{ "id": 929131, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Calvin PARSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Parson", "decision_date": "2005-06-14", "docket_number": "No. 24,451", "first_page": "773", "last_page": "778", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 N.M. 773" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "115 P.3d 236" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2005-NMCA-083" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "113 N.M. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723200 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776556 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388", "parenthetical": "stating that the title of an act may be utilized as an aid in determining legislative intent and to resolve doubts as to meanings" }, { "page": "742", "parenthetical": "stating that the title of an act may be utilized as an aid in determining legislative intent and to resolve doubts as to meanings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/63/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-113", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 18530 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 352261 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566678 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "1382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 257701 ], "weight": 38, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "amended 2001" }, { "parenthetical": "amended 2001" }, { "parenthetical": "amended 2001" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 34-37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5-6" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7, 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b613" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16, 31, 29-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0240-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 21587, "ocr_confidence": 0.684, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.33836798979399957 }, "sha256": "866fae9198b1c97573f06e0f9c8ac7da21667206debf99f776a7e1aad1407e60", "simhash": "1:2b266e1a91ed6a63", "word_count": 3447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:10.753344+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Chief Judge and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Calvin PARSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} Defendant Calvin Parson unlawfully transported elk heads. He appeals his convictions under felony statutes outlawing \u201ctransporting ... stolen or unlawfully possessed livestock or any unlawfully possessed game animal, or any parts thereof,\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-18-6 (1963), and conspiring to commit that crime, see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-28-2(A) (1979). He grounds his appeal on the view that he should have only been charged with a misdemeanor under the more specifically applicable game and fish laws in NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 17-2-7 and -20.3 (1979), and NMSA 1978, \u00a7 17-2-10 (1999). We agree with Defendant and reverse.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} In presenting its case, the State put on testimony regarding an unlawful, multi-million dollar elk head and antler trophy business. The testimony included a description of a joint investigation into waste of wildlife and illegal antler trade by the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish and the Colorado Division of Wildlife. In the investigation, Department personnel discovered the carcasses of two decapitated mature bull elk. The investigation led to a possible poacher by the name of Zach Romero and then to Defendant. Each was charged with a violation of Section 30-18-6 and charged with conspiracy to violate Section 30-18-6, pursuant to Section 30-28-2(A). These crimes are fourth degree felonies. \u00a7\u00a7 30-18-6, 30-28-2(B)(3).\n{3} The linking of firearm shell casings found at the sites of the killed elk with cartridges in Defendant\u2019s home, the linking of DNA from blood of the elk and blood found in Defendant\u2019s van, and testimony- of Romero in Defendant\u2019s trial that the two shot the elk in question out of season and transported the elk heads, led to Defendant\u2019s convictions on both charges. Before he testified against Defendant, Romero pled guilty to the same charges.\n{4} Defendant sought dismissal of the charges on the ground that he was improperly charged under Section 30-18-6 instead of under the game and fish laws. He argued that the felony statute under which he was convicted was a general statute, whereas the applicable misdemeanor game and fish statutes were the more specific, and that the State was required to prosecute him under the more specific statutes. Defendant\u2019s argument on this issue centered on State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23, in which the Court held that NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-18-1 (1963, repealed 1999) (amended 2001) (cruelty to animals), one of the many animal-related statutes in Article 18 of the New Mexico Criminal Code (Chapter 30), did not apply to Defendant\u2019s conduct in \u201csnaring two deer.\u201d Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6 37, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. The Supreme Court construed the words \u201cany animal\u201d in Section 30-18-1 to mean \u201cdomestic animals and wild animals in captivity,\u201d and determined that the conduct was covered under the more specific game and fish laws. See Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6\u00b6 34-37, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23.\n{5} The district court denied Defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss, distinguishing Cleve on the basis that Section 30-18-1 in Cleve and Section 30-18-6 in the present case were different statutes. In making the distinction, the Court focused mostly on the proscribed conduct of \u201ctransporting\u201d a game animal or a part of a game animal in Section 30-18-6.\n{6} Defendant asserts on appeal that: (1) Section 30-18-6 applies only to elk when elk are being raised as livestock, and not to free-roaming, wild elk and, therefore, the State failed to prove that Defendant stole livestock as defined by the statute; (2) under a plain meaning analysis, the State was required to charge Defendant under the game and fish statutes; and (3) if the plain meaning rule is inapplicable, then Cleve\u2019s determination of legislative intent that the game and fish laws are an exception to the animal-related statutes in Article 18 of the Criminal Code controls.\nDISCUSSION\nI. Standard of Review\n{7} We decide the issues in this case based on statutory construction alone. Our review, therefore, is de novo. See State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995).\nII. The Statutes\n{8} We preface our discussion of Defendant\u2019s points on appeal by discussing Chapter 30, Article 18 of our statutes, and by setting out the various statutes on which Defendant relies, together with a fuller discussion of Cleve.\nArticle 18\n{9} Article 18 of Chapter 30 relates to \u201canimals\u201d generally. Several specific statutes relate to cruelty to animals and the seizure, disposition, and award of costs in connection with animals endangered from cruel treatment. See \u00a7 30-18-1; NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-18-1.1, -1.2, -1.3 (1999). Several of the other sections in Article 18 expressly mention \u201clivestock\u201d or obviously cover livestock by referring to \u201ccattle\u201d or \u201ccow.\u201d See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-18-3(C) (1963); NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-18-4, -5, -6, -8, -12, -14 (1963, as amended through 2001). One of these sections relates to injury to livestock that is the property of another and defines \u201clivestock\u201d as \u201cused in this section.\u201d See \u00a7 30-18-12(B). The definition there does not include the family cervidae or elk. Id. Section 30-18-14 authorizes livestock inspectors who are certified peace officers to enforce \u201ccriminal laws relating to livestock,\u201d including those in Article 18.\n{10} Several provisions in Article 18 that do not expressly or exclusively relate to clearly domesticated animals such as livestock, cattle, dogs, equines (horse, pony, mule, donkey or hinny), are nevertheless obviously or likely meant to cover only domesticated animals. See \u00a7\u00a7 30-18-3; -4(D), (E), (F); \u20146;\u20147; -15. Section 30-18-3 covers unlawful branding. Section 30-18-4 covers the unlawful disposition of animals that are owned or are the property of others. Section 30-18-6, which proscribes transporting \u201cstolen\u201d livestock and defines this as transporting \u201cstolen or unlawfully possessed livestock or any unlawfully possessed game animal,\u201d by use of the word \u201cstolen\u201d implies the taking of property from another. See Merriam Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1150 (10th ed.1996) (defining \u201csteal\u201d to mean \u201cto take the property of another wrongfully\u201d). Section 30-18-7 relates to misrepresentation of the pedigree of an animal. Section 30-18-15, the last section in Article 18, proscribes certain injections by personnel of an animal control service or facility, animal shelter, or humane society.\n{11} Only two provisions in Article 18 use the words \u201cgame animal.\u201d Section 30-18-6, as indicated earlier in this opinion, proscribes the transporting of an unlawfully possessed game animal. Section 30-18-10 excludes from Article 18 proscriptions \u201cthe taking of game animals, game birds or game fish by the use of dogs\u201d under certain circumstances.\nThe Livestock Code\n{12} Defendant turns to the Livestock Code, NMSA \u00a7\u00a7 77-2-1 to -18-4 (1869, as amended through 2004), which states that, \u201c[a]s used in The Livestock Code ... \u2018animals\u2019 or \u2018livestock\u2019 means all domestic or domesticated animals that are used or raised on a farm or ranch, including ... farmed cervidae upon any land in New Mexico.\u201d \u00a7 77-2-l.l(A). Based on these definitions and pointing out that \u201ccervidae\u201d are elk and deer, Defendant contends that \u201cgame animals\u201d as used in Section 30-18-6 do not include free-roaming animals.\nGame and Fish Laws\n{13} The game and fish laws are found in Chapter 17 of the statutes. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 17-1-1 to 17-8-6 (1912, as amended through 2003). Defendant contends that the State\u2019s evidence established nothing more than that the elk in question were free-roaming, wild animals protected under the game and fish laws. Defendant cites, in particular, Sections 17-2-3(A)(4), -7, -10, and -20.3. Section 17-2-3(A)(4) lists certain \u201cgame mammals\u201d as protected wildlife species. Among the game mammals listed is \u201cthe family Cervidae.\u201d Id. Under Section 17-2-7(A)(l) and (2), unless permitted under regulations or law, \u201cit is unlawful to[ ] hunt, take, capture, [or] kill ... any game animal,\u201d and it is unlawful to \u201cpossess ... all or any part of any game animal.\u201d Section 17-2-10(A) states that it is a misdemeanor to violate any provision of Chapter 17 or any regulations \u201cthat relate to the time, extent, means or manner that game animals ... may be hunted, taken, captured, killed, possessed, sold, purchased or shipped.\u201d Section 17-2-20.3 states that the \u201cillegal possession or transportation of big game during closed season\u201d is a misdemeanor, and, further, that \u201ctaking or attempting to take big game during closed season,\u201d and \u201cselling or attempting to sell big game or parts thereof\u2019 without a permit, are misdemeanors. \u00a7 17-2-20.3(A), (B), (D).\nState v. Cleve\n{14} In Cleve, only the cruelty to animals provision in Article 18, namely, Section 30-18-1, was at issue. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6 7, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. The defendant in Cleve was convicted of cruelty to animals under Section 30-18-1 and unlawful hunting under Section 17-2-7(A). Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. In regard to Section 30-18-1, the question in Cleve was whether \u201cany animal\u201d in that statute meant all animals, including game animals. 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6\u00b6 7, 9,127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. Interpreting Section 30-18-1, the Court read the three subsections of the statute as it then existed to \u201cprohibit behavior that could only apply to domesticated animals or wild animals previously reduced to captivity[.]\u201d Cleve, 1999\u2014 NMSC-017, \u00b6 12, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. The Court concluded that \u201cthe Legislature intended that the phrase \u2018any animal\u2019 denote domesticated animals and wild animals in captivity throughout Section 30-18-1.\u201d Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6 12, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. The Court also \u201cconcludefd] that the Legislature enacted the entire [Article 18] with the exclusive purposes of controlling certain human behavior in relation to domesticated animals and protecting the property rights of the owners of domesticated or previously captured wild animals.\u201d Id. \u00b6 13. Section 30-18-6 was among the statutes in Article 18 specifically referred to by the Court that paved the way for the Court\u2019s statement that, \u201c[e]ach of these other statutes exclusively concern livestock and other animals possessed by humans[.]\u201d Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b613, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. As to Section 30-18-1, in studying the context surrounding its enactment, the Court concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude wild animals from its protection. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6 15,127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23.\n{15} The Court in Cleve then turned to game and fish laws, including the unlawful hunting statute under which the defendant was charged, Section 17-2-7. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6\u00b6 16, 31, 29-34, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. The Court looked at these laws in the context of the general/specific rule of statutory construction. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 16-36. Cleve concluded \u201cthat the Legislature did not intend for Section 30-18-1 to apply to hunting activities contemplated by New Mexico\u2019s specific laws governing game and fish.\u201d Id. \u00b6 18. The Court held:\n[T]he overall statutory scheme governing hunting and fishing demonstrates a legislative intent to preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to game and fish with respect to conduct contemplated by game and fish laws. We believe that the general/specific statute rule therefore provides additional support for our interpretation of Section 30-18-1.\nId. \u00b6 16. The Court further concluded that:\n[E]ven if the Legislature had intended to protect wild animals in Section 30-18-1, the Legislature, having dealt with the subject of the hunting of game animals more particularly in the game and fish laws, intended to create an exception from the cruelty-to-animals statute for hunting and fishing activity contemplated by game and fish laws.\nId. \u00b6 35.\n{16} The general/specific statute rule discussed and applied in Cleve was reconfirmed as a rule to \u201cdetermine legislative intent in the context of potentially conflicting laws\u201d in State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, \u00b6 11, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456. The Cleve preemption analysis appears to have been disfavored in Santillanes as a label that \u201cdo[es] not serve [its] intended purpose of clarifying the general/specific statute rule.\u201d Id.\n{17} The version of Section 30-18-1 addressed in Cleve was repealed in the 1999 legislative session and reenacted in the same session with significant changes and as a considerably more comprehensive statute. See 1999 N.M. Laws ch. 107, \u00a7 1; 2001 N.M. Laws ch. 81, \u00a7 1. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23, filed March 11, 1999, does not mention this 1999 legislative activity. It would appear that the legislation was at least in part a reaction to this Court\u2019s 1997 decision in Cleve, which interpreted Section 30-18-1 to apply to wild animals including the deer that the defendant in that case snared. See State v. Cleve, 1997-NMCA-113, \u00b6 13, 124 N.M. 289, 949 P.2d 672, rev\u2019d by 1999-NMSC-017, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. The 1999 reenacted Section 30-18-1 covers, in part, negligently \u201ckilling without lawful justification ... an animal[,]\u201d \u201cintentionally ... mutilating, injuring or poisoning an animalf,]\u201d and \u201cmaliciously killing an animal.\u201d \u00a7 30 \u2014 18\u20141 (B)(1), (E)(1), (2) (2001). The reenactment states, however, that the provisions of the section \u201cdo not apply to ... fishing, hunting, falconry, taking and trapping, as provided in Chapter 17 NMSA 1978[.]\u201d \u00a7 30 \u2014 18\u20141 (I)(l). The question is whether the change in Section 30-18-1 affects the precedential value of Cleve.\n{18} We see nothing in the 1999 reenactment of Section 30-18-1 that reflects a legislative intent to cover the hunting, capturing, or killing of free-roaming, wild elk or the transporting of such elk after being hunted, captured, or killed. To the contrary, that section contains the express statement that the section\u2019s provisions do not apply to activities under Chapter 17. Chapter 17 is comprehensive regulatory legislation to protect free-roaming, wild game animals through State regulation of hunting, taking, capturing, killing, and possessing free-roaming, wild game animals, specifically including elk. See \u00a7\u00a7 17-1-1, 17-2-1, -2, -3. We read the exclusion in Section 30 \u2014 18\u20141(I)(1) to mean that Section 30-18-1 does not criminalize conduct regulated under Chapter 17. Thus, while Section 30-18-1 was substantially changed during the formation and filing of the Cleve opinion in 1999, we doubt that the Legislature was attempting to write Section 30-18-1 to apply to the hunting and killing of free-roaming, wild animals regulated under Chapter 17. Rather, we construe the legislative intent in enacting Section 30-18-1(1) to be in sync with the Supreme Court\u2019s analysis and holding in Cleve.\n{19} We believe that Cleve\u2019s assessment that Article 18 was intended to cover only \u201cdomesticated or previously captured wild animals\u201d remains valid. The fact that reenacted Section 30-18-l(A) expressly also excludes \u201cinsects\u201d and \u201creptiles,\u201d and also expressly does not apply to the practice of veterinary medicine, or rodent and pest control, see \u00a7 30 \u2014 18\u20141(I)(2), (3), does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the validity of Cleve\u2019s assessment of the legislative intent behind Article 18.\nIII. The Parties\u2019 Arguments\n{20} In his appellate arguments, Defendant first asserts that Section 30-18-6 proscribes only the transportation of elk being raised as livestock, and bases this assertion on the various statutes in Chapters 17 and 77 discussed earlier in this opinion. He next relies on Cleve\u2019s general/specific legislative intent analysis, asserting that the State can charge him only with a more specific statute in Chapter 17. His third and final assertion is that if this Court were to conclude that Section 30-18-6 and statutes in the Chapter 17 game and fish laws give rise to legitimate, differing interpretations, requiring a contextual analysis (history, apparent object, statutes in pari materia), we are bound by Cleve\u2019s holding that the game and fish laws demonstrate a legislative intent to preempt application of Section 30-18-6.\n{21} The State asserts that the words in Section 30-18-6 are plain and clear, making no distinction between farmed and free-roaming elk. The State argues that if the Legislature intended in Section 30-18-6 to exclude illegally possessed free-roaming, wild game, it could easily have expressed that intent in the statute. The State further argues that no provision in the game and fish statutes specifically addresses the acts of transporting unlawfully possessed game animal parts, whereas Section 30-18-6 does specifically address that activity. According to the State, Section 17-2-10 does not outlaw the transporting of trophy elk heads, and Section 17-2-20.3 does not outlaw the transporting of parts. The State\u2019s only substantive law-related reference to Cleve is one parenthetically indicating that Cleve is contrary to the State\u2019s view that \u201cthe [Legislature's intentional use of the phrase (or game animals) in the transporting stolen livestock statute, as opposed to simply using the term or \u2018any animal\u2019 or \u2018livestock\u2019, supports that conclusion that the [Legislature intended for the transporting stolen livestock statute to concern more than just animals possessed by humans.\u201d\nIY. Defendant Was Chargeable Only Under the Game and Fish Laws\n{22} Section 30-18-6 was originally enacted in 1963 as part of an \u201cAct Providing for a Revised Criminal Code.\u201d See 1963 N.M. Laws ch. 303, \u00a7 18-6. The title and content of Section 30-18-6 have remained unchanged. The appearance of \u201cgame animal\u201d in a statute titled \u201cTransporting Stolen Livestock\u201d that is surrounded by statutes intended for the most part, if not exclusively, to relate only to domesticated animals, gives appropriate pause in considering what animals the words \u201cgame animals\u201d in that statute were meant to include. See Harriett v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 388, 320 P.2d 738, 742 (1958) (stating that the title of an act may be utilized as an aid in determining legislative intent and to resolve doubts as to meanings); Serrano v. Dep\u2019t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 113 N.M. 444, 447, 827 P.2d 159, 162 (Ct.App.1992) (stating that a legislatively enacted section heading may be useful in determining legislative intent in an ambiguously drafted statute). Cleve necessitates a cautious analysis. Cleve also provides the analytic basis for decision. The game and fish laws in Chapter 17 are expressly intended to cover free-roaming, wild game elk; the animal statutes in Article 18 of Chapter 30 are not. The game and fish laws more specifically apply to the elk and trophy-head hunting and transporting than do the animal statutes.\n{23} As indicated earlier in this opinion, Section 17-2-3, which covers protected wildlife species, specifically defines \u201cgame mammals\u201d to include \u201call of the family Cervidae (elk and deer).\u201d \u00a7 17-2-3(A)(4). Under Section 17-2-7(A)(l) and (2), it is unlawful to hunt, take, capture, kill, or possess any game animal except as permitted by regulations or other laws. Section 17-2-10(A) prescribes up to six months imprisonment for any person who violates a Chapter 17 provision \u201cre-lat[ing] to the time, extent, means or manner that game animals ... may be hunted, taken, captured, killed, possessed, sold, purchased or shipped.\u201d Further, Section 17-2-20.1(A)(1) and (A)(2) refers to the crimes of \u201cillegal possession or transportation of big game,\u201d and \u201ctaking big game during closed season.\u201d Further, under Section 17-2-20.3(A), (B), (C), and (D), the following constitute misdemeanors: illegal possession or transportation of big game and the taking or attempting to take big game during closed season; and selling or attempting to sell big game or parts thereof, except by regulation of the State game commission.\n{24} The evidence against Defendant proved that he transported the head of an elk. The State did not attempt to prove that the elk had been domesticated or was not a free-roaming, wild elk. The evidence was sufficient to charge Defendant with violating the game and fish laws. The Legislature intended the game and fish statutes to apply to Defendant\u2019s actions and did not intend Section 30-18-6 to apply to Defendant\u2019s actions. To the extent the public may be dissatisfied with only misdemeanor punishment for elk head trophy hunting and simultaneous carcass waste, the Legislature may want to consider increasing the penalty under the game and fish laws.\nCONCLUSION\n{25} We hold that Defendant could be convicted, if at all, only under the game and fish laws, and not under Section 30-18-6, for transporting heads of free-roaming, wild elk. We therefore reverse Defendant\u2019s convictions.\n{26} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Chief Judge and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge.\n. We are not saying that Cleve forecloses any circumstance in which a person's cruelty to a wild game animal can be prosecuted under Section 30-18-1. For example, a person who is not hunting or searching out free-roaming, wild elk might come across an injured elk and treat the animal in a manner proscribed under Section 30-18-1 and not covered under Chapter 17. It may be that such conduct is subject to prosecution under Section 30-18-1.", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.", "John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Sheila Lewis, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2005-NMCA-083 115 P.3d 236\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Calvin PARSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 24,451.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 14, 2005.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.\nJohn Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Sheila Lewis, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0773-01", "first_page_order": 805, "last_page_order": 810 }