{ "id": 929253, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Garcia", "decision_date": "2005-04-18", "docket_number": "No. 24328", "first_page": "583", "last_page": "588", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 N.M. 583" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "113 P.3d 406" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2005-NMCA-065" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "681 N.W.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9228872 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/681/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Wis.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8672551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding a probation condition prohibiting association with minor children, not his own, when the defendant was convicted of child molestation" }, { "page": "536-37", "parenthetical": "upholding a probation condition prohibiting association with minor children, not his own, when the defendant was convicted of child molestation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/73/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ariz. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1186845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1206", "parenthetical": "holding that a reasonable relationship existed between a probation condition's requirement that the defendant not have unsupervised contact with children and the goals of rehabilitating him and protecting the public from any further criminal acts he might commit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/199/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Or.App. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 4414010 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that when the defendant was convicted of raping his stepdaughter, a condition that prohibited his presence in a residence or vehicle with a child of either gender under eighteen years was valid" }, { "page": "1027-28", "parenthetical": "stating that when the defendant was convicted of raping his stepdaughter, a condition that prohibited his presence in a residence or vehicle with a child of either gender under eighteen years was valid" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/96/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.Y.S.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622", "parenthetical": "upholding condition of probation preventing contact with stepdaughter and biological daughters when the defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 A.D.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3594878 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding condition of probation preventing contact with stepdaughter and biological daughters when the defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/150/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 So.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9639992 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/328/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 So.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9551908 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/378/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 P.2d 1379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10410279 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1381", "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant convicted of lewd and lascivious acts toward a child was properly subjected to a probation condition that prohibited contact with his daughter and other girls under eighteen" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/745/1379-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727673 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427993 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588680 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "1266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "850" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-049", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427962 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352321 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77144 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588533 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "stating that an appellate court will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the proposition" }, { "page": "1330", "parenthetical": "stating that an appellate court will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the proposition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731543 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106562 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138", "parenthetical": "stating that subject matter jurisdiction, or the power to decide a particular type of case, may not be waived and \"may be raised for the first time on appeal\"" }, { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "stating that subject matter jurisdiction, or the power to decide a particular type of case, may not be waived and \"may be raised for the first time on appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260688 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b69-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77174 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0566-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 839, "char_count": 17044, "ocr_confidence": 0.673, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3486914786654207e-07, "percentile": 0.6328276281744611 }, "sha256": "245a30f330f8c9f0a72d2837aa2ab862a959d68d49a39c585847352a6b432668", "simhash": "1:bb535d32f28b77ca", "word_count": 2613 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:10.753344+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ALARID and ROBINSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, J.\n{1} Defendant Arthur Garcia appeals a special condition of his probation included in the district court\u2019s judgment and sentence in his criminal case. The condition prohibits Defendant from having direct or indirect contact with all children under the age of eighteen, including the victim of his crimes, absent a court order. Principally because of the district court\u2019s authority in sentencing and the relationship of the special condition to Defendant\u2019s conduct in this case, we affirm the district court\u2019s judgment and sentence.\nBackground\n{2} Defendant pleaded guilty to eight counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the fourth degree. The charges stemmed from a series of incidents that occurred over the course of several months between Defendant and one of his daughters adopted from Russia. After the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to incarceration for three years followed by five years of supervised probation. It partially suspended the sentence and imposed nine conditions of probation. Special condition number eight states that \u201cDefendant shall have no contact, direct or indirect, with children under the age of eighteen (18) or with the victim unless it is pursuant to a Court order.\u201d The terms of this provision effectively prohibit Defendant from having contact with his two biological daughters and two adopted daughters until they reach majority, without a court order.\n{3} Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentence. He contended that: (1) he fully cooperated with the authorities in the investigation and prosecution of the case and with the various psychological professionals involved with treating his family; (2) the proposed resolution of the ease included treatment, intervention, and reunification of Defendant\u2019s family \u201cunder stringent protective safeguards to insure that the children are safe and that their urgent psychological need for contact with [Defendant] would be addressed;\u201d (3) he was \u201ccaught entirely by surprise\u201d by letters that requested a harsh sentence, which were submitted to the district court prior to the sentencing hearing; (4) he was unable to produce testimony rebutting the assertions made at the sentencing hearing; and (5) condition number eight would \u201ccause significant emotional damage to [Defendant\u2019s] other children and the [v]ictim.\u201d Finding that its sentence was proper, the district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion.\n{4} Defendant then moved the district court to reconsider its order denying his motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to reconsider certain portions of the sentence imposed. Defendant asserted that special condition number eight should be amended to provide for supervised contact between Defendant and his children in accordance with the recommendations of therapists who observed the children and concluded that special condition number eight was not in conformity with the children\u2019s best interests. The prosecutor consented to supervised visitation so long as certain conditions were met. The district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant now appeals special condition number eight included in the district court\u2019s judgment and order partially suspending sentence.\nIssues Addressed in This Appeal\n{5} On appeal, Defendant contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to impose special condition number eight prohibiting all contact with minors without a court order because that condition was a \u201cde facto\u201d termination of his parental rights to his four daughters. He argues that the children\u2019s court has sole jurisdiction over child custody, contact, and visitation issues, and the Children\u2019s Code provides the exclusive, exhaustive, and comprehensive procedure that a court must follow before it \u201cde facto\u201d terminates parental rights. Specifically, Defendant asserts that \u201cwhen the [district [cjourt terminated [his] parental rights by imposing probation condition number 8, it exceeded its jurisdiction, acted illegally, deprived [him] of all due process as proscribed by the Children\u2019s Code and violated his family\u2019s fundamental right of familial integrity.\u201d Defendant urges this Court to strike special condition number eight and remand this case to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to the children\u2019s court for proceedings in accordance with the Children\u2019s Code to address the subject matter of Defendant\u2019s contact with his children. Defendant further argues that special condition number eight enjoined him from having contact with his children without following the proper procedures of Rule 1-066 NMRA.\n{6} Defendant states that these issues were preserved in the district court. However, the record does not reflect that Defendant raised the arguments concerning the jurisdiction of the children\u2019s court, the constitution, or the need for notice for injunctions before the district court. We generally do not consider issues on appeal that are not preserved below. Rule 12-216(A) NMRA; State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6 52, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (\u201cTo preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Constitutional issues must also be properly preserved. See Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6\u00b69-10, 132 N.M. 401, 49 P.3d 662. However, we will address an argument that a court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. See Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 133, 138, 899 P.2d 576, 581 (1995) (stating that subject matter jurisdiction, or the power to decide a particular type of case, may not be waived and \u201cmay be raised for the first time on appeal\u201d); see also In re Aaron L, 2000-NMCA-024, \u00b6 10, 128 N.M. 641, 996 P.2d 431 (stating that on appeal the reviewing court will not consider issues not raised in the district court unless the issues involve matters of fundamental right or fundamental error). As a result, Defendant did not waive his argument concerning the children\u2019s court jurisdiction by failing to preserve it.\n{7} To the extent that Defendant appears to argue that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, this argument has no merit. Defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court when he pleaded guilty to the charges. See Stetz v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs., Inc., 114 N.M. 465, 470, 840 P.2d 612, 617 (Ct.App.1992) (\u201cThe defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is subject to waiver when not properly asserted.\u201d). Defendant also does not cite authority that states that Rule 1-066 is applicable in the criminal sentencing context. See In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that an appellate court will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the proposition). We therefore focus our review on Defendant\u2019s substantive arguments that the children\u2019s court had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and that the district court acted improperly by imposing special condition number eight.\nSubject Matter Jurisdiction of the District Court and the Children\u2019s Court\n{8} The State initiated this case as a criminal ease under the Criminal Code, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-9-13 (2001). Defendant admitted criminal sexual contact with his adopted daughter who was under the age of eighteen. Upon conviction of a crime under the Criminal Code, the court sentences a defendant in accordance with the Criminal Sentencing Act. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-18-13 (1993). When sentencing, a district court may, as did the district court in this case, suspend the sentence and order the defendant placed on probation for all or part of the period of the suspension, and when doing so, may require the defendant to satisfy \u201cconditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation.\u201d See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-20-6(F) (1997) (stating conditions trial eourt is required and has discretion to attach to order deferring or suspending sentence); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-20-5(A) (1985) (allowing court to defer or suspend sentence and order probation for all or part of the period of deferment or suspension).\n{9} The State did not bring this case as a termination of parental rights action under the Abuse and Neglect Act provisions of the Children\u2019s Code. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 32A-4-1 to 32A-4-33 (1993, as amended through 2001). The Abuse and Neglect Act contains comprehensive procedures concerning the termination of parental rights when children have been abused or neglected. Id. It includes within its purview \u201csexual abuse\u201d defined as including, but not limited to, \u201ccriminal sexual contact.\u201d Section 32A-4-2(G). The Children\u2019s Code provides that \u201ca court other than the children\u2019s court division of the district court\u201d shall transfer a criminal action to the children\u2019s court division of the district eourt if it appears that the \u201cjurisdiction is properly within the children\u2019s court division.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-5(C) (1993).\n{10} Defendant contends that the district court should have transferred this case to the children\u2019s court because special condition number eight either was a termination of his parental rights or constituted a \u201cde facto\u201d termination of his parental rights subject to the comprehensive provisions of the Abuse and Neglect Act. Defendant\u2019s argument poses a standard of review that is both de novo and deferential to the discretion of the district court. We review questions concerning subject matter jurisdiction and issues of law de novo. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. King, 2003-NMSC-029, \u00b6 4, 134 N.M. 467, 78 P.3d 1226; Ottino v. Ottino, 2001-NMCA-012, \u00b6 6, 130 N.M. 168, 21 P.3d 37. We apply an abuse of discretion standard to determine whether a district court properly imposed a condition of probation. State v. Baca, 2004-NMCA-049, \u00b6 13, 135 N.M. 490, 90 P.3d 509.\n{11} Although special condition number eight affects Defendant\u2019s relationship with his children, we do not agree with Defendant that it amounted to a \u201cde facto\u201d termination of parental rights, necessitating jurisdiction within the children\u2019s court. In the criminal context, conditions of probation are imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See id. \u00b6 17. Conditions of probation are reasonably related to rehabilitation if they are \u201crelevant to the offense for which probation was granted.\u201d State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171, 174, 619 P.2d 847, 850 (Ct.App. 1980). The court has broad discretion to effect rehabilitation and may impose conditions \u201cdesigned to protect the public against the commission of other offenses during the term, and which have as their objective the deterrence of future misconduct.\u201d State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 119, 666 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Ct.App.1983) (citation omitted).\n{12} To fashion its sentence, the district court had before it Defendant\u2019s psychological evaluation and other information, including letters from community members, family members, and a therapist. An international adoption agency submitted a letter expressing its shock and disappointment about Defendant\u2019s charges and the potential jeopardy to future international adoptions. Letters from community members, including a teacher and other families who have adopted children, expressed concern for Defendant\u2019s children and the treatment that they received under Defendant\u2019s care. Defendant\u2019s psychological evaluation, written by a licensed clinical psychologist, revealed, among other things, that Defendant\u2019s wife observed that every few years Defendant \u201c \u2018feels neglected\u2019 and develops a crush on someone.\u201d She stated that she had noticed a physical closeness between Defendant and the victim that \u201cfelt inappropriate.\u201d The evaluation also revealed that Defendant was sexually aroused when he touched his daughter\u2019s breasts and that although he knew what he was doing was wrong, he felt that he was unable to stop himself even after she told him not to touch her. The clinical psychologist concluded that these behaviors revealed poor judgment and inadequate impulse control.\n{13} Therefore, despite the fact that therapists recommended supervised visitation and that others, such as Defendant, Defendant\u2019s wife, Defendant\u2019s father-in-law, and the prosecutor, asked that supervised visitation be allowed, the district court could determine that due to the serious nature of the crimes, it would not agree to such visitation and would prohibit all contact with minors, subject to modification by court order. The district court\u2019s prohibition of Defendant\u2019s contact with all minors, including his daughters, is reasonably related to achieving the sentencing goal of deterring Defendant from engaging in similar criminal conduct to that charged in this ease. See State v. Wacey C., 2004-NMCA-029, \u00b6 11,135 N.M. 186, 86 P.3d 611 (stating that the general considerations governing the appropriateness of probation conditions applicable in adult eases were consistent with this Court\u2019s holding in a juvenile case that a probation condition forbidding a child from going to certain locations where he committed offenses was not a banishment and was a reasonable probation condition); State v. McCoy, 116 N.M. 491, 500, 864 P.2d 307, 316 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that random drug testing as a condition of probation is reasonably related to deterring future criminal conduct), rev\u2019d on other grounds sub nom. State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 882 P.2d 1 (1994). Case law from other jurisdictions addressing similar conditions of probation supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Nitz v. State, 745 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Alaska Ct.App. 1987) (holding that a defendant convicted of lewd and lascivious acts toward a child was properly subjected to a probation condition that prohibited contact with his daughter and other girls under eighteen); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) (holding that, after a guilty plea to aggravated child abuse, a special condition of probation that prohibited the defendant from having custody of her children was valid because the condition had a clear relationship to the crime); State v. Credeur, 328 So.2d 59, 64 (La.1976) (determining that a special probation condition that prevented contact with the defendant\u2019s children was reasonable when sexual abuse crime involved the defendant\u2019s children); People v. McAllister, 150 A.D.2d 913, 541 N.Y.S.2d 622, 622 (N.Y.App.Div. 1989) (upholding condition of probation preventing contact with stepdaughter and biological daughters when the defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter); State v. Crocker, 96 Or.App. 111, 771 P.2d 1026, 1027-28 (1989) (stating that when the defendant was convicted of raping his stepdaughter, a condition that prohibited his presence in a residence or vehicle with a child of either gender under eighteen years was valid); see also State v. Kessler, 199 Ariz. 83, 13 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2000) (holding that a reasonable relationship existed between a probation condition\u2019s requirement that the defendant not have unsupervised contact with children and the goals of rehabilitating him and protecting the public from any further criminal acts he might commit); Ramaker v. State, 73 Wis.2d 563, 243 N.W.2d 534, 536-37 (1976) (upholding a probation condition prohibiting association with minor children, not his own, when the defendant was convicted of child molestation).\nConclusion\n{14} The Abuse and Neglect Act requires the children\u2019s court to \u201cgive primary consideration to the physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the child\u201d in proceedings to terminate parental rights. Section 32A-4-28(A). The children\u2019s court must consider the \u201cphysical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the child.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-5-15(A) (1995). This focus on the child is different from the focus of sentencing in a criminal case. The prohibition of special condition number eight related to Defendant\u2019s crime of criminal sexual contact with a minor. Given the purposes of special condition number eight of rehabilitation and deterrence, the district court had jurisdiction of this case and did not err by not transferring it to the children\u2019s court. See State v. Ehli 681 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (N.D.2004) (holding that a probation condition prohibiting the defendant from having contact with minor children under the age of eighteen, including his own, was proper and not a de facto termination of parental rights). We affirm the district court\u2019s imposition of the probation condition prohibiting Defendant from having contact with all children under eighteen unless modified by court order.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID and ROBINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellee.", "Daniel A. Bryant, Daniel A. Bryant, P.A., Ruidoso, Mark Pickett, Pickett & Murphy, Las Cruces, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2005-NMCA-065 113 P.3d 406\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 24328.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 18, 2005.\nPatricia A Madrid, Attorney General, James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellee.\nDaniel A. Bryant, Daniel A. Bryant, P.A., Ruidoso, Mark Pickett, Pickett & Murphy, Las Cruces, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0583-01", "first_page_order": 615, "last_page_order": 620 }