{ "id": 2548363, "name": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eddy HINER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Hiner", "decision_date": "2005-06-09", "docket_number": "No. 24,822", "first_page": "154", "last_page": "161", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "138 N.M. 154" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "117 P.3d 960" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2005-NMCA-104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "120 N.M. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "1159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597049 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1428059 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16-17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260668 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827419 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708256 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "927" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15762 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731641 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "1252" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "1253" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "1252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827320 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827421 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 17424 ], "weight": 24, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 22, 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 21, 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0512-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 796, "char_count": 21444, "ocr_confidence": 0.673, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.378143155729211e-08, "percentile": 0.39054535611921776 }, "sha256": "72587e48cebc874538fcb63f5cf67f075b3ea6cedbef741fc337cb1119b7889b", "simhash": "1:ee52e651c30836d9", "word_count": 3536 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:47.861903+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and IRA ROBINSON, Judges." ], "parties": [ "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eddy HINER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\n{1} This ease requires that we address the requirements of a claim for malicious abuse of process. Defendant Eddy Hiner had previously filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Company (SFBC) and its insured, alleging that the insured had driven his vehicle into storage sheds on Hiner\u2019s property, damaging them. SFBC disputed Hiner\u2019s claim and, when the claim was dismissed, filed this action for malicious abuse of process and fraud. Hiner moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, and SFBC now appeals. We hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Hiner had probable cause to file the underlying lawsuit and that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. We therefore affirm.\nBackground\n{2} In the complaint filed in the underlying lawsuit, Hiner alleged that, on January 20, 2001, SFBC\u2019s insured drove into storage buildings on Hiner\u2019s property and then left the scene. Although SFBC disputes the number of buildings that were damaged, it does not dispute that the next day an officer from the Portales Police Department told Hiner that SFBC\u2019s insured was responsible for hitting the storage buildings. It is also undisputed that SFBC and its insured were subsequently dismissed from the underlying lawsuit and another person was named as the defendant. In his motion for summary judgment, Hiner produced the testimony of a police officer who had told Hiner thatSFBC\u2019s insured, and not another person, was responsible for the damage.\n{3} Following the dismissal of SFBC and its insured from the underlying lawsuit, SFBC filed this action against Hiner, alleging malicious abuse of process and fraud. In its amended complaint, SFBC alleged that the morning after the accident occurred, Hiner was informed that a person other than SFBC\u2019s insured was responsible for the damage to his property, but Hiner failed to investigate this information and, instead, demanded payment from SFBC and its insured. SFBC also alleged that Hiner falsely exaggerated the amount of damage that occurred, asserted a claim for punitive damages that was without basis, and failed to disclose the name of the person who had claimed responsibility for the property damage.\n{4} Hiner moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts showed that SFBC had not presented evidence to support all the elements of its claims for malicious abuse of process and fraud, entitling him to judgment as a matter of law. In its response, SFBC argued that disputed issues of material fact remained. The district court agreed with Hiner and granted the motion for summary judgment. The court filed its letter ruling on December 31, 2003. At the time of this ruling, the court appeared unaware that SFBC had filed a motion for partial summary judgment on December 29, 2003. In this motion, SFBC argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on its malicious abuse of process claim based on Hiner\u2019s allegations in the underlying lawsuit that SFBC had acted in bad faith. SFBC also appears to have asked the court to reconsider its ruling granting Hiner\u2019s motion for summary judgment. In its order granting Hiner\u2019s motion for summary judgment, the court denied SFBC\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and its motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.\nSFBC\u2019S Malicious Abuse of Process Claim\n{5} SFBC raises two general issues on appeal: that legal presumptions and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Hiner and that Hiner failed to provide evidence to rebut SFBC\u2019s allegation that he lacked probable cause to sue SFBC directly. The first issue arises from Hiner\u2019s motion for summary judgment and the second from SFBC\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment or to reconsider.\n{6} As the district court stated in its letter ruling, the elements of the tort of malicious abuse of process are:\n(1) the initiation of judicial proceedings against the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) an act by the defendant in the use of process other than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the claim; (3) a primary motive by the defendant in misusing the process to accomplish an illegitimate end; and (4) damages. In short, there must be both a misuse of the power of the judiciary by a litigant and a malicious motive.\nDeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6 17, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. In this case, there was no dispute about the existence of the first element of the tort. Instead, SFBC\u2019s arguments below and on appeal focus on the second element, the actions of Hiner in the underlying process and the evidence showing that those actions rose to the level of a misuse of the power of the judiciary. SFBC does not raise any argument on appeal with regard to its fraud claim, and we consider any argument that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on that claim to be abandoned. See State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, \u00b6 41, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140 (\u201c[Tissues not addressed in an appellant\u2019s brief will be deemed abandoned[.]\u201d).\n{7} In DeVaney, our Supreme Court explained that the second element, misuse of process, can be satisfied in two ways: by a lack of probable cause to file a complaint or by \u201csome irregularity or impropriety suggesting extortion, delay, or harassment.\u201d DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6\u00b6 22, 28, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. But the Court warned that \u201cwe must construe the tort of malicious abuse of process narrowly in order to protect the right of access to the courts.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19. The Court also warned that \u201c[t]he lack of probable cause must be manifest\u201d in order to establish that the filing of a complaint constituted an improper, overt act in the use of process necessary to establish the second element of the tort of malicious abuse of process. Id. \u00b6 22.\n{8} The district court ruled in this case that the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Hiner had probable cause to file the underlying lawsuit and that SFBC had not been able to raise a factual question about any procedural impropriety. The court also denied SFBC\u2019s motions for partial summary judgment and reconsideration. We first address whether the court erred in granting Hiner\u2019s motion for summary judgment and then address whether the court erred in denying SFBC\u2019s motions for partial summary judgment and reconsideration.\nHiner\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment\n{9} \u201cSummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The issue on appeal is whether the [defendant] was entitled to [judgment] as a matter of law. We review these legal questions de novo.\u201d Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, \u00b6 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582 (citation omitted). \u201cA defendant seeking summary-judgment ... bears the initial burden of negating at least one of the essential elements upon which the plaintiffs claims are grounded.\u201d Blauwkamp v. Univ. of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 231, 836 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct.App.1992). Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with admissible evidence to establish each required element of the claim. Id. at 232, 836 P.2d at 1253.\n{10} In arguing that there were legal presumptions in favor of trial on the merits and genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, SFBC raises four sub-issues: (1) that the district court incorrectly evaluated the legal significance of Hiner\u2019s voluntary dismissal of the underlying lawsuit; (2) that probable cause cannot be determined as a matter of law if material issues of fact are in dispute; (3) that material issues of fact existed concerning probable cause to sue SFBC directly; and (4) that factual issues existed as to procedural improprieties or misuse of process. The first three of these sub-issues arise from the court\u2019s determination that Hiner had probable cause to file the underlying lawsuit. The fourth sub-issue arises from the court\u2019s ruling that SFBC had not raised a question of fact over a procedural impropriety.\n(1) Probable Cause\n{11} DeVaney emphasizes that although the filing of a complaint can, in some circumstances, constitute a malicious abuse of process, \u201cthe filing of a proper complaint with probable cause, and without any overt misuse of process, will not subject a litigant to liability for malicious abuse of process, even if it is the result of a malicious motive.\u201d DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6 20, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277.\n{12} It is well-settled that \u201cthe existence of probable cause in the underlying proceeding, that is, whether the facts amount to probable cause, is a question of law\u201d which is to \u201cbe decided by the trial judge.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 24, 41. When \u201cthe essential facts on which the issue of probable cause turns\u201d are not in dispute, the question is one of law and should not be submitted to the jury. Weststar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 2003-NMSC-002, \u00b6 17, 133 N.M. 114, 61 P.3d 823. Therefore, within the context of a malicious abuse of process claim, if the extent of a plaintiffs knowledge in the underlying suit at the time of the initiation of the action is not in dispute, the issue becomes one of law. See id.\n{13} SFBC argues that the question of whether Hiner had probable cause to file the underlying lawsuit should not have been determined as a matter of law because material issues of fact were in dispute surrounding the filing of the complaint and the circumstances leading to its voluntary dismissal. Indeed, DeVaney supports the propositions that \u201csome form of recovery for the original-proceeding plaintiff, is conclusive evidence of the existence of probable cause,\u201d and that dismissal can create an inference of lack of probable cause in some circumstances. Id. \u00b6 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, a dismissal does not create an issue of fact when other undisputed facts establish that probable cause existed to support the underlying lawsuit at the time it was filed. See Weststar Mortgage Corp., 2003-NMSC-002, \u00b6 16, 133 N.M. 114, 61 P.3d 823 (stating that probable cause is to be judged by the facts as they appeared at the time of filing).\n{14} In this case, as the district court determined, there was no factual question because the facts supporting a finding of probable cause at the time the case was filed were undisputed. Hiner produced evidence to support his factual assertion that he had been informed by the police that SFBC\u2019s insured was the person responsible for damaging his property. He produced evidence that the police had told him that another person was not responsible. SFBC did not produce evidence to rebut this testimony, but objected to it on hearsay grounds. The district court did not specifically rule on the issue of whether such a reported conversation was hearsay. However, the district court would not have abused its discretion in ruling that the police officer\u2019s statement was not hearsay because the conversation was not introduced to support its truth, but only to demonstrate that such a conversation had occurred for the purposes of establishing probable cause. See Rule 11 \u2014 801(C) NMRA. Moreover, even if the officer\u2019s statement was hearsay, it still would have been admissible for purposes of establishing probable cause. See Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 106 N.M. 628, 632, 747 P.2d 923, 927 (Ct.App.1987) (stating that \u201ceven hearsay evidence may be used to establish probable cause\u201d).\n{15} We are not persuaded by SFBC\u2019s argument that Weststar Mortgage Corp. supports the assertion that, in addition to Hiner\u2019s knowledge at the time he filed the underlying complaint, a \u201cpanorama\u201d of circumstances was relevant to the question of probable cause and that those facts should have been determined by a jury. As we have discussed, our Supreme Court stated in Weststar Mortgage Corp. that when the plaintiffs extent of knowledge at the time of filing the underlying suit is not in dispute, the question of probable cause is one of law and should not be submitted to the jury. Weststar Mortgage Corp., 2003-NMSC-002, \u00b6 17, 133 N.M. 114, 61 P.3d 823.\n{16} In this case, there was no dispute that Hiner had been told by the police investigating the property damage that SFBC\u2019s insured, and no one else, was responsible, and that SFBC did not meet its burden in disputing these essential facts. Similarly, Hiner\u2019s motives in filing suit are irrelevant if the complaint was supported by probable cause. See DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6 20, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. In light of the undisputed material facts, the district court did not err in ruling that Hiner had probable cause to file his complaint against SFBC\u2019s insured for damages.\n{17} SFBC also argues that the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that Hiner had probable cause to sue SFBC in a direct action for unreasonably denying his claim because SFBC had no contractual relationship with Hiner. SFBC acknowledges that our Supreme Court has recognized that the insurance provider for a tortfeasor may be joined as a necessary party in a case brought pursuant to the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 66-5-201 to 66-5-239 (1978, as amended through 2003). See Raskob v. Sanchez, 1998-NMSC-045, \u00b6 3, 126 N.M. 394, 970 P.2d 580. SFBC argues, however, that a plaintiff under that statute \u201ccould not proceed against the insurer alone.\u201d Martinez v. Reid, 2002-NMSC-015, \u00b6 13, 132 N.M. 237, 46 P.3d 1237. Accordingly, SFBC contends that there was no basis for a direct and independent claim against SFBC for its denial of Hiner\u2019s claim.\n{18} Hiner responds to this argument by noting that our Supreme Court pointed out that since 1984 New Mexico has recognized a private right of action against insurers who engage in unfair claims practices under the Insurance Code. See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, \u00b6 11, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69; see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 59A-16-20 (1997), and \u00a7 59A-16-30 (1990). Moreover, in Hovet, our Supreme Court clarified that its holding in Russell v. Protective Insurance Co., 107 N.M. 9, 14, 751 P.2d 693, 698 (1988), recognizes a direct cause of action for unfair insurance practices for third-party claimants. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, \u00b6 17, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69. Based on our Supreme Court\u2019s determination in Hovet that the reasoning of Russell was applicable in insurance contexts other than workers\u2019 compensation and on the narrow construct of the tort of malicious abuse of process, DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6 19, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277, it was not an abuse of process for Hiner to file a direct action against the insurance company. See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, \u00b6\u00b6 16-17, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69.\n{19} SFBC also argues that Hiner did not argue that his claim arose under the Insurance Code and that, even if it does, the Insurance Code permits such an action only when \u201cliability has become reasonably clear.\u201d See \u2022\u00a7 59A-16-20(E). SFBC argues that in this case the complaint and amended complaint make no such allegation. Instead, SFBC suggests that the contested facts did not establish probable cause for the claim. We disagree. Probable cause does not require certainty; it requires \u201cthe reasonable belief, founded on known facts established after a reasonable [pre-trial] investigation, that a claim can be established to the satisfaction of a court or jury.\u201d DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6 22, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277 (citation and footnote omitted). At the time Hiner filed his complaint, based on the information given to him by the Portales Police Department, it was reasonable for him to believe SFBC\u2019s insured was the party responsible for the damage to Hiner\u2019s property-\n{20} We acknowledge that our Supreme Court stated that any \u201caction for unfair claims practices based on failure to settle may only be filed after the conclusion of the underlying negligence litigation, and after there has been a judicial determination of fault in favor of the third party and against the insured.\u201d Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, \u00b6 25, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69. However, because Hovet was filed after the commencement of the underlying lawsuit in this case, the requirement of a separate lawsuit does not demonstrate a lack of probable cause to file suit at the time the underlying lawsuit was filed. We therefore hold that the district court did not err when it determined that Hiner had probable cause to file his complaint in the underlying lawsuit.\n(2) Procedural Impropriety\n{21} SFBC also argues, relying on DeVaney, that even if Hiner was able to establish probable cause to file his complaint, factual issues remained regarding procedural improprieties or misuse of the process that precluded summary judgment. See DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6\u00b6 21, 28, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. SFBC argued below that evidence of Hiner\u2019s failure to disclose the name of the person who had told him he might be responsible for the damage to SFBC in answers to interrogatories, to the Texas Department of Insurance, to the insurance adjusters, to the district attorney\u2019s office, and during the course of the underlying litigation, constitutes evidence of procedural impropriety sufficient to cause a question of fact. In its supplemental response to Hiner\u2019s motion for summary judgment, SFBC also argued that Hiner made an exaggerated claim for damages. The district court ruled as a matter of law that these allegations were not sufficiently outrageous to create a question of fact about whether a procedural impropriety had occurred.\n{22} On appeal, SFBC argues that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining that only outrageous conduct could establish a procedural impropriety. SFBC contends that the district court was weighing facts, which was inappropriate on summary judgment. SFBC also suggests that Hiner\u2019s letter to the Texas Department of Insurance and claim filed against an insurance company could be viewed as extortion. In his answer brief, Hiner points out that it was undisputed that SFBC did not view the letter to the Department of Insurance as extortion or harassment, noting in its communications with the Department that Hiner had been patient in waiting for his claim to be processed. In addition, Hiner argues that his lawsuit and inquiries were based entirely on information he received from the Portales Police Department.\n{23} The letter to the Texas Department of Insurance does not constitute legal process. See Weststar Mortgage Corp., 2003-NMSC-002, \u00b6 21, 133 N.M. 114, 61 P.3d 823 (stating that \u201ca report to the authorities of possible criminal activity is not legal process and neither are the pre-trial investigative actions of the police\u201d). Moreover, as our Supreme Court explained in DeVaney, extortion consists of \u201cusing the process to put pressure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt or to take some other action or refrain from it.\u201d DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, \u00b6 28, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, Hiner did not apply pressure to compel the payment of a different debt. He initiated the lawsuit to compel a payment that he believed was an unpaid debt. See id. \u00b6 30 (stating that one example of improper purpose is the initiation of proceedings \u201cprimarily for the purpose of inducing settlement in an unrelated proceeding\u201d). SFBC did not produce evidence to show that Hiner\u2019s purpose in failing to mention the name of a person the police had said was not connected to the damage to his property was to induce settlement in an unrelated proceeding. Thus, we find no error in the district court\u2019s determination that SFBC had not met its burden of raising a factual issue as to whether Hiner had committed a procedural impropriety.\nSFBC\u2019s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment\n{24} SFBC also argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for partial summary judgment, in which SFBC argued that Hiner lacked probable cause to sue SFBC directly. Although a defendant who moves for summary judgment has only to negate one of the essential elements of the claim, see Blauwkamp, 114 N.M. at 231, 836 P.2d at 1252, a plaintiff who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to each element of the claim. See Mayfield Smithson Enters. v. ComQuip, Inc., 120 N.M. 9, 12, 896 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1995). Thus, in order to prevail, SFBC had the burden of proving, along with the other elements of malicious abuse of process, that Hiner lacked probable cause to sue SFBC directly.\n{25} In light of our earlier determination that Hiner had probable cause to file the underlying lawsuit, we affirm the district court\u2019s denial of SFBC\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment.\nConclusion\n{26} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court\u2019s grant of Hiner\u2019s motion for summary judgment and the court\u2019s denial of SFBC\u2019s motions for partial summary judgment and reconsideration.\n{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and IRA ROBINSON, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy Knudson, Doerr & Knudson, P.A., Portales, NM, for Appellant.", "Eric D. Dixon, Attorney and Counselor at Law, P.A., Portales, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2005-NMCA-104\n117 P.3d 960\nSOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eddy HINER, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 24,822.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 9, 2005.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 29,305, Aug. 5, 2005.\nRandy Knudson, Doerr & Knudson, P.A., Portales, NM, for Appellant.\nEric D. Dixon, Attorney and Counselor at Law, P.A., Portales, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0154-01", "first_page_order": 186, "last_page_order": 193 }