487 ], "weight": 19, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563605 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "740" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "742" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "742", "parenthetical": "describing opinions as \"statements which cannot be proved or disproved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "1193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561204 ], "weight": 14, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "618" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "stating that characterizing problems at motorcycle rally as a \"big deal\" not actionable because not provable as false" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "characterizing problems as a \"big deal\" cannot be proved false, so statement not actionable" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision" }, { "page": "482" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "noting the Court's refusal to address issues unsupported by cited authority and consisting of a mere conclusory reference" }, { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "noting the Court's refusal to address issues unsupported by cited authority and consisting of a mere conclusory reference" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573161 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586329 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "1265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "858 F.2d 618", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10529292 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/858/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 F.Supp. 969", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3782119 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/614/0969-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" }, { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827320 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0396-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1328, "char_count": 32778, "ocr_confidence": 0.711, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.898253828779022e-08, "percentile": 0.4194937619915292 }, "sha256": "5021b0aeeb3221cc7f61b8cc7fbab9a2866bf27595e0e8670069916d3ada8fdd", "simhash": "1:b650ad20de8b1274", "word_count": 5155 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:22.762722+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judges." ], "parties": [ "Jay Courtney FIKES, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter T. FURST, Ph.D., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nROBINSON, Judge.\n{1} This case concerns a personal feud that began in the 1980s. Plaintiff and Defendant are both professors holding doctorate degrees. Each steadfastly believes that the other is out to destroy his reputation and career. After much contention between the two, Plaintiff brought this defamation action. We affirm in part and reverse in part the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in Defendant\u2019s favor on the defamation counts, and reverse as to the tortious interference with contract count.\nI. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n{2} The parties\u2019 dispute began when Plaintiff challenged the validity of certain observations Defendant made of the Huichol Indians in Mexico in the 1960s. Defendant and others reportedly observed practices including peyote enemas and waterfall jumping. Plaintiff studied the Huichol Indians in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and questioned the accuracy and legitimacy of Defendant\u2019s reports. Eventually, Plaintiff began a crusade, spanning more than a decade, to discredit Defendant\u2019s work.\n{3} Defendant, sensitive to Plaintiffs academic fraud claims, and responding to the threat he perceived to his long academic career, embarked on a similar quest to discredit Plaintiff. Over the course of a decade or more, Defendant made various derogatory statements about Plaintiff, some of which became the subject of the defamation cause of action in this case.\n{4} In addition, Plaintiff had a contract with Madison Books to publish a book he had written, entitled Carlos Castaneda: Academic Opportunism and the Psychedelic Sixties, that criticized Defendant\u2019s findings concerning the Huichol Indians. On April 1, 1992, Defendant wrote a letter to Madison Books threatening to sue if it published Plaintiffs book. Madison Books then declined to publish Plaintiffs book, in a letter to Plaintiff dated November 11, 1992. Defendant\u2019s letter provides the basis for Plaintiffs claim of tortious interference with contract.\n{5} Plaintiffs amended complaint presented seven causes of action. Over the course of the litigation, the district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on all counts. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges only the grant of summary judgment on Counts I and V, the defamation and tortious interference with contract claims. Plaintiff does not appeal the grant of summary judgment on the other counts.\nII. DEFAMATION\nA. Standard of Review\n{6} We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, \u00b6 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. \u201cSummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Id.; Rule 1-056(C) NMRA 2002. We consider the issues in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ruiz v. Garcia, 115 N.M. 269, 271, 850 P.2d 972, 974 (1993).\nB. Statute of Limitations\n{7} At the outset, we address Defendant\u2019s argument that several of the alleged defamatory statements were made outside of the applicable statute of limitations period. The statute of limitations for a defamation claim is three years. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 37-1-8 (1976). The statute of limitations runs in a defamation case from the point of publication of the defamatory statement. See Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, Inc., 614 F.Supp. 969, 981 (D.N.M.1985), rev\u2019d on other grounds sub nom Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of W. Art, 858 F.2d 618 (10th Cir.1988). It is Defendant\u2019s burden to show sufficient facts to establish a statute of limitations defense. See Romero v. Ole Tires, Inc., 101 N.M. 759, 761, 688 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.App.1984).\n{8} Here, two limitation periods are applicable. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 15, 1996, alleging that Defendant\u2019s statements in a June 22, 1995, letter to Dr. Joseph C. Winter defamed Plaintiff. The statements in this letter are not time-barred because they were made less than three years before Plaintiff filed his complaint. However, on June 25, 1997, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which added claims that Defendant defamed Plaintiff in various other statements not included in the June 1995 letter to Winter. Because the amended complaint cited facts, conduct, and injuries not found in the original, it did not relate back to the date the original complaint was filed. See Raven v. Marsh, 94 N.M. 116, 118, 607 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1980). Therefore, to be actionable, these statements had to have been made after June 25, 1994, or within the three years preceding the date Plaintiff filed his amended complaint.\n{9} Defendant argues in particular that three allegedly defamatory statements he made to Dr. Earl Joseph Volk were time-barred. We agree. These statements to Volk, a member of the Friends Committee for National Legislation, were that Plaintiff was a \u201clousy anthropologist\u201d; Plaintiff was \u201cincapable of doing a competent job on the Zingg manuscript\u201d; and Plaintiff was \u201cparanoid.\u201d In Volk\u2019s March 6, 1997, deposition, which Plaintiff cites for these statements, Volk stated that seven years had passed since his conversation with Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff does not offer any contrary evidence in his reply brief, instead making only a conclusory assertion that all of the statements were \u201cmade within the applicable statute of limitations.\u201d See State v. Clifford, 117 N.M. 508, 513, 873 P.2d 254, 259 (1994) (noting the Court\u2019s refusal to address issues unsupported by cited authority and consisting of a mere conclusory reference). We hold that these statements fall outside the limitations period applicable here.\n{10} Defendant maintains that his alleged statement that Plaintiff \u201ccommitted unethical and professional misconduct\u201d is also time-barred. Plaintiff gives two record citations for this statement. The first is to Defendant\u2019s deposition where he admitted making the statement, but not within the limitations period, and the other is to a 1989 letter to Plaintiff, copied to others. This is sufficient to make a prima facie case for the statute of limitations defense. Again, Plaintiff offers no contradictory evidence. We therefore hold this statement, too, was made outside of the three-year statute of limitations.\n{11} Defendant also claims that his statement to Dr. David Maybury-Lewis that Plaintiff was \u201cparanoid\u201d fell outside the limitations period. Maybury-Lewis, the director of the organization Cultural Survival, stated in his affidavit that Defendant told him this in November 1993. Under Raven, 94 N.M. at 118, 607 P.2d at 656, this statement is also time-barred, as it was made more than three years prior to the filing of the amended complaint and does not relate back.\n{12} Defendant also states that Plaintiffs claim that he called Plaintiff a \u201cracist\u201d is time-barred. Plaintiff cites to a letter from 1992 in support of the allegation. To the extent that the claim rests on this letter, it clearly is time-barred.\n{13} Defendant also claims that other statements, which he denies having made within the applicable statute of limitations period, should not be considered. Defendant was unable to say whether he had made statements that Plaintiff is \u201cdelusional\u201d and \u201cbeset by devils,\u201d \u201chas little grasp on reality,\u201d or \u201ccrazy\u201d within the previous three years. As for the statement that Plaintiff \u201cattempted to blackmail\u201d Defendant, Defendant similarly was uncertain, stating that he did not think he had made the statement within three years. This uncertainty is insufficient to make a prima facie case that the statements were not made within the limitations period. Therefore they are not time-barred.\nC. The Law of Defamation\n{14} In New Mexico, the plaintiff in a defamation case must prove nine elements of the tort. UJI 13-1002(B) NMRA 2002. In this case, the following elements are at issue with respect to some or all of the alleged defamatory statements:\n(2) whether the communication was defamatory;\n(3) whether the communication contains a statement of fact;\n(4) whether the person receiving the communication understood it to be defamatory; and\n(5) whether the communication proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff\u2019s reputation.\nUJI 13-1002(B)(5), (2), (6), (8). As we address the alleged defamatory statements, we discuss only those elements that are argued with respect to each statement.\n1. Defamatory Meaning\n{15} The Court must first determine whether the communication in question has a defamatory meaning. \u201cAt common law, a statement is considered defamatory \u2018if it has a tendency to render the party about whom it is published contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men from associating \"with him.\u2019 \u201d Andrews v. Stallings, 119 N.M. 478, 482, 892 P.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.1995) (quoting Bookout v. Griffin, 97 N.M. 336, 339, 639 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1982)). The jury instructions similarly but more accessibly advise that \u201c[djefamatory communications are those which tend to expose a person to contempt, to harm the person\u2019s reputation, or to discourage others from associating or dealing with [him].\u201d UJI 13-1007 NMRA 2002. This is to be determined based on the plain and obvious meaning of the communication. Id.; Moore v. Sun Publ\u2019g Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 380, 881 P.2d 735, 740 (Ct.App.1994).\n{16} While sometimes a communication is so obviously defamatory that it is deemed defamatory as a matter of law, often the statement is merely capable of a defamatory meaning. In the latter situation, the question of whether the communication was defamatory is left to the jury. See Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 404, 649 P.2d 462, 472 (1982); UJI 13-1007 Directions for Use.\n2. Fact Versus Opinion\n{17} Statements of mere opinion are not actionable for defamation. Brown, 98 N.M. at 404, 649 P.2d at 472. This is so because, as the Supreme Court observed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., \u201cUnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.\u201d 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). In order to support a defamation claim, the communication at issue must contain a statement of fact, or imply that it is based upon the existence of undisclosed facts. UJI 13-1004 NMRA 2002. The fact/opinion determination, however, is a fact-specific one that must be resolved for each statement. Brown, 98 N.M. at 401, 649 P.2d at 469. The fact finder is directed to consider \u201c[t]he entirety of the communication and the context in which the communication was made\u201d and \u201c[wjhether reasonable persons would be likely to understand the communication to be a statement of the defendant\u2019s opinion or a statement of fact.\u201d UJI 13-1004.\n{18} As many courts and commentators have noted, the distinction between fact and opinion is often elusive. See Moore, 118 N.M. at 382, 881 P.2d at 742. In addition to the two factors set out in the UJI, most courts, including ours, have followed the United States Supreme Court opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. by adding the consideration of whether the statement is verifiable. 497 U.S. 1, 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); see Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618. If the statement is verifiable, it is fact and not opinion. While the Milkovich case involved a plaintiff deemed a public figure, a media defendant, and a statement relating to matters of public concern, the assurance that a statement \u201cmust be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law\u201d is instructive even in private defamation cases such as this. See also Andrews, 119 N.M. at 486, 892 P.2d at 619 (stating that characterizing problems at motorcycle rally as a \u201cbig deal\u201d not actionable because not provable as false); Moore, 118 N.M. at 382, 881 P.2d at 742 (describing opinions as \u201cstatements which cannot be proved or disproved\u201d).\n{19} The role of this Court, therefore, is to determine whether the communications were unambiguously fact or unambiguously opinion. Brown, 98 N.M. at 404, 649 P.2d at 472. If we can say that a communication was wholly opinion, it is not actionable as a matter of law. If it is apparent that the statement was factual or clearly implicated a factual basis, then we proceed to determine whether it meets the other threshold requirements of the tort of defamation, and whether genuine issues of material fact exist so that it should go to the jury.\n3. Understanding by the Recipient\n{20} If the statement is susceptible to a defamatory meaning and may be factual or imply a factual basis, then it must be determined whether the recipient understood the communication to be defamatory. Uniform Jury Instruction 13-1008 requires that \u201cthe defamatory meaning of the communication must be understood by the person to whom it was communicated.... It is what the recipient of the communication reasonably understood the meaning to be that controls; not what the defendant may have intended to convey.\u201d UJI 13-1008 NMRA 2002. \u201cIf a defamatory statement is made to a person who knows that the statement is untrue, then a publication has not occurred.\u201d Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, \u00b6 23, 125 N.M. 500, 964 P.2d 61.\n{21} Defendant argues that none of the recipients of the alleged defamatory communieations believed them, and therefore none of the statements are actionable. In no other sense does Defendant deny that the statements were published to third parties. See UJI 13-1003 NMRA 2002 (\u201cPublication is an intentional or negligent communication to one other than the person defamed.\u201d).\n4. Resulting Damages\n{22} Defendant also contends that Plaintiff has failed to prove he suffered any damages. Damages are predicated on \u201cactual injury proximately caused [to Plaintiff] by the defamatory communication.\u201d UJI 13-1010 NMRA 2002. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit to the court that stated he had suffered humiliation, stress, and mental anguish as a result of Defendant\u2019s defamatory statements to his colleagues. The affidavit also outlines lost job opportunities and other consequences Plaintiff attributes to the alleged defamation. This affidavit is sufficient to create an issue of material fact with respect to damages resulting from those statements we hold below to be actionable, leaving damages an issue that must be decided by a jury.\n{23} We now turn to the statements themselves, and address them each with respect to the three remaining contested elements of defamation.\nD. The Alleged Defamatory Statements\n1. \u201cLousy Anthropologist\u201d\n{24} Defendant made the statement that Plaintiff was a \u201clousy anthropologist\u201d in a letter to Winter, the University of New Mexico anthropologist who organized the Huichol Indian Assistance Program. On its face, this statement is susceptible to a defamatory meaning. We next ask whether it is a statement of fact or of opinion. We hold that a reasonable person hearing this accusation would not accept it as fact, but rather determine it to be the personal opinion of one anthropologist. See Brown, 98 N.M. at 401, 649 P.2d at 469; Valentine v. N. Am. Co., 16 Ill.App.3d 277, 305 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1973) (calling someone a \u201clousy agent\u201d commonly is non-libelous name-calling). Nor does this statement imply facts such that the statement is actionable. See Brown, 98 N.M. at 404, 649 P.2d at 472. Therefore, this statement is non-actionable opinion, and we need not continue its analysis.\n2.Unqualified to Work on the Huichol Indian Assistance Project\n{25} According to the deposition testimony of Dr. Bruce Bernstein, Defendant \u201con more than one occasion went through a litany of reasons why [Plaintiff] was unqualified\u201d for the Huichol project. Bernstein was the Chief Curator and Assistant Director of the Museum of New Mexico, and was interested in Plaintiffs effort to publish Robert Zingg\u2019s manuscript, \u201cHuichol Mythology.\u201d Dr. Joan O\u2019Donnell of the School of American Research also stated that Defendant told her that there was a project he thought Plaintiff was unqualified for. The statements to Bernstein in particular are defamatory per se, because they plainly impute to Plaintiff \u201cunfitness to perform duties of office or employment for profit\u201d and/or \u201csome falsity which prejudices plaintiff in his or her profession.\u201d Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 429, 773 P.2d 1231, 1236 (1989). Not only did these statements speak directly about Plaintiffs professional qualifications, or lack thereof, Defendant himself admitted that such statements would be false. The defamatory nature of these statements is prima facie apparent.\n{26} There is also a question of fact as to whether these were opinions or factually based statements. The specificity of the statement that Plaintiff was \u201cunqualified for a particular job\u201d implies that he lacked specific required credentials. This question is sufficiently susceptible to verification, that is, being proven true or false, that a jury should make that determination.\n{27} Defendant also argues that Bernstein did not believe these statements, so they could not meet the \u201cunderstanding by recipient\u201d aspect of defamation. We disagree with Defendant\u2019s formulation of this element. The UJI considers a statement to be \u201cunpublished\u201d if the recipient knew it to be untrue. UJI 13-1003. We find nothing in Bernstein\u2019s deposition to indicate that he knew the statements to be untrue. To the contrary, Bernstein stated that the tension between the parties affected his relationship with both parties and he was inclined to take \u201csteps backward\u201d from both of them. He also described Defendant as an \u201celder statesman of anthropology and respected for the work he did amongst Huichol people.\u201d Given this context, there is a factual dispute for the jury to resolve as to whether Bernstein knew the statements to be untrue. These statements should have gone to a jury.\n{28} As to the statement made to O\u2019Donnell, it is too vague to be evaluated or found defamatory. Therefore, it is non-actionable. See Leyba v. Renger, 874 F.Supp. 1218, 1221 (D.N.M.1994) (holding statement \u201cLeyba did not have the full support of the men in the anesthesia group\u201d not defamatory because it was vague, had elements of fact and opinion and did not specifically address professional skills or credentials); Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding that plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision).\n3. \u201cReligious Fanatic\u201d\n{29} Dr. Kelly Klein read the June 22, 1995, letter Defendant wrote to Winter, gleaning from it the information that Plaintiff was a \u201creligious fanatic.\u201d This statement, however, is not contained in that letter. That letter refers to \u201cfanaticism,\u201d but not in conjunction with Plaintiffs purported religious beliefs. Given the lack of evidence that this statement was made as Plaintiff claims, Plaintiff is unable to support his contention that this communication was either defamatory or published. Therefore, we will not address this alleged statement further, and we hold that summary judgment was properly granted with respect to it.\n4. \u201cAnti-Semitic\u201d\n{30} Both Bernstein and O\u2019Donnell stated that Defendant told them he thought Plaintiff was anti-Semitic. The accusation that Plaintiff was anti-Semitic is non-actionable opinion. Recognized treatises on defamation as well as a majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation, \u00a7 2.4.7 (3d ed.2001) (stating charges of bigotry or racism ordinarily are not actionable); Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 643 A.2d 972, 980-81 (1994) (concluding statement that plaintiff hated Jews not actionable); Condit v. Clermont County Review, 110 Ohio App.3d 755, 675 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1996) (holding statement that plaintiff was anti-Semitic not actionable); Rambo v. Cohen, 587 N.E.2d 140, 148-49 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (same). Such statements are not actionable because they are hyperbolic and ambiguous as well as unverifiable. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, when a \u201cstatement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\u201d Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ\u2019g Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 649 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The term \u201canti-Semite\u201d is not verifiable because it represents a clearly subjective point of view. See id. The only verification of a person\u2019s bigoted motives is in the mind and conscience of that person.\n{31} Plaintiff argues that the statement that someone is \u201canti-Semitic\u201d is factual because it implies specific, undisclosed, defamatory facts. Brown, 98 N.M. at 404, 649 P.2d at 472. The implication that Plaintiff may have done or said something Defendant perceived as anti-Semitic does not alter our analysis. Plaintiffs motives are not verifiable.\n5. \u201cRacist\u201d\n{32} Plaintiff cites Defendant\u2019s deposition testimony in support of his allegation that Defendant called him a \u201cracist.\u201d In his deposition, Defendant answered the question whether he called Plaintiff a racist by stating \u201conly in the sense that he called the Huichols dirty and nosy and so forth.\u201d Because Plaintiff does not offer evidentiary support for his allegation that the statement was made and published, this statement is not actionable.\n6. \u201cEthnocentric\u201d\n{33} The sole record support Plaintiff cites for this claim is Defendant\u2019s deposition, in which he admitted that he had called Plaintiff \u201cethnocentric\u201d within the previous three years. Whether this statement might have a defamatory meaning must be considered in context. See Marchiondo v. N.M. State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 288, 648 P.2d 321, 327 (Ct.App.1981), overruled on other grounds by Brown, 98 N.M. at 404, 649 P.2d at 472. While the specific context of the statement was not presented at the summary judgment stage, the entire context of the debate between Plaintiff and Defendant revolves around issues of Huichol culture and sensitivity. In such a context, a charge of ethnocentricity may well be defamatory. We do not find it defamatory as a matter of law. Marchiondo, 98 N.M. at 287, 648 P.2d at 326.\n{34} In determining whether such a comment is fact or mere opinion requires an evaluation of \u201c(1) the entirety of the publication; (2) the extent that the truth or falsity may be determined without resort to speculation; and (3) whether reasonably prudent persons reading the publication would consider the statement as an expression of opinion or a statement of fact.\u201d Brown, 98 N.M. at 401, 649 P.2d at 469. Because Plaintiffs evidence does not elucidate the context or the audience of the statement, we are unable to determine it to be opinion or factual in nature. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden as stated in UJI 13-1002.\n7. \u201cChristian Fundamentalist\u201d\n{35} Plaintiffs allegation that Defendant called him a \u201cChristian fundamentalist\u201d also is lacking in factual support. Plaintiff cites Stacy Schaefer\u2019s deposition for this communication. That deposition, however, does not even use the words \u201cChristian fundamentalist.\u201d Because Plaintiff has failed to provide adequate record support for the existence of the statement, the statement is not actionable for defamation. UJI 13-1002.\n8. Statements About Plaintiffs Mental State\n{36} We need not address these statements separately, because they all are non-actionable opinion statements. These statements describe Plaintiff as \u201cpursuing a half-assed fantasy,\u201d \u201cpursuing a bizarre obsession,\u201d \u201cparanoid,\u201d \u201cdelusional,\u201d \u201cbeset by devils,\u201d \u201ccrazy,\u201d and \u201c[having] little grasp on reality.\u201d Even if they satisfied the other elements of defamation, none of these statements is objectively verifiable. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 486, 892 P.2d at 619 (characterizing problems as a \u201cbig deal\u201d cannot be proved false, so statement not actionable). Nor can their truth or falsity be determined without resort to speculation. See Brown, 98 N.M. at 401, 649 P.2d at 469. Defendant\u2019s assessments or interpretations of Plaintiffs mental state are not actionable because they are reasonably considered expressions of opinion. In some contexts, such statements about another\u2019s mental state could qualify as statements of fact. See 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation, \u00a7 4.3.1. For example, a statement made by a psychiatrist or other mental health professional might require a different analysis. The statements here, when taken in their context as statements by one anthropologist about a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual.\n9. Made \u201cSome Threat Against the Faculty\u201d\n{37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein\u2019s statement that \u201cI believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]\u201d This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the \u201cthreat\u201d is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision).\n{38} Even if actionable, there is insufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs contention that the statement had a defamatory meaning. The context of the statement reveals that Defendant\u2019s meaning of \u201cthreat\u201d was not of physical violence, but \u201ca battle of words and letters\u201d among anthropologists. Bernstein explained that Defendant\u2019s statements occurred \u201cin defending anthropology\u201d and stated that \u201cit\u2019s quite common those things happen.\u201d Given this context, it does not appear that this kind of statement would make Plaintiff an object of public scorn. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 482, 892 P.2d at 615. Therefore, the statement was not actionable, and the district court was correct in granting summary judgment for Defendant on this statement.\n10. Statements Pertaining to University of Michigan\n{39} Plaintiff received his doctoral degree from the University of Michigan. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made three statements regarding Plaintiffs academic credentials and relationship with the University of Michigan. Defendant allegedly asserted that the University of Michigan \u201cdisowned\u201d Plaintiff, \u201cdidn\u2019t want anything to do with him,\u201d and was \u201csorry they had ever given him or provided him with a doctor\u2019s degree.\u201d\n{40} These statements are all susceptible to a defamatory meaning. There was deposition testimony about the importance of one\u2019s affiliation with one\u2019s academic institution and the ability to obtain recommendations from that institution in order to secure employment. Therefore, at least in the academic context of this dispute, such comments could harm Plaintiffs reputation or discourage others from associating or dealing with him. See UJI 13-1007.\n{41} These statements can also be construed as factual. Statements that imply the speaker\u2019s reliance on specific, undisclosed facts are considered factual for these purposes. UJI 13-1004; Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 566, cmt. c (1976). Not only is there an implication that .this information came from the Michigan faculty, but Defendant stated that he had received this information from the chair of the anthropology department at Michigan.\n{42} Defendant argues that the recipients of these communications did not believe them. \u201cBelief,\u201d however, is not the standard. According to UJI 13-1008, the requirement is that the actual audience understood the communication to have a defamatory meaning. Even though one recipient, O\u2019Donnell, stated she did not \u201cbelieve\u201d the statements, she acknowledged they were \u201cextreme\u201d ad hominem attacks. The fact that Defendant\u2019s statements caused Bernstein \u201cto have a much more cautious approach\u201d in his dealing with Plaintiff implies that he understood the statements to be defamatory.\n{43} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the challenged elements of defamation in the Michigan statements are all open-fact questions that should have gone to a jury. We remand for further proceedings as to these statements.\n11.Plaintiff Wrote a \u201cLibelous\u201d Book and \u201cAttempted to Blackmail\u201d Defendant\n{44} The only record support Plaintiff cites for these statements is Defendant\u2019s deposition, in which he acknowledges having made the statements within the previous three years. Because Plaintiff does not offer evidence to indicate to whom these statements were made, we are unable to determine whether their defamatory meaning was understood. Because Plaintiff did not present evidence on all of the elements of the tort with respect to these statements, he did not meet his burden and summary judgment was proper.\nIII.TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT\n{45} Defendant\u2019s April 1, 1992, letter to Madison Books is the basis for Plaintiffs claim of tortious interference with contract. Tortious interference with contract requires Plaintiff to show that Defendant \u201cused improper means or acted with an improper motive intended solely to harm [Plaintiff].\u201d Silverman, 1998-NMCA-107, \u00b6 28, 125 N.M. 500, 964 P.2d 61. This Court has defined \u201c \u2018improper means\u2019 as actions which are innately wrongful or predatory in character.\u201d Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 102 N.M. 201, 207, 692 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Ct.App.1984). The issue here is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Defendant\u2019s motivation so as to preclude the grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff points out that Defendant had previously threatened to sue him over another dispute, but never acted on it. Plaintiff maintains that this prior \u201cempty\u201d threat is evidence of Defendant\u2019s improper motive in writing the letter, and lack of true concern about his reputation.\n{46} Plaintiff also suggests that the evidence supports an inference that Defendant never had any intent to litigate the matter, even if Madison Books had published Plaintiffs book. Plaintiffs book was published by Millennia Press and Defendant has maintained that portions of the book are defamatory. Nonetheless, Defendant has not taken action against Millennia Press. One possible inference from these facts is that Defendant never intended to litigate and only threatened to do so in order to harm Plaintiff. If there is any dispute of material fact, this claim must go to the jury. See Rule 1-056. Here, the key question of Defendant\u2019s intent in writing to Madison Books is in question. Plaintiff has cited evidence to support an inference that Defendant merely sought to harm him.\n{47} We also reject Defendant\u2019s argument that the letter did not cause Madison Books to abandon publication. Defendant suggests that Madison Books determined independently that the book was libelous in its current version. However, based on the communications from Madison Books itself, including a letter to Plaintiff stating \u201cwe have decided not to publish your proposed book\u201d due to \u201cthreats of litigation,\u201d the jury could find that Defendant\u2019s letter precipitated the decision not to publish Plaintiffs book. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this count.\nIV.CONCLUSION\n{48} We reverse the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to the following alleged defamatory statements: (1) unqualified to work on the Huichol Indian Assistance Project; (2) University of Michigan had \u201cdisowned\u201d Plaintiff; (3) University of Michigan \u201cdidn\u2019t want anything to do with him\u201d; and (4) University of Michigan was \u201csorry they had ever given him or provided him with a doctor\u2019s degree.\u201d We also reverse summary judgment for Defendant on the tortious interference claim. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{49} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judges.\n. We note that Defendant does not contend that he is a public figure or limited public figure, such that Plaintiff would have the burden of proving that the statements were made with a more malicious intent than mere negligence. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974).", "type": "majority", "author": "ROBINSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David M. Overstreet, Overstreet & Associates, P.C., Alamogordo, NM, for Appellant.", "Michael W. Brennan, Madison, Harbour, Mroz & Brennan, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2003-NMCA-006\n61 P.3d 855\nJay Courtney FIKES, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter T. FURST, Ph.D., Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 20,717.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 18, 2002.\nCertiorari granted, No. 27,824, Jan. 13, 2003.\nDavid M. Overstreet, Overstreet & Associates, P.C., Alamogordo, NM, for Appellant.\nMichael W. Brennan, Madison, Harbour, Mroz & Brennan, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0146-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 190 }