{ "id": 1427962, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Noel BACA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Baca", "decision_date": "2004-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 23,429", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "506", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 N.M. 490" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "90 P.3d 509" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2004-NMCA-049" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "798 N.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "104-05", "parenthetical": "balancing private and governmental interests, holding that probationer has a reduced expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "rejecting Fourth Amendment rationale for the \"totality of circumstances\" test to establish probable cause" }, { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "rejecting Fourth Amendment rationale for the \"totality of circumstances\" test to establish probable cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552750 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158-59", "parenthetical": "declining to adopt federal rule allowing warrantless arrest without exigent circumstances" }, { "page": "120-21", "parenthetical": "declining to adopt federal rule allowing warrantless arrest without exigent circumstances" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 352577 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 F.3d 1138", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11201417, 11201349 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/219/1138-02", "/f3d/219/1138-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322320 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-059", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827337 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827391 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 F.3d 358", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414027 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/71/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Vt. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 5776787 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/159/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Vt. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 4849366 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rejecting the probationer's request that the court construe the state constitution to require a warrant, even though, like in New Mexico, the court in State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 616 A.2d 774, 781 (1991" }, { "page": "662-63", "parenthetical": "rejecting the probationer's request that the court construe the state constitution to require a warrant, even though, like in New Mexico, the court in State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 616 A.2d 774, 781 (1991" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/160/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "967 P.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 11797879 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/967/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142202 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8-10, 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 F.3d 1193", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11393393 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1199" }, { "page": "1201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/305/1193-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 260738 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2852520 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "275" }, { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727676 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" }, { "page": "1060" }, { "page": "445-47", "parenthetical": "rejecting good faith rationale under Fourth Amendment and the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule based on deterring police misconduct" }, { "page": "1066-68", "parenthetical": "rejecting good faith rationale under Fourth Amendment and the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule based on deterring police misconduct" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9550 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2871457 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "stating that reasonable suspicion is to be judged by whether \"the facts available to the officer warrant the officer, as a person of reasonable caution, to believe the action taken was appropriate\"" }, { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "stating that reasonable suspicion is to be judged by whether \"the facts available to the officer warrant the officer, as a person of reasonable caution, to believe the action taken was appropriate\"" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260742 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 F.3d 841", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 302341 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/122/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723234 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720-21" }, { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-166", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827345 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-064", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 260761 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 P.3d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 9422755 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "\"Thus, like the United States Supreme Court, we too have stated that whether an individual convicted of a crime has any reasonable expectation of privacy requires a balancing of the government's interest in operating its [probation system] and the individual's privacy interest.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/44/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N.M. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 827379 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142207 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11, 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill.Dec. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. Dec. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974984 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868166 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "281-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 646", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1564392 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959437 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-115", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106503 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352511 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 31-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585, 589-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 326", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505639 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Idaho 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4884211 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/125/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Cal.Rptr. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66", "parenthetical": "determining there existed a nexus between the underlying crimes and the condition to abstain from drugs in case involving warrantless probation search following convictions for false imprisonment and simple assault" }, { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "stating that a warrantless search condition enables the probation officer to ascertain whether the probationer is complying with the terms of probation, whether he disobeys the law, and whether he obeys the law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Cal.App.3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6040099 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "determining there existed a nexus between the underlying crimes and the condition to abstain from drugs in case involving warrantless probation search following convictions for false imprisonment and simple assault" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/211/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 868", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28251 ], "weight": 21, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873, 887" }, { "page": "871, 876" }, { "page": "873-74" }, { "page": "873-74" }, { "page": "873-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9108037 ], "weight": 39, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "118-19" }, { "page": "121-22" }, { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "118-22" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-107", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15933 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575569 ], "weight": 19, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "analyzing whether special conditions of probation, namely, a prohibition against drug use, submission to urine samples upon request, and submission to searches upon request, were reasonably related to rehabilitation" }, { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "analyzing whether special conditions of probation, namely, a prohibition against drug use, submission to urine samples upon request, and submission to searches upon request, were reasonably related to rehabilitation" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "upholding a warrantless probation search provision as reasonably related to the probationer's rehabilitation" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "848", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant shall submit to a search of his car, person or residence at anytime upon request of his probation officer.\"" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "851", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "851", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]hen the search is at the probation officer's request, ... the search was reasonable if the probation officer believes that a search is necessary to perform his duties properly\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588654 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "holding a warrantless probation search condition, that is reasonably related to a probationer's rehabilitation, is a valid limitation to a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "'You shall permit your probation officer to visit at your home and place of employment at any time and permit a search of your person, automobile, and residence to ensure compliance of your probation conditions.\"" }, { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727673 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499-500" }, { "page": "315-16" }, { "page": "499-500" }, { "page": "315-16", "parenthetical": "holding that probationer failed to satisfy the Donaldson test for determining if a probation condition is not reasonably related to the probationer's rehabilitation and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588680 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "1266-67" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588665 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" }, { "page": "1279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217162 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552727 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144-45" }, { "page": "106-07" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "145-46" }, { "page": "107-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" }, { "page": "972-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" }, { "page": "1316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0383-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1738, "char_count": 54233, "ocr_confidence": 0.682, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.790263259544549e-07, "percentile": 0.7148926443201901 }, "sha256": "7784cc728c8ee8499b35ea8ad88a86615b88575a137697a1781857b75cf85213", "simhash": "1:170bdc4aeba22623", "word_count": 8313 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:21.658788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JAMES J. WECHSLER, C.J. and MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Noel BACA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless probation search and leading to his plea of no contest to the charge of trafficking by possession with intent to distribute cocaine. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} In 1999 Defendant Noel Baca, Jr. pled guilty to one count of petty misdemean- or assault (attempted battery), in violation of NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-3-KA) (1963), in State v. Noel Baca, Jr., Second Judicial District Court, No. CRCR-99-00400. He was placed on supervised probation for six months pursuant to a judgment, sentence, and order deferring sentence (deferred sentence). The deferred sentence specifically stated \u201cDefendant is ordered to be placed on supervised probation for six (6) months on condition that Defendant obey all rules, regulations and orders of the Probation Authorities,\u201d and that \u201c[t]he terms and conditions of probation are made terms and conditions of the deferred sentence.\u201d\n{3} The order of probation specifically enumerated the terms of probation that a person under supervised probation must acknowledge. The order prohibited the possession and distribution of unlawful drugs and the possession of firearms, and also included the following terms:\n1. You will not violate any of the laws or ordinances of the State of New Mexico, or any other jurisdiction, and you shall not endanger the person or property of another.\n6. You will permit any Probation Officer to visit you at your home or place of employment at any time and you will permit [a] warrantless search, by a Probation Officer, of your person, automobile, residence, property and/or living quarters if he/she has reasonable cause to believe that such a search will produce evidence of a violation of your conditions of probation.\n(Emphasis added.) The order of probation was signed by Defendant, his probation officer, and the sentencing judge on May 15, 2000. Above Defendant\u2019s signature, the order read \u201cI have read and understand the terms of this Probation Order and will abide by its terms.\u201d\n{4} About three months later, Defendant\u2019s probation officer, Stacy Kunkle, received a tip from a confidential source that Defendant was selling drugs from his home. Kunkle testified she had known the confidential source for one or two months and that the source was not paid, on probation, or subject to charges. Kunkle notified an investigator from the probation department, Carl Cleland, concerning the information within seven to ten days from receiving the tip. Cleland then conducted an investigation into the allegations against Defendant.\n{5} Cleland concluded from his investigation that Defendant was living above his economic means. Cleland learned that Defendant worked for the City of Albuquerque Solid Waste Department and earned approximately $2000 per month and that Defendant\u2019s wife earned approximately the same amount. Cleland found that Defendant had five vehicles registered to him including two Harley Davidson motorcycles both paid in full, a 1998 GMC truck with a lien, a 1992 Ford Ranger with a lien, and his wife\u2019s 1996 Honda Accord with a one-year lien. Cleland also learned that Defendant had one child attending private school and that he had taken a trip to Aruba in June 2000. Finally, Cleland also obtained information that Defendant had expensive leather furniture, computers, and electronic equipment. Cleland did not determine if someone else paid the tuition for Defendant\u2019s child or the trip to Aruba, nor did he check the amount of the monthly payments for the vehicles. Cleland conducted surveillance on Defendant\u2019s house at least five times without detecting any suspicious activity. However, Cleland believed he had \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d to investigate further whether Defendant \u201cwas possibly in violation of his probation by trafficking narcotics\u201d based on the totality of circumstances. Cleland therefore concluded he needed to conduct a warrantless probation search for evidence of drugs and/or trafficking.\n{6} Accompanied by two Albuquerque Police Department detectives, Cleland and his partner arrived at Defendant\u2019s home to conduct a warrantless probation search. Defendant was not home and his teenage son answered the door. Defendant\u2019s son allowed the probation officers and detectives to enter the home, and they then requested him to call his father. After ensuring no one else was in the residence, as directed by Cleland, one of the detectives reported seeing a gun safe in the bedroom. The gun safe aroused Cleland\u2019s suspicion because Defendant was not allowed to have firearms in his possession as a condition of his probation. The detectives conducted no further search of the home, at this time, other than the original sweep to assure no one else was present. Defendant arrived at the house approximately fifteen to twenty minutes later. Cleland then notified Defendant that the probation officers had \u201creasonable cause to come and talk to him and look through his place for possible violations of probation\u201d and asked Defendant to open the gun safe. Cleland testified that Defendant became very nervous upon the request to open the safe. Defendant eventually opened the safe which contained a small amount of marijuana and approximately $18,000 in cash. Defendant was read his rights, informed of the information leading the probation officers to believe he was violating the terms of his probation by selling drugs, and was asked if he had any other drugs in the house. Defendant paused for several seconds and finally responded, \u201c[i]f there are any drugs, I don\u2019t know about them.\u201d\n{7} Cleland informed one of the detectives about the confidential tip, the items found in the safe, and the fact Cleland believed \u201cwe definitely have a probation violation at this point because he had marijuana in the safe.\u201d After Cleland consulted with his supervisor he decided to \u201ctalk to the detectives ... and see what they want[ed] to do.\u201d At this point the probation officers and detectives had ceased searching Defendant\u2019s home. The detectives obtained a search warrant based on the items found in the safe, the information that led to the warrantless probation search, and Defendant\u2019s behavior during the warrantless probation search. Further search of the house led to the discovery of cocaine and additional United States currency, for a total of $19,510.\n{8} Defendant was charged with trafficking by possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-31-20(A)(3) (1990), and with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-31-22(A)(l) (1990). Also, a forfeiture complaint for $19,510 in United States currency seized from Defendant\u2019s home was filed in the Second Judicial District Court, No. CV-2000-09717. The criminal and forfeiture cases were consolidated.\n{9} Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless probation search and subsequent warrant search. 'The district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Reserving the right to appeal the district court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant pled no contest to the charge of trafficking by possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The possession with intent to distribute marijuana charge was dismissed. Defendant waived any interest in the currency which was the subject of the forfeiture action.\n{10} On appeal, Defendant asserts (1) the warrantless search (a) was unlawful because the purported probation condition violations on which the officers acted to conduct the search were not reasonably related to his rehabilitation in connection with his misdemeanor assault conviction, and (b) violated the New Mexico Constitution because probable cause plus exigent circumstances were required but absent for the warrantless search; (2) the lower standard of reasonable suspicion for a warrantless probation search, if applicable, was not met with a threshold of substantial evidence; and (3) the warrantless probation search was invalid as a subterfuge for an investigation.\nDISCUSSION\nStandard of Review\n{11} The legality of a search questioned in a suppression hearing is generally tested as a mixed question of law and fact wherein we review any factual questions under a substantial evidence standard and we review the application of law to the facts de novo. State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 384, 890 P.2d 1315, 1316 (1995); State v. Werner, 117 N.M. 315, 316-17, 871 P.2d 971, 972-73 (1994); State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144-45, 870 P.2d 103, 106-07 (1994). In reviewing the application of law to facts, we view the facts in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party. State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b6 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856; State v. Boeglin, 100 N.M. 127, 132, 666 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ct.App.1983).\n{12} The rules and exceptions that \u201cflourish in the jurisprudence of search and seizure are often no more than factual manifestations of the constitutional requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.\u201d Attaway, 117 N.M. at 145, 870 P.2d at 107. The rules and the tests they contain are \u201cbased ... on careful balancing of the underlying constitutional values,\u201d and \u201ceach is a proxy for reasonableness, generally applicable, but inherently factual.\u201d Id. Thus, we must \u201cshape the parameters of police conduct by placing the constitutional requirement of reasonableness in factual context,\u201d and where the mixed question involved \u201clies closest in proximity to a conclusion of law, ... [the] determination} ][is] to be reviewed de novo.\u201d Id. at 145-46, 870 P.2d at 107-08.\n{13} We review whether a court\u2019s imposition of a condition of probation is lawful under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 119-20, 666 P.2d 1258, 1266-67 (Ct.App.1983) (stating that the district court has broad discretion in imposing probation and \u201cthe court\u2019s discretion will not be set aside on review unless the terms and conditions of probation (1) have no reasonable relationship to the offense for which defendant was convicted, (2) relate to activity which is not itself criminal in nature[,] and (3) require or forbid conduct which is not reasonably related to deterring future criminality\u201d); see also State v. McCoy, 116 N.M. 491, 499-500, 864 P.2d 307, 315-16 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that probationer failed to satisfy two of the three prongs of the Donaldson test for determining if a probation condition was reasonably related to the probationer\u2019s rehabilitation and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation), rev\u2019d on other grounds sub nom. State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 882 P.2d 1 (1994).\nConstitutional Validity of Probation Conditions and Warrantless Probation Search\n{14} Defendant contends (1) that the drug-related probation condition the probation officers suspected was violated was not reasonably related to his misdemeanor assault conviction and to his rehabilitation, and (2) that our State Constitution should be interpreted to require probable cause plus exigent circumstances, or at the very least, reasonable suspicion with exigent circumstances, for any warrantless probation-related search of his home.\n1. Reasonable Relationship of Condition of Probation to Rehabilitation\n{15} Defendant seeks constitutional protection against the warrantless search, asserting that the conditions of probation authorizing a warrantless search and prohibiting possession of drugs were not reasonably related to his rehabilitation in connection with his underlying offense of a misdemeanor assault. See State v. Gallagher, 100 N.M. 697, 699, 675 P.2d 429, 431 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation); State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171, 174, 619 P.2d 847, 850 (Ct.App. 1980) (analyzing whether special conditions of probation, namely, a prohibition against drug use, submission to urine samples upon request, and submission to searches upon request, were reasonably related to rehabilitation).\n{16} Below, Defendant had the burden to come forward with evidence sufficient to raise a prima facie defense of lack of a reasonable relationship in order to test the legality of the search. See In re Alberto L., 2002-NMCA-107, \u00b6 10, 133 N.M. 1, 57 P.3d 555 (\u201cA defendant has [the] burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to raise an issue as to the illegal search and seizure claimed.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). On appeal, Defendant must persuade us that the first trial court abused its discretion in imposing the search, gun, and drug-related conditions of probation, or that the second trial court erred by holding that a reasonable relationship existed between Defendant\u2019s assault conviction and his conditions of probation. See McCoy, 116 N.M. at 499-500, 864 P.2d at 315-16 (holding that probationer failed to satisfy the Donaldson test for determining if a probation condition is not reasonably related to the probationer\u2019s rehabilitation and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation).\n{17} A New Mexico district court has statutory authority to place a convicted defendant on supervised probation. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-20-6(C) (1997). Probation is \u201c \u2018a form of criminal sanction\u2019 it is \u201c \u2018one point [ ] on a continuum of possible punishments.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). \u201c[A] court ... may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.\u201d Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587.\n{18} If the court orders probation, the court shall \u201cattach to its order ... suspending sentence such reasonable conditions as it may deem necessary to ensure that the defendant will observe the laws of the United States and the various states and the ordinances of any municipality.\u201d \u00a7 31-20-6. The court may require that a person on probation \u201csatisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation.\u201d \u00a7 31-20-6(F). \u201cTo be reasonably related, the probation condition must be relevant to the offense for which probation was granted.\u201d Gardner, 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850.\n{19} Defendant fails to set out on appeal any evidence presented at trial to prove the lack of a reasonable relationship. We find no evidence in the record bearing on the relationships between the assault conviction and the conditions prohibiting him from possessing drugs or firearms. For example, we find no evidence of the facts surrounding Defendant\u2019s conduct relating to the assault offense. Nor is there any evidence showing whether Defendant engaged in prior criminal conduct that would cause a court to impose particular conditions. Defendant presents no factual basis or argument to persuade us why a condition prohibiting' use or trafficking in drugs or possession of weapons is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Defendant\u2019s contention fails due to his own lack of proof. See People v. Bauer, 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62, 65-66 (1989) (determining there existed a nexus between the underlying crimes and the condition to abstain from drugs in case involving warrantless probation search following convictions for false imprisonment and simple assault); State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 867 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Idaho Ct.App.1993) (determining distinction between misdemeanor and felony to be irrelevant in considering validity of warrant-less search condition on probationer with misdemeanor assault convictions). The mere fact of conviction on a plea of guilty, with no other evidence regarding Defendant, the offense, and any criminal history, is insufficient to make the case that the possession and search conditions are not reasonably related to Defendant\u2019s rehabilitation in connection with the underlying offense. The district court specifically determined that:\nThe warrantless probation search condition in this case clearly is related to enforcement of probation terms ... that the probationer obey all laws, not possess firearms, not possess, or distribute controlled substances. Enforcing those terms is reasonably related to rehabilitation of the Defendant and protection of the public.\nIt would not be reasonable for this Court to conclude that drugs, guns and violence, such as assault, are not reasonably related to each other. It would further be unreasonable for this Court to declare that a probation term prohibiting the Defendant from possessing drugs and weapons would not reasonably relate to his rehabilitation, and/or protection of the public.\nOn the evidence presented, the first trial court did not err in imposing the possession and search probation conditions, and the second trial court did not err by determining that the conditions were reasonably related to Defendant\u2019s rehabilitation in connection with his misdemeanor assault offense.\n2. The Validity of Warrantless Probation Search Based on Reasonable Cause or Suspicion\n{20} Defendant seeks constitutional protection against the warrantless search on the ground that a warrantless search must be based on probable cause and exigent circumstances, or at a minimum reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances. Otherwise, Defendant contends, the search is unreasonable and thus constitutionally insufficient under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.\na. The Fourth Amendment and Probation\n{21} The Fourth Amendment\u2019s \u201c \u2018central requirement\u2019 is one of reasonableness.\u201d Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001); see also Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587 (\u201cThe touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.\u201d). In order to protect privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has established rules that \u201c[s]ometimes ... require warrants.\u201d McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330, 121 S.Ct. 946. Normally, the search of a home is only reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes if it is conducted pursuant to a warrant grounded in probable cause. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).\n{22} However, there exist exceptions to the warrant requirement: \u201cWhen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.\u201d McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330, 121 S.Ct. 946; see also State v. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029, \u00b6\u00b6 31-41, 130 N.M. 261, 23 P.3d 936 (discussing this Court\u2019s concern about intrusion into the privacy and sanctity of the home without a warrant, and holding that under limited circumstances, allowing appropriate application of the community caretaker doctrine, an entry without a warrant issue based on probable cause showing is permissible); In re Josu\u00e9 T., 1999-NMCA-115, \u00b6 15, 128 N.M. 56, 989 P.2d 431 (stating that \u201c[t]he reasonableness of a particular search is usually gauged by whether the state actor had probable cause and a search warrant,\u201d but recognizing that there exist instances, such as \u201cspecial needs\u201d as discussed in Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, and the warrantless search of students by school officials as discussed in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), and in Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), permitting school officials to dispense with both probable cause and a warrant).\n{23} The search of a probationer\u2019s home, as well, must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Yet \u201c[t]o a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers ... that they do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.\u201d Id. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cInherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.\u201d Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201c[A] probationer\u2019s rights concerning searches are more limited than the rights of a person not on probation.\u201d Gardner, 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850. \u201cProbationers are not auto matically granted full constitutional protection.\u201d Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 699, 675 P.2d at 431; see also State v. Baca, 90 N.M. 280, 282, 562 P.2d 841, 843 (Ct.App.1977) (\u201cProbation assumes the offender can be rehabilitated without serving the suspended jail sentence. It is not meant to be painless. It has an inherent sting and the restrictions on the probationer\u2019s freedom are realistically punitive.\u201d).\n{24} The United States Supreme Court permitted an exception to the warrant requirement in probation searches when \u201cspecial needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.\u201d Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Griffin, the Supreme Court held a warrant-less probation search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted in compliance-with a probation regulation that itself satisfied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. Id. at 873, 887, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The regulation permitted warrantless probation searches if based on \u201creasonable grounds,\u201d rather than \u201cprobable cause.\u201d Id. at 871, 876,107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court reasoned that the state\u2019s operation of a probation system presented \u201c \u2018special needs\u2019 beyond normal law enforcement ... justifying] departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.\u201d Id. at 873-74,107 S.Ct. 3164.\n{25} In Knights, a probation search was conducted pursuant to a state court imposed probation condition requiring the probationer to submit to a search of his home \u201cat anytime, with or without a search warrant ... or reasonable cause.\u201d Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. Knights concluded that the search in question satisfied the Fourth Amendment because it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587. The Court determined that it need not address the issue of the constitutionality of a suspicionless search, i.e., whether a search without any individualized suspicion as permitted in the probation condition would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, since the Court examined on its own whether reasonable suspicion supported the search and held that it did. Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587; see also People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d 231, 278 Ill. Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91, 105 (2003) (noting, after discussing Knights and Griffin, that \u201c[e]ven though the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed [the issue of the minimum level of individualized suspicion that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment], we note that the clear majority of federal courts of appeals also require reasonable suspicion to support a probation search\u201d).\n{26} In Knights, addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a probationer\u2019s home, the Supreme Court stated that \u201cthe reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual\u2019s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\u201d 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). After balancing the government\u2019s interests and the probationer\u2019s private interests, a unanimous Supreme Court held a warrantless probation search valid under the Fourth Amendment where reasonable suspicion supported the search. Id. at 121-22,122 S.Ct. 587.\n{27} The Court in Knights reasoned that the liberty interests of probationers were legitimately restricted through probation conditions and that probationers therefore had \u201csignificantly diminished\u201d expectations of privacy. Id. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587. The Court determined that the balance of governmental and private interests \u201cwarrant a lesser than probable-cause standard,\u201d make a reasonable suspicion standard constitutionally sufficient, and \u201crender a warrant requirement unnecessary.\u201d Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587; see also Lampitok, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d at 104-05 (balancing private and governmental interests, holding that probationer has a reduced expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens). The Court noted that \u201c[t]he degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual\u2019s privacy interest reasonable.\u201d Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587.\nb. Application of State Constitution \u2014 Gomez Analysis\n{28} Defendant acknowledges that the right he asserts is not protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Offering the Gomez interstitial approach, see State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 20, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1, Defendant asks this Court to impose a probable cause and exigent circumstances requirement, or, at the very \u00a1east, a reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances requirement, to a warrantless probation search.\n{29} In State v. Marquart, 1997-NMCA-090, \u00b6\u00b6 11, 16, 123 N.M. 809, 945 P.2d 1027, we determined that Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provided more protection to probationers than that afforded under federal law in regard to the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings. Relying on Marquart and on other New Mexico cases providing more protective State constitutional relief under Article II, Section 10, Defendant asks us to interpret Article II, Section 10 to afford greater protection than that provided by federal law for warrantless searches of a probationer\u2019s home when evidence obtained from the search is the subject of a separate criminal prosecution.\n{30} A court applying the Gomez-interstitial approach, after first determining that the right being asserted is not protected under federal law, is to turn to our State Constitution. 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. In examining our Constitution, the court may diverge from federal precedents if (a) the federal analysis is flawed, (b) structural differences exist between state and federal government, or (c) there exist distinctive state characteristics. Id. If one of these circumstances is shown by the defendant to exist and to compel a more protective approach than that available under the Fourth Amendment, the court may grant the more protective relief under the State Constitution. See State v. Cline, 1998\u2014 NMCA-154, \u00b6 16, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785 (stating that, where consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement under federal law, the court \u201cmust proceed to examine whether there is any compelling reason why [the] consent should not constitute an exception as well to the warrant requirement of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution\u201d).\n(1) Federal Analyses Are Not Flawed\n{31} Defendant does not argue that the federal analyses are flawed and our review of Griffin and Knights reveals no flaws. We cannot say that the analyses in Griffin and Knights are flawed. Starting with Griffin, the Court held the \u201cspecial needs\u201d of a state\u2019s probation system, beyond normal law enforcement, justified an exception to the \u201cusual warrant and probable-cause requirements.\u201d Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164; see also Lampitok, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d at 104 (holding that \u201cimposing the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the Illinois probation system\u201d because \u201cthe process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officer\u2019s ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer\u201d and \u201cwould facilitate the probationer\u2019s evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct\u201d).\n{32} The Knights Court weighed a state\u2019s interest in its probation system against a probationer\u2019s diminished expectation of privacy and required reasonable suspicion for warrantless searches. 534 U.S. at 118-22, 122 S.Ct. 587; see also In re interest of A.C.C., 44 P.3d 708, 712 (Utah 2002) (\u201cThus, like the United States Supreme Court, we too have stated that whether an individual convicted of a crime has any reasonable expectation of privacy requires a balancing of the government\u2019s interest in operating its [probation system] and the individual\u2019s privacy interest.\u201d). In New Mexico, as well, whether a search is unreasonable is determined by balancing the degree of intrusion into a probationer\u2019s privacy against the interest of the government in promoting rehabilitation and protecting society. See State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064, \u00b6 8, 132 N.M. 364, 48 P.3d 102.\n(2) No Structural Differences or Distinctive Characteristics\n{33} Given that Defendant has not argued that the federal analyses are flawed, at most, he seeks departure from federal law based on structural differences or distinctive characteristics by arguing that the focus of the Fourth Amendment in Griffin was the state\u2019s operation of a probation system, deterrence, and special needs, whereas, according to Defendant, the focus of N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 10 in Marquart is on the probationer and rehabilitation. Defendant argues that \u201c[t]he general purposes of probation in New Mexico are education and rehabilitation without the requirement of the defendant serving the suspended period of incarceration.\u201d\n{34} Defendant offers further reasons to depart from federal law asserting that the New Mexico probation regime \u201cwould not be unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause plus exigent circumstances or reasonable suspicion plus exigent circumstances,\u201d relying on our case law that treats the exclusionary rule differently due to the factor of deterrence. See State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, \u00b6 15, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843 (stating \u201cNew Mexico\u2019s exclusionary rule is not based on the rationale that suppression of tainted evidence is warranted only if such suppression is likely to alter the behavior or policies of law enforcement officials [but instead] \u2018focuses on the constitutional rights of individuals.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Marquart, 1997-NMCA-090, \u00b6 17, 123 N.M. 809, 945 P.2d 1027)). Finally, Defendant recites language in Vigil v. Martinez, 113 N.M. 714, 720-21, 832 P.2d 405, 411-12 (Ct.App.1992), and cites NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-21-4 (1963), in regard to the functions of a probation officer, and the distinction between the duty to maintain public order and the duty to further a probationer\u2019s rehabilitation. In turning to the statutory duties of probation officers, Defendant argues that the conduct of the probation officers in the present case \u201cexhibited the lack of urgency, lack of focus upon rehabilitation of the probationer, and the preoccupation with [Defendant] obeying all laws which displaced the principal or chief duty of [Defendant\u2019s] probation officer.\u201d The chief duty, Defendant asserts, was to further Defendant\u2019s rehabilitation by helping him to become a good citizen.\n{35} None of Defendant\u2019s arguments has persuaded us that, under a Gomez interstitial approach, there are any reasons, much less compelling ones, to depart from Griffin and Knights based on structural differences or distinctive characteristics. It is clear that, under New Mexico law, \u201ca probationer\u2019s rights concerning searches are more limited than the rights of a person not on probation.\u201d Gardner, 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850. It is also clear, under New Mexico law, that a warrantless search probation condition is permissible if reasonably related to the probationer\u2019s rehabilitation. Id. Defendant, indeed, acknowledges that \u201ca probationer clearly does not have all of the rights of a non-probationer.\u201d\n{36} The general purposes of probation, under federal or New Mexico law, are rehabilitation and deterrence for community safety, which involve special needs beyond law enforcement, such as supervision. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75, 107 S.Ct. 3164; see, e.g., United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 842 (9th Cir.1997) (determining that Washington\u2019s probation scheme \u201cpromotes the goal of rehabilitation\u201d and the enhancement of \u201ccommunity safety by permitting the rapid detection of contraband and criminal activity\u201d); Donaldson, 100 N.M. at 119, 666 P.2d at 1266 (stating that a judge \u201cmay impose conditions reasonably related to ... rehabilitation, which are designed to protect the public against the commission of other offenses during the term, and which have as their objective the deterrence of future misconduct\u201d (citation omitted)); Baca, 90 N.M. at 281-82, 562 P.2d at 842^13 (\u201cThe broad general purposes to be served by probation are education and rehabilitation.\u201d).\n{37} Our probation-related search cases are consistent with the federal law allowing warrantless searches as developed in Knights and Griffin. See Marquart, 1997-NMCA-090, \u00b6 19, 123 N.M. 809, 945 P.2d 1027 (\u201cOur ruling, however, does not prevent a court from imposing as a condition of probation that the probationer give his or her consent to reasonable warrantless searches by a probation officer to ensure compliance with the conditions of probation.\u201d); Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 699, 675 P.2d at 431 (holding a warrantless probation search condition, that is reasonably related to a probationer\u2019s rehabilitation, is a valid limitation to a defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights); Gardner, 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850 (upholding a warrantless probation search provision as reasonably related to the probationer\u2019s rehabilitation). Gallagher and Gardner in fact upheld probation search conditions that did not expressly require probable cause, reasonable cause, or reasonable suspicion. See Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 698, 675 P.2d at 430 (\u2018You shall permit your probation officer to visit at your home and place of employment at any time and permit a search of your person, automobile, and residence to ensure compliance of your probation conditions.\u201d); Gardner, 95 N.M. at 172, 619 P.2d at 848 (\u201cDefendant shall submit to a search of his car, person or residence at anytime upon request of his probation officer.\u201d). Today, of course, warrantless probation searches in New Mexico cannot, under Knights and Griffin, be without a proper showing of an adequate degree of likelihood of criminal activity.\n(3) Reasonable Suspicion, Not Probable Cause, Is Required\n{38} New Mexico Probation and Parole Division (PPD) Regulation 214 defines a reasonable cause search and limits the execution of a warrantless search pursuant to the probation condition to \u201c[a] search in which available evidence would lead a reasonable person to believe that the offender is in possession of prohibited items or that evidence of a violation will be found.\u201d As applied to criminal conduct, this definition is consistent with the definition of reasonable suspicion in our New Mexico case law. See State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, \u00b6 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (\u201cPolice officers possess reasonable suspicion when they are aware of specific articulable facts that ... would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Galvan, 90 N.M. 129, 131, 560 P.2d 550, 552 (Ct.App. 1977) (stating that reasonable suspicion is to be judged by whether \u201cthe facts available to the officer warrant the officer, as a person of reasonable caution, to believe the action taken was appropriate\u201d). Our view of reasonable suspicion stems from United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-84, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). See Galvan, 90 N.M. at 131, 560 P.2d at 552.\n{39} Defendant cites State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 439, 863 P.2d 1052, 1060 (1993), and Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1138, 1081 (5th ed.1979), asserting reasonable cause must be equated with probable cause. Defendant argues that Gutierrez equated probable cause with reasonable cause through its citation to State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 275, 372 P.2d 837, 842 (1962). Defendant further states that Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201creasonable cause,\u201d \u201creasonable belief,\u201d and \u201cprobable cause,\u201d with basically the same meaning: \u201c[a] reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1081. Defendant\u2019s message appears to be that no \u201creasonable cause\u201d standard is acceptable or applicable if it is not the same as the probable cause standard, since reasonable cause and probable cause mean the same thing. Presumably, Defendant thinks PPD Regulation 214 must be read as requiring probable cause.\n{40} Assuming we read Defendant\u2019s argument correctly, we think Defendant is stretching too much to try to support his constitutional contention. Lucero does not appear in any way to suggest that a reasonable cause standard equates to a higher probable cause standard. See Lucero, 70 N.M. at 275, 372 P.2d at 842. Gutierrez does not suggest this when it cites Lucero. Through its rule-making authority, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between probable cause and reasonable cause in regard to nighttime search warrants. See State v. Garcia, 2002-NMCA-050, \u00b6\u00b6 10-16, 132 N.M. 180, 45 P.3d 900 (discussing Rule 6-208(B) NMRA 2004 requiring a district court to determine whether \u201creasonable cause,\u201d apart from the affidavit supported by probable cause, exists to support a nighttime search). However, apart from PPD Regulation 214, in a search and seizure context, reasonable cause does not appear to have been as yet defined in New Mexico law.\n{41} We see no reason to equate reasonable cause with probable cause. Nothing greater than reasonable suspicioii is constitutionally required under federal law. We therefore do not construe our Constitution to require any higher degree of probability than reasonable suspicion as long as the suspected probation violation on which the warrantless search is based is reasonably related to the probationer\u2019s rehabilitation or to community safety.\n{42} \u2019\u2019[Probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, do not apply.\u201d Knights, 534 U.S. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 587. Probation status significantly reduces a probationer\u2019s expectation of privacy. See id. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587; see also. United-States v. Tticker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.2002) (stating same for parolee). Probationers understand through the probation order that part of the supervision includes warrantless searches. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587. Probation is imposed as a criminal sanction for both rehabilitation and protection of society. Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587; Donaldson, 100 N.M. at 119, 666 P.2d at 1266 (stating that \u201c[probation is an act of clemency,\u201d it \u201cis not meant to be painless,\u201d and conditions of probation related to the probationer\u2019s rehabilitation are to protect the public and deter future misconduct). The diminishment in the expectation of privacy permits a lower threshold for reasonableness in conducting searches relating to suspected criminal activity by probationers. We think reasonable suspicion is the appropriate threshold.\n{43} In conclusion, we hold that warrantless probation searches can and must be supported by reasonable suspicion as defined in New Mexico law to be an awareness of specific articulable facts, judged objectively, that would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring. We do not in any way intend by this holding to undermine or lessen this Court\u2019s or our Supreme Court\u2019s steadfast preference for warrants, see Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 36, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1, outside of clearly recognized exceptions, or in the probation context involving reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal conduct has occurred or is occurring.\n(4) Exigent Circumstances Are Not Required\n{44} Understanding that we might not require a standard more stringent than reasonable cause or reasonable suspicion, Defendant seeks to add the requirement of exigent circumstances to the lesser standard. Exigent circumstances are those giving rise to \u201can emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.\u201d Id. \u00b6 39 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not see any reason to require exigent circumstances in connection with a warrant-less probation search supported by reasonable suspicion.\n{45} The exigent circumstances requirement is part and parcel of the \u201cprobable cause plus exigent circumstances\u201d exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Tywayne H., 1997-NMCA-015, \u00b6 16, 123 N.M. 42, 933 P.2d 251. No New Mexico case attaches the exigent circumstances concept to warrantless probation searches. Defendant cites no case from another jurisdiction holding that the exigent circumstances concept attaches to warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion or reasonable cause. We are unwilling to take that step. See Ott v. State, 967 P.2d 472, 475-76 (Okla.Crim. App.1998) (indicating .exigent circumstances were not required in warrantless parole search based on reasonable grounds); State v. Lockwood, 160 Vt. 547, 632 A.2d 655, 662-63 (1993) (rejecting the probationer\u2019s request that the court construe the state constitution to require a warrant, even though, like in New Mexico, the court in State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 616 A.2d 774, 781 (1991), had earlier determined, that the state constitution required a warrant for vehicle searches absent a showing of exigent circumstances); cf. Tywayne K, 1997-NMCA-015, \u00b6\u00b6 8-10, 16, 123 N.M. 42, 933 P.2d 251 (distinguishing warrantless searches of students by school officials based on reasonable suspicion, constitutionally permissible under T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41, 105 S.Ct. 733, from searches by police officers requiring both probable cause and a warrant unless the warrantless search fell within the probable cause plus exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement).\n{46} Defendant was aware of the formal conditions of probation. Formal conditions of probation give notice to the probationer of proscribed activities. State v. Doe, 104 N.M. 107, 109, 717 P.2d 83, 85 (Ct.App. 1986). Defendant was aware of the possible consequences of violating proscribed activities and of the warrantless search condition. There existed no lack of fairness in notice to Defendant of the consequences of engaging in proscribed conduct, including a warrant-less search. With fair warning of the consequences of violating probation by engaging in prohibited criminal conduct, we fail to see why a probationer should be protected from warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion by a further requirement of exigent circumstances.\n{47} In placing a convicted criminal under strict conditions of probation and under probation supervision, the policy of the State of New Mexico and the obligation of the courts of New Mexico are to place guarded trust in the probationer to consciously conduct himself in a manner to prove he can remain free from criminal activity. The warrantless search condition is fairly and reasonably placed in the probation order to facilitate the probation officer\u2019s important supervisory and protective duties to help assure that the probationer assumes his responsibility \u2014 a responsibility both to the probationer himself and to society, to stay on a path of rehabilitation. \u201cBy the fact of ... conviction, the probationer has already demonstrated a need for supervised control.\u201d Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 699, 675 P.2d at 431 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 362 (10th -Cir.1995) (upholding a warrantless parole search, stating that, \u201c[t]o adequately monitor a parolee\u2019s progress and deter further criminal conduct, a parole agent must be permitted in the proper instance to act expeditiously and without warning\u201d); Lampitok, 278 Ill.Dee. 244, 798 N.E.2d at 104 (determining that imposition of warrant and probable cause requirements \u201cwould unduly interfere with the effective administration of the Illinois probation system,\u201d would delay a probation officer\u2019s \u201cability to respond to evidence of misconduct\u201d in connection with the officer\u2019s particular ability to determine the appropriate level of supervision, and \u201cwould facilitate the probationer\u2019s evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct\u201d); Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (stating that a warrantless search condition enables the probation officer to ascertain whether the probationer is complying with the terms of probation, whether he disobeys the law, and whether he obeys the law).\n{48} Finally, we note that the reasonable suspicion requirement is protective enough because it does not permit a lesser standard of random, indiscriminate spot searches based on speculation or less. Reasonable suspicion adequately addresses a probationer\u2019s more limited expectation of privacy as well as standards of privacy that society should expect for those given the chance at rehabilitation.\n{49} Defendant has not offered either authority or argument to convince this Court that a warrantless search probation condition under which warrantless searches are conducted pursuant to reasonable suspicion is an unreasonable condition absent exigent circumstances. In conclusion, we hold that exigent circumstances are not required to make a warrantless probation search reasonable. We hold that, for rehabilitation and community safety purposes, probation officers have the right to conduct warrantless searches without the added requirement of exigent circumstances.\nReasonable Suspicion Was Satisfied\n{50} Defendant argues that, if the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion applies, the district court erred by finding that reasonable suspicion existed. Defendant asserts the tip from the confidential source was not sufficiently corroborated before the warrantless probation search to satisfy a reasonable suspicion standard. Defendant cites to Urioste indicating an informant\u2019s information must be sufficiently verified to show \u201cpast, present or pending criminal conduct\u201d likely occurred or is occurring. 2002-NMSC-023, \u00b6 9, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{51} Our Supreme Court further explained in Urioste that when a confidential source\u2019s tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, but is corroborated by subsequent investigation, even the observation of lawful conduct can establish reasonable suspicion. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 16-17. In the present case, the district court ruled reasonable suspicion existed based on the confidential source and the fact that Cleland \u201cfurther investigated [Defendant's household income, assets, debts, and continuing expenses to determine that [Defendant\u2019s continuing lifestyle was above and inconsistent with his means.\u201d The district court concluded \u201c[o]ne could reasonably expect to see evidence of continuing and unexplained wealth or affluent lifestyle from someone involved in continuous trafficking of drugs.\u201d Cleland\u2019s knowledge of the confidential informant\u2019s tip, corroborated with the facts of which he became aware through his subsequent investigation of Defendant\u2019s financial situation, constituted articulable facts, objectively judged, that could lead a reasonable person to believe a violation of a condition of probation occurred or was occurring. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 6, 16-17 (holding an informant\u2019s tip, if questionable, can be corroborated by the observation of lawful conduct); cf. State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, \u00b6 28,126 N.M. 742, 975 P.2d 355 (holding an informant\u2019s tip can establish reasonable suspicion, without investigative confirmation, if the tip is credible); State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, \u00b6 8, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (holding a tip by informant who claimed to witness wrongdoing sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion); State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, \u00b6 8, 122 N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 1038 (\u201cAn anonymous tip may justify an investigatory stop if the information is sufficiently corroborated by subsequent investigation to establish reliability.\u201d). Furthermore, \u201c[reasonable suspicion may exist ... on information less reliable than that needed to establish probable cause.\u201d Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1201.\n{52} We hold that there existed a sufficiently high degree of individualized suspicion that criminal conduct had occurred to make the intrusion on Defendant\u2019s privacy interest reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The warrantless search probation condition in the present ease was constitutionally valid. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the warrantless search was supported by reasonable suspicion and was constitutionally valid.\nSubterfuge for Investigation\n{53} Defendant asserts that the search by the probation officers accompanied by the detectives constituted a subterfuge for an investigation. He correctly points out that this Court in Gardner quoted federal case authority stating that \u201cunder no circumstances should cooperation between law enforcement officers and probation officers be permitted to make the probation system a subterfuge for criminal investigations.\u201d Gardner, 95 N.M. at 175, 619 P.2d at 851 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, as Gardner determined, the fact that \u201cthere was cooperation between the probation officer and the police did not make the search illegal, because it was requested by the probation officer.\u201d Id. Additionally, according to Gardner, a visit by a probation officer does not cease to be proper because he is accompanied by a law enforcement official. Id.\n{54} In the present case, Cleland testified he requested the detectives to accompany him and his partner while executing the warrantless probation search for security reasons and that the detectives conducted no search of the house, other than to assure no one was present in the house, until the probation search ceased, and the detectives obtained a search warrant. The record indicates Cleland had reasonable suspicion to support a warrantless probation search based on the information he gathered and the tip reported by Kunkle. The probation search was executed by Cleland accompanied by his partner and two detectives.\n{55} Under PPD regulation, in non-emergency circumstances, a probation officer is to \u201cseek the assistance of a law enforcement agency in conducting the search.\u201d PPD Reg. 214.1(II)(A). We have no doubt, under the facts, that Cleland believed the search was necessary to perform his duties properly. See Gardner, 95 N.M. at 175, 619 P.2d at 851 (stating that, \u201c[w]hen the search is at the probation officer\u2019s request, ... the search was reasonable if the probation officer believes that a search is necessary to perform his duties properly\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the warrantless probation search, which was initiated and controlled by the probation officers, did not constitute a subterfuge for law enforcement investigation.\nCONCLUSION\n{56} We affirm the district court\u2019s order denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\n{57} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, C.J. and MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, J., concur.\n. Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was heard in November 2001 and denied in January 2002. Knights was decided in December 2001. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). Surprisingly, the State did not mention Knights in its appellate brief and Defendant minimally drew Knights to our attention indicating it \"overruled\u201d United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.2000).\n. Defendant cites State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, \u00b6 21, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (ruling that prolonged border patrol checkpoint stop violated N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 10); State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 39, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (requiring particularized showing of exigent circumstances for warrantless search of vehicle under N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 10); Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 158-59, 870 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1994) (declining to adopt federal rule allowing warrantless arrest without exigent circumstances); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 445-47, 863 P.2d 1052, 1066-68 (1993) (rejecting good faith rationale under Fourth Amendment and the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule based on deterring police misconduct); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989) (rejecting Fourth Amendment rationale for the \"totality of circumstances\u201d test to establish probable cause); State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, VH 18-24, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843 (holding that N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 10 exclusionary rule applied to use of evidence in state court criminal proceeding when that evidence resulted from warrantless search by federal border patrol agents at checkpoint in New Mexico).\n. We do not address the breadth of the reasonable cause requirement in PPD Regulation 214 insofar as it might be read to permit warrantless searches based on reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred of a condition of probation not involving suspected criminal activity.", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Patricia Gandert, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.", "Edmund J. Lang, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2004-NMCA-049\n90 P.3d 509\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Noel BACA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 23,429.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 1, 2004.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Patricia Gandert, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.\nEdmund J. Lang, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 524, "last_page_order": 540 }