{ "id": 1224671, "name": "The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE and Cynthia Tidwell, Planning and Zoning Administrator for the Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, and Linda Anne Hutchinson Cronk, Respondents-Appellants, v. Richard SANCHEZ, Olga Sanchez, Vincent Sanchez, Raymond Fuentes, Kate Fuentes, Chester R. Vernon, And Barbara Vernon, Petitioners-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Trustees of Village of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Sanchez", "decision_date": "2004-09-16", "docket_number": "No. 24,220", "first_page": "528", "last_page": "532", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.M. 528" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "101 P.3d 339" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2004-NMCA-128" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1997-NMSC-042", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 142267 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592822 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 3", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "134" } ], 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exist\"" }, { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a] case is moot when it does not involve any actual controversy [or][w]here the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582514 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723241 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566662 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769", "parenthetical": "stating that all parts of a statute must be read in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole" }, { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "stating that all parts of a statute must be read in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352358 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580157 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-124", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106545 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15821 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727683 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "\"This principle of finality is also well-settled in the federal courts.\"" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0412-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 693, "char_count": 12776, "ocr_confidence": 0.682, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.097301770780555e-08, "percentile": 0.4266742964551215 }, "sha256": "ad84dd1e6f2124bfe0327670d9b0f47f057893aefc89a38406c454fe48c290ca", "simhash": "1:180696ff8a8ae75b", "word_count": 2111 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:59.278788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE and IRA ROBINSON, Judges." ], "parties": [ "The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE and Cynthia Tidwell, Planning and Zoning Administrator for the Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, and Linda Anne Hutchinson Cronk, Respondents-Appellants, v. Richard SANCHEZ, Olga Sanchez, Vincent Sanchez, Raymond Fuentes, Kate Fuentes, Chester R. Vernon, And Barbara Vernon, Petitioners-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Chief Judge.\n{1} In this appeal, we consider whether the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 44-2-7 (1884) is a final order for purposes of appeal when an issue of damages in connection with the activity covered by the writ has not been resolved. We hold that the order granting the peremptory writ of mandamus is not final and remand to the district court.\n{2} Petitioners, Richard, Olga, and Vincent Sanchez, Raymond and Kate Fuentes, and Chester R. and Barbara Vernon, filed a verified petition for mandamus in district court seeking to compel Respondents, the Board of Trustees of the Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque (Board of Trustees) and its Planning and Zoning Administrator, Cynthia Tidwell, to enforce zoning ordinances relating to the use of an adjoining or nearby property within the village. Petitioners contended that the use of the property violated the ordinance because it was used for public horse shows and to stable more than the allowable eleven horses. They also sought damages.\n{3} The district court informed the parties in a letter ruling that it would grant Petitioners\u2019 motion for summary judgment. Before entry of an order, Respondents moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Respondents stated that the court\u2019s action on the merits of the writ of mandamus was a final decision practically disposing of the case under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-3-2 (1966). They nevertheless requested an immediate appeal to advance \u201cthe ultimate termination of the litigation,\u201d noting that the issue of damages, which included the loss of enjoyment of the property, was not simple and would involve extensive testimony. The district court did not grant the motion.\n{4} The district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus, ordering Respondents to enforce the zoning code and to pay damages and costs sustained by Petitioners or show cause why they should not act as directed by the writ. It ordered that the owner of the property, Linda Anne Hutchinson Cronk, be joined as a Respondent in the proceeding.\n{5} The district court subsequently entered its order granting Petitioners partial summary judgment. It ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus, requiring the Board of Trustees and Tidwell to enforce the existing ordinance as defined by the court, issued an injunction against Respondent Cronk, and reserved for further hearing the issue of \u201cdamages, costs and other disbursements, if any, which should be awarded Petitioners.\u201d Board of Trustees and Cronk filed a joint notice of appeal from the issuance of the peremptory writ of mandamus and the summary judgment order. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. This Court held the motion in abeyance pending calendaring. The appeal was placed on the general calendar, briefed, and submitted to a panel. We now dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order.\n{6} Because of the problems attendant to piecemeal appeals, New Mexico courts adhere to the rule that an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal if the issue of damages is outstanding. See Principal Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Straus, 116 N.M. 412, 413, 863 P.2d 447, 448 (1993); Albuquerque Commons P\u2019ship v. City of Albuquerque, 2003-NMCA-022, \u00b6 1, 133 N.M. 226, 62 P.3d 317; City of Sunland, Park v. Paseo del Norte Ltd. P\u2019ship, 1999-NMCA-124, \u00b6 1, 128 N.M. 163, 990 P.2d 1286; Cole v. McNeill, 102 N.M. 146, 147, 692 P.2d 532, 533 (Ct.App.1984). When the issue of damages remains, the order or judgment has not practically disposed of the merits of the case. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 N.M. at 413, 863 P.2d at 448.\n{7} In this mandamus proceeding, the verified petition requested, and the alternative writ of mandamus ordered, damages, attorney fees and costs in addition to the enforcement of the zoning ordinance. Indeed, the statutes pertaining to mandamus specifically authorize such relief. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 44-2-12 (1884) (\u201cIf judgment is given for the plaintiff, he shall recover the damages which he has sustained, together with costs and disbursements.\u201d). We limit our discussion to the order for damages based on the motion to dismiss.\n{8} In her response to the motion to dismiss, Respondent Cronk contends that the issuance of the writ of mandamus is appeal-able in and of itself, without regal'd to the issue of damages. She relies on NMSA 1978, \u00a7 44-2-14 (1887), which states: \u201cThat in all cases of proceedings by mandamus in any district court of this state, the final judgment of the court thereon shall be reviewable by appeal or writ of error in the same manner as now provided by law in other civil cases.\u201d Respondent Cronk argues that the district court \u201chas issued its final judgment on the writ of mandamus\u201d and that \u201c[t]here are no further issues before the Court as to the relief ordered in the writ of mandamus.\u201d Thus, according to this reasoning, the peremptory writ of mandamus is \u201creviewable by appeal\u201d under Section 44-2-14. We do not agree with Respondent Cronk\u2019s reading of this statute.\n{9} We read the statutes concerning mandamus for internal consistency. See Ramirez v. IBP Prepared Foods, 2001-NMCA-036, \u00b6 16, 130 N.M. 559, 28 P.3d 1100 (stating that when interpreting statues \u201c[w]e must attempt to achieve internal consistency and avoid making any portion of the statute superfluous\u201d). Section 44-2-12 states: \u201cIf judgment is given for the plaintiff, he shall recover the damages which he has sustained, together with costs and disbursements, and a peremptory mandamus shall be awarded without delay.\u201d It therefore allows recovery of damages if the district court concludes in Petitioners\u2019 favor and grants the writ, and the court must then award the peremptory writ of mandamus without delay. Section 44-2-12. We do not construe this language to mean that an appeal lies from a \u201cjudgment\u201d granting a writ of mandamus if the issue of damages has not been resolved. The legislature precluded such an appeal by enacting, in 1897, the language of Section 44-2-14 which provides that \u201cthe final judgment of the court\u201d in a mandamus proceeding \u201cshall be [reviewed] by appeal or writ of error in the same manner as now provided by law in other civil cases.\u201d It had previously, in 1893, provided that appeals and writs of error be taken from \u201cfinal decrees or judgments.\u201d C.L. 1897, Section 3136. As stated in Section 44-2-14, the territorial legislature intended that appeals in mandamus proceedings be the same as in other civil cases.\n{10} Respondent Cronk narrowly reads Section 44-2-14 to argue that because the district court has issued its final judgment on the writ of mandamus, the matter is now \u201creviewable by appeal.\u201d However, because the legislature distinguished between \u201cjudgment\u201d in Section 44-2-12 and \u201cfinal judgment\u201d in Section 44-2-14, we do not believe that this argument has merit. Although the district court may have determined to grant the writ of mandamus, this determination incorporated into a judgment is not a final judgment reviewable on appeal. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 769, 918 P.2d 350, 355 (1996) (stating that all parts of a statute must be read in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole).\n{11} Respondents make additional arguments against the dismissal of this appeal. Respondent Cronk urges that we interpret the rule of finality practically rather than technically. See Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1992). Respondents Board of Trustees and Tidwell argue that they have a strong case on the merits and the issue of damages will not be examined if they are successful in this appeal. However, the rule of finality that a judgment or order is not final if the issue of damages has not been resolved is not within the \u201ctwilight zone of finality\u201d as Respondent Cronk implies. See Clancy v. Gooding, 98 N.M. 252, 254, 647 P.2d 885, 887 (Ct.App.1982) (stating the general rule that \u201ca judgment or order is not final unless all issues of law and of fact necessary to be determined have been determined, and the ease has been completely disposed of to the extent the court has power to dispose of it\u201d). It is a well-settled principle. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 N.M. at 414, 863 P.2d at 449 (\u201cThis principle of finality is also well-settled in the federal courts.\u201d). As Respondents acknowledge in their motion for an interlocutory appeal, this case does not merely involve the ministerial or formulaic calculation of damages.\n{12} We underscore the policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals. See id. at 415, 863 P.2d at 450. The mandamus statutes contemplate that a mandamus proceeding be treated in the same way as any civil action. Section 44-2-14. We do not delve into the merits to treat the issuance of a writ of mandamus differently. Cf. City of Sunland Park, 1999-NMCA-124, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 10-11, 128 N.M. 163, 990 P.2d 1286 (declining to deviate from general rule of finality in condemnation proceeding in which court\u2019s order granted possession to condemner, infringing upon condemnee\u2019s property interests, without resolving the issue of damages). In any case in which the issue of damages is reserved after liability is determined, the issue of damages would be rendered moot or affected in some manner if the determination of liability were overturned on appeal. See Hamman v. Clayton Mun. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 74 N.M. 428, 429, 394 P.2d 273, 274 (1964) (stating that \u201c[a] case is moot when it does not involve any actual controversy [or][w]here the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist\u201d); Insure N.M., LLC v. McGonigle, 2000-NMCA-018, \u00b6\u00b6 24, 25, 128 N.M. 611, 995 P.2d 1053 (refusing to issue an advisory opinion where a defendant\u2019s claim had been rendered moot). The requirements of finality apply notwithstanding such a procedural reality.\n{13} Lastly, Respondent Cronk asserts that counter motions for summary judgment constitute final judgments, and Respondent Board of Trustees and Tidwell assert that a partial summary judgment can constitute a final judgment for appellate review. We agree, in circumstances in which the ruling on the motion or motions disposes of the case \u201cto the fullest extent possible.\u201d Sunwest Bank v. Nelson, 1998-NMSC-012, \u00b6 6, 125 N.M. 170, 958 P.2d 740 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By way of example, in Davis v. Board of County Commissioners, 1999-NMCA-110, 127 N.M. 785, 987 P.2d 1172, cited by Respondent Cronk, the district court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant\u2019s motion. Id. \u00b6 10. Its decision defeated the plaintiffs claims, and it no longer had before it any issue on which to proceed. Id. In other cases cited by Respondents Board of Trustees and Tidwell, a partial summary judgment was reviewed on appeal after a trial on the merits had been held for a final order entered. See Adobe Masters, Inc. v. Downey, 118 N.M. 547, 548, 883 P.2d 133, 134 (1994); Cress v. Scott, 117 N.M. 3, 5, 868 P.2d 648, 650 (1994); Sun Country Sav. Bank v. McDowell, 108 N.M. 528, 529, 775 P.2d 730, 731 (1989). In Rummel v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 1997-NMSC-042, \u00b6 1 n. 1, 123 N.M. 767, 945 P.2d 985, our Supreme Court noted by footnote that the summary judgment \u201cwas only partial because the trial court had not yet resolved the claim of abuse of process.\u201d However, finality is not addressed in the opinion and there is no explanation by the Court concerning its review of the case. We cannot conclude from Rummel that a partial summary judgment that leaves issues remaining for decision by the district court is reviewable on appeal.\nConclusion\n{14} The district court\u2019s grant of partial summary judgment and issuance of a writ of mandamus was not a final order for purposes of appellate review because it did not resolve the issue of damages requested by Petitioners. We dismiss this appeal and remand to the district court.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE and IRA ROBINSON, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David L. Mathews, Bernalillo, NM, for Appellants Board of Trustees and Cynthia Tidwell.", "David S. Campbell, Vogel, Campbell & Blueher, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant Linda Anne Hutchinson Cronk.", "Dennis M. McCary, McCary, Wilson & Pryor, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2004-NMCA-128\n101 P.3d 339\nThe BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE and Cynthia Tidwell, Planning and Zoning Administrator for the Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, and Linda Anne Hutchinson Cronk, Respondents-Appellants, v. Richard SANCHEZ, Olga Sanchez, Vincent Sanchez, Raymond Fuentes, Kate Fuentes, Chester R. Vernon, And Barbara Vernon, Petitioners-Appellees.\nNo. 24,220.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nSept. 16, 2004.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 28,915, Nov. 10, 2004.\nDavid L. Mathews, Bernalillo, NM, for Appellants Board of Trustees and Cynthia Tidwell.\nDavid S. Campbell, Vogel, Campbell & Blueher, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant Linda Anne Hutchinson Cronk.\nDennis M. McCary, McCary, Wilson & Pryor, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees." }, "file_name": "0528-01", "first_page_order": 554, "last_page_order": 558 }