{ "id": 2548472, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Ray PRATT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pratt", "decision_date": "2005-06-14", "docket_number": "No. 24,387", "first_page": "161", "last_page": "164", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "138 N.M. 161" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "117 P.3d 967" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2005-NMCA-099" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2003-NMCA-147", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77175 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "850 F.2d 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1792801 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/850/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C. \u00a7 802", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(15)" }, { "page": "(22)" }, { "page": "(22)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563445 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575545 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" }, { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" }, { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-104", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224649 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10, 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257777 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 5-6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0667-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 10777, "ocr_confidence": 0.686, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0820555561347399 }, "sha256": "e0383be1ec422339f2713b0cef62b463f11aa3ec4914eac4b8b39fca1e7d9ab9", "simhash": "1:dc4884645d490d19", "word_count": 1677 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:47.861903+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: LYNN PICKARD and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Ray PRATT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\n{1} Defendant appeals his conviction of trafficking psilocybin mushrooms by manufacture contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-31-20(A)(1) (1990) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-31-1 to 30-31-41 (1972, as amended through 2002). He argues that his conviction should be reversed because the legislature did not intend to punish the act of growing mushrooms as \u201cmanufactur[ing]\u201d when it enacted Section 30-31-20(A)(l). We agree and reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction. Because we find the Section 30-31-20(A)(l) issue dispositive, we do not reach the other issues Defendant raises on appeal.\nFactual and Procedural History\n{2} The facts are not in dispute. On June 6, 2002, police, on information obtained from a confidential informant, obtained and executed a search warrant on Defendant\u2019s home. Throughout the house, they found glass mason jars containing psilocybin mushrooms at varying stages of maturity. Some of the jars had psilocybin spores growing on top of a rice cake mixture. The officers also found syringes filled with spores, which were allegedly used to inoculate the rice cake mixture. In the kitchen, the officers found a white styrofoam cooler containing a \u201cbubbling apparatus,\u201d which was apparently used by Defendant as a humidifier for growing the psilocybin mushrooms. The machine was \u201cturned on and pumping\u201d when the officers found it. The officers also found \u201crecipes\u201d with instructions on growing psilocybin mushrooms. A message was written on the cooler stating \u201cRemember to be patient!!!! Pinning might take a few weeks.\u201d\n{3} After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking psilocybin mushrooms by manufacture and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant does not appeal the possession conviction. We will address the remaining facts as they pertain to the issue on appeal.\nApplicability of Section 30-31-20(A)(l)\n{4} The State argues that Defendant \u201cmanufacture[dj\u201d psilocybin mushrooms by growing them artificially using special equipment. Defendant, relying primarily on our holding in State v. Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, \u00b6 17, 127 N.M. 667, 986 P.2d 463, argues that the mushrooms \u201cwere in a natural state of mushroomness\u201d when they were seized by police and that \u201cassisting a growing plant or a fungus by providing [a] growing medium and water\u201d is not \u201cmanufacture\u201d as proscribed by Section 30-31-20(A)(1).\n{5} The question of whether Defendant\u2019s conduct of artificially growing psilocybin mushrooms falls within the ambit of Section 30-31-20(A)(l) is a legal question subject to de novo review. See State v. Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, \u00b6 6, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801; Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, \u00b6 17, 127 N.M. 667, 986 P.2d 463. When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, \u00b6 7, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801. \u201cWe do this by giving-effect to the plain meaning of the words of [the] statute, unless this leads to an absurd or unreasonable result.\u201d Id.\n{6} The CSA prohibits, as intentional trafficking, the \u201cmanufacture of any controlled substance enumerated in Schedules I through V or any controlled substance analog as defined in Subsection W of Section 30-31-2.\u201d Section 30-31-20(A)(1). \u201cManufacture\u201d is defined in Section 30-31-2(M) in relevant part as:\nthe production, preparation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog by extraction from substances of natural origin or independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container.\n{7} Section 30-31-20(A)(l) is silent as to its applicability to the act of artificially growing psilocybin mushrooms. However, Shaulis-Powell is instructive in deciding this issue. In Shaulis-Powell, one defendant was convicted of violating Section 30-31-20(A)(1) by growing eight marijuana plants in his yard. Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 5-6, 127 N.M. 667, 986 P.2d 463. In reversing that defendant\u2019s conviction for trafficking by manufacture, we stated that \u201c[t]he plain meaning of \u2018manufacture\u2019 does not include simply growing marijuana. Without more, growing marijuana does not constitute manufacture.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19.\n{8} The State seeks to distinguish Shaulis-Powell on its facts by arguing that: (1) mushrooms are different from marijuana plants, which were at issue in Shaulis-Powell, and (2) the mushrooms found in Defendant\u2019s possession were not in their natural state. See id. (noting that the marijuana plants seized from the defendant \u201cwere growing in their natural state\u201d). In making these arguments, the State relies primarily on the testimony at trial of its expert witness.\n{9} The witness, a forensic scientist with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Forensic Science Laboratory, testified that \u201cMushrooms are fungi, and so they are different from plants [in] that they don\u2019t have seeds; they have spores that they start out with____ [S]pores are ... the seeds of the mushroom; they\u2019re the reproductive cells.\u201d The witness also stated that the four stages that make up the life cycle of the mushroom are the spores, the mycelium, the primordia, and the mature fruit. The witness detailed an experiment she conducted in an attempt to duplicate the process Defendant used to grow psilocybin mushrooms. She prepared a substrate using distilled water, brown rice powder, and vermiculite. She placed this mixture into glass jars and inoculated the substrate with psilocybin mushroom spores she purchased legally from an advertisement in High Times Magazine. The witness stated that the mushroom spores were legal because they did not contain psilocybin. However, she detected psilocybin at the \u201cmycelium knot\u201d stage of mushroom development during her experiment. The witness also stated that the process is labor intensive, and, if not followed carefully, the mushrooms will not grow. Based on this evidence, the State argues that Defendant \u201cmanufactured\u201d mushrooms as defined by Section 30-31-20(A)(1) and Section 30-31-2(M).\n{10} Although Shaulis-Powell noted that the marijuana plants at issue \u201cwere growing in their natural state when the officers seized them,\u201d we based our holding in the case on the statutory definition of \u201cmanufacture.\u201d Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, \u00b6 19, 127 N.M. 667, 986 P.2d 463. We stated that \u201c[e]ven if growing marijuana could be considered \u2018production\u2019 under the statute, \u2018production\u2019 is modified by the phrase \u2018by extraction from substances of natural origin or independently by means of chemical synthesis.\u2019 \u201d Id. The same statutory analysis applies in this case. We do not agree with the State that Defendant\u2019s actions met the chemical synthesis requirement of \u201cmanufacture\u201d by \u201c[u]sing a specialized process [thereby manufacturing] illegal ... mushrooms from the legal spores ... received in the mail.\u201d This argument is controverted by the State\u2019s own expert witness who testified that \u201cspores are ... the seeds of the mushroom\u201d and that the drug was produced naturally in the mushrooms at the mycelium knot stage. Because there is no evidence that Defendant engaged in \u201cextraction from substances of natural origin or ... chemical synthesis\u201d as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, \u00b6\u00b6 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so \u201cwould impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written\u201d).\n{11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (recognizing that the CSA is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar), overruled on other grounds by State v. Olguin, 118 N.M. 91, 98, 879 P.2d 92, 99 (Ct.App.1994). The federal act, in pertinent part, proscribes any person from knowingly or intentionally manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing \u201cwith intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.\u201d 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1). Its definitional section, which is virtually identical to Section 30-31-2(M), defines \u201cmanufacture\u201d in pertinent part as:\nthe production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or other substance, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of such substance or labeling or relabeling of its container.\n21 U.S.C. \u00a7 802(15) (2000). However, the federal act specifically includes a separate definition of \u201cproduction\u201d as the \u201cplanting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.\u201d 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 802(22); see also United States v. Klein, 850 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir.1988) (affirming the defendant\u2019s conviction of the \u201cmanufacture\u201d of marijuana when the defendant grew ninety-four marijuana plants in the basement of his home using fluorescent lights, light fixtures, a heater, planting pots, and soil testing equipment). Because the CSA is patterned after the federal act, we believe the legislature acted intentionally when it omitted a similar definition of \u201cproduction,\u201d criminalizing as manufacture the \u201cplanting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance,\u201d from the CSA. 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 802(22); see also State v. Bennett, 2003-NMCA-147, \u00b6 11, 134 N.M. 705, 82 P.3d 72 (\u201cWe presume that the legislature knows the law when enacting a statute.\u201d).\nConclusion\n{12} Because Defendant\u2019s conduct did not fall within the ambit of Section 30 \u2014 31\u2014 20(A)(1), we reverse his conviction. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{13} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: LYNN PICKARD and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Patricia Gandert, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.", "John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Cordelia A. Friedman, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2005-NMCA-099\n117 P.3d 967\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Ray PRATT, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 24,387.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 14, 2005.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 29,322, Aug. 4, 2005.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Patricia Gandert, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.\nJohn Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Cordelia A. Friedman, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0161-01", "first_page_order": 193, "last_page_order": 196 }