{ "id": 1224663, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John MONTOYA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Montoya", "decision_date": "2004-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 24,192", "first_page": "674", "last_page": "682", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.M. 674" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "104 P.3d 540" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2005-NMCA-005" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "908 P.2d 1379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1566678 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1384", "parenthetical": "emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590286 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "\"The word 'or' is given a disjunctive meaning unless the context of the statute demands otherwise.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "\"The word 'or' is given a disjunctive meaning unless the context of the statute demands otherwise.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-102", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217145 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428041 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "\"We presume the legislature is aware of existing law when it enacts legislation.\"" }, { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "\"We presume the legislature is aware of existing law when it enacts legislation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827416 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183126 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77128 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], 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"reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561274 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "discussing that although appellants' \"arguments were not a model of clarity, and certainly could have been made with more specificity, they were sufficient to alert the trial court and opposing counsel to the substance of the argument being made\"" }, { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "discussing that although appellants' \"arguments were not a model of clarity, and certainly could have been made with more specificity, they were sufficient to alert the trial court and opposing counsel to the substance of the argument being made\"" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834273 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "968 P.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.M. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 827440 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-158", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-109", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77141 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-070", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428071 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183089 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584560 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" }, { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731564 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "1204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-065", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257610 ], "weight": 19, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-17" }, { "page": "\u00b614" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-101", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77198 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-069", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257617 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352453 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 26-34" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731530 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "referring to crimes \"closely approaching\" or constituting \"near\" strict liability crimes" }, { "page": "768", "parenthetical": "referring to crimes \"closely approaching\" or constituting \"near\" strict liability crimes" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "908 P.2d 1379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1566678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "1384", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-065", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257610 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0362-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1193, "char_count": 28179, "ocr_confidence": 0.669, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.6227663346512e-08, "percentile": 0.5269884460445378 }, "sha256": "a64c1df122fed693b9fca62abcc5a68d56aa30281dd3de66c116296682cb3b8c", "simhash": "1:c67ced67768b1d62", "word_count": 4550 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:59.278788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring).", "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge (specially concurring)." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John MONTOYA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} In State v. Stein, 1999-NMCA-065, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295, we examined the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d in the Crimes Against Household Members Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-3-10 to -16 (1995, prior to 2001 amendment) (CAHMA), and concluded that the crime of \u201cbattery against a household member does not encompass battery against one\u2019s own child.\u201d Stein, 1999\u2014 NMCA-065, \u00b6 19, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295. The victim in Stein, however, was the 13-year-old daughter of the accused. Id. \u00b6 4. Today we must decide whether a defendant who has battered his adult son may be convicted of battery against a household member. We conclude that he may on the ground that the exclusion recognized in Stein applies only to the minor children of the perpetrator.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Following a scuffle with Victim, Defendant was charged with battery against a household member. Victim was the 28-year-old son of Defendant and had been estranged from his father for several years. On Father\u2019s Day, Victim was out driving with his wife and their two children when they encountered Defendant riding his bicycle. Conflicting versions of the events that followed were presented at trial. Victim and his wife both testified that Defendant rode in front of their car and flipped them off. They testified that when Victim asked Defendant if there was something wrong with his finger, Defendant got off his bike, approached the car, swore at Victim in Spanish, choked him, and threw coins at him. They also testified that when Victim got out of the car, Defendant punched Victim twice in the face before Victim retaliated with blows of his own. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that Victim called Defendant a \u201cbum\u201d and a \u201chobo\u201d and threatened to run over him with his car. According to Defendant, when Victim got out of his car, he struck Defendant, and Defendant fought back only in self-defense. Rejecting Defendant\u2019s version of the events, the district court found Defendant guilty of battery against a household member.\nDISCUSSION\nFinality\n{3} Preliminarily, we address whether the district court\u2019s order on trial de novo is a final, appealable order. Originally, Defendant was convicted by a jury in magistrate court of battery against a household member. He was sentenced by the magistrate court to 364 days in jail with ah 364 days suspended. Defendant then appealed his conviction to the district court where a trial de novo was held. Following a bench trial, the district court entered an order finding Defendant guilty of battery against a household member and remanding to the magistrate court \u201cfor imposition of the original sentence.\u201d\n{4} As the State correctly notes, when a defendant is convicted in a trial de novo on appeal from magistrate court, the district court is required to impose a sentence prior to remanding the case to the magistrate court for enforcement of the district court\u2019s judgment. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 35-13-2(0) (1996). When the district court enters an order of remand to the magistrate court that does not resolve the issue of sentencing, this Court has held that the order is not final and appealable. State v. Cordova, 114 N.M. 22, 23, 833 P.2d 1203, 1204 (Ct.App.1992); see also State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 466, 471, 659 P.2d 918, 923 (Ct.App.1983) (recognizing that a final judgment in a criminal case either adjudicates the defendant guilty and imposes, suspends, or defers sentence or dismisses the charges).\n{5} Here, the district court did not impose a sentence but remanded to the magistrate court \u201cfor imposition of the original sentence.\u201d As the State acknowledges, on remand, the magistrate court will have no discretion to revisit the issue of sentencing, but must simply enter the sentence previously imposed. See State v. Gage, 2002-NMCA-018, \u00b6 20, 131 N.M. 581, 40 P.3d 1025 (explaining that the magistrate court has no jurisdiction or authority to exceed the mandate of the district court); see also State Celusniak, 2004-NMCA-070, \u00b69, 135 N.M. 728, 93 P.3d 10 (\u201cOn remand, the magistrate court proceeds with the case in keeping with the mandate of the district court.\u201d). Therefore, because the magistrate court will lack authority to make any substantive determination regarding Defendant\u2019s sentence, and -will be limited to the purely ministerial act of imposing the original sentence, we conclude that the order on trial de novo is final for purposes of appeal. Cf. State v. Candy L., 2003-NMCA-109, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 213, 75 P.3d 429 (dismissing appeal as premature where \u201cwe are not merely awaiting a ministerial act, but rather a substantive determination\u201d of the child\u2019s restitution plan); State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, \u00b6 13, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (applying the doctrine of practical finality to permit appeal from an order of remand).\nPreservation\n{6} Next we address the issue of preservation raised by the State. According to the State, Defendant failed to preserve his argument that Victim is not a \u201chousehold member\u201d within the meaning of the CAHMA, and thus cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal. In particular, the State points out that Defendant did not argue that his \u201cchild\u201d or \u201cadult son\u201d cannot be considered a \u201cfamily member\u201d or \u201crelative\u201d under Section 30-3-11, and did not refer to Stein in the district court. We conclude that the issue of whether Victim meets the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d was adequately preserved.\n{7} \u201cThe New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure require a ruling or decision by the district court to be \u2018fairly invoked\u2019 in order to preserve a question for review.\u201d State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, \u00b6 9, 125 N.M. 111, 957 P.2d 1145; Rule 12-216(A) NMRA. The primary purposes of the preservation requirement are \u201c(1) to alert the trial court to a claim of error so that it has an opportunity to correct any mistake, and (2) to give the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond and show why the court should rule against the objector.\u201d State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 29, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. As an appellate court, we bear these dual purposes in mind when we apply the preservation requirement. Gracia v. Bittner, 120 N.M. 191, 195, 900 P.2d 351, 355 (Ct.App. 1995).\n{8} During closing argument, the prosecutor recited the essential elements of battery against a household member, including that Victim was a \u201chousehold member.\u201d The prosecutor then argued that there was evidence to support each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Defendant was the first aggressor. Defense counsel disagreed, arguing that the elements of battery on a household member had not been met, and that Defendant acted in self-defense. Defense counsel\u2019s objection, while broad and nebulous, appears to have alerted the district court to the issue of whether the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d was met because it prompted the court to ask the prosecutor for the statutory definition of the term following the defense\u2019s closing argument. In response to the district court\u2019s inquiry, the prosecutor, during rebuttal, recited the applicable statutory definition and argued that the definition was met under the facts of this case. Specifically, she stated that \u201cco-habitation is not necessary\u201d for Victim \u201cto be deemed a household member\u201d and that the definition was met because Defendant \u201cis a parent\u201d of Victim. After reviewing the evidence in chambers, the district court returned on the record to announce its finding that Defendant was guilty of battery against a household member.\n{9} Based on the foregoing facts, we conclude that the issue of whether Victim falls within the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d was fairly presented below. Despite the ambiguity of defense counsel\u2019s objection, the district court was alerted to the question of whether Victim meets the definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d the State had an opportunity to respond and argue evidence relating to the issue, and the district court ruled on the issue by finding evidence to support each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 540, 893 P.2d 428, 436 (1995) (discussing that although appellants\u2019 \u201cargum\u00e9nts were not a model of clarity, and certainly could have been made with more specificity, they were sufficient to alert the trial court and opposing counsel to the substance of the argument being made\u201d); State v. Griffin, 2002-NMCA-051, \u00b66, 132 N.M. 195, 46 P.3d 102 (concluding that jury instruction issue was preserved where the district court understood the defendant\u2019s argument and made a well-informed ruling on the question); cf. State v. Woodruff, 1997-NMSC-061, \u00b6 21, 124 N.M. 388, 951 P.2d 605 (recognizing that the district court may itself fairly invoke a ruling on an issue).\n{10} Although no mention of the Stein case was made below, the issue of whether Victim was a \u201chousehold member\u201d as defined by the applicable statute, the same question addressed in Stein, appears to have been raised and thus was adequately preserved. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 30, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (determining that a party\u2019s failure to cite to specific cases in support of a legal principle was not fatal \u201cso long as the party has asserted the principle recognized in the eases and has developed the facts adequately to give the opposing party an opportunity to respond and to give the court an opportunity to rule\u201d). \u201cThe rules that govern the preservation of error for appellate review are not an end in themselves, rather they are instruments for doing justice.\u201d Garcia, 119 N.M. at 541, 893 P.2d at 437. Because we conclude that the preservation requirement was met in this case, we need not consider whether to review the issue on appeal for fundamental error. Id.\nStandard of Review\n{11} Defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed because the evidence at trial cannot support a finding that Victim was a \u201chousehold member\u201d within the meaning of Section 30-3-11. \u201cAlthough framed as a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, Defendant\u2019s argument requires us to engage in statutory interpretation to determine whether the facts of this ease, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are legally sufficient to sustain a conviction.\u201d State v. Barragan, 2001-NMCA-086, \u00b6 24, 131 N.M. 281, 34 P.3d 1157. Thus, underlying issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo. Id.\nStatutory Definition of Household Member and Stein\n{12} Under the CAHMA, battery against a household member \u201cconsists of the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of a household member, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner.\u201d \u00a7 30-3-15(A). \u201chousehold member\u201d is defined under the CAHMA as:\na spouse, former spouse or family member, including a relative, parent, present or former step-parent, present or former in-law, a co-parent of a child or a person with whom a person has had a continuing personal relationship. Cohabitation is not necessary to be deemed a household member for the purposes of the Crimes Against Household Members Act.\n\u00a7 30-3-11.\n{13} In Stein, this Court concluded that the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d in the CAHMA does not include the \u201cchild\u201d of the accused. Stein, 1999-NMCA-065, \u00b6 19, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295. Defendant argues that because he was charged with battering his son, his conviction must be reversed based on this Court\u2019s holding in Stein. Relying on Stein and the omission of the term \u201cchild\u201d from the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d Defendant urges us to apply the statute as written. He also argues that words should not be read into the statute and that if the legislature had intended to include minor or adult children in the definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d it would have specifically done so. We conclude that Defendant\u2019s reliance on Stein is misplaced and that the holding of that case is limited to the minor children of the accused.\n{14} Initially, we address Defendant\u2019s argument favoring an application of the plain meaning rule of statutory construction. See State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 790, 791 P.2d 64, 65 (1990). We find Defendant\u2019s argument unavailing because a plain reading of the applicable statute supports a conclusion that the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d includes adult children of the accused. See \u00a7 30-3-11; State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064 (explaining that in ascertaining legislative intent we start by looking at the words chosen by the legislature). As we observed in Stein: \u201cOn its face, the statutory definition of \u2018household member\u2019 would appear to encompass a child of the accused. The definition includes \u2018a family member,\u2019 \u2018a relative,\u2019 and \u2018a person with whom a person has had a continuing personal relationship.\u2019 \u201d Stein, 1999\u2014 NMCA-065, \u00b6 11, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295. We find other indications that -the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d is to be read broadly. The victim need not cohabit or reside with the defendant in order to be a household member. \u00a7 30-3-11. Nor is it necessary for the victim to be related to the defendant; \u201ca continuing personal relationship\u201d is sufficient. Id.; cf. State v. Fike, 2002-NMCA-027, \u00b6 19,131 N.M. 676, 41 P.3d 944 (concluding that a continuing personal relationship was established where both victim and defendant lived together for several weeks before the incidents in question occurred). Thus, under a plain reading of the broadly drawn statute, Victim would certainly meet the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d since he is a \u201cfamily member\u201d and \u201crelative\u201d of Defendant.\n{15} In Stein, however, this Court looked beyond the plain language of Section 30-3-11 because a closer examination of the statute and its background revealed \u201cthat the legislative intent was to exclude children.\u201d Stein, 1999-NMCA-065, \u00b6\u00b6 11-17, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295; see State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (explaining that \u201cwe have not relied upon the literal meaning of a statute when such an application would be absurd, unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate\u201d); Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. We observed that while the definitions of \u201chousehold member\u201d in the Harassment and Stalking Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, and the Family Violence Protection Act, specifically include the term \u201cchild,\u201d the definition in the CAHMA omits the term. Stein, 1999-NMCA-065, \u00b614, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295. In all other respects, however, the language in the statutory definitions is identical. Id. \u00b6 16; see also State v. Trujillo, 1999-NMCA-003, \u00b6 8,126 N.M. 603, 973 P.2d 855. In addition, an examination of the legislative history of Section 30-3-11 revealed that the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d originally included the word \u201cchild,\u201d but that the word was later deleted by amendment and never reinserted. Stein, 1999-NMCA-065, \u00b6\u00b6 16-17, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295. Concluding that the omission of \u201cchild\u201d from Section 30-3-11 was \u201csubstantive and purposeful,\u201d id. \u00b6 17, this Court determined that the legislature intended to \u201cexclude children\u201d of the accused from the statutory definition. Id. \u00b6 11.\n{16} For several reasons, we conclude that the exclusion recognized in Stein applies only to the minor children of the accused. First, the victim in Stein was the 13-year-old daughter of the defendant. Id. \u00b6 4. Second, because the victim was a minor, the contentions of the defendant and the resulting holding of this Court were necessarily limited to minor children of the accused. See id. \u00b6 10. Third, in speculating why \u201cchild\u201d was omitted from the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d this Court identified two reasons: (1) conflict with the child abuse statute, and (2) the limited right of parents to impose corporal punishment on their children. Id. \u00b6 19. Both rationales apply only to minor children of the perpetrator.\n{17} In addition, as the State points out, \u201cchild\u201d is defined in the child abuse statute, and elsewhere, as a person under the age of eighteen. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-6-l(A)(l) (2004) (child abuse statute); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-4(B) (2003) (Children\u2019s Code). We believe that by omitting the word \u201cchild\u201d from the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d the legislature must have intended that only children under the age of eighteen be excluded from the definition. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep\u2019t (In re Kira M.), 118 N.M. 563, 569, 883 P.2d 149, 155 (1994) (\u201cWe presume the legislature is aware of existing law when it enacts legislation.\u201d); accord State v. Smith, 2004-NMCA-026, \u00b6 15, 135 N.M. 162, 85 P.3d 804.\n{18} Accordingly, today we reaffirm our holding in Stein, clarifying that only minor children of the accused are excluded from the definition of \u201chousehold member.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19. We note that since our decision in Stein, the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d has not been changed. The legislature has made only one amendment to the CAHMA, increasing the penalty of battery against a household member from petty misdemeanor to misdemeanor, apparently responding to the serious and pervasive nature of the problem of domestic violence. See \u00a7 30 \u2014 3\u201415(B).\n{19} Having determined that only minor children of the accused are excluded from the definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d and that the definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d is otherwise broad in scope, we conclude that Victim, as the adult son of Defendant, is a relative of Defendant and therefore fits within the definition of \u201cfamily member\u201d and thus a \u201chousehold member\u201d within the meaning of the statute. See \u00a7 30-3-11. If construed otherwise, the statute would have the absurd result of shielding a parent who has committed battery against an adult child from prosecution under Section 30-3-15, even though the victim is a \u201cfamily member\u201d or \u201crelative,\u201d while permitting an adult child who has battered a parent to be prosecuted under the statute. See State v. Pearson, 2000-NMCA-102, \u00b6 5, 129 N.M. 762, 13 P.3d 980 (\u201cFundamentally, our role is to effectuate the [l]egislature\u2019s intent as evidenced by the statute\u2019s plain terms and avoid strained or absurd constructions.\u201d).\n{20} Defendant argues that because he was estranged from Victim, there was no \u201ccontinuing personal relationship,\u201d and thus, the State cannot rely on that portion of the statute that defines \u201chousehold member\u201d as \u201ca person with whom a person has had a continuing personal relationship.\u201d See \u00a7 30-3-11. However, because we determine that Victim is a \u201crelative\u201d under Section 30-3-11, the State was not required to prove that Defendant had a continuing personal relationship with Victim. Under the statute, \u201chousehold member\u201d is defined, in part, as a family member, which term may include a person with whom a person has had a continuing personal relationship, or a number of other relationships, such as a relative. See State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 668, 671, 789 P.2d 616, 619 (1990) (\u201cThe word \u2018or\u2019 is given a disjunctive meaning unless the context of the statute demands otherwise.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, insofar as Defendant contends that an estranged family member cannot be a \u201chousehold member\u201d under the CAHMA, we reject this contention as without merit since Section 30-3-11 expressly includes former spouses, step-parents, or in-laws, who may or may not have had a continuing personal relationship with the accused at the time in question.\n[8] {21} Finally, Defendant argues that the statutory definition of \u201chousehold member\u201d must be strictly construed in his favor under the rule of lenity. See State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 434, 423 P.2d 867, 868 (1967). However, the rule of lenity is reserved \u201cfor those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute\u2019s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.\u201d State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. Ill, 116, 908 P.2d 1379, 1384 (1995) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Because we find that no such doubt persists after revisiting Stein and applying rules of statutory construction, we reject Defendant\u2019s argument urging us to apply the rule of lenity. We also need not address the State\u2019s arguments concerning the appropriate remedy in the event of reversal, and remand to the district court.\nCONCLUSION\n{22} Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring).\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge (specially concurring).", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(specially concurring).\n{24} NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-3-11 (1995) should be strictly construed. \u201c[Pjenal statutes must be strictly construed, and the definition of crimes therein contained is not to be broadened by intendment.\u201d State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 434, 423 P.2d 867, 868 (1967). Further, lenity applies when \u201creasonable doubt persists about a statute\u2019s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies.\u201d State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 116, 908 P.2d 1379, 1384 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{25} The Crimes Against Household Members Act was enacted in response to the Legislature\u2019s concern about domestic violence. State v. Stein, 1999-NMCA-065, \u00b6 2, 127 N.M. 362, 981 P.2d 295. It was aimed at household violence. Id. Stein raised some doubt as to the scope of Section 30-3-11. Furthermore, the term \u201cfamily member,\u201d without any limitation on how far \u201cfamily\u201d is intended to extend, and the analogical term \u201crelative,\u201d create a conceivably limitless unit. Section 30-3-11 should be strictly construed in favor of a defendant, particularly given the connotations of domestic and household, and given Stein\u2019s restrictive reading of the statute in regard to children. Nevertheless, even applying strict construction and considering lenity, I concur in the majority opinion.\n{26} Guidelines as to the meaning of \u201cfamily member\u201d are provided by the inclusionary terms that follow it in the statute. There appears to be no evidence regarding a continuing personal relationship between Defendant and Joseph. Section 30-3-11\u2019s restrictive definitional term \u201cfamily member,\u201d and inelusionary term \u201crelative,\u201d should be the only definitional terms applicable in the present case. Joseph, however estranged, was Defendant\u2019s son and thus came from the immediate family; and, of course, Joseph was a relative. It is reasonable to bring a victim\u2019s adult son within the meaning of \u201cfamily member.\u201d\n{27} I nevertheless want to express my concerns about the statute\u2019s scope. The statute neither requires the battery to have taken place in the home or to have been committed against a person residing in the home. The statute automatically covers any person who batters any relative whatsoever no matter the ages, sexes, emancipation, alienation, estrangement, and other circumstances such as chance meeting. Further, the statute automatically includes any person with whom the victim may have at some distant time in the past had a continuing personal relationship. Despite the word \u201cfamily\u201d in \u201cfamily member,\u201d the term \u201cfamily member\u201d could be interpreted to automatically include any person, whether a relative or not, with whom the victim has had at some time a continuing personal relationship.\n{28} Many examples can be recited that would seem to make application of the statute virtually absurd without evidence beyond that of the status of relative. An eighty-year-old grandaunt or granduncle can be convicted of battery or aggravated battery under NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-3-15 (2001), -16 (1995), for hitting her or his thirty-five-year-old nephew or niece once or twice removed with no further evidence than the elements of simple battery and proof that the victim was a relative. We must speculate that underlying its enactment of the Crimes Against Household Members Act the Legislature intended to establish a very broad policy that, no matter how diluted, attenuated, transient, and generally non-discordant the relationship may be, it was very important to society to provide every member of a virtually limitless family unit (except of course minor children) added protection from every other member of that unit.\n{29} Once a battery against a household member takes place, the statute makes the relative-actor criminally liable under Section 30-3-15(B), increasing the penalty from the petty misdemeanor of simple battery under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-3-4 (1963), to a misdemeanor. In this sense, the statute is or approaches a strict liability statute, because once a simple battery is proved, the sole question for the jury is whether it believes the defendant was a relative. See State v. Baca, 114 N.M. 668, 674, 845 P.2d 762, 768 (1992) (referring to crimes \u201cclosely approaching\u201d or constituting \u201cnear\u201d strict liability crimes); State v. Anderson, 2001-NMCA-027, \u00b6\u00b6 26-34, 130 N.M. 295, 24 P.3d 327 (discussing strict liability for aggravation of a crime by the mere possession of an object or instrument that, if used as a weapon, could inflict serious injury). As such, perhaps it can be presumed to have been intended to afford a high level of protection and should be construed in a manner so that such protection is not vitiated. See Baca, 114 N.M. at 674, 845 P.2d at 768.\n{30} Unquestionably expanded way beyond what the public normally thinks of as domestic or household violence against household members, the Legislature apparently felt that as a matter of our social welfare there should be no physical squabbling within this virtually limitless family unit. See State v. Rios, 1999-NMCA-069, \u00b6 5, 127 N.M. 334, 980 P.2d 1068 (stating the legislative interest in establishing a strict liability crime to presumably be \u201cthat the public interest in the matter is so compelling or that the potential for harm is so great, that public interests override individual interests\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). I am not so sure, however, that the statute should be read so broadly. See State v. Torres, 2003-NMCA-101, \u00b6 12, 134 N.M. 194, 75 P.3d 410 (noting that policy considerations may require the conclusion that \u201csome of the potential victims within the purview of [a strict liability] statute do not require the protection of strict liability\u201d).\n{31} Defendant has raised no constitutional issue. Absent a constitutional defect in the statute, I hesitatingly defer to possible legislative intent and concern, notwithstanding my skepticism that the Legislature actually intended Section 30-3-11 to reach an estranged adult son under the circumstances of this case, because it is conceivable that the Legislature intended protection where the victim, even though an adult son, is a product of the nuclear family unit, a unit in which psychological sores and scars and abuse are often in hidden closets, and as to which the Legislature may well have wanted to provide added protection.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" }, { "text": "KENNEDY, Judge\n(specially concurring).\n{32} I concur with Judge Sutin\u2019s assessment of the utilitarian conundrum that produces a hair-trigger for imposing \u201cnear strict liability\u201d based on no genuinely functional distinction between this victim and any other person. Then too, I utterly concur with Judge Fry that we must take the statute as we find it, and that as we find it here, it is clear and lenity does not apply. Besides, it was the former familial relationship out of which the fight here was born. Much consideration in cases like these also rests with the prosecutor, in whose discretion, following the dictates of justice, rests the power of obsta principiis in the face of a temptation to upgrade a simple brawl to a charge rooted in a legislative desire to protect families.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "KENNEDY, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM for Appellee.", "John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Sue A. Herrmann, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2005-NMCA-005\n104 P.3d 540\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John MONTOYA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 24,192.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 9, 2004.\nCertiorari Granted, No. 28,972, Jan. 4, 2005.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM for Appellee.\nJohn B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Sue A. Herrmann, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0674-01", "first_page_order": 700, "last_page_order": 708 }