{ "id": 1428015, "name": "Peter Mack BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C.B. TRUJILLO, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Trujillo", "decision_date": "2004-01-28", "docket_number": "No. 23,529", "first_page": "365", "last_page": "374", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 N.M. 365" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "88 P.3d 881" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2004-NMCA-040" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1998-NMCA-131", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834301 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Idaho 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4376944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying equity when the actions of the purchaser \"prevented\" the debtor from complying with the statute" }, { "page": "1055", "parenthetical": "applying equity when the actions of the purchaser \"prevented\" the debtor from complying with the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/45/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 717010 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "stating that the party seeking review has the burden of providing an adequate record to review the issues on appeal" }, { "page": "1024", "parenthetical": "stating that the party seeking review has the burden of providing an adequate record to review the issues on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657, 661" }, { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill.Dec. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App.3d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3268398 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 P.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 6791095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/551/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.E. 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "setting aside a purchase when a property worth $4000 was sold for less than $400 at the sheriffs sale and there were multiple deficiencies in the requirements for sale" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 Ill. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 6045150 ], "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "setting aside a purchase when a property worth $4000 was sold for less than $400 at the sheriffs sale and there were multiple deficiencies in the requirements for sale" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/264/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Mont. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 5007031 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding an equitable extension when a 320-acre farm with outbuildings and granaries was mortgaged to secure a debt of $1000, which was a \"fraction of its real value\"" }, { "page": "136, 140-42", "parenthetical": "upholding an equitable extension when a 320-acre farm with outbuildings and granaries was mortgaged to secure a debt of $1000, which was a \"fraction of its real value\"" }, { "page": "141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/101/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 U.S. 180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8299666 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/117/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Vand. L.Rev. 599", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Vand. L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 707017 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" }, { "page": "372-73" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "374", "parenthetical": "stating that the trial court found that prior to the purchaser's misconduct, the debtor was \"ready, willing and able\" to pay the redemption amount at the proper time" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 P. 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29", "parenthetical": "permitting an equitable extension when debtor properly tendered amount specified by the court clerk, but the clerk had misstated the rate of interest" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Kan. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 280139 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "permitting an equitable extension when debtor properly tendered amount specified by the court clerk, but the clerk had misstated the rate of interest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/99/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Kan. App.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 394546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "permitting an equitable extension when purchaser filed a voucher with the court increasing the redemption amount by $290.30 two days after debtor properly tendered payment to the court" }, { "page": "585-86", "parenthetical": "permitting an equitable extension when purchaser filed a voucher with the court increasing the redemption amount by $290.30 two days after debtor properly tendered payment to the court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan-app-2d/5/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-140", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77151 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6-7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 P. 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883", "parenthetical": "holding that tender conditioned on delivery of a deed is not effective" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.M. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841444 ], "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144", "parenthetical": "holding that tender conditioned on delivery of a deed is not effective" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/26/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N.M. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1554384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "holding that a conditional tender is not effective" }, { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "holding that a conditional tender is not effective" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566584 ], "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557926 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 P. 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 2, "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "characterizing redemption as \"a statutory right that is not to be enlarged by judicial interpretation\"" }, { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "holding that a tender on the condition that purchaser execute a deed and agree that nothing more is due is not effective" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.M. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4693252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "characterizing redemption as \"a statutory right that is not to be enlarged by judicial interpretation\"" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/18/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566535 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77124 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-113", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834303 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-151", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77161 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0665-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1330, "char_count": 33583, "ocr_confidence": 0.653, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3587103995952702e-07, "percentile": 0.6350389540085155 }, "sha256": "6bff11cc9555bd4f8ded9ee6c69b22880e5465ae2e2e3cdadb2db15c5895f520", "simhash": "1:be46fc73c6aa5f67", "word_count": 5537 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:21.658788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ALARID and SUTIN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Peter Mack BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C.B. TRUJILLO, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nPICKARD, J.\n{1} Petitioner (Debtor) appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment, which dismissed his petition to redeem property sold under judgment or decree of foreclosure. Debtor argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had not substantially complied with the redemption statute as a matter of law. Debtor also contends that genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude the trial court\u2019s denial of an extension of the redemption period in equity, but we interpret his argument as raising the issue of law of whether, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Debtor, equity permits the trial court to grant an extension. Finally, Debtor asserts that Respondent (Purchaser) waived his right to strict compliance with the redemption statute by agreeing to issue a quitclaim deed in exchange for the redemption price. We affirm.\nFACTS AND PROCEEDINGS\n{2} Debtor owned a tract of property in Tres Piedras, New Mexico, on which a predecessor to Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) held a mortgage. In June 2000, Chase began foreclosure proceedings that concluded with a foreclosure judgment against Debtor in November 2000. At a sheriffs sale of the property on October 24, 2001, Purchaser acquired the property. The order confirming the sale was not issued until December 21, 2001.\n{3} When the court entered the order confirming the sale, the time for Debtor to exercise his right to redemption commenced. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-5-18 (1987). Debtor\u2019s mortgage had shortened the redemption period to one month. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-5-19 (1965) (permitting the nine-month statutory period for redemption to be shortened by contract to not less than one month). The parties operate under the assumption that the final day for redemption was January 20, 2002. But see U.S. Bank Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n v. Martinez, 2003-NMCA-151, \u00b6 5, 134 N.M. 665, 81 P.3d 608 (holding that one-month period means a calendar month so that redemption period for a sale confirmed on December 21 would end on January 21).\n{4} Debtor made arrangements with Arriba Mortgage Company to secure private financing- that would enable him to redeem the property. Debtor worked with Taos Title Company (Taos Title), which contacted Purchaser. According to Debtor, Purchaser agreed to come to a closing on January 11, 2002, where he would execute a quitclaim deed in exchange for the full amount required for redemption. On January 11th, Purchaser did not come to the closing, although Debtor had deposited the funds in escrow with Taos Title. On January 14th, a representative of Taos Title called Purchaser, and Purchaser denied having ever agreed to come to the closing and stated that he was unwilling to deal with Debtor. The private lenders from whom Arriba Mortgage had secured financing would not agree to place their funds in the district court registry to effect redemption. In the remaining six days before the expiration of the redemption period, Debtor was unable to find any alternative financing.\n{5} On January 17, 2002, Debtor filed a petition to redeem property sold under judgment or decree of foreclosure (Petition). The Petition was not accompanied by the deposit of funds with the clerk of the district court, as prescribed by Section 39-5-18(A)(2). Instead, Debtor requested that the district court \u201cwaive any requirement of deposit of funds with the Court\u201d because \u201call funds needed to satisfy the [Purchaser] have been available at Taos Title Company ... and cannot be released to [Purchaser] until he signs a Quitclaim deed to [Debtor].\u201d Debtor attached an affidavit from the Special Master in the foreclosure case, which stated that the Special Master had informed Purchaser that the funds were available at Taos Title and that Purchaser had not completed the closing. The Petition also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim that was dismissed by the trial court and is not at issue in this appeal.\n{6} Purchaser answered that Debtor had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and he counterclaimed for quiet title and declaratory judgment confirming the sale of the property. He also made a claim for unlawful detainer and rent, which was subsequently settled and is not at issue on appeal. Purchaser then moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Debt- or had failed to meet the statutory requirements for redemption as a matter of law. In response, Debtor put forth the arguments that he had substantially complied with the requirements of the redemption statute and that he was entitled to an extension of the redemption period in equity.\n{7} After a hearing on July 22, 2002, the trial court issued an oral ruling granting summary judgment for Purchaser. The court noted that Debtor\u2019s petition was not filed with cash as required by the statute, that the money was no longer in escrow at Taos Title, and that none of Debtor\u2019s actions rose to the level of substantial compliance.\n{8} Debtor moved for reconsideration and provided four additional affidavits to the court. Fust, an employee of Taos Title stated that all the arrangements had been made for the January 11th closing, that Purchaser had been notified, and that Purchaser \u201cindicated that he was agreeable and would come\u201d to the closing. Second, the private lenders with whom Arriba Mortgage had contracted for the funds stated that they \u201cwould not agree to place the funds in the District Court\u201d when they learned that the closing had not been completed. Third, a representative of Arriba Mortgage stated that after the closing had fallen through, the private lenders had told him that \u201cthey did not want to have their money tied-up with the District Court pending the outcome of a legal dispute.\u201d Finally, Debtor explained that he \u201chad great difficulty\u201d obtaining financing for the redemption and that he \u201crelied on [Taos Title\u2019s employee\u2019s] assurances that [Purchaser] was agreeable and would attend the closing, and did not make further efforts to find an alternative lender who would allow the money to be deposited in court.\u201d Purchaser\u2019s response included his own affidavit, stating that he had never agreed to come to the closing and had never agreed to sign a quitclaim deed.\n{9} On August 26, 2002, Debtor placed the redemption amount into the court registry. That same day, the court heard Debt- or\u2019s motion for reconsideration. The arguments in this hearing focused mostly on Debtor\u2019s request for an extension of the redemption period in equity. The trial court remained unconvinced. It stated that Debt- or was not entitled to equitable relief because, even assuming Purchaser\u2019s misrepresentation as to the closing, Debtor still had the option of depositing the funds in the court registry before the redemption period expired. Finding that any factual issue pertaining to Purchaser\u2019s agreement to come to the closing was \u201cperipheral,\u201d the trial court denied Debtor\u2019s motion for reconsideration of its summary judgment for Purchaser and entered its final order.\nDISCUSSION\n{10} \u201dOn appeal of an order granting summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and the evidence is reviewed to determine whether there are disputed material factual issues warranting trial on the merits.\u201d Blackwood & Nichols Co. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 1998-NMCA-113, \u00b6 5, 125 N.M. 576, 964 P.2d 137 (citation omitted). We review the issues de novo, considering the whole record. Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 2003-NMSC-019, \u00b6 7, 134 N.M. 133, 74 P.3d 67.\nISSUE ONE: Substantial Compliance\n{11} Debtor\u2019s stated argument is that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he substantially complied with the provisions of Section 39-5-18, which sets forth the procedures for redemption. We, however, view his argument as raising the question of law of whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, the trial court could find substantial compliance. Section 39-5-18 reads:\nA. After sale of any real estate pursuant to any such judgment or decree of any court, the real estate may be redeemed by the former defendant owner of the real estate\n(1) by paying to the purchaser, his personal representatives or assigns, at any time within nine months from the date of sale, the amount paid, with interest from the date of purchase at the rate of ten percent a year, together with all taxes, interest and penalties thereon, and all payments made to satisfy in whole or in part any prior lien or mortgage not foreclosed, paid by the purchaser, with interest on such taxes, interest, penalties and payments made on liens or mortgages at the rate of ten percent a year from the date of payment; or\n(2) by petitioning the district court in which the judgment or decree of foreclosure was entered for a certificate of redemption and by making a deposit of the amount set forth in Paragraph (1) of this subsection in cash in the office of the clerk of the district court in which the order, judgment or decree under which the sale was made was entered, at any time within nine months from the date of sale.\n{12} Debtor argues that the trial court misapplied the law by failing to consider statutory provisions permitting tender of the redemption amount directly to the purchaser and by \u201capplying an unduly technical and rigid approach to substantial compliance.\u201d He also states that the trial court improperly decided that the disputed fact of Purchaser\u2019s agreement to come to the closing was not material to this issue. We disagree with Debtor\u2019s arguments.\n{13} Substantial compliance is a doctrine of statutory interpretation that examines whether an actor follows a statute \u201csufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted\u201d and in a manner that \u201caccomplishes the reasonable objectives of the statute.\u201d Lane v. Lane, 1996-NMCA-023, \u00b6 17, 121 N.M. 414, 912 P.2d 290 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The doctrine is premised on the concept that the Legislature \u201ccannot anticipate every contingency.\u201d Id. Our analysis examines the nature and purpose of the statute, and we examine the acts purporting to achieve compliance in light of \u201cthe purposes served by strict compliance with the letter of the statute.\u201d Id. \u00b6 18.\n{14} Redemption is a statutory right that our courts construe narrowly. See Union Esperanza Mining Co. v. Shandon Mining Co., 18 N.M. 153, 165, 135 P. 78, 80 (1913) (characterizing redemption as \u201ca statutory right that is not to be enlarged by judicial interpretation\u201d); see also 30 Am. Jur.2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments \u00a7 434 (1994) (stating that \u201cthe right of redemption is recognized as a substantive right to be exercised in strict compliance with statutory terms\u201d). Originally, our redemption statute permitted only one course of action: payment of the redemption amount to the purchaser. NMSA 1915, \u00a7 4775 (1909). In the 1930 case of Richardson v. Pacheco, 35 N.M. 243, 244, 294 P. 328, 328 (1930), a debtor who could not find the purchaser in time to tender the redemption amount attempted to redeem the property by tendering cash to the clerk of the district court. Our Supreme Court rejected this effort, holding that the debtor could achieve redemption only by following the letter of the statute. Id. at 245, 294 P. at 329. In 1931, the Legislature amended the statute to permit redemption through a cash deposit in the office of the clerk of the district court. 1931 N.M. Laws ch. 149, \u00a7\u00a7 2, 4, 6.\n{15} Our key case examining substantial compliance with the redemption statute is Dalton v. Franken Construction Cos., 1996\u2014 NMCA-041, 121 N.M. 539, 914 P.2d 1036. In that case, the debtor tendered an unendorsed cashier\u2019s check to the district court on the last day of the redemption period, and the funds were not transferred into the court account until after the redemption period expired due to the judge\u2019s being out of town and the court\u2019s policy of not signing faxed orders. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 5-6. We held that the failure to tender cash or its equivalent to the court before the deadline was \u201cmore than merely a technical deficiency\u201d and did not rise to the level of substantial compliance. Id. \u00b6 14.\n{16} Debtor argues that placing the redemption amount in escrow at Taos Title was the functional equivalent of paying Purchaser. We disagree. The difference between making money available to Purchaser upon his execution of a quitclaim deed at a closing at an escrow company and giving Purchaser cash in hand is apparent, and the difference is greater than the deviation from the standard procedure asserted in Dalton. In fact, such a conditional tender has been expressly rejected by our Supreme Court. Moise v. Timm, 33 N.M. 166, 167, 262 P. 535, 535 (1927) (holding that a conditional tender is not effective); Nutter v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 26 N.M. 140, 144, 189 P. 882, 883 (1920) (holding that tender conditioned on delivery of a deed is not effective); Union Esperanza Mining Co., 18 N.M. at 165, 135 P. at 80 (holding that a tender on the condition that purchaser execute a deed and agree that nothing more is due is not effective).\n{17} Debtor argues that those cases are no longer good law in light of NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-5-23 (1931), which requires the pur- ' chaser to execute and record evidence of the. redemption. Thus, Debtor argues that the quitclaim deed was nothing more than what Section 39-5-23 requires. That statute, however, does not indicate that a debtor or its financier can condition the payment to the purchaser required by Section 39-5-18(A)(l) upon Section 39-5-23\u2019s previous or eontemporaneous satisfaction. Moreover, we do not know what problems might have erupted at the closing that caused the lenders in this case to make the availability of funds conditional or to refuse to deposit them with the court. As indicated above, we still believe that the deviation from statutory compliance is more significant than in Dalton and that Moise and the other cases remain good law under the facts of this case. By conditionally tendering money to Purchaser and then filing the Petition without a cash deposit with the trial court, Debtor did not substantially comply with either procedure the Legislature has created.\n{18} We agree with Debtor that the redemption statute has not given the purchaser \u201cany right to retain title to the property by turning down the debtor\u2019s cash payment.\u201d However, Debtor did not offer a \u201ccash payment,\u201d but rather a conditional tender, which our case law has given a purchaser the option to refuse. Furthermore, our Legislature responded to the circumstance of purchaser unavailability in Richardson by creating an alternative process for the debtor, not by regulating the conduct of the purchaser. Thus, Debtor does not present us with a contingency that the Legislature has not anticipated, and we see no reason to deviate from the statute to this extent under these circumstances.\n{19} Whether Purchaser\u2019s actions somehow induced Debtor to think his conditional tender would be accepted is an issue to be considered in equity, as we do below. In analyzing substantial compliance, we look to whether Debtor\u2019s actions fulfill the spirit of the redemption law. We cannot say that putting funds in escrow with a title company conditioned on the giving of a quitclaim deed rises to this level. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s rejection of Debtor\u2019s substantial compliance argument.\nISSUE TWO: Extension of Redemption Period\n{20} Debtor contends that he is entitled to equitable relief if he can prove that Purchaser acted wrongfully by reneging on a promise to come to the January 11th closing. He argues that because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Purchaser agreed to come to the closing, there can be no summary judgment. Although we ordinarily review a trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss a debtor\u2019s request for an equitable extension of the redemption period for an abuse of discretion, see Dalton, 1996-NMCA-041, \u00b6 15, 121 N.M. 539, 914 P.2d 1036, because the trial court\u2019s decision came in the context of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Blackwood & Nichols Co., 1998-NMCA-113, \u00b6 5, 125 N.M. 576, 964 P.2d 137, to determine whether the trial court had discretion to exercise under the facts so viewed, see United Props. Ltd. Co. v. Walgreen Props., Inc., 2003-NMCA-140, \u00b6\u00b6 6-7, 134 N.M. 725, 82 P.3d 535 [Vol. 42 SBB No. 52, page 11]. Thus, the issue is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that Debtor was not entitled to equitable relief, accepting as true Debtor\u2019s contentions that Purchaser made misrepresentations about his willingness to participate in the closing upon which Debtor relied. We hold that there was no error as a matter of law because Debtor\u2019s showing did not bring his case within any of the situations in which a trial court can exercise discretion.\n{21} In general, there are two situations in which a court will use its equitable powers to grant a debtor an extension of the redemption period. In the first type of situation, the debtor fulfills all of the requirements of the redemption statute, but redemption is not complete because of a clerical error or technical mix-up. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. McKain, 5 Kan. App.2d 387, 617 P.2d 583, 585-86 (1980) (permitting an equitable extension when purchaser filed a voucher with the court increasing the redemption amount by $290.30 two days after debtor properly tendered payment to the court); Loomis v. Nat\u2019l Supply Co. of Kansas, 99 Kan. 279, 161 P. 627, 628-29 (1916) (permitting an equitable extension when debtor properly tendered amount specified by the court clerk, but the clerk had misstated the rate of interest). In the present case, Debtor asserts no such mistake.\n{22} In the second type of situation, courts look for evidence of fraud, deceit, or collusion to justify the grant of a redemption period extension. See 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments \u00a7 443 (1994). In Dalton, we held that a trial court\u2019s exercise of its equitable discretion requires \u201csome showing of wrongful conduct on the pai't of the person against whom relief is sought.\u201d 1996-NMCA-041, \u00b6 16, 121 N.M. 539, 914 P.2d 1036 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We affirmed the trial court\u2019s rejection of the debtor\u2019s request for an equitable extension because the debtor had not alleged any wrongdoing by the purchaser. Id. To this extent, we agree with Debtor that, in this line of cases, a showing of wrongful conduct on the part of the purchaser is an \u201cessential predicate\u201d for the exercise of the court\u2019s discretion.\n{23} We also agree with Debtor that in purchaser-misconduct cases, the purchaser\u2019s wrongdoing need not rise to the level of illegality. In Plaza National Bank v. Valdez, 106 N.M. 464, 464-65, 745 P.2d 372, 372-73 (1987), the debtors had contacted the purchaser to confirm the amount necessary for redemption, and the purchaser sent a letter to the debtors\u2019 attorney specifying an amount. Then, ten days before the expiration of the redemption period, the purchaser paid off a secondary mortgage on the property, which effectively raised the amount necessary for redemption. Id. at 465, 745 P.2d at 373. The Court held that although the purchaser did not break any law, these actions \u201csubjected the debtors to an extreme and unnecessary burden\u201d and created an \u201cunconscionable advantage\u201d for the purchaser. Id. at 467, 745 P.2d at 375. Thus, the trial court had properly used its equitable power to grant the debtors\u2019 request for an extension of the redemption period.\n{24} However, insofar as Debtor argues that the trial court erred in basing its holding entirely on the issue of illegality, we do not agree that the trial court did so. Initially, we note that Debtor does not cite us to a particular point in the transcript that supports this notion. In our own review of the record, we see that the trial court only makes one mention of illegality, noting that \u201cnothing in the record ... indicates [Purchaser] bound himself legally or contractually to honor the redemption without some court procedure behind it.\u201d The trial court gave additional reasons for its decision to grant summary judgment, including its findings that the actions Debtor took did not substantially comply with the redemption statute, that the affidavits did not show that Purchaser\u2019s actions amounted to a promise to come to the closing that would merit Debtor\u2019s reliance, and that Debtor\u2019s proper course of action should have been to deposit money in the court registry.\n{25} Furthermore, we do not agree that Plaza National Bank stands for the proposition that any and all misconduct on the part of a purchaser will merit an equitable extension of the redemption period. An examination of case law from other jurisdictions reveals that a court properly exercises its equitable discretion to extend the redemption period only when it would further the purposes of the redemption statute.\n{26} Redemption statutes essentially protect debtors, and they do so in two basic ways. First, redemption statutes give debtors more time to secure financing, which protects debtors from disruption and allows individuals facing temporary hardships to recover and reclaim their properties. Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52 Vand. L.Rev. 599, 608 (1999). During this additional time, a debtor may also convince the lender that the default is not permanent and may renegotiate the terms of the loan. Id. at 630, 745 P.2d 372.\n{27} Second, a redemption statute may increase the price of property at a foreclosure sale by creating the risk that a debtor will easily redeem his or her property from a purchaser who bids too low. Id. at 608, 745 P.2d 372. This protects the debtor, because when the foreclosure sale price is lower than the amount of the debt, the balance of the debt falls back to the debtor. Taking advantage of this provision, some lenders will purchase a property at a foreclosure sale for considerably less than the amount of the debt, thereby receiving the property for a minimal price while retaining the right to recover the full amount of the debt. Id. at 606, 745 P.2d 372. In theory, redemption statutes help to prevent this type of dealing without restricting the actions of the lender or preventing full repayment. If a foreclosure price is inordinately low, the debtor can redeem and prevent the lender from gaining an unjust windfall, while still remaining obligated to pay the balance of his or her debt.\n{28} When a purchaser\u2019s misconduct allows him or her to evade or undermine these protections, courts can use their equitable discretion in favor of the debtor. For example, an early United States Supreme Court case upheld an equitable extension when the purchaser\u2019s particularly egregious conduct defrauded the debtor by preventing her from realizing that a foreclosure had taken place. See Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 186-87, 6 S.Ct. 686, 29 L.Ed. 839 (1886) (allowing debtor to redeem because of purchaser\u2019s misconduct that included purposely preventing debtor from knowing of foreclosure sale until redemption period was over even though purchaser observed debtor expend considerable sums in repairs and improvements to the property, employing individuals to watch debtor\u2019s movements in order to break into and take possession of the home in debtor\u2019s absence, and removing debtor\u2019s personal property). As a result, the debtor was effectively denied the benefits of the redemption period, as she did not know that she had the opportunity to redeem or renegotiate. Id. at 187, 6 S.Ct. 686. The Court upheld an extension of the redemption period in equity.\n{29} Furthermore, the purchaser in Graffam foreclosed on a property worth $10,000 to satisfy the debtor\u2019s obligation of just $200. Id. at 186, 6 S.Ct. 686. The purchaser then paid $73.10 for the property at the foreclosure sale. Id. at 182, 6 S.Ct. 686. Courts commonly view such price discrepancies as indicative of a purchaser\u2019s attempt to evade the protections for a debtor discussed above. See Malvaney v. Yager, 101 Mont. 331, 54 P.2d 135, 136, 140-42 (1936) (upholding an equitable extension when a 320-acre farm with outbuildings and granaries was mortgaged to secure a debt of $1000, which was a \u201cfraction of its real value\u201d); see also McDaniel v. Wetzel, 264 Ill. 212, 106 N.E. 209, 210 (1914) (setting aside a purchase when a property worth $4000 was sold for less than $400 at the sheriffs sale and there were multiple deficiencies in the requirements for sale).\n{30} In the above cases, the courts used equity to protect a debtor who was ready, willing, and able to tender the redemption amount in accordance with the statute, but who failed to effect redemption because of the misconduct of a purchaser. See also Plaza Nat\u2019l Bank, 106 N.M. at 466, 745 P.2d at 374 (stating that the trial court found that prior to the purchaser\u2019s misconduct, the debtor was \u201cready, willing and able\u201d to pay the redemption amount at the proper time). For example, in Malvaney, 54 P.2d at 141-42, the debtor was unable to acquire insurance proceeds that were rightfully his within the redemption period. Had the purchaser not schemed to prevent the debtor from getting the insurance money, the proceeds would have enabled the debtor to tender the redemption amount within the redemption period. The purchaser in Malvaney also made reliable assurances to the debtor that he would extend the redemption period if necessary. Id. at 141. The Montana Supreme Court characterized this as a situation in which the debtor \u201chas acted upon assurances that the redemption within the statutory time would not be insisted upon, yet, after the period has expired, the mortgagee purchaser seeks to rely upon a strict statutory right.\u201d Id. at 142.\n{31} Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court applied an equitable extension in United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976). In that case, the debtor had tendered the proper redemption amount to the purchaser one day before the expiration of the redemption period, but the purchaser returned the money seven days after the period expired, making compliance impossible. Id. at 507.\n{32} Conversely, courts will not allow a debtor who is otherwise unable to pay the redemption amount to shield him or herself from losing property by merely asserting purchaser misconduct. In Wylie v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank, 74 Ill. App.3d 8, 30 Ill.Dec. 1, 392 N.E.2d 656, 657, 661 (1979), the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the purchaser, despite the debtors\u2019 allegations that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the purchaser had fraudulently promised to grant an extension of the redemption period. The Wylie court held that although one individual agreed that he would \u201cbe willing to entertain any proposal\u201d for redemption and another individual \u201cappeared to be amenable\u201d to an extension, these statements were too vague to be considered a promise for an extension. Id. at 660 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the debtor had furnished no explanation of why he had not secured the money earlier. The court stated, \u201c[w]ithout a satisfactory explanation, the record merely indicates that plaintiffs had until November 14 to redeem and failed to redeem their property.\u201d Id. Our own courts have noted that \u201c[i]t is effective action, not good intentions, that the [redemption] statute calls for.\u201d Dalton, 1996-NMCA-041, \u00b6 19, 121 N.M. 539, 914 P.2d 1036 (quoting Richardson, 35 N.M. at 245, 294 P. at 329).\n{33} In the instant case, even if we assume that there was misconduct and deceit and that Debtor relied on Purchaser\u2019s assurances that he would come to the closing, none of the factors favoring an equitable extension are present. There is nothing to suggest that Purchaser prevented Debtor from enjoying the extra time to secure funds that the redemption period affords. The strongest evidence of Purchaser\u2019s misconduct is the affidavit of the Taos Title company employee, stating that Purchaser \u201cindicated that he was agreeable and would come to the Taos Title Company\u201d for the closing. Even assuming that this amounted to a promise to come to the closing, this does not approach the egregious conduct contemplated in Grajfam. Debtor was still aware that he had one month to effect redemption, and, as opposed to the situation in Plaza National Bank, the amount of money he needed to redeem his property did not change.\n{34} Debtor provides no evidence to suggest that the trial court was required to act to prevent an unjust windfall to Purchaser. Debtor contends that the redemption amount, $204,000, was \u201csignificantly below the market value\u201d for the property. However, Debtor does not provide evidence of the market value of the property, so we cannot consider whether the price paid at foreclosure was less than the fair market value. See State ex rel. Educ. Assessments Sys., Inc. v. Coop. Educ. Servs, of N.M., Inc., 110 N.M. 331, 332, 795 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Ct.App. 1990) (stating that the party seeking review has the burden of providing an adequate record to review the issues on appeal). The record reveals that the property at issue was the subject of a mortgage with Chase that secured a debt of $160,000 and that Debtor\u2019s debt to Chase was $185,202.57 by the time of foreclosure. Purchaser paid $199,900 for the property at the sheriffs sale. From these facts, we see no indication that the foreclosure sale failed to get adequate value for the property, nor do we see any reason for the trial court to have used its equitable powers to protect Debtor in this respect.\n{35} Finally, there is no indication that Debtor was ready, willing, and able to tender the proper amount within the redemption period, notwithstanding Purchaser\u2019s misconduct. In contrast to Malvaney and Loosley, Purchaser\u2019s misconduct was apparent to Debtor before the expiration of the redemption period. When Purchaser did not appear at the January 11th closing, there remained a full nine days, or more than one-quarter of the total redemption period, for Debtor to secure alternative financing. Although on appeal Debtor indicates that \u201cit was too late\u201d to obtain funds at this point, the evidence shows that he \u201cdid not make further efforts\u201d to obtain the necessary money. Debtor did not request an extension of the redemption period from Purchaser, and his initial petition for redemption did not request an extension of the period from the court.\n{36} In fact, nothing in Debtor\u2019s arguments indicates that Purchaser prevented him from redeeming his property. On the contrary, Debtor\u2019s evidence indicates that it was extremely difficult for him to obtain any financing for redemption, even with the full month available, and that the only lenders he could find were ones who demanded that Debtor place additional conditions on his tender of funds to Purchaser.\n{37} Because of the strictness of the redemption statute and the beneficial purposes thereof, we believe that, absent gross disparity between the property\u2019s value and the sale price, Debtor must make a threshold showing of some causal connection between Purchaser\u2019s alleged misconduct and Debtor\u2019s inability to comply with the statute in order to invoke a trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion in equity. See, e.g., Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052, 1055 (1928) (applying equity when the actions of the purchaser \u201cprevented\u201d the debtor from complying with the statute). Here, that showing would be one that Debtor could have obtained the necessary funds for a proper tender but for Purchaser\u2019s misconduct. Absent this showing, we cannot say that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Debtor was entitled to an equitable extension.\n{38} In sum, Debtor\u2019s situation, while unfortunate, was not one that the redemption statute seeks to prevent. Purchaser\u2019s alleged misconduct did not prevent Debtor from availing himself of the full benefits of the statute. Debtor did not show any of the other situations in which a trial court would be entitled to apply equity. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying equitable relief as a matter of law.\nISSUE THREE: Waiver of Strict Compliance\n{39} Finally, Debtor asserts that Purchaser waived his right to strict compliance with the redemption statute. Debtor did not raise this argument below. We do not review arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. Campos Enters., Inc. v. Edioin K. Williams & Co., 1998-NMCA-131, \u00b6 12, 125 N.M. 691, 964 P.2d 855. Debtor contends that his waiver argument is implicit in the statutory-compliance and equitable arguments he did make below. Therefore, we do not separately consider this argument, and instead we reject the argument for the reasons stated in our discussion of the first two issues above.\nCONCLUSION\n{40} We affirm the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Purchaser and its dismissal of Debtor\u2019s claims with prejudice.\n{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID and SUTIN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PICKARD, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jane Bloom Yohalem, Santa Fe, for Appellant.", "Jacob D. Caldwell, Stephen Natelson, Natelson Law Firm, Taos, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2004-NMCA-040\n88 P.3d 881\nPeter Mack BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C.B. TRUJILLO, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 23,529.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 28, 2004.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 28,545, April 1, 2004.\nJane Bloom Yohalem, Santa Fe, for Appellant.\nJacob D. Caldwell, Stephen Natelson, Natelson Law Firm, Taos, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0365-01", "first_page_order": 399, "last_page_order": 408 }